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Abstract 
This thesis examines how middle class Pakistani young people construct contemporary 
international conflicts. Little previous research has been conducted in this area, and 
none in Pakistan. This investigation is of interest because young people like the ones 
who participated in my research may become future leaders. Therefore, their 
perceptions and understanding of these issues may influence the way these are 
addressed in the future.  
This thesis draws on literature about the just war tradition – what are the just causes 
of war or jus ad bellum and how ethical warfare must be conducted or jus in bello. The 
theoretical framework used is that of social constructionism, especially drawing on the 
ideas of Jonathan Potter, Margaret Wetherell, Kenneth Gergen and Michel Foucault. 
The research involved six focus groups with Pakistani young people aged 17-18 years.  
The study found that the participants talked enthusiastically about issues related to 
international conflicts. They drew on a range of discourses and evidence to construct 
their arguments, some of which were grounded in not very reliable evidence. They 
argued that terrorism, whether perpetrated by state or non-state actors, was wrong, 
and they were highly critical of US policies and actions in the wider world. 
These findings are important because Pakistani society faces a serious challenge from 
militancy and terrorism. The thesis suggests that changes to the content and delivery 
of school curricula can help young people to develop a more informed and morally 
active sense of citizenship and world affairs. 
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1 Introduction 
This thesis investigates how middle class Pakistani young people construct 
contemporary international conflicts. In order to do this, I examined how they made 
sense of what was happening in the world around them against the backdrop of the 
September 11, 2001 attacks on the US, and I explored the discourses they drew on to 
construct their understanding of some aspects of the international conflicts prevailing 
at the time when the fieldwork for this study was carried out.  
This study is important because little research has been conducted anywhere focusing 
on young people’s constructions of international conflicts. Moreover, no comparable 
study has been done in Pakistan. Since the fateful attacks on the Pentagon and the 
World Trade Centre in 2001, Pakistan became a key player in the so called ‘war on 
terror’ initiated and led by the US government. The implications of the ‘war on terror’ 
have been momentous for the Pakistani state, polity and people.  
The education system in Pakistan is a highly stratified one, comprising three main tiers 
– state schools, private schools and the madrassas (religious seminaries). Most middle 
class Pakistani children attend private schools. State schools are mainly attended by 
working class children. The madrassas predominantly enrol children from poor, rural 
households in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Punjab provinces. Most private school 
children go into higher education within Pakistan as well as overseas, including the UK 
and the USA. Many of these young people, after completing their studies, go into 
important middle class occupations like the civil service, army, medicine, engineering, 
banking and business. It would then be reasonable to say that young people attending 
private schools go on to occupy strategic roles in Pakistani society. Therefore, it is 
important to understand their perspective on the world conflicts that dominated the 
first decade of the 21st century and continue to do so at the time of writing of this 
thesis. 
None of the three systems of education prevalent in the country offer young people 
opportunities to study and discuss contemporary issues in citizenship, politics and 
history. In both private and state schools, young people take Pakistan Studies as a 
compulsory subject. The Pakistan Studies curriculum combines elements of geography, 
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history of the Indo-Pak Subcontinent and the Pakistan Movement. The Pakistan Studies 
textbooks are either prescribed or approved by the government textbook boards. One 
of the significant foci of these textbooks (e.g. Khan, 2004; Rabbani, 2009) is the ‘two 
nation theory’, which is offered as the raison d’être for the creation of Pakistan in 
1947. As a result, the textbooks emphasise the Islamic identity of the Pakistani state 
and its people, present India as the hostile ‘other’, and extol the country’s military. 
This excessive preoccupation with religious nationalism leaves hardly any curricular 
space for discussion of citizenship; contemporary political and economic issues 
confronting the Pakistani state; and its role within regional geopolitics and the wider 
globalised world. This study aims to investigate young people’s constructions of 
contemporary geopolitics and international conflicts. Given the serious challenges 
faced by the Pakistani state and society, devising a citizenship curriculum that prepares 
students, who are expected to take-on important strategic roles in the country, to 
engage with various national and international challenges appears imperative. Berg, 
Graeffe and Holden (2003) highlight the importance of the citizenship curriculum in 
helping children and young people learn about controversial issues; international 
conflicts, according to the definition that they use, fall within the ambit such issues. It 
has also been argued that school curricula can play a strategic role in addressing issues 
of extremism that lead to various forms of violence, including terrorism (Davies, 2005; 
Durrani and Dunne, 2010). It is envisaged that the findings of this study will provide 
useful insights for devising an appropriate citizenship curriculum for Pakistani schools. 
This study is significant from another perspective. Traditionally, in Pakistan, like many 
other parts of the world, the notion of child is taken unproblematically as referring to a 
young human being who is both physically and psychology immature. Consequently, 
childhood is seen as a state of becoming – a journey towards adulthood. As such, 
children are conceived as having certain needs, which ‘are at the heart of 
contemporary public concern, part of the everyday vocabulary of countless numbers of 
social welfare workers and teachers, policy makers and parents’ (Woodhead, 1997: 
63). To a very significant extent, these ‘needs’ of the child are met through the 
curricular provision in schools, conceived and organised by adult professionals whose 
thinking is guided by ‘what is desirable for the child’ (Woodhead, 1997: 66). However, 
there is little, if any, effort made to solicit the views of the children themselves. 
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Departing from this adult-centric perspective, this study aims to understand some key 
issues related to international conflicts from the young people’s own perspectives. As 
such, this study subscribes to the belief that ‘children’s social relationships and 
cultures are worthy of study in their own right, and not just in respect to their social 
construction by adults’ (James and Prout, 1997: 4).  
The above mentioned commitment of this study to recognise young people’s agency 
and giving them a voice of their own is located within the new sociology of childhood 
which in turn can be located within the wider perspective of social constructionism in 
social sciences (James and Prout, 1997). Chapter two of this thesis will discuss and 
explain some key tenets of social constructionism which form the ontological and 
epistemological backdrop for this research. While doing so, it will especially focus on 
the notion of discourse and the way it has been employed in the context of this thesis.  
Since this thesis studies middle class, Pakistani young people’s constructions of their 
understanding of international conflicts, it was important to identify and analyse some 
of the possible key discourses that would have been available to them and which they 
might have drawn upon while discussing these. Therefore, chapter three focuses on 
some important discourses related to international conflicts and wars. Arguing from a 
social constructionist perspective, this chapter eschews any definite, fixed and stable 
notions and principles underpinning inter-state conflicts and wars. Instead, it presents 
some key discourses related to the just causes of war or jus ad bellum and the just 
conduct of war or jus in bello.  
Chapter 4 discusses the research design for this study. The research was carried using 
the qualitative paradigm. The ontological and epistemological bases of the study are 
informed by the wider theoretical perspective of social constructionism (Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987; Gergen, 2001, 1999/2009a, 2009b; Burr 1995 and 2003). Rather than 
aiming to provide generalisable findings that would relate to all young Pakistani 
people, the study presents insights that are specific to its context – the sites where the 
research was conducted and the young people who participated in it. Therefore, all 
conclusions drawn and claims made in this thesis are located and contingent. I 
recognise that if the research had been carried out in different schools, the outcomes 
might not have been the same. For example, one of the schools where the fieldwork 
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was carried out was located in Rawalpindi, close to headquarters of the Pakistan army 
and it is likely that many of the research participants had close relatives serving in the 
armed forces. As a result of this, their constructions would have been significantly 
affected by this close connection with this powerful national institution.  
Moreover, my own personal and professional history must also have impacted on the 
research. I grew up in a middle class Pakistani family, with close connections to the civil 
service of Pakistan. I have worked throughout my professional career in the education 
sector across the age range. I worked as the headteacher and principal in schools quite 
similar to those where the fieldwork for this research was carried out. My early life 
experiences as well as my academic and professional background played an important 
role in shaping my world view, which in turn had a significant influence on the choice 
of my research topic and the way I designed and executed the study and, very 
importantly, on the way I interpreted the data. I believe that interpretation of data is a 
creative process and is the result of a complex interaction between the information 
gathered and the person of the researcher.  The data was collected through six focus 
groups with 17-18 year old young people. These were conducted in four schools within 
the twin cities of Islamabad and Rawalpindi between 2005 and 2008.  
The data was analysed using a ‘thematic framework’ (Ritchie, Spencer and O’Connor 
2003: 220). Key issues related to the main focus of the research, were identified and 
used to code the data; they structured the first stage of the analysis. Subsequently, I 
reviewed the use of various discourses used to discuss contemporary international 
conflicts, which are set out in chapter three.  
Chapter five looks at the participants’ constructions of Pakistan – the country where 
they lived and studied at the time when this research was carried out. This was 
important because Pakistan formed the central reference point for them for 
understanding the wider world and various inter-state conflicts. Chapter six then 
analyses the participants’ constructions of the wider world. This chapter gives an 
insight into the participants’ perceptions of the world and the relationships of nation 
states with each other. 
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Chapter seven, eight and nine focus on international conflicts discussed by the 
participants: Pakistan-India hostilities; the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United 
States of America; and the subsequent US led ‘war on terror’.  
Finally chapter ten summarises the findings, reflects on the research process, and 
considers implications both for education (for example, the need to develop 
citizenship curricula for Pakistani schools that would equip students to take up some of 
the complex challenges in a paradoxically integrated yet polarised world) and for 
future research.   
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2 Social Constructionism and Discourse 
My research is about middle class Pakistani young people’s construction of 
contemporary international conflicts. I am focussing on ‘constructing’ rather than 
‘knowing’ because the former represents a dynamic process whereby people actively 
engage in making sense of the world around them. This is in contrast to knowing 
something which has a connotation of internalisation of an authentic description of 
how the world is. The theoretical perspective that I have drawn in this study is that of 
social constructionism (Berger and Luckman, 1966; Potter and Wetherell, 1987; 
Edwards & Potter, 1992; Shotter, 1993; Gergen, 2001, 1999/2009a, 2009b, 2011; 
Wetherell, 2001; Burr, 1995, 2003).   
In this chapter, I will begin by briefly delineating the somewhat disparate origins and 
fluid boundaries of social constructionism as a theoretical perspective. After this, I will 
present my case for using the terms ‘constructing’ rather than ‘knowing’ in my 
research. 
Subsequently, I will present a critique of the human subject as traditionally conceived 
within social sciences, especially psychology and sociology. I will offer an alternative 
account of the subject drawing on theorists and writers that either classify themselves 
as social constructionist or whose ideas have been formative for this perspective 
(Berger and Luckman, 1966; Bakhtin, 1986; Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Billig et al., 
1988; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Shotter, 1993; Gergen, 2001, 1999/2009a, 2009b, 2011; 
Wetherell, 2001; Burr, 1995, 2003). After presenting a social constructionist take on 
the human subject, I will briefly problematize the common-sense, hegemonic 
conception of human knowledge which is steeped in the Enlightenment worldview 
(Berger and Luckman, 1966; Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Shotter, 1993; Gergen, 
1999/2009a, 2009b; Burr, 1995, 2003; Zhen, 2010). I offer an alternative perspective 
that I have referred to as relational epistemology, which speaks of knowledge in terms 
of socially constructed and located accounts or versions, instead of ‘authentic’ 
representations of ‘reality’. 
After sketching out an alternative epistemology, I will outline the notion of discourse 
that has been widely used by writers of a social constructionist orientation. This is 
followed by an analysis of the idea of discourse as developed by the French 
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poststructuralist philosopher, Michel Foucault (1970, 1980a, 1980b, 1980c, 
1966/1989a, 1969/1989b). I will conclude the chapter by engaging with the realism 
versus relativism debate in the context of social constructionism. I will outline the 
implications of the critique of relativism, levelled against social constructionism, for 
curriculum development, pedagogy and social research, especially in the context of my 
research.  
2.1 Origins of Social Constructionism 
Social Constructionism is a theoretical perspective, which neither has a clear point of 
origin nor a sharp boundary that differentiates it from what it is not (Burr, 1995; 
Gergen, 1999/2009a). Notwithstanding the relatively fluid origin and somewhat porous 
boundaries, over the course of past few decades, social constructionism has emerged 
as a distinct and significant orientation within the social sciences. Its origins can be 
best located in the unease among some social scientists around the middle of the 
twentieth century about the way their respective disciplines were organised (Burr, 
1995, 2003; Hosking and Morley, 2004). Hosking and Morley (2004: 318) located the 
origin of the perspective in the so called ‘crisis in social psychology’. However, some of 
the key ideas that got incorporated into the perspective came from beyond the 
disciplinary boundaries of social sciences. For example, Mikhail Bakhtin whose ideas 
have influenced social constructionism (Shotter, 1993; Gergen, 2001, 1999/2009a,) 
was a literary critic and semiotician. Another figure whose ideas have been formative 
for the perspective is Ludwig Wittgenstein – an Austrian philosopher of language 
(Potter and Wetherell 1987; Shotter, 1993; Burr, 1995; Gergen, 2001, 1999/2009a).  
The term social constructionism was first formally used by Peter Berger and Thomas 
Luckmann in their seminal book The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the 
Sociology of Knowledge (1966).  Berger and Luckmann both were sociologists. Kenneth 
Gergen, an influential social constructionist writer, trained as a social psychologist. 
Similarly, John Shotter, Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell, who have written 
extensively on social constructionism, have academic and professional backgrounds in 
social psychology.  
Thus, theorists and writers who have contributed to social constructionism have come 
from a diverse range of backgrounds. For the purpose of my thesis, I have drawn on a 
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range of writers some of whom acknowledged themselves as social constructionists 
and others who did not. However, all of them contributed ideas which have some 
relevance and affinity with the perspective that is broadly referred to as social 
constructionism in social sciences. In other words, the ideas that I have drawn on, 
share what Burr (1995: 2) refers to as a ‘family resemblance’.  Based on these 
resemblances and relevance for my study, I have grouped these ideas under the title of 
social constructionism.  
2.2 Constructing Rather than Knowing the World 
Traditionally empirical studies have focused on what people know – almost a case of 
getting into the minds of participants and finding what lies there. However, social 
constructionism has questioned this tendency in social scientific research and 
problematized the possibility of ‘discovering’ what a person might ‘know’. Social 
constructionism posits that when people speak instead of communicating what they 
know, they actively construct their accounts (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Bakhtin, 
1986; Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Shotter, 1993; Gergen, 1999/2009a, 2009b; Burr, 
1995, 2003). This assertion has significant implications for social research, including 
mine. 
The term ‘construct’ implies that people actively create and build versions of the 
world, using linguistic resources available to them. Therefore, any account of a specific 
event or phenomenon is actually a version, implying that there are other, at times 
competing, accounts of issues at hand (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). Whenever people 
speak to describe another person, group of people, an event or a phenomenon, their 
speech is never merely descriptive; their ‘accounts’ do not merely reflect what they 
know. Each account is a specific construction and presents the object of speech in a 
certain way. Sometimes people construct their accounts consciously and on other 
occasions less self-consciously (Potter & Wetherell, 1987: 34).  
Potter and Wetherell (1987: 32), drawing on the speech act theory of the British 
philosopher John Austin and the notion of indexicality in ethnomethodology argue that 
people often ‘use their language to do thing’. In other words, language, as employed 
by people in their everyday conversations, often has a specific function. They posit that 
due to the functional nature of people’s speech, there is ‘considerable variation’ in 
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their accounts (Potter and Wetherell, 1987: 33). These accounts vary from one person 
to another and also with the same person at different times in different circumstances. 
As a result of this, variability becomes a significant feature of people’s accounts of the 
world. Traditionally, studies conducted in the social sciences have tried to reduce and 
contain variability in accounts by using standardized questionnaires and creating finite 
and relatively inflexible categories to classify people’s responses (Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987). Commenting on the variability of accounts, Potter and Wetherell 
(1987: 33) write: 
In general, we find that if talk is orientated to many different functions, global 
and specific, any examination of language over time reveals considerable 
variation. 
(emphasis in original) 
According to Potter and Wetherell (1987), the variability in accounts is due to the fact 
that people’s speech is never merely descriptive, it is always functional. For them 
‘functionality’ is a fundamental quality of people’s speech. Whenever we construct 
something – for example a house – it is rarely done without a specific purpose. We 
build a house because we might want to provide for ourselves and our family members 
a protected space to live in. Therefore, the term construction connotes purpose or 
function – the overt activity, speaking, almost always aims to achieve something. 
Because at different times, people want to achieve different ends and purposes, there 
is variation in their speech. Examples of purpose in people’s talk can include 
persuading, appeasing, scoring points, justifying one’s actions, apportioning 
responsibility or blame, and preparing the ground for a future course of action.  
The factors that influence the variability in people’s accounts can include: 
a) availability of different cultural, linguistic, religious, social and political 
resources;    
b) the nature and extent of investment or stake in the topic of the conversation; 
c) different audiences; 
d) social contexts; 
e) self-presentation; 
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f) the lack of fixed and straightforward correspondence between the words, 
terms and concepts and the aspects or objects of the external world, the 
former purport to represent. 
The above is not an exhaustive list but it highlights some important reasons for the 
variability in people’s accounts of the events, phenomena, objects and categories of 
the world. People inhabit different, cultural, linguistic, religious, social and political 
frameworks, which inevitably affect the way they construct the accounts of the world. 
Making a similar point, Bakhtin (1986: 88) writes: 
In each epoch, in each social circle, in each small world of family, friends, 
acquaintances, and comrades in which a human being grows and lives, there 
are always authoritative utterances that set the tone—artistic, scientific, and 
journalistic works on which one relies, to which one refers, which are cited, 
imitated, and followed. 
Thus, when people describe events as being either good or bad, their accounts are 
contingent on the cultural, social, religious and political resources available to them 
and as such their accounts are at best provisional, which sanitise and iron out other 
versions. The cultural, social, religious and political investments create for people what 
Potter (cited in Wetherell, 2001: 21) refers to as ‘stake’. For example, the claim by 
President Bush and his government that the attacks on the twin towers were driven by 
a warped and evil ideology is one possible way of describing these acts. The 
perpetrators and people in sympathy with them saw these as acts of resistance against 
and retribution for a country that trampled the rights of other peoples and nations. A 
person speaking from either of these perspectives can be seen as constructing a 
specific account that would serve to make his/her position appear reasonable and 
tenable. Their respective accounts would have been influenced by their specific life 
histories and the resultant stake in their respective ways of interpreting these events. 
The accounts of both these groups of people constitute a ‘provisional analysis of 
reality’ which they come to ‘regard … as final’ (Whorf, 1956: 263). The proponents of 
both these positions would present their respective accounts as authentic – 
representing the world as it actually is (Whorf, 1956). However, beneath the surface of 
this moral certitude there is actually a spectrum of competing positions from which the 
speaker chooses the position that s/he espouses.   
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Similarly, the same people would construct their positions differently in different social 
circumstances, depending on who their audience is. For example, young people, like 
the ones who participated in my research, would not speak in the same way, drawing 
on the same linguistic resources, within their group of friends as they would with their 
parents or in the presence of their teachers and members of their school leadership 
team. Thus, the sense of audience is another factor that leads to variability in people’s 
accounts. 
When people talk they often try to present a certain image of themselves in front of 
their audience (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell, 2001). By doing this, they create 
what Wetherell (2001: 23) refers to as ‘subject positions’. Consider the following 
excerpt from President Obama’s address to the nation on Syria made on September 
10, 2013 (Obama, 2013):  
I have resisted calls for military action because we cannot resolve someone 
else's civil war through force, particularly after a decade of war in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  
Notwithstanding the fact that President Obama was one of those few world leaders 
who had been strongly in favour of military action against the government of President 
Bashar Al Assad, in the above excerpt, he can be seen as trying to present an image of 
himself as a president who has been reluctant to resort to force to settle international 
issues.   
Billig et al. (1988) posit that human thinking is essentially dilemmatic and our common-
sense ways of describing the world are frequently conflicting and contradictory. 
Therefore, when a person speaks, his/her speech is the culmination of internal and 
external debates and reflects conscious or unconscious choices that s/he has made. 
Therefore, people’s speech is rarely a collection of ‘mere labels which neutrally 
package up the world’ (Billig et al. 1988: 16). Harris (1981) also challenges the idea that 
our language unproblematically conveys meanings that are universal and inhere in the 
objects and for which our words are merely transparent labels. He says this creates the 
‘language myth’ based on the ‘determinacy fallacy’ which makes us believe that we 
‘use the ‘same words’ to express the ‘same ideas’ supplied by Nature’ (Harris, 1981: 
10). Thus, in many instances the variability of accounts is due to the fact that our use 
of language to describe the objects, events and phenomena of the external world does 
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transparently communicate reality. For example, the movement of resistance against 
the British rule in India in 1857 was referred to as ‘mutiny’ by the British government 
and ‘war of independence’ by the indigenous people. Therefore, the accounts of these 
events of 1857 in India varied tremendously depending who was speaking – a Hindu 
nationalist, a Muslim nationalist or a British administrator. 
Shotter (1993: 28) argues that human language can be better understood as a 
‘rhetorical-responsive’ system instead of a ‘referential-representational’ one. The 
latter refers to the traditional view of language as a transparent medium that 
unproblematically represents the external world. The former, on the other hand, 
presents a much more dynamic, albeit less straightforward, take on language. It 
implies that language is a rhetorical device used by people to create certain effects and 
thereby persuade others of their viewpoints. Therefore, as discussed above, when 
people speak about an issue, rather than communicating what they ‘know’, they 
actively construct their versions to perform certain functions.  
In the context of my thesis, this rhetorical function of language is pertinent. When 
politicians speak about international affairs, especially in the context of conflicts, their 
speech constructs a specific version of events rather than presenting the facts 
(Edwards and Potter, 1992).  For example, in his address to the joint session of the 
Congress, on September 20, 2001, President Bush, giving information about the 
identity of the people who attacked the World Trade Center, said (Bush, 2001a):  ‘They 
are the same murderers indicted for bombing American embassies in Tanzania and 
Kenya, and responsible for bombing the USS Cole.’ From a social constructionist 
perspective, President Bush’s remarks about the identity of the attackers rather than 
presenting the truth are constructing the individuals, who carried out the attacks, in a 
specific way. By using the term ‘murderers’ the president was employing, as argued by 
Edwards and Potter (1992: 160) the strategy of ‘category entitlement’ to construct the 
perpetrators of these actions in a certain way. They are classified as ‘murderers’ – a 
consensual criminal category – who would be expected to carry out such horrific acts. 
Moreover, by positing that the attackers belonged to the same group of people who 
had attacked US interests in the past, President Bush was creating amongst the 
American people a sense of anxiety that would legitimise the use of force to punish 
these ‘murderers’ and prevent their nefarious designs in the future.    
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2.3 From the Epistemic Subject to the Linguistic Self 
In the preceding section, I outlined the social constructionist idea of how people 
through their talk construct accounts and version of events, phenomena and categories 
of the world, which in many cases serve specific functions. Variability is an important 
feature of these accounts. This position is predicated on social constructionism’s 
challenge to the notion of the knowing subject, what Piaget (cited in Hutchings, 1997: 
32) referred to as the ‘epistemic’ subject.  Social constructionism’s radical view of the 
human subject is important for my thesis because it leads to a very different way of 
understanding what the participants of my research said during the focus group 
sessions.  
The rational, rule governed, unitary epistemic subject has been the lynchpin of 
traditional social psychology (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). It also forms one pole of the 
Enlightenment ‘individual-society’ (Henriques et al., 1984) or the subject-object 
dualism. The modern conception of the epistemic subject is driven by the assumption 
that the human subject is a self-contained entity, like other objects of the natural 
world (Potter and Wetherell, 1987).  
Traditional psychology assumes that through the application of rigorous methods, the 
inner kernel of the human subject can be reached, studied and authentically theorised 
(Henriques et al., 1984; Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Shotter, 1993; Burr, 1995, 2003). 
The human subject is taken as the autonomous and self-sufficient unit, distinct from 
other human subjects and the world. S/he is the initiator of experience and is capable 
of objectively observing and knowing the world. This self-contained unit, the epistemic 
subject, is in distinct contrast with the world and other individuals and as such forms 
the basis of the subject-object binary epitomised in the Cartesian statement cogito 
ergo sum. However, social constructionism disrupts this clear and neat binary and the 
notion of the self-contained, unitary human subject, positing it as much more labile, ad 
hoc and enmeshed in a profusion of relationships (Bakhtin, 1986; Shotter, 1993; 
Gergen, 2009b).   
For Shotter (1993) the traditional conception of the individual, self-contained, 
autonomous, sovereign subject is a grave fallacy and deprives us from developing a 
more rewarding understanding of ourselves – selves imbricated in relationships with 
other selves. Shotter (1993: 45) writes: 
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…the current view we have of persons, as all equal, self-enclosed (essentially 
indistinguishable) atomic individuals, possessing an inner sovereignty, each 
living their separate lives, all in isolation from each other – the supposed 
experience of the modern self – is an illusion…It would seem that people’s 
‘inner’ lives are neither so private, nor so inner, nor so merely orderly or 
logical, as has been assumed.  
Gergen (1999/2009a, 2009b) also suggests a much more labile and dynamic view of 
the human subject, one that is constituted in and through relationships. These 
relationships for Gergen (2009b) are not between the individual Cartesian subjects but 
are the very substance of which the human self is made.  As a result, all action and 
thought comes out of relationships and it is because of this that he refers to the 
human subject as a ‘relational being’ (Gergen, 2009b: xv). 
Bakhtin (1986: 68) presents the human subject as enmeshed in a generative flux of 
speech communication. He criticised Saussurian linguistics because it posited linguistic 
exchange as a mechanical process and referred to such passive conceptions of 
language users as ‘a scientific fiction’. For Bakhtin (1986) the speaker is actively 
engaged in the process of linguistic communication. Even when s/he is listening, they 
are actively interpreting, constructing and responding to what is being said. Sometimes 
the listener might not immediately and/or outwardly respond to speech because the 
social occasion does not require him/her to do so. However, in such instances too, the 
listener actively manipulates what he hears (or reads) and this process affects his own 
sense of the relevant aspects of the world and himself.  
From a social constructionist perspective (e.g. Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Bakhtin, 
1986; Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Shotter, 1993; Gergen, 1999/2009a & 2009b; Burr, 
1995, 2003), the human subject is fundamentally and inextricably linked to his/her 
surrounding the social fabric, which is woven through language. For Shotter (1993), in 
order to understand the human subject and what they say, it is important to view 
him/her as firmly located in the ‘everyday, background common sense’ social 
environment from which they cannot be extricated. He argues that the human subject 
and what they say can only be meaningfully understood as engaged in a dialectical 
process of everyday negotiation and social exchanges.  
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Billig et al. (1988) claim that the human subject is imbricated in a social world replete 
with common-sense notions and ideas that are conflicting, contradictory and 
competing. For them, this chaotic sea of common sense ideas is not an 
epiphenomenon that needs purging while studying the human subject; it is the 
ontological basis of the subject. In order to make sense of what people say, instead of 
trying to ‘uncover’ the ‘inner, private’ mental structures one needs to study the 
everyday, common-sensical ideas in which individuals are immersed. Based on the 
contradictory nature of everyday thinking, Billig et al. (1988) argue that a society’s 
collective, everyday ideas are essentially ideological. These everyday ideological ideas 
form an important resource on which people draw during their talk. 
Thus, what the participants of my research said during the focus group sessions can be 
meaningfully understood only when one pays attention to the linguistic, cultural, 
social, religious and political resources that may have been available to them and the 
discourses they may have drawn upon. In the next section, I will briefly discuss this 
process through which people jointly construct their understanding of the world. 
2.4 Towards a Relational Epistemology 
One of the key tenets of social constructionism, on which there is at least a basic 
agreement amongst various writers, is that the human world cannot be studied using 
the traditional scientific approaches bequeathed to us by the European Enlightenment 
and that alternative ways of making sense of this are needed (Whorf, 1956; Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966; Rorty, 1979; Harris, 1981; Ossorio, 1981; Bakhtin, 1986; Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987; Billig et al., 1988; Edwards and Potter, 1992; Shotter, 1993; Hughes 
and Sharrock, 1997; Hutchings, 1997; Gergen, 1999/2009a, 2009b; Burr, 1995, 2003).   
One of the grounds on which the traditional, Enlightenment epistemology has been 
criticised by social constructionism is that it takes language as a transparent medium of 
communication. In this view, language un-problematically and faithfully represents the 
external world. According to this view, we first experience the world and then use 
language to ‘objectively’ represent this experience. Thus, the world of objects and 
human perception of these is both independent of and exist a priori to its 
representation in language. Gergen (1999/2009a: 6) writes: 
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…the idea that we first experience the world, and then try to put the 
experience into words, is the view of language as a picture. That is, if our 
experience mirrors the world – thus providing us with a mental picture – then 
effective language should communicate to others the picture in our minds.  
(emphasis in original) 
In the view of language as a picture, our perception of objects in the world, 
represented through the transparent medium of language constitute facts – nuggets of 
‘true’ knowledge that are objective and unbiased, representing the world as it exists. 
Shotter (1993: 70) challenges this view and argues that ‘Facts, however, are not the 
cause of our perceptual processes, but their result.’ He maintains that their 
‘naturalness’ comprise factors that are essentially culturally and historically contingent. 
This belief in ‘natural essence’ of things is legitimized by the metaphor of ‘finding’ or 
‘discovering’ in natural sciences instead of making or constructing (Shotter, 1993). For 
Potter and Wetherell (1987: 136) in traditional social psychology ‘categories’ are 
entities which are seen to have a ‘factual’ status because they are ‘preformed and 
enduring’.   
Shotter (1993: 88) posits that we tend to see language as a ‘conduit’. The ‘conduit’ 
metaphor assumes that if we are effective and proficient users of language we 
communicate our ideas un-problematically and without ‘distortion’ to others. We 
assume that we have communicated our ideas from our minds, which according to 
Rorty (1979) is a Cartesian legacy, to other minds without any interference from the 
conduit. However, Shotter (1993) maintains that we can never assume that our 
message has been exactly replicated in the listener’s mind. As Bakhtin (1986: 68) 
points out the listener is not a mere passive recipient of speech because s/he too 
‘takes an active, responsive attitude toward’ the speech directed to them. Therefore, 
the people towards whom our speech is directed interpret what they hear. And, 
interpretation is an open ended, creative process and does not guarantee exact 
reproduction of the speaker’s intentions. It is because of this, Bakhtin (1986) argues 
that human speech is always dialogic and is never an isolated, self-contained 
utterance.  Whorf (1956: 258) also points out that ‘We are all mistaken in our common 
belief that any word has an “exact meaning”.’ 
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Social constructionism challenges the ‘picture’ and the ‘conduit’ views of language 
(Whorf, 1956; Rorty, 1979; Harris, 1981; Ossorio, 1981; Bakhtin, 1986; Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987; Billig et al., 1988; Shotter, 1993; Gergen, 1999/2009a, 2009b; Burr, 
1995, 1998, 2003). Gergen (1999/2009a: 33) uses the analogy of ‘threshing machines’ 
for nouns in a language. Just like a threshing machine converts a wheat field into bits 
of grain which are useful for human beings, a language chops and categorises the 
amorphous world into bits of ‘ordered’ reality (Gergen 1999/2009a). Every language 
has its own unique system of ordering reality. This is a serious challenge to the picture 
or the conduit view of language which sees language as a neutral channel for 
representing and communicating reality as exists in the external world. Harris (1981) 
argues that we seldom look at this ‘formative’ function of language. He says that we 
commonly talk about language as a noun that has a plural form – languages. Thus we 
may talk about how many languages we can speak. However, we seldom pay attention 
to the term language as a noun that has no plurals and refers to the linguistic domain 
in a general or abstracted manner. As discussed earlier, Harris (1981: 9) posits, this 
creates the ‘language myth’. This myth pervades the modern world and encourages us 
to see language as a transparent medium that communicates ‘without distortion the 
actuality it purports to represent’ (Harris, 1981: 26). 
Potter and Wetherell (1987), Shotter (1993), Gergen (1999/2009a) and Wetherell 
(2001) argue that far from being a transparent referential system, language is a 
rhetorical device. Shotter (1993) and Gergen (1999/2009a) maintain that rhetoric 
acquired a negative connotation in the post-Enlightenment world in which objectivity 
and truth became the cherished touchstones of valid and reliable knowledge. Gergen 
(1999/2009a) argues that rhetoric is a pervasive aspect of human language usage. In 
certain contexts, like advertisements and political campaigns, rhetorical devices are 
more easily discernible. However, in certain other domains, like scientific texts, 
rhetoric operates more subtly and indiscernibly. It is here where the rhetorical 
dimension of language is more dangerous because it masks the rhetoric by references 
to rationality and concrete, objective experience. Gergen (1999/2009a: 41) writes: 
More dangerous are communications that only “report the facts” –  the world 
as it is , outside anyone’s particular perspective…Too often, a resort to the 
facts functions to silence other voices. Too often, the language of objective 
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reality is used as a means of generating hierarchies of inclusion and exclusion. 
This is so not only in science… but it is also the case more generally, where 
those who don’t speak the rhetoric are scorned as “unrealistic”, “deluded”, 
“irrational”, or “self-deceived”. 
For Gergen (1999/2009a: 42) rhetoric creates the impression of reality in two ways. 
Firstly, because reality relates to the ‘world out there’, the speaker tries to create the 
image of distance between himself and the reality that s/he is talking about. Words 
like ‘the, that, or those’ (Gergen 1999/2009a: 42) help create this feeling of distance 
between the speaker and the object to which his/her speech refers and, hence, a 
sense of objectivity. Secondly, by purifying the speech of any references to the 
personal beliefs, inclinations, desires and experiences of the speaker gives the 
impression of non-interference and objectivity, again creating the illusion of objectivity 
and untainted realism. Thus, objectivity rather than being state of reality is actually a 
rhetorical accomplishment.  
The rhetorical function of language is confined not only to helping speakers achieve 
their purposes and giving the gloss of objectivity and truth to knowledge, which is 
contingent, ad hoc and tentative. Bakhtin (1986), Billig et al. (1988) Gadamer (1991), 
Shotter (1993), Gergen (1999/2009a) maintain that the rhetorical dimension of 
language also plays an important role in the life of a community. Shotter (1993: 54), 
drawing on Vico, discusses the idea of ‘sensus communis’ – ‘a culture’s common 
sense’. According to Shotter (1993: 54), sensus communis is created by a community’s 
‘commonplaces’ or ‘shared moments in a flow of social activity which afford common 
reference’. Language for Vico (as cited in Shotter, 1993) is predicated on a set of such 
common reference points, comprising a shared system of beliefs and values.  
Gergen (1999/2009a: 43) argues that a community’s sense of cohesion is sustained by 
the ‘rhetoric of reality’. This reality is essentially intralinguistic. Berger and Luckman 
(1966: 56) referred to the process of construction of reality through language as 
‘linguistic objectification’, which enabled people to ‘live in the common-sense world of 
everyday life equipped with special bodies of knowledge’. Bakhtin (1986: 88) maintains 
that every human society, no matter how big or small, is based on some ‘authoritative 
utterances’ that become the reference points for valid and reliable knowledge.   For 
example, within the modern international system any unprovoked act of aggression 
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against the citizens or territory of a nation-state is deemed as an act of hostility and 
merits retaliatory action from the army of the victim state. This principle, usually 
referred to self-defence, can be seen as an instance of ‘sensus communis’ of the 
Westphalian international community that is also articulated in the Charter of the 
United Nations (United Nations 1945: Article 2). 
Social constructionism suggests that rather than being solitary, self-contained, 
autonomous epistemic subjects, people continually construct and reconstruct their 
understanding of themselves and the world around them, jointly with one another. 
Gergen (1999/2009a) argues that our systems of meaning are social accomplishments, 
which we achieve in collaboration with one another. He refers to this joint production 
of meaning as ‘co-action’ (Gergen, 1999/2009a: 98).  
Shotter (1993: 39) uses the term ‘joint action’ to refer to the joint systems of 
understanding and meaning that people create in tandem with one another. He argues 
that by doing so: 
…people create, without a conscious realization of the fact, a changing sea of 
moral enablements and constraints, of privileges and entitlements, and 
obligations and sanctions – in short, an ethos.  
(Shotter, 1993: 39) 
This ‘ethos’ creates possibilities for people to participate in constructing their own 
realities. These realities are never identical and in complete harmony with those of 
other members of the group. Being able to participate in the dialogue gives a person 
his/her agency and voice. It is in this exchange of voices or the conversational 
background, referred to as joint action by Shotter (1993: 39) that human reality is 
continually constructed and reconstructed.  
Bakhtin (1986: 89) argues that what a person says is continually ‘shaped and 
developed’ by other people’s utterances. This process must not be confused with a 
simplistic imitation or internalisation of other people’s ideas; this is a creative process 
in which the speaker actively engages with other people’s speech and produces what 
has an indelibly personal quality to it and as a result has ‘varying degrees of otherness 
or varying degrees of “our-own-ness,” varying degrees of awareness and detachment’ 
(Bakhtin, 1986: 89). It is this dialogic quality of human speech that makes the thinking 
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process possible in the first place. Therefore, whenever we speak our speech reflects a 
creative amalgam or smorgasbord of other people’s utterances and our own unique 
thoughts. Thus, from a social constructionist perspective, people’s construction of the 
world is the result of neither a passive internalisation of other texts nor an entirely 
isolated, personal accomplishment – it is a creative process whereby other voices 
merge with the speaker’s own thinking and produces a unique subjective position.  
The alternative epistemology where knowledge is socially constructed by people has 
important implications for the processes of education and school curricula, especially 
in areas like history, geography and citizenship education. If knowledge rather than 
having a concrete, objective basis is socially constructed by people then school 
curricula built on either the aims and objectives or the content driven model of 
curriculum planning become highly problematic (Ross, 2000; Kelly, 2004/2009). These 
models of curriculum planning assume a static view of knowledge and conceptualise 
learning as either internalisation of a ‘worthwhile’, fixed body of knowledge or 
achievement of certain fixed competencies articulated as learning objectives (Ross, 
2000; Kelly, 2004/2009). Both these models of curriculum planning and accompanying 
pedagogical philosophy assume the learner to be passive – either a vessel to be filled 
or an organism whose behaviour has to be modified (Ross, 2000; Kelly, 2004/2009).  
If we believe that knowledge is socially constructed by people in the intra-linguistic and 
inter-linguistic spaces then a need to reconceptualise the curriculum, pedagogy and 
learning becomes urgent. Kelly (2004/2009) argues that if we take knowledge to be 
provisional, evolving and negotiated through social processes then the content and 
aims and objectives driven model of curriculum planning will not do. He proposes an 
alternative model for curriculum planning that he refers to as the ‘process approach’ 
(Kelly, 2004/2009: 81). In the process driven model, knowledge is seen as ‘socially 
constructed’ (Kelly 2004/2009: 31) and is never shorn of dynamics of ideology and 
power. Such a curriculum requires an active engagement of all – the learners as well as 
teachers – where they jointly construct and reconstruct their knowledge of the world. 
This conception of curriculum and pedagogy closely resembles what Freire 
(1970/2005: 80) refers to as ‘problem-posing’ education. In this conception of 
education, a learning community is envisaged where everyone learns – the learners as 
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well as teachers – through a process of dialogue, and learning becomes a ‘joint 
responsibility’.  
Social constructionist epistemology and the ideas of joint construction of meaning that 
Gergen (1999/2009a:98) refers to as ‘co-action’ and Shotter (1993: 39) as ‘joint action’ 
have important implications for our understanding of what people say in various social 
contexts. Consequently, it has ramifications for social research; individual interviews 
have very different social dynamics compared to focus groups. In a focus group, what 
participants say can be seen as a joint construction of meaning. The focus group 
membership entitles the individual members to have a voice, which may at times 
corroborate and at others challenge what others say. Cohen, Manion and Morrison 
(2007: 376) maintain that in a focus group ‘It is from the interaction of the group that 
the data emerge.’ 
 In conclusion, social constructionism offers an account of knowledge that is a radical 
departure from the traditional, Enlightenment view of knowledge predicated on the 
rationalist and empiricist ideologies. Social constructionism rather than seeing 
language as a ‘conduit’ or a ‘transparent medium’ for recording and communicating 
knowledge is posited as a fecund site where knowledge is created and constructed by 
people within their everyday social interactions with one another. And this view of 
knowledge has important ramifications for the way school curricula are planned, 
teaching and learning is transacted and data in social research is collected and 
analysed. 
2.5 Discourse 
As I have discussed in the previous sections, social constructionism has challenged the 
traditional ways of making sense of the world. Most social constructionist writers (e.g. 
Whorf, 1956; Rorty, 1979; Harris, 1981; Ossorio, 1981; Bakhtin, 1986; Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987; Billig et al., 1988; Edwards and Potter, 1992; Shotter, 1993; Edwards, 
Ashmore & Potter, 2003; Gergen, 1999/2009a, 2009b; Burr, 1995, 2003) have argued 
that we construct our sense of the world through the medium of language. Many of 
them have drawn, to varying degrees, on the writings of the French philosopher Michel 
Foucault and his notion of discourse. This is an important strand of the theoretical 
framework of my thesis.   
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I begin this section by briefly describing the term ‘discourse’ and some of the 
theoretical and disciplinary contexts within which the idea emerged. Subsequently, I 
analyse the term discourse in the context of the French poststructuralist tradition, 
especially as developed by Michel Foucault (1970, 1980a, 1980b, 1980c, 1966/1989a, 
1969/1989b).  
In an everyday sense, the term discourse refers to ‘spoken language or ways of 
speaking’ (Dijk, 1997:1). In other words, discourse in lay terms refers to relatively 
extended instances of spoken language. The term discourse has been used extensively 
in various academic disciplines in a range of different ways (Burr, 1995; Mills, 1997). 
Some of these usages are similar, others different and some even competing with each 
other. In an academic sense, the idea of discourse is much more complex and varied 
and depends on the discipline and perspective one uses to talk about it. The origin of 
the term discourse, as it is generally used in social sciences, can be located in some 
intellectual developments and shifts that took place around the middle of the 
twentieth century (Macdonell, 1986). These shifts concerned the relationship between 
language and meaning. Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics (1983) disrupted the 
accepted understanding of this relationship. He proposed that meaning rather than 
inhering in the objects of the external world was an intra-linguistic phenomenon 
(Saussure, 1983; Culler, 1986; Macdonell, 1986). The posthumous publication of this 
work initiated an immense interest in the study of language as a site where meaning 
was constructed.  
One of the directions in which the mid-twentieth century interest in study of language 
led to was the field of discourse analysis (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Dijk, 1997). 
Discourse analysts look at how people use language in social contexts to achieve their 
various purposes (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). A closely related approach to the study 
of language is that of conversation analysis ‘which grew out of the 
ethnomethodological tradition in sociology developed by Harold Garfinkel’ (Liddicoat, 
2007: 2). In conversation analysis the focus is on the details of people’s use of spoken 
language – for example, how they take turns and negotiate and manage silences and 
gaps within their conversations.  
The way in which I have used the term discourse in my thesis is more in line with the 
poststructuralist tradition, especially the writings of French philosopher Michel 
23 
 
Foucault (1970, 1980a, 1980b, 1980c, 1966/1989a, 1969/1989b; Burr, 1995, 2003; 
Mills, 2003). This take on discourse is not incompatible with discourse analysis as 
developed in social psychology (Potter and Wetherell, 1987) and conversation analysis 
influenced by ethnomethodology (Burr, 1995). However, Foucault’s use of the term 
implies different points of salience and emphasis.  
 Foucauldian Discourse 2.5.1
Discourse is one of the most commonly used terms in Foucault’s writing (Mills 2003). 
Foucault was basically interested in developing a new ‘method of historical analysis 
freed from the anthropological theme’ (Foucault, 1969/1989b: 17). In other words, 
Foucault wanted to challenge through his writing the traditional method of historical 
research, predicated on the twin pillars of the ‘founding subject’ and ‘originating 
experience’ (Foucault, 1970: 65). By doing so, Foucault’s work (1970, 1966/1989a, 
1969/1989b) challenges both the ideas of the rational Cartesian subject, and the 
experiencing individual – the respective fulcrums of the idealist and empiricist 
ideologies. The key tool that Foucault (1970, 1966/1989a, 1969/1989b) presents to do 
so is discourse. 
Foucault (1969/1989b: 121) defines discourse ‘as the group of statements that belong 
to a single system of formation’. Foucault (1969/1989b: 121) explains that discourses 
comprise groups of linguistic signs that are so organised that they form ‘statements’. 
Foucault (1969/1989b: 97) defines the statement as: 
. . . a function of existence that properly belongs to signs and on the basis of 
which one may then decide, through analysis or intuition, whether or not they 
‘make sense’, according to what rule they follow one another or are 
juxtaposed, of what they are the sign, and what sort of act is carried out by 
their formulation (oral or written). 
Mills (2003) argues that we should refrain from the temptation to conflate discourse 
with language. Discourse rather than communicating reality forms the ‘system which 
structures the way we perceive reality’ (Mills, 2003: 55). In The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, Foucault (1969/1989b: 53-54) writes: 
“I would like to show that ‘discourses’, in the form in which they can be heard 
or read, are not, as one might expect, a mere intersection of things and words: 
an obscure web of things, and a manifest, visible, coloured chain of words; … I 
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would like to show with precise examples that in analysing discourses 
themselves, one sees the loosening of the embrace, apparently so tight, of 
words and things, and the emergence of a group of rules proper to discursive 
practice. … discourses [are not] groups of signs … but … practices that 
systematically form the objects of which they speak.” 
Foucault (1970, 1969/1989b) emphasises that the objects that discourse forms are 
neither ‘anterior to discourse’, reducible to ‘a lexical organisation, [n]or the scansions 
of semantic field’ or ‘the elements of meaning at the disposal of speaking subjects’ 
(1989b:52-3). These objects appear within the interiority of discourse that exists as a 
practice which is governed by a ‘body of rules’ (Foucault, 1969/1989b: 53). Objects do 
not exist in a pristine form, prior to their appropriation by discourse; instead they are 
created by discourse itself which disperses these, according to certain rules, within a 
constellation of other objects and concepts within a given discursive formation 
(Foucault, 1969/1989b). These regularities and rules of dispersion operate within what 
Foucault (1969/1989b: 41) refers to as a ‘discursive formation’. 
Foucault (1969/1989b: 35) was interested in analysing the genesis and nature of 
apparently unified fields like ‘medicine, grammar or political economy’ etc. According 
to him, fields like these were characterised by a group of statements that were 
apparently related to one another. However, he rejects the hypotheses that the 
principles unifying these groups of statements or fields of study were based either on 
the unity of objects, the style of articulation of statements, the unity and coherence of 
concepts or their thematic coherence. Instead of these apparent unities, what 
underlay these fields were ‘tables of difference’ and ‘systems of dispersion’ (Foucault, 
1969/1989b: 41). He writes: 
Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, such a system 
of dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or 
thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions 
and functionings, transformations), we will say, for the sake of convenience, 
that we are dealing with a discursive formation…  
Within a given discursive formation, statements combine together according to certain 
‘rules of formation’ (Foucault 1969/1989b: 42). For Foucault (1969/1989b: 42) these 
‘rules of formation are conditions of existence (but also of coexistence, maintenance, 
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modification, and disappearance)’ for objects, concepts and statements within a 
discursive formation. The groups of statement belonging to a given discursive 
formation form the contours of a topic or even an academic discipline. Thus, a 
discipline like international relations may be seen as discursive formation – a large 
group of statements that combine together according to certain ‘rules of formation’ 
(Foucault 1969/1989b: 42). However, a discursive formation is predicated neither on a 
‘tightly packed, continuous, geographically well-defined field of objects’ nor ‘on a 
definite, normative type of statement’ (Foucault 1969/1989b: 41). Within a given 
discursive formation, according to its rules of formation, statements combine and form 
discourses.  
However objects and concepts of discourse are not generally formed at will by the 
speaking subject because the ‘production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, 
organized and redistributed by a certain number of procedures’ (Foucault, 1970: 52). 
According to Foucault (Mills, 2003: 57), we can utter any number of statements that 
could be linguistically and grammatically correct ‘but what is surprising is that, in fact, 
we choose to speak within very narrowly confined limits’. Foucault (1970) identifies 
two sets of constraints or exclusionary mechanisms – external and internal – which 
control what can be said within a discourse because ‘one cannot speak of anything at 
any time; it is not easy to say something new’ (Foucault, 1969/1989b: 49).  
The set of external constraints comprise ‘taboo’, ‘the opposition between reason and 
madness’, ‘the opposition between true and false’ and the ‘will to truth’ (Foucault 
1970: 53).  Taboo relates to the fact that in every society, in a given historical period, it 
is ‘difficult to speak about certain subjects such as sexuality and death’ (Mills, 2003: 
58). For example,  within the discursive formation of ‘Islamic terrorism’ and the ‘war 
on terror’, speaking of the possible grievances and violation of fundamental rights of 
certain groups of people as possible factors that motivated certain individuals to attack 
US interests would count as  a taboo.  According to Foucault (1970: 53), since the 
middle ages, the madman has been deprived of the right to speak because ‘his words 
may be considered null and void, having neither truth nor importance.’ He may speak 
as much as he likes but he will never be considered to be ‘in the true’ (Foucault, 1970: 
61) and his speech will be annulled by the exclusionary mechanisms of discourse. The 
distinction between true and false for Foucault (1970) constitutes a system of judging 
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what knowledge will be accorded the status of truth and what will be denied this 
privilege. These criteria of truth ‘are arbitrary to start with or . . . at least are organised 
around historical contingencies’ (Foucault, 1970: 54). The ‘will to truth’ (Foucault, 
1970: 55), the final external constraint on discourse, relates to what counts as useful 
and valid directions for creating new knowledge. Foucault (1970: 55) elaborates the 
notion by referring to sixteenth century England where the knowing subject was 
invested with the warrant to ‘sketch[ed] out schemas of possible, observable, 
measureable, classifiable objects’. The recent proliferation of interest in studying the 
idea of ‘Islamic terrorism’ can be seen as an instance of ‘the will to know’ in the 21st 
century, in the context of the September 11 attacks and the discourse of ‘war on 
terror’ that followed. 
In addition to the external exclusionary mechanism of discourse, Foucault (1970: 57) 
identifies four ‘internal procedures’ of exclusion and control exercised by the 
discourse. These comprise ‘commentary’, ‘the author’, ‘disciplines’ and the ‘rarefaction 
of the speaking subject’ (Foucault, 1970: 56-61). Foucault (1970: 56) uses the terms of 
‘primary and secondary text’ to explain the notion of commentary. The primary text 
can be an original work of literature or any other seminal text like the Bible or the 
Koran. The secondary text or the commentary consists of ‘a certain number of new 
speech-acts which take them [primary texts] up, transform them or speak of them’ 
(Foucault, 1970: 57). The commentaries on the primary texts, whether religious, 
literary, sociological or political, proffer specific interpretations and they do so by 
simultaneously excluding alternative explanations. By author, Foucault means the 
person who is the source of discourses and forms ‘a principle of grouping of 
discourses, conceived as the unity and origin of their meanings, as the focus of their 
coherence’ (Foucault, 1970: 58). In the context of the discourse of ‘war on terror’, 
President George Bush can be seen as performing the author function because he used 
it for the first time in 2001 to ‘characterize the US conflict with Islamic extremists’ 
(EBSCOHOST, 2013). His status as the author of the discourse of ‘war on terror’ made 
his explanation of events count as valid and authoritative, marginalizing alternative 
viewpoints. In ‘The Order of Discourse’ Foucault (1970: 59) defines a discipline as ‘a 
domain of objects, a set of methods, a corpus of propositions considered to be true, a 
play of rules and definitions, of techniques and instruments’. The field of international 
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relations could be cited as an instance of the Foucauldian discipline; nation state and a 
sovereign government would be classified as valid objects, studying the interaction of 
nation states with one another would count as a method, respect for the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of a nation state would count as a rule, and perspectives like 
realism and constructivism would form the techniques and instruments of the 
discipline.  By ‘rarefaction of the speaking subject’ Foucault (1970: 62) means that a 
person would not be allowed to ‘enter the order of discourse if he does not satisfy 
certain requirements or if he is not, from the outset, qualified to do so’. In The 
Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault (1969/1989b: 55) argues that not everyone has 
‘the right, sanctioned by law or tradition, juridically defined or spontaneously accepted 
to proffer such a discourse’. Taking the example of the use of the term ‘war on terror’ 
for the first time by President Bush in 2001, the ensuing discourse might not have such 
wide currency had the term been used by the head of state of a smaller, less powerful 
country. In other words, President Bush had ‘the right to use this sort of language’ 
(Foucault, 1970: 55).    
According to Foucault (1970, 1969/1989b) one of the key effects of discourse is the 
production of knowledge through statements that are ‘in the true’ (1970: 61). 
However, for Foucault, truth does not exist exterior to and independent of discourse 
(Foucault, 1970, 1969/1989b, Rouse, 2005). In fact, discourse forms the ‘locus of 
emergence of concepts’, which are the building blocks of our knowledge of the world – 
knowledge that constitutes the truth. For Foucault, truth inheres neither in the 
‘horizon of ideality’ (1989b: 68), in the objects that ‘wait in limbo’ (1969/1989b: 49) to 
be discovered by the experiencing subject, in language that is merely ‘a system for 
possible statements’ (1969/1989b: 30), nor in the ‘the continuous generosity of 
meaning’ (1970: 73) within the linguistic system. Thus, Foucault’s theory of discourse 
presents a radical point of departure for our understanding of notions of knowledge 
and truth: 
. . . we must not resolve discourse into a play of pre-existing significations; we 
must not imagine that the world turns towards us a legible face which we 
would have only to decipher; the world is not the accomplice of our 
knowledge ; there is no prediscursive providence which disposes the world in 
our favour. We must conceive discourse as a violence we do to things, or in 
any case a practice which we impose on them . . . 
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(Foucault, 1970: 67) 
According to Foucault (1980b: 118), trying to separate truth from untruth in discourse 
is an exercise in futility because the ‘effects of truth are produced within discourses 
which in themselves are neither true nor false’. Another radical assertion that Foucault 
(1980a, 1980b) makes is about the relationship between truth and power. Truth is 
created and sustained by mechanisms of power that saturate a society in a ‘capillary 
form of existence’ (Foucault 1980a: 39). For Foucault (1980a: 52), ‘Knowledge and 
power are integrated with one another, and there is no point in dreaming of a time 
when knowledge will cease to depend on power...’ 
As Hall (2001) points out, knowledge that is backed by power not only presents itself 
as true but also has the ability to get itself granted the seal of truth in society. Very 
often social and political knowledge creates truths that give rise to ‘practices of 
discipline, surveillance, and constraint’, which ultimately lead to ‘new forms of social 
control’ (Rouse, 2005: 97). In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the ensuing 
discourse of the ‘war on terror’ created a sense of danger and anxiety about the threat 
posed by militant Islam that resulted in a proliferation of knowledge, or a ‘will to know’ 
about the extremist mind-set, which in turn provided legitimacy to exercise various 
forms of surveillance adopted by various Western governments, especially the US and 
the UK, on people, including their own citizens.  
As discussed above, discourse, according to Foucault (1970, 1980, 1966/1989a, 
1969/1989b), cannot be reduced to merely the linguistic level. Campbell (2007: 216) a 
poststructuralist international relations scholar says that ‘discourses are performative’ 
and give rise to ‘discursive practices’, which lead to certain courses of action by 
excluding other options. Soloman (2009: 281-5) insightfully explains how, against the 
wider backdrop of the discourse of ‘war on terror,’ Saddam Hussein’s regime was 
discursively constructed, by President Bush and other parts of the US establishment, as 
a threat to American values of freedom and democracy by invoking terms and phrases 
like ‘axis of evil’, ‘contemporary incarnation of Hitlerism, militarism, and communism’, 
‘outlaw regime’, ‘evil regime’, ‘terrorist’ and ‘rogue state’. This discursive construction 
of Saddam and his Iraq made ‘the idea of an American-led invasion of Iraq more 
palatable and sensible’ to the American public (Solomon, 2009: 276). Thus, discourses 
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are not merely linguistic constructions; they have real and physical – at times brutal – 
implications.  
Thus, for Foucault (1980b: 122), truth never exists independent of power; effects of 
truth are induced by mechanisms of power that infiltrate the  
‘State apparatus . . . [whose] meta-power with its prohibitions can only take 
hold and secure its footing where it is rooted in a whole series of multiple and 
indefinite power relations’.  
For Foucault (1980a, 1969/1989b) the task of the historian or the intellectual is to 
analyse the discourses that circulate in society and make visible their mutual 
articulations and their points of mutual compatibilities as well as incompatibilities and 
the exclusionary mechanisms that they exercise and render silent and push to the 
margins many other discourses. However, this must not be confused with separating 
truth from falsehood because: 
It’s not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power (which 
would be a chimera, for truth is already power) but of detaching the power of 
truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within 
which it operates at the present time. 
(Foucault, 1980b: 133) 
In recent years, the notion of discourse has been used by scholars and researchers, of 
a poststructuralist orientation, working in various disciplines including education (e.g. 
Hey, 1997; Hutchings, 1997; Francis, 2003; MacNaughton, 2005; Burman, 2008; 
Ailwood, 2010; Durrani & Dunne, 2010; Dussel, 2010; Leese, 2010; Blundell, 2012; 
Thomas, 2013)  and international relations (e.g. Bankoff, 2003; Troyer, 2003; Campbell, 
2007; Jackson, 2007a, 2007b; Kiersey, 2009; Solomon, 2009; Ailwood, 2010; 
Featherstone, Holohan & Poole, 2010). Francis (1998) used the idea of discourse to 
study children’s constructions of gender in English primary schools. Francis (1998: 7) 
states that she found Foucault’s idea of discourse useful because it helped her in 
highlighting the socially constructed nature of gender and challenging ‘gender 
essentialism’. Jackson (2007a: 395), an international relations scholar, used the 
theoretical framework of discourse to analyse the notions of ‘Islamic terrorism’. In 
order to do this, he researched an extensive corpus of relevant documents like 
speeches of political leaders, think-tank reports, journalistic articles, popular and 
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academic books and journal articles. He argues that the discourse of ‘war on terror’ 
draws on a range of historical and socio-political antecedents, including: 
. . . the ‘good war’ narrative surrounding the struggle against fascism during 
the Second World War; mythologies of the Cold War, including the notion of 
‘the long war’, the deeply embedded civilization-versus-barbarism narrative, 
the cult of innocence, the language and assumptions of the enemy within, the 
labels and narratives of ‘rogue states’, and the discourse surrounding the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
 (Jackson, 2007a: 400-1) 
Similarly, Durrani and Dunne (2010) conducted research, employing the notion of 
discourse, to explore how the curriculum in some state schools, in the North West 
Frontier Province (now renamed as the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province), contributed to 
pupils’ constructions of their own identities, predicated on notions of religious and 
national difference from others, especially the Hindus of India – Pakistan’s 
longstanding adversaries. 
Thus, the implications of this Foucauldian project for social research are far-reaching. 
Using the theoretical framework of discourse presents the researcher an emancipatory 
opportunity by enabling him/her to challenge common sense constructions by 
exposing their historical and cultural locatedness. Social research, including mine, is no 
longer concerned with finding out the truth or establishing an authentic version of 
events. The task is to identify the key discourses and how these articulate with and 
augment or resist one another. By doing so one might loosen the hold of ‘power of 
truth’ from naturalized (read hegemonic) modes of being.  
2.6 Social Constructionism – Articulating the Limits of Realism or a 
Precipitous Slide into Relativism? 
As argued in one of the preceding sections, social constructionism offers a serious 
challenge to realist epistemology. However, this has also proved its Achilles heel and 
has been used by its detractors (Cruickshank 2011; Slife and Richardson 2011) to 
dismiss it as a relativist perspective that can lead to unrelenting nihilism. The reasons 
for this charge against social constructionism are not hard to discern. The perspective 
questions the idea of fixed, objective reality and what it suggests in its place are a 
range of accounts or versions of any given aspect of the world that are constructed 
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through language (Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Burr, 1995, 2003; Billig et al., 1988; 
Edwards & Potter, 1992; Shotter, 1993; Hutchings, 1997; Gergen, 1999/2009a, 2009b). 
Confronted with this plethora of alternatives, how does one choose a specific account, 
as the familiar ‘foundation’ of a ‘true’ or ‘real’ criteria no longer exists (Burr, 1998)? 
This can lead to what Burr (1998: 14) calls ‘a road to social and personal paralysis’. Slife 
and Richardson (2011: 334) also criticise social constructionism on the grounds that it 
renders untenable any basis for establishing a perspective or position ‘more valuable 
than any other’. They argue that ‘the practical utility or usefulness of an understanding 
requires nonarbitrary criteria for what usefulness means, something social 
constructionism cannot provide’ (Slife and Richardson, 2011: 334).  
Burr (1998) argues that social constructionism’s challenge to a fixed, objective reality 
and accompanying categories can be seen as presenting a significant obstacle for 
political and social theory. If there are no concepts and ideas that relate to aspects of 
the ‘real’ world then how can we speak of social categories like ‘disadvantaged pupils’, 
‘privileged elites’, ‘terrorists’ and ‘religious fundamentalists’? For example, in 
Baluchistan – Pakistan’s geographically largest province – for many years, there has 
been an on-going resistance to the authority of the central government (Alamgir 
2012). The groups involved in this resistance are labelled as ‘insurgents’ and ‘rebels’ by 
the Pakistan government but as ‘freedom fighters’ by people and groups within the 
province, sympathetic to the cause of Baluch nationalism. If, as social constructionism 
posits, there is no objective, fixed external reality and all our categories are mere social 
constructions, how do we decide between these two conflicting accounts of Baluch 
resistance?  I have labelled this type of relativism as ontological relativism because it 
challenges the objectivity and truth value of the categories or the building blocks of 
the social world.  
The issue of  ontological relativism which is the result of constructionism’s suggestion 
that there are only accounts and versions of events and phenomena in the social world 
without any anchorage in objective fixed reality does indeed pose serious challenge for 
our conventional understanding of the social world. The issues resulting from this 
severing of the link, at least of a straightforward, unproblematic kind, between our 
accounts of the world and categories, events and phenomena in the external world 
have been frequently highlighted (Ossorio, 1981; Clark, 1984; Shotter, 1993; Burr, 
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1998; DeLamater & Hyde, 1998; Merttens, 1998; Parker, 1998; Edwards, Ashmore & 
Potter, 2003; Cruickshank, 2011; Horsthemke, 2011; Slife & Richardson, 2011). The 
case for rejecting the belief in an objective, fixed, external reality, independent of the 
language used to describe it has been made persuasively by many writers and theorists 
of a social constructionist orientation (Whorf, 1956; Berger and Luckmann, 1966; 
Harris, 1981; Ossorio, 1981; Bakhtin, 1986; Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Billig et al., 
1988; Shotter, 1993; Gergen 1999/2009a, 2009b; Burr 1995, 2003).  
I would like to argue that the case for the position that language does not objectively 
and unproblematically represent the external world is, indeed, a powerful one.  To do 
this, I will use the theory of post ex facto fallacy as presented by Ossorio (Ossorio, 
1981; Shotter, 1993). Shotter (1993: 85) drawing on Ossorio (1981) argues that 
people’s unwillingness to let go of the realist ontological clarity and certainty is actually 
based on and sustained by the ‘ex post facto fallacy’. According to Ossorio (1981) our 
conceptual categories that apparently reflect aspects of the external world are human 
creation and are historically located. At a given moment in time, a certain object is 
defined by a group of people in a specific way by choosing one explanation from 
various other possibilities. The historical and cultural locatedness of such choices, over 
time, get obviated and the descriptions acquire a natural authenticity, which masks 
their temporal and cultural origins. Ossorio (1981: 7) writes: 
The ex post facto explanation is the penultimate form of a certain kind of 
logical progression, and it has this form: At a given time, T2, something 
happens so that it becomes the case that a certain thing, P, was so at an 
earlier time T1, even though at T1 it was not already the case that P was 
so.  
For Ossorio (1981) and Shotter (1993) language is a medium par excellence for creating 
ex post facto fallacies. As a result of this fallacy, people see their linguistic descriptions 
of the world as having a natural authenticity, anchored in the essential characteristics 
of the objects as they exist in the external world. Wittgenstein (1953/1958: 103) 
eloquently pointed to the human inability to get outside our taken for granted ways of 
conceiving the world: 
The ideal, as we think of it, is unshakable. You can never get outside it; you 
must always turn back. There is no outside; outside you cannot breathe.—
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Where does this idea come from? It is like a pair of glasses on our nose 
through which we see whatever we look at. It never occurs to us to take them 
off. 
Thus, the realists get trapped within a specific intra-linguistic framework and all their 
arguments against relativists are from within it and, as such, they fall prey to the ex 
post facto fallacy because their ‘non-represented, unconstructed external world is 
inevitably representational’ (Edwards, Ashmore & Potter, 2003: 232) – a state of affairs 
they are unable to acknowledge. Going back to the issue of Baluch resistance in 
Pakistan – the problem of treating the members of Baluch nationalist groups either as 
insurgents or freedom-fighters stems from the fact that people, depending on their 
political positioning, see their chosen label as having a privileged relationship to reality. 
They fail to see that these labels rather than representing reality are socially 
constructed discursive strategies that form part of the wider discourse that they 
subscribe to and which would have emerged at a specific point in time under certain 
social conditions and relationships. By not acknowledging the cultural and historical 
locatedness of these terms, one tends to get trapped in the ex post facto fallacy, which 
in turns leads to political stalemate and inertia.     
Closely related to the ontological relativism, described above, is what is referred to as 
moral relativism (Burr, 1998; Tännsjö, 2007). Moral relativism stems from the fact that 
social constructionism allows us to see the social world as comprising accounts and 
versions, constructed through language, without having any ‘real’ or ‘objective’ basis in 
the external world. This can facilitate in identifying and problematizing oppressive and 
unjust practices as they are seen as not grounded in objective, privileged reality; 
however, the situation gets difficult beyond this point because if all that we have are 
equally valid alternatives how do we privilege any of these over others? This creates, 
what Burr (1998: 16) refers to as ‘frustrating impotence’ or what as Gill (1995: 169) 
and Edwards, Ashmore & Potter (2003: 235) point out as ‘moral quietism’. Taking the 
example of Baluch resistance a step further, if we want to address the issue of violence 
that this phenomenon has led to in the province, how do we proceed? Do we deal with 
the people and groups involved in this resistance as insurgents who need to be 
controlled and suppressed or as ‘freedom-fighters’ with whom we might start a 
process of political negotiation and dialogue?  
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The charge of moral relativism is predicated on social constructionism’s not privileging 
any specific account over other accounts of the world. If a specific state of affairs is 
oppressive, social constructionism facilitates us in problematizing and challenging it 
because it recognises it to be based on socially constructed ways of interpreting the 
world. However, the critics of social constructionism argue that this view limits the 
potential for social and political activism of the social constructionist project (Burr, 
1998; Willig, 1998; Gergen, 2001; Edwards, Ashmore & Potter 2003; Cruickshank, 
2011). 
Social constructionist writers have defended the charge of social and political 
impotence levelled against social constructionism (Burr, 1998; Shotter, 1993; Gergen, 
2001, 1999/2009a; Edwards, Ashmore & Potter 2003). Potter (2012) and Gergen 
(2001, 1999/2009a) have argued that realism rather than having a privileged claim to 
‘truth’ is itself a specific constructed account. Potter (2012: 19) argues that the realist 
accounts are rhetorically constructed by ‘blurring together the abstract ontological 
arguments with the everyday tropes of realism talk.’ Gergen (2001: 15) argues that 
both ‘realist and constructionist arguments are forms of discourse’. In other words, 
both are distinct and unique ways of describing the world. Whereas constructionism 
acknowledges its own ontology which is essentially linguistic, realism mistakenly sees it 
as physical and essentialist because it gets trapped in the ex post facto fallacy, which 
prevents realists from realising that their knowledge of the world is representational 
and does not present a primordial, immutable reality that is untainted by any other 
influence (Ossorio, 1981; Shotter, 1993). According to Edwards, Ashmore and Potter 
(2003) this realist fallacy leads to political and moral impotence because rather than 
looking at oppressive conditions as socially constructed they are conceived as real, 
structural constraints that bring with them insurmountable social and political inertia. 
They defend social constructionism because ‘the advantage of relativistic notions of 
reality as rhetoric is that we can take positions and argue’ (Edwards, Ashmore and 
Potter, 2003: 236). Edwards, Ashmore and Potter (2003: 235) write: 
[Realism] is a familiar kind of argument against change, against action, against 
open-ended potentiality of any kind . . . Arguably, it is for relativists and 
constructionists that the good life is to be lived and made, as and in 
accountable social action including that of social analysis; rather than to be 
taken as given, ruled out as impossible or, as disengaged objective analysts, 
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passively observed and recorded. At the very least, realism has no exclusive 
claim upon the pragmatics of making a better world. 
Issues related to ontological as well as moral relativism have significant implications for 
social research. Cruickshank (2011: 78) argues that social constructionist research is 
tenable to the extent that it encourages ‘scepticism’ about privileging any particular 
account as having a ‘positive knowledge claim that may make reference to the truth’.  
However, beyond this point the social constructionist project encounters an impasse 
because it finds it difficult to offer a more emancipatory alternative because of its 
pervasive scepticism (Willig, 1998). Whenever a social constructionist researcher offers 
an alternative s/he is bound to face an epistemological stalemate. If s/he suggests an 
alternative, which they might consider to be better, they would be making a covert 
recourse to a set of normative principles, rendering his/her position as ‘crypto-
normative’ (Cruickshanck 2011: 78). Drawing on Merttens (1998), Cruickshank (2011) 
argues, the other option available to a social constructionist researcher is to offer 
his/her research project as a story to be interpreted uniquely by individual readers. 
However, social constructionist research will be of limited value ‘if it relied on 
individuals’ subjective meanings and not on any reference to the truth’ (Cruickshank 
2011: 79).   
Thus, carrying out social research from within a social constructionist framework one 
has to be cognisant of multiplicity of perspectives. However, this should not lead to 
intellectual paralysis because nothing stops a social constructionist researcher from 
interpreting the social world. The social constructionist position enables him/her to 
recognise that their interpretation of the world has no privileged claim to ‘truth’; it is 
but one possible way of looking at the world that is located within the specific social, 
cultural and temporal circumstances within which the research has been carried out. 
The gaze of the researcher is also saturated with his/her own personal life story and 
would inevitably affect the ultimate narrative that emerges from the research.  
The critique of social constructionism on the basis that it is a relativistic perspective 
has some important implications in the context of my research. The first issue is 
related to the social constructionist position that we have accounts and versions of 
events rather than absolute truths. Issues related to international conflicts are 
especially susceptible to competing, often conflicting, claims. If one is researching 
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using a social constructionist framework then how does one make sense of various 
explanations and accounts of events in the international domain because, as Burr 
(1998: 14) posits, one cannot decide which account to prefer because the ‘foundation 
on which to base this is removed’. Secondly, because one is faced with equally valid 
and legitimate perspectives how does one design a school curriculum in areas like 
citizenship education and history – what gets included and what gets excluded? We 
cannot present some perspective/s, howsoever chosen, to the pupils because there 
would be many other competing and equally valid perspectives. Moreover, what does 
one do if a pupil or a group of pupils come up with views or positions which are 
deemed, by the teacher, for some reason, as ‘problematic’ or ‘undesirable’? For 
example, what does a teacher do if a student airs racist or sexist views? A belief in 
equal legitimacy and validity of all perspectives erodes the moral ground beneath our 
feet as educators to challenge a ‘problematic’ idea.   
I would conclude this section by briefly analysing the issues alluded to earlier about 
citizenship curriculum that is underpinned by a social constructionist epistemology. As 
mentioned before, social constructionism sits comfortably with what Kelly (2004/2009: 
81) refers to as the ‘process approach’. In this approach to curriculum planning, 
arguably, it would be untenable to out-rightly reject pupils’ views even if they are 
considered ‘problematic’ or ‘wrong’ by the teacher. However, in this approach the 
focus gets shifted from ‘products or outcomes’ to ‘intellectual development and 
cognitive functioning’ (Kelly 2004/2009: 83). In this approach to curriculum planning, 
students are encouraged to engage in a dialogue and debate about contentious and 
problematic issues, with the teacher facilitating the process. The process model of the 
curriculum sees ‘the individual as an active being’ and its ‘central concern is with 
individual empowerment’ (Kelly 2004/2009: 84). Nothing prevents the teacher to 
present a more ‘reasonable’ or ‘balanced’ view about a contentious issue. However, 
this view would not be a presented as a privileged take on reality but a contingent and 
located narrative. The process driven curriculum, arguably, would equip each student 
to make ethical choices and thereby become ‘an autonomous member of a free and 
genuinely self-governing community’ (Kelly, 2004/2009: 217). 
Thus, social constructionism does not offer an easy alternative to traditional research 
and pedagogy. In fact, within a social constructionist framework, both processes 
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become much more fluid and complex and eschew any ‘comfortable’, ‘neat’ and ‘final’ 
solutions. However, as discussed above, social constructionist research and pedagogy 
both offer exciting opportunities for challenging oppressive and unjust social orders 
and suggesting more emancipatory options for creating the world anew  – a world that 
is dynamic, fluid, unfinished and perpetually in the process of recreating itself.   
2.7 Social Constructionism and Discourse – Implications for My 
Research 
In this final section of the chapter, I consider the implications of adopting a theoretical 
framework comprising social constructionism and Foucauldian discourse for my thesis. 
Firstly, using the term ‘constructing’ rather than ‘knowing’ means that what the 
participants of research said does not represent the knowledge that they would have 
internalised from different sources like their social encounters, the media, and the 
school curricula. Their responses are treated as constructions that are socially, 
culturally and historically contingent. The fact that they engaged in these 
conversations in focus group settings as opposed to individual interviews or in their 
groups of friends would have had a significant effect on their responses. Moreover, the 
focus groups were facilitated by me, an adult, who would have been constructed as an 
authority figure, which, in turn, would have affected their talk.  
Secondly, adopting a social constructionist perspective means that analyzing what 
people, for example, the research participants and political leaders, say involves 
identifying and teasing out various discourses and versions of events they draw upon 
to construct their arguments. What people say, along with versions of accounts 
provided by the media, government declarations and policy statements and school 
textbooks and curricula arise from and contribute to socially constructed and culturally 
and historically located discourses.  
Thirdly, using Foucault’s idea of discourse equips me to analyse what the participants 
said in the context of the key discourses that they may have encountered. What 
people say is made possible by the discursive formations they inhabit and the 
discourses they may have had access to. Discourses create and shape the way we 
perceive ‘reality’ and give rise to the objects, concepts and categories of our world(s). 
By using this approach, one is alerted to the fact discourses are selective and operate 
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by silencing alternative ways of naming, categorizing and constructing other people, 
events and phenomena of the world. 
Finally, one needs to be cognizant of the relativism that emerges from social 
constructionism and the idea of discourse. Therefore, I acknowledge that the 
interpretations that I will make and the conclusions that I will draw from this study are 
contingent and located, significantly affected by the specific circumstances of this 
research, including the participants’ and my own life histories.  
Thus, taking with me the emancipatory impulse that my theoretical framework affords 
and tempered by the acknowledgement of the locatedness of my insights, in the next 
chapter, I analyse some key discourses that the participants of my research may have 
drawn upon while speaking about international conflicts. 
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3 Discourses of International Conflict 
In this chapter, I outline and briefly analyse some important discourses related to 
international conflicts that would potentially have been available to the participants of 
my research. As discussed in the previous chapter, I have used Foucault’s idea of 
discourse as one of the important theoretical strands in my thesis. In The Archaeology 
of Knowledge (1969/1989b), Foucault presents an elaborate conceptual architecture to 
explain and explicate the notion of discourse. From amongst these, I found the notions 
of episteme and discursive formation especially useful and have used these to 
construct a theoretical framework for this chapter. I suggest that the reasons for 
initiation of, and the processes involved in, the use of violence in international conflicts 
form a discursive formation. I start this chapter by arguing that the discourses of wars 
and international conflicts can be seen as originating at different time periods or 
epistemes and I have identified three distinct epistemes: Medieval Christianity (1st to 
14th century), marked by the dominance of natural and Divine law; Modernity (15th to 
late 20th century) influenced by the Scientific Revolution and the European 
Enlightenment; the Post-Cold War Period (1991 to present), ushered in as a result of 
the seismic changes in international geopolitics precipitated by the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and subsequently the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Centre 
and the Pentagon.  
The discourses that I analyse in this chapter were widely used within what I have 
referred to as the Post-Cold War Episteme. However, many of these discourses had 
their origins in earlier epistemes. For example, the discourse of protecting the 
innocents as a just cause of war, which can be traced back to Saint Ambrose of Milan, 
in the 4th century, was also used by President Bush for presenting the ‘war on terror’ as 
having just and legitimate cause. I analyse the discourses available to the young people 
who participated in my study by moving back and forth between these three 
epistemes. Since my purpose in doing so is to analyse the discourses that would have 
been available to the research participants, I am not structuring my discussion 
historically. Doing so would have resulted in repetition because many of the discourses 
appear in more than one epistemes. Instead, in this chapter, I have organised these 
discourses in four broad categories – the discourses of just causes of wars or jus ad 
40 
 
bellum1; the discourses of legitimate authority, the nation state and the international 
order; the discourses of ethical conduct of wars or jus in bello1; and the discourses of 
terrorism and Islamic terrorism.  I do this in order to cover many of the key discourses 
that were in wide circulation in Pakistan in the first decade of the 21st century and 
would have potentially been available to the young people who participated in my 
research. However, it would be pertinent to note that many of these discourses 
overlap and are closely related to one another and it was difficult to prise them apart 
and organise them in these broad categories, which, in the final analysis, are arbitrary 
and ad hoc.   In figure 3.2, I give examples of different discourses which would have 
been potentially available to my research participants and how they relate to the 
epistemic structure I have outlined above.  
3.1 The Discourses of Just Cause of War – Jus ad Bellum 
This section will briefly analyse a range of discourses that have been used to justify 
wars. I have identified these discourses by reviewing the arguments that Western 
politicians used to justify the ‘war on terror’.  The September 11 attacks were a big 
shock for the US. President Bush was swift in blaming Al-Qaeda for those atrocities and 
identifying the Taliban regime in Afghanistan as providing a safe haven for them. By 
declaring that the Taliban were protecting Al-Qaeda, who had attacked US, President 
Bush, drawing on the discourses of just cause of war, presented the decision to invade 
Afghanistan as legitimate and justified. He constructed the Afghan invasion as having a 
just cause because, firstly, its purpose was to redress harm caused to innocent people, 
secondly, it aimed to punish the perpetrators, who were the wrongdoers, thirdly, it 
would help fight ‘evil’, and, fourthly, not doing so would have resulted in more attacks 
in the future. Hence, the invasion constituted self-defence, which made it a just war. 
These discourses are discussed in subsequent sub-sections. However, these are not the 
only discourses of just causes of war used around this time. 
  
                                                             
1 The Latin terms jus ad bellum and jus in bello are of relatively recent origin. Kolb (1997) posits that the 
terms began appearing formally in literature during the 1930s. However, the ethical principles that 
these represent can be traced back to ancient Greek and Roman civilizations.  
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Figure3.2: Epistemes Related to Discourses of International Conflicts 
  
The Medieval Christian Episteme of discourses related to wars and international 
conflicts                                                                                                                     
Examples of key discourses:  
 Just Causes of War: protecting the innocent; punishing the wrongdoer; fight 
between good and evil; self-defence; doing justice and establishing peace 
 Ethical warfare: the rights of the enemy combatants; preventing harm to 
non-combatants 
 
 
The Modern Episteme of discourses related to wars and international conflicts 
Examples of key discourses:                                                                                           
 Just Cause(s) of War: self-defence 
 Legitimate Authority: the nation state; national sovereignty; the 
international legal order 
 Ethical Warfare: the rights of enemy combatants; permissible weapons; 
preventing harm to non-combatants; collateral damage; supreme 
emergency 
 
 
The Discursive Formation of Wars and International Conflicts 
The Post Cold-War Episteme of discourses related to wars and international 
conflicts                                                                                                                         
Examples of key discourses: 
 Just Causes of War: self-defence; protecting the innocent; doing justice and 
establishing peace, humanitarian intervention; terrorism; pre-emptive 
strikes; establishing democracy; upholding human rights and freedom; 
American imperialism 
 Ethical Warfare: preventing harm to non-combatants; collateral damage; 
supreme emergency 
Discourses of international conflicts potentially available to 
research participants 
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In 2003, President Bush, supported by Prime Minister Blair, as part of the on-going 
‘war on terror’ attacked Iraq without approval from the Security Council. This led to 
widespread criticism of the ‘war on terror’ in general and the invasion of Iraq in 
particular. The Invasion of Iraq was criticised on the grounds that it was not authorised 
by the legitimate authority – the Security Council. The discourse of legitimate authority 
comprises another just cause of war. Many people also criticised the invasion of Iraq 
because, according to them, all other avenues to resolve the issue related to the 
country’s stock of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) had not been exhausted. This 
criticism of the war drew on the discourse of war as a last resort. Moreover, critics 
argued that Iraq had not attacked the US and its invasion did not constitute self-
defence. In order to justify the Iraq war, President Bush drew on the discourse of pre-
emptive strike. Finally, in order to present the invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq 
as just President Bush also drew on the discourse of humanitarian intervention which 
included establishing democracy, promoting human rights and upholding freedom. I 
now briefly analyse each of these discourses of just cause of war in turn. 
 The Discourse of Protecting the Innocent 3.1.1
President Bush (e.g. 2001a and 2001c) while paving the way for the ‘war on terror’, 
constructed the September 11 attacks as driven by an evil ideology bent upon 
murdering innocent people going about their daily lives. Drawing on the discourse of 
protecting the innocent, he said that ‘the government has a responsibility to protect 
our citizens’ (Bush, 2001b). The discourse of protecting the innocent from harm as a 
just cause of war has a long history and was first used by Saint Ambrose, the 
Archbishop of Milan, in the 4th century (Christopher, 2004).  This discourse was also 
used in the Modern Episteme in the writing of the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius about just 
causes of war (Christopher, 2004) and, subsequently, in the Charter of the United 
Nations (1945), through its commitment to uphold human rights. In the Post-Cold War 
Episteme, the discourse to protect the innocent was reinforced during the tenure of 
Kofi Annan as the Secretary General of the United Nations with the publication of the 
influential report The Responsibility to Protect by The International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001).   
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 The Discourse of Punishing the Wrongdoers 3.1.2
President Bush (2001b) in order to justify the ‘war on terror’ used the discourse of 
punishing the wrongdoers, whether they were non-state actors or regimes harbouring 
them: 
If any government sponsors the outlaws and killers of innocents, they have 
become outlaws and murderers, themselves. And they will take that lonely 
path at their own peril. . . The only way to pursue peace is to pursue those 
who threaten it. 
The discourse of punishing wrongdoers can be traced back to the episteme of 
medieval Christianity. It was Saint Ambrose who used the discourse of punishing the 
wrongdoers. He cited David who entrusted the task of avenging the murder of his 
enemy Abner to his own son and, as such, risked his life because for him ‘the death of 
an innocent man should not be left unavenged’ (Ambrose, 4th century/2004: book II, 
Chapter VII, 33). Saint Augustine too used the discourse of punishing the wrongdoers 
and avenging the wrong done by them (Christopher, 2004). Saint Thomas Aquinas also 
used the discourse of punishing the wrongdoer as he ‘is dangerous to the community . 
. . [and] it is praiseworthy and wholesome that he be slain . . .’ (Aquinas, 13th century/ 
2007: 68). Tony Blair (2001), like President Bush, drew on the discourse of punishing 
the wrongdoers in the wake of the September 11 attacks, and argued that ‘We must 
bring Bin Laden and other Al Qaida leaders to justice and eliminate the terrorist threat 
they pose’. Thus, the discourse of punishing wrongdoers was used by both President 
Bush and Prime Minister Blair to present the ‘war on terror’ as having a just cause. 
However, it is interesting to note that this discourse was not frequently drawn on in 
late Modern Episteme, which was largely defined by the legalist framework that 
underpinned the charter of the United Nations (O’Driscoll, 2008).   
 The Discourse of Fight between Good and Evil 3.1.3
Another discourse that President Bush (2002c) used extensively to present the ‘war on 
terror’ as having a just cause was that of the fight between good and evil:  
There can be no neutrality between justice and cruelty, between the innocent 
and the guilty. We are in a conflict between good and evil. And America will 
call evil by its name.                                                                                             
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Kellner (2007: 626) argues that President Bush used a ‘Manichean discourse to 
construct an “Evil Other”’. This discourse of a fight between good and evil has its roots 
in the just war discourses of Medieval Christian Episteme. Saint Augustine maintained 
that one of the most important just causes of wars was to ensure the triumph of good 
over evil (Christopher, 2004). For Saint Augustine, there were two types of humans 
being in the world – those who have been ‘granted efficacious grace’ and are driven by 
a love of God and those who are devoid of the efficacious grace and are driven by self-
love (Christopher, 2004: 32). This binary division of humanity into good and evil was 
frequently echoed in President Bush’s articulation of the discourses related to the ‘war 
on terror’. The discourse of a fight between good and evil is essentially a discourse of 
the Medieval Christian Episteme and was rarely drawn upon in the Modern Episteme, 
which was marked by the dominance of international legal order. O’Driscoll (2008) 
argues that President Bush and Prime Minister Blair frequently drew on medieval 
Christian discourses of just war, sidestepping the multilateral, legalist discourses of late 
modernity, most notably enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations (1945). 
O’Driscoll (2008: 97-8) writes:  
Bush regularly refers to the war on terror in sweeping, moralistic overtones 
that make recourse to the rhetoric of good and evil and even divine 
providence. 
Thus, the discourse of fighting evil formed an important strand in President Bush’s 
rhetoric on ‘war on terrorism’, and would have been potentially available to my 
research participants.  
 The Discourse of Self-Defence 3.1.4
The next key discourse that President Bush drew on to offer a just cause for his 
invasions of various countries of the world, as part of the ‘war on terror’, was that of 
self-defence. In 2006, he said:  
With the twin towers and the Pentagon still smoldering, our country on edge, 
and a stream of intelligence coming in about potential new attacks, my 
administration faced immediate challenges. We had to respond to the attack 
on our country. We had to wage an unprecedented war against an enemy 
unlike any we had fought before. We had to find the terrorists hiding in 
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America and across the world before they were able to strike our country 
again.                                                                                   (Bush, 2006) 
The discourse of self-defence as a just cause of war is a very important one and has 
existed in all three epistemes. In the Medieval Christian Episteme, it was first cited as a 
just cause of war by Saint Ambrose (4th century/2004:129) who said: ‘For courage, 
which in war preserves one’s country from the barbarians, or at home defends the 
weak, or comrades from robbers, is full of justice . . .’ 
Like Saint Ambrose, Saint Augustine also approved acts of violence in situations 
involving self-defence. In the Medieval Christian Episteme, self-defence was seen as a 
valid cause of war fought either to save the country or other members of the 
community against aggression, because acts of violence in defence of one’s 
community were driven by the love of God. In contrast, acts of aggression in personal 
self-defence were not acceptable because they were considered to be driven by self-
love (Christopher, 2004).   
At the start of the Modern Episteme, Vitoria – considered alongside Hugo Grotius the 
father of international law – suggested that self-defence constituted a just cause of 
war (Zapatero, 2009). Grotius (17th century/2001: 19) also drew on the discourse of 
self-defence and presented it as one of the main just causes of war:  
For the preservation of our lives and persons, which is the end of war . . .  is 
most suitable to [those] principles of nature, and to use force, if necessary, for 
those occasions, is no way dissonant to the principles of nature . . . 
Self-defence, indeed, constituted the most important discourse of just cause in the late 
Modern Episteme and was reflected in the Covenant of the League of Nations 
(1919/1924) and was subsequently enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations 
(United Nations, 1945: Article 51). Thus, self-defence was seen as a justifiable reason 
for a country to fight in the face of aggression perpetrated by another state. 
President Bush (2006) drew on the discourse of self-defence, among others, for 
attacking Afghanistan (Glen, 2009). However, he was using this discourse in a different 
context, because what he was proposing to do was to attack a country in retaliation for 
an attack by non-state terrorist agents. The country and its regime had not directly 
attacked the US. Thus, arguably the invasion of Afghanistan contravened the UN 
Charter and gave rise to discussions about the legitimacy of this action. For example, 
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Dorn (2011: 246) remarks that ‘the singular focus on defeating terrorists may have 
received a high mark in and of itself [on the just war criteria], the inclusion of removing 
a regime [the Taliban] is less just.’ Similarly, in the context of invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
Glen (2009:316) maintains that the principle of self-defence ‘was reinterpreted and 
significantly altered’. Grotius (cited in Dallmayr, 2004: 273) suggested that all acts of 
war, initiated on the pretext of self-defence needed to be assessed against rigorous 
criteria in order to ‘ward off frivolous abuse of this justification’. Notwithstanding the 
debates that whether the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq by the US-led coalition 
were just, the discourse of self-defence is an important one and is stated in the UN 
Charter as the only justified cause for a nation-state to resort to use of force against 
another sovereign state, and, as I have shown, President Bush frequently drew on this 
discourse to present the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as having a just cause. 
 The Discourse of War as a Means to do Justice and Establish Peace 3.1.5
In order to present the ‘war on terror’,  initiated in the wake of the September 11 
attacks, as a just war, President Bush and Prime Minister Blair both drew on the twin 
discourses of doing justice and establishing peace. The two discourses were closely 
linked together in the Medieval Christian Episteme because doing justice, which 
entailed use of violence in wars, was seen as a means of establishing peace, which 
Saint Augustine (cited in O’Driscoll, 2008: 94) referred to as Tranquillitas Ordinas.  
President Bush (2001a), while addressing the joint session of the Congress on 
September 20, 2001, emphasised the need for doing justice and said: ‘Whether we 
bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done’.  
O’Driscoll (2008:  97) argues that this discourse of doing justice has its origin in ‘the 
biblical injunction of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth’. President Bush in an 
interview with Woodward (2004: 279) said: ‘Going into this period, I was praying for 
strength to do the Lord’s will . . . I pray that I be as good a messenger of His will as 
possible.’ 
O’Driscoll (2008: 100) argues that this discourse of vindictive justice goes back to the 
early Medieval Christian Episteme ‘and is ultimately derived from St. Paul’s 
proclamation (Romans 13:4) that the prince (or the state leader) is the minister of God 
to execute His wrath upon the evildoer’. Saint Ambrose of Milan (cited in Christopher, 
2004) considered justice to be one of the highest virtues and constituted a just cause 
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of war. In the Medieval Christian Episteme doing justice by punishing the wrongdoers 
was seen as the means of establishing peace of earth. And President Bush often drew 
on these twin discourses and portrayed the ‘war on terror’ as a vehicle for carrying out 
vindictive justice to establish peace in the US and the wider world. In a press 
conference in 2002, he said: 
There should be no doubt in anybody's mind, this man [Saddam Hussein] is 
thumbing his nose at the world, that he has gassed his own people, that he is 
trouble in his neighborhood, that he desires weapons of mass destruction. I 
will use all the latest intelligence to make informed decisions about how best 
to keep the world at peace, how best to defend freedom for the long run. 
                  (Bush, 2002a) 
The discourse of creating peace, not just for the US, but, for the region and ultimately 
the whole world, constructed a moral burden for his office, and created a moral 
imperative for him to respond urgently to. In order to present the ‘war on terror’ as 
just, President Bush drew directly on the Medieval Christian Episteme’s discourse of 
establishing peace in civitas terrena – the earthly abode of humans. It is interesting to 
juxtapose President Bush’s discourse of establishing peace with what Saint Augustine 
(4/5th century/1887: 377) wrote: 
A great deal depends on the causes for which men undertake wars, and on the 
authority they have for doing so; the natural order which seeks the peace of 
mankind, ordains that the monarch should have the power of undertaking war 
if he thinks it advisable . . . 
As the above excerpts illustrate and as discussed in an earlier section, President Bush’s 
rhetoric on ‘war on terror’ drew significantly on the discourses of just wars of Medieval 
Christian Episteme (O’Driscoll, 2008: 98).  
 The Discourse of War as the Last Resort 3.1.6
The 2003 invasion of Iraq by the ‘coalition of the willing’ (Enemark & Michaelsen, 
2005: 546) led by the US was criticised by people by who drew on the discourse of war 
as the last resort.  When President Bush and Prime Minister Blair decided to invade 
Iraq in 2003, the UN weapons inspectors were still in the country and they were not 
given a chance to complete their work. Enemark & Michaelsen (2005: 561) write: 
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At a Security Council briefing two weeks prior to the invasion [of Iraq], chief 
UN weapons inspector Hans Blix pleaded for “a few more months” to 
complete the inspectors’ mission and bring about a peaceful resolution of the 
stand-off with Iraq. 
Within the modern discourses of just causes of war there is a presumption that peace 
is a desirable and normal state of affairs in the international arena. This presumption is 
reflected in the discourse of war as the last resort which entails that even if all other 
just causes of war exist, resort to violence should be made only if all other avenues for 
peaceful resolution of pending issues have been exhausted and found ineffective 
(Enemark & Michaelsen, 2005). This discourse of war as the last resort did not exist per 
se in the Medieval Christian Episteme. We get only a tangential reference to it in the 
discourse of the necessity to declare wars in advance of the initiation of actual 
hostilities in the writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas (Christopher, 2004). The 
implications of this discourse are that ‘the very act of declaration invites the second 
party to the pending hostilities the opportunity to offer redress in lieu of war’ 
(Christopher, 2004: 51).  
The discourse of war as the last resort was alluded to by Vitoria, writing at the 
threshold of the Modern Episteme, in his three canons of war (cited in Christopher, 
2004: 58). He maintained ‘only under compulsion and reluctantly should he [the 
prince] come to the necessity of war’. Thus, in Vitoria’s view, for a war to be just, it had 
to be initiated after careful deliberation and once all other options for peaceful 
resolution of the issues had failed.  
Grotius too, writing in the early Modern Episteme, used the discourse of war as the 
last resort.  For Grotius (17th century/2001: 234-5), war was an action of such ‘weighty 
magnitude’ that all peaceful options must be first tried and wherever possible one 
must ‘incline in favour of peace’. He suggested that belligerent parties should try to 
avoid violence by exploring the methods of conference, compromise, fortune and 
single combat. Only once all these avenues had been exhausted and found of no use, 
should they choose the option of war. 
This discourse of war as the last resort was a key tenet of The Covenant of League of 
Nations (The League of Nations, 1919/1924) and became enshrined in International 
Law in the Charter of the UN (United Nations, 1945: Article 2: 3): 
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All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in 
such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not 
endangered. 
Thus, the discourse of war as the last resort was the key discourse in the Modern 
Episteme, especially the Charter of the United Nations. Therefore, when the ‘coalition 
of the willing’ invaded Iraq, without waiting for all options to be exhausted, especially 
before the publication of the report of the UN weapons inspectors, it led to 
widespread criticism of their actions and the critics were primarily drawing on the 
discourse of war as the last resort. From my own experience of living in Pakistan at 
that time, I know that this discourse was in wide circulation there.  
 The Discourse of Preventive Attack 3.1.7
In 2003, the ‘coalition of the willing’ (Enemark & Michaelsen, 2005: 546) led by the US 
attacked Iraq. One of the main reasons that President Bush (2003) cited for attacking 
the country was its regime’s capability to inflict serious harm to American interests: 
Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the 
Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal 
weapons ever devised . . . The danger is clear . . . The United States of America 
has the sovereign authority to use force in assuring its own national security. 
That duty falls to me, as Commander-in-Chief, by the oath I have sworn, by 
the oath I will keep. 
According to President Bush (2003) and Prime Minister Blair (2003), the main reason 
for invading Iraq, even without Security Council approval, was the possession of WMD 
by Saddam’s regime and the potential threat these posed to the US and Western 
interests generally. However, the Iraqi regime had not carried out any act of aggression 
against US. Hence, the US strikes against the regime constituted preventive self-
defence (Kastenberg, 2004). The discourse of preventive attacks also underpinned The 
National Security Strategy of the United States of America (The White House, 2002: 
15):  
The United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in 
the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s 
threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our 
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adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our 
enemies strike first. 
Although the discourse of preventive attacks did not exist per se in the Medieval 
Christian Episteme, non-retaliatory acts of violence were not necessarily seen as 
unjust. For Saint Thomas Aquinas, the war carried out by a Christian ruler represented 
Divine will. The ruler could, if he deemed appropriate, wage a war to ‘achieve peace’ 
on earth (Christopher, 2004: 36). Thus, rather than being contingent on objective 
criteria, wars ‘become just based on the command of the ruler’ (Christopher, 2004: 
37). President Bush’s rhetoric of his duty as the commander-in-chief of the American 
army was reminiscent of the Divine duty of the ruler posited by Saint Thomas Aquinas, 
which included preventatively punishing the reprobate in order to establish peace on 
earth (Christopher, 2004). Thus, the discourse of establishing peace of the Medieval 
Christian Episteme could be used to justify preventative strikes and was used by 
President Bush while justifying the decision to invade Iraq in 2003. 
At the beginning of the Modern Episteme, Vitoria posited that offensive as well as 
defensive wars could be just. For Vitoria (Kinsella and Carr, 2007: 56), just causes of 
war could include: 
. . . avenging previous injustices, punishing wrongdoers, and protecting 
themselves [states] against tyrants who might otherwise threaten them with 
impunity. 
President Bush’s discourse of punishing Saddam Hussein, who, he claimed, had 
amassed and was concealing a stockpile of WMD chimes with Vitoria’s discourse of 
offensive wars against tyrants who could potentially pose a threat to the invading 
state.  
Unlike Vitoria, Grotius did not posit prevention of possible future harm as a just cause 
of war. He (Grotius, 17th century/2007: 82-3) dismissed the premise of preventive war: 
. . . to maintain that the bare probability of some remote, or future annoyance 
from a neighbouring state affords a just ground of hostile aggression, is a 
doctrine repugnant to every principle of equity. 
Generally speaking in the Modern Episteme, the discourse of preventive attacks was 
not widely used and does not figure either in the Covenant of the League of Nations 
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(The League of Nations, 1919/1924) or the Charter of the United Nations (1945). 
Notwithstanding the absence of the discourse of preventive attacks in modern 
international law, Delahunty and Yoo (2009) argue that this discourse had been quite 
common in the statements of senior US politicians throughout the 20th century. They 
write (Delahunty & Yoo, 2009: 853):  
A succession of twentieth-century American Presidents also announced 
“doctrines” of preventive intervention. These included Theodore Roosevelt 
(through Secretary of State Henry Stimson), Harry Truman, Dwight 
Eisenhower, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald 
Reagan. 
However, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, predicated on a discourse of preventive attacks, 
was widely criticised across the world because in the international law there is no 
provision to attack a sovereign state on the basis of the possibility of future harm that 
it might inflict on the invading state. From my own experience, I am aware that the 
discourse of preventive attacks adopted by the US establishment in the wake of 
September 11 attacks was widely criticised in Pakistan. 
 The Discourse of Promoting Democracy 3.1.8
In addition to the discourse of preventive attack, discussed in the previous section, 
another discourse that both President Bush and Prime Minister Blair used, especially in 
the context of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, was that of promoting democracy in failed 
states controlled by autocratic regimes (Monten, 2005; Chomsky, 2006; Acharya, 
2007). Monten (2005: 112) writes: 
The promotion of democracy is central to the George W. Bush 
administration’s prosecution of both the war on terrorism and its overall 
grand strategy, in which it is assumed that U.S. political and security interests 
are advanced by the spread of liberal political institutions and values abroad. 
The National Security Strategy of the US (The White House 2002: Introduction by 
President George W Bush), commonly known as the Bush Doctrine, made promotion 
of democracy a key strand of the wider ‘war on terror’ by ‘actively work[ing] to bring 
the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of 
the world’. 
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The discourse of promoting democracy did not exist in the Medieval Christian 
Episteme. This discourse emerged in the Modern Episteme, almost exclusively, as part 
of the discourse of US ‘liberal exceptionalism’ – a discourse that posits the US as a 
unique political project committed to, besides other things, ‘long-term promotion of 
democratic change’ (Monten, 2005:113). However, it was only in the Post-Cold War 
Episteme that the discourse of promoting democracy acquired an explicitly central 
position in the US foreign policy and was used to justify the invasion of Iraq and the 
wider ‘war on terror’. Notwithstanding President Bush and Prime Minister Blair’s 
rhetoric of bringing democracy to the peoples of Afghanistan and Iraq, these invasions 
were criticised by ordinary people and scholars (e.g. Leaman, 2004; Chomsky, 2006; 
Mazari, 2008a; Acharya, 2007) on the grounds that these were carried out for ulterior 
purposes. This will be discussed in greater detail in later sections. 
 Discussion – Discourses of Just Causes of War or Jus ad Bellum 3.1.9
In this section, I have discussed some discourses of just causes of war which were 
drawn upon by key Western politicians, as well as their critics, to justify and criticise, 
respectively, the ‘war on terror’. However, many wars have been fought in the world 
which could not be justified by drawing on any of these discourses. For example, many 
international conflicts, especially colonial exploits, were driven by economic interests. 
De Sousa (2008: 61) writes: 
Modern colonialism was grounded in economic exploitation: a central reason 
for establishing colonial rule was that the colonies would supply raw materials 
to and provide captive markets for the metropolitan center. 
However, in none of the three epistemes of international conflicts, posited in this 
thesis, one finds discourses that justify wars fought for economic gain or advantage. 
Notwithstanding the underlying economic interest, the legitimacy of imperial 
expansions was often argued by using the discourses of bringing civilization, education 
and development to the colonized people. Many writers (e.g. Ferguson, 2004; Flint & 
Falah, 2004; Leaman, 2004; Chomsky, 2006; Adriaensens & Baker, 2012) have 
suggested that the US in the 20th century has acted as an imperial power and many 
international conflicts in which it has had a stake were actually driven by economic 
interests. These issues will be discussed in greater detail in a later section. Flint and 
Falah (2004: 1380-1) argue that the members of the US establishment used the 
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discourses of just causes of war as a façade for many of the country’s foreign exploits 
because:      
If the hegemonic power is unable to demonstrate such justness then its extra-
territoriality risks being perceived as an imperial project, which is in itself a 
rejection of the accepted just interaction of sovereign states. 
Thus, pursuing economic interests does not constitute a discourse of just cause for 
using violence in the international arena.  
Another contentious motivation for use of violence relates to furthering and imposing 
a religious ideology. As I have discussed earlier, the Medieval Christian Episteme was 
replete with discourses of just war that were predicated on religious precepts and 
ideology. For example, in the Medieval Christian Episteme, one set of wars that were 
fought expressly for religious purposes comprised the crusades initiated by Pope 
Urban II in 1095 (Chevedden, 2013).  Similarly, in the Medieval Episteme various 
Muslim rulers from amongst the Rashidun caliphs and the Ummayyad and Abbasid 
dynasties, fought wars that were driven by a desire to expand the outreach of the 
religion and extend the frontiers of the Islamic Empire (Eamonn, 2011).  However, not 
many of the wars fought in this period were driven by a desire for expansion of religion 
per se (Sorensen, 2013). 
In contrast to the above, in the Modern Episteme one hardly finds any discourses of 
just wars that had religious bases. An exception to this general trend was the discourse 
of converting the heathens to Christianity that at times was used as one of the reasons 
for colonizing countries in Asia and Africa. The main reason for the absence of 
discourses with religious bases in the Modern Episteme was that this period coincided 
with the emergence of the international system that was based on a secular world-
view. This will be discussed in greater detail in one of the later sections. 
In the Post-Cold War Episteme, religious discourses related to use of violence in 
national and international affairs emerged with a force never seen before (Haynes, 
2007/2013). This was especially true in the context of rise of Islamic militancy in the 
last decade of the 20th century that reached its climax in the September 11 attacks on 
the US in 2001. Whether the main Islamic militant groups profess and aim to resort to 
violence against other sovereign states to enforce their own religious ideologies on 
them is a moot point. Soherwordi, Ashraf and Khattak (2012) argue that the Afghan 
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Taliban have been mainly driven by a desire to purge the Pashtun society of corruption 
and violence that took hold of Afghanistan as a result of the conflicts that broke out 
between local warlords after the Soviet withdrawal in 1988. Their narrow and rigid 
interpretation of Islam and its enforcement were confined to the Pashtun areas. 
Similarly, the main aim of Al-Qaeda after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, 
according to Burke (cited in Soherwordi, Ashraf and Khattak, 2012: 350), was to create 
a force for ‘defending Muslims from oppression’. It can be argued that religion, at best, 
forms only one of the reasons for the actions of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, as many of 
their demands are of a political rather than religious nature. Thus, even in the Post-
Cold War Episteme in which there has been marked by a resurgence of religious 
discourses in international politics, discourses that justify wars fought for imposing 
religious ideologies on the followers of other religions in foreign territories are rare. 
Even if the belligerent party has a religious motive or is driven by a strong religious 
ideology, as in the case of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, they tend to, at least partly, draw 
on secular political discourses to make their case more acceptable and appealing to 
the wider world.  
This section, then, has shown that those initiating wars have drawn on a wide range of 
discourses to establish their legitimacy. However it has been widely argued that in 
many cases these discourses have been used to conceal other motivations which were 
less just or ‘legitimate’. Another key aspect of discourses of just cause of war is the 
legitimacy of the authority initiating the war. The next section deals with this. 
3.2 The Discourses of the Legitimate Authority – the Nation State and 
the International System 
In this section, I consider the authorities that can declare a legitimate war – that is, 
nation states and international organisations. Thus, I begin by briefly outlining socio-
political circumstances, which, at the beginning of the Modern Episteme, led to 
emergence of the notion of the nation-state and the accompanying international 
order. I then analyse the discourse of national sovereignty which lies at the very core 
of the ideas of the nation-state and the international system. Next, I discuss the 
discourse of international legal order that began emerging with the creation of the 
system of sovereign nation-states and got consolidated with the birth of international 
law and supranational organisations such as the United Nations around the middle of 
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the 20th century. After this, I consider various characteristics of modern nation states 
which are related to the causes of and justifications for recent international conflicts. I 
discuss two contrasting discourses – the discourse of secular nationalism and the 
discourse of religion in national and international politics. I conclude this section with a 
brief analysis of the discourse of American Imperialism which has posed significant 
challenges for national sovereignty of individual nation-states and the supremacy of 
the system of international law predicated on a network of supranational 
organisations. 
 The Discourse of the Nation State and National Sovereignty 3.2.1
The discourse of a nation-state, as we understand it today, did not exist in all periods 
of history (Devetak, 2012). The discourse of a nation state, in its current form, 
emerged in the Modern Episteme and is crucial for understanding the complex 
economy of discourses and discursive practices related to international conflicts. Tilly 
(1985: 170) defines a nation-state as a collection of: 
. . . relatively centralized, differentiated organizations the officials of which 
more or less successfully claim control over the chief concentrated means of 
violence within a population inhabiting a large, contiguous territory. 
During the Middle Ages, the situation was, however, quite different. State power in 
Europe was distributed and contested amongst a number of individuals and 
institutions including the kings, princes, the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor. 
According to Devetak (2012: 137), during that period, Europe ‘looked like a patchwork 
quilt of overlapping and intersecting layers of power, authority and allegiance’. The 
relationship between political power and geographical territory was not as clear cut 
and well-defined as is the case in modern nation states. This lack of a clear centre of 
power and authority partly explains the frequent, almost incessant, conflicts that 
ravaged medieval Europe. The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 marked the end of the 
Thirty Years War in Europe – the longest running large scale conflict in recent times 
(Mingst, 2008).  The Treaty of Westphalia, thus, became a defining moment in world 
politics that heralded the emergence of important political discourses that we have 
come to associate with idea of the modern nation state. A key discourse that emerged 
from the Treaty of Westphalia was that of national sovereignty, which located the right 
to the use of force within a given geographical territory, almost exclusively, in the 
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person of the monarch or the secular ruler. This discourse also constructed the 
monarch or the sovereign ruler as the legitimate authority who could declare war on 
another nation, under certain circumstances.  Thus, discourse of national sovereignty 
is central to understanding the dynamics of international conflicts in the context of my 
research and is discussed in greater detail in the next sub-section. 
When I carried out the fieldwork for my research, the discourse of national sovereignty 
was widely used in Pakistan. Many Pakistanis felt that as a result of joining the ‘war on 
terror’, the government of Pakistan had ceded a significant part of its sovereignty to 
the US. Mazari (2009g: no page number) a well-known international relations scholar 
and writer in a newspaper article demanded that: 
If the credibility of the government and the establishment is to be re-
established, they [the ruling party] must first come clean on the extent of the 
sovereignty already surrendered to the US. Then they must delink from the US 
and claim back the lost sovereignty before it is too late.  
Drone attacks in the tribal regions of Pakistan, which the US government claimed were 
targeted against terrorists hiding in the area, were seen by many Pakistanis as unfair 
and as an invasion of Pakistan’s national sovereignty. As discussed earlier, the invasion 
of Iraq in 2003 by the US, without Security Council approval, was also discussed very 
often at that time and was cited as another instance of the violation of a country’s 
sovereignty by the US. Thus, many actions taken by the US government after the 
September 11 attacks were criticised by Pakistanis, drawing on the discourse of 
national sovereignty.   
The discourse of national sovereignty per se did not exist in the Medieval Christian 
Episteme. It can be traced back to the early part of the Modern Episteme in the Six 
Books on the Commonwealth by Jean Bodin, a 16th century French political 
philosopher. Bodin (1576/1967: 25) defines sovereignty as the ‘absolute and perpetual 
power vested in a commonwealth’. He goes on to say that sovereignty is: 
. . . the distinguishing mark of the sovereign that he cannot in any way be 
subject to the commands of another, for it is he who makes law for the 
subject, abrogates law already made, and amends obsolete law. No one who 
is subject either to the law or to some other person can do this. 
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Hobbes, a 17th century English philosopher, further developed the discourse of 
sovereignty in his book the Leviathan (1651), where we get the first glimpse of the 
discourse of national sovereignty as we understand it today. He maintained that 
before the formation of the state, human beings existed in a state of anarchy. In order 
to create civic order and peace every member of society makes a covenant with every 
other member, whereby each one of them gives up the right of self-governing in 
favour of one person or group people who are invested, by popular will, with ‘so much 
power and strength’ that ‘by terror thereof, he is enabled to form the wills of them all, 
to peace at home, and mutual aid against their enemies abroad’ (Hobbes, 1651: 106). 
This contract amongst the members of the ‘Commonwealth’ thus creates the person of 
sovereign. Thus, according to Hobbes, the discourse of state sovereignty posits it as a 
contract amongst individual people and the state, usually represented by the person of 
the sovereign, which for Hobbes (1651: 106) is the ‘mortal god to which we owe, under 
the immortal God, our peace and defence’. For Hobbes (1651: 106): 
…sovereignty [includes] the right of making war and peace with other nations 
and Commonwealths; that is to say, of judging when it is for the public good, 
and how great forces are to be assembled, armed, and paid for that end, and 
to levy money upon the subjects to defray the expenses thereof. 
Thus, for Hobbes sovereignty not only entailed unfettered power within the dominion 
but it also conferred on the person of sovereign the right to judge when it was prudent 
and right to declare war on another commonwealth or geographical dominion.    
The discourse of national sovereignty, which emerged in the wake of the Treaty of 
Westphalia, located the control of a specific geographical territory in the person of the 
monarch and vested in him exclusively the right to use violence within his given 
geographical dominion. This right is referred to as autonomy and is predicated on the 
principle of non-interference by any external agent (Krasner, 1995). Therefore, 
sovereign authority and territorial control became coterminous in the discourse of 
national sovereignty, which has become the sine qua non of the modern state 
(Devetak, 2012). 
The discourse of national sovereignty forms an important component of the Charter of 
the United Nations (1945). Article 2 of the Charter states: ‘The Organization is based 
on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.’ The discourse of national 
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sovereignty entails that every member state of the United Nations will be considered 
fully competent and independent to deal with issues internal to its geographical 
borders (Krasner, 1995; Cohan, 2006; Acharya, 2007; Mingst, 2008; Devetak, 2012, 
United Nations, 1945). Any intrusion into the internal affairs of the state by another 
state is considered a violation of its national sovereignty. Thus, the discourse of 
national sovereignty and its violation by US under the pretext of ‘war on terror’ were 
highly topical in Pakistan when I carried out the fieldwork for my study and, as such, 
would potentially have been available to the young people who participated in my 
study.  
 The Discourse of International Legal Order 3.2.2
The previous section has shown that leader of each nation state has the legitimate 
authority to declare war on another state. However, this authority has been to some 
extent curtailed by international agreements. This section discusses the discourse of 
international legal order.  The international legal order, that characterised the Modern 
Episteme, began to emerge in the in the wake of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and 
was marked by discourses of autonomy, territorial integrity, non-intervention and 
national sovereignty of individual states and focused on their relationship with other 
sovereign states (Devetak, 2012; Rothwell, 2012). Rothwell (2012: 232) writes: 
From the seventeenth century onwards international law continued to 
develop with a principal focus upon the core relationships that at the time 
existed between states such as trade and commerce, boundaries and 
territoriality, war and peace. 
However, this early system of international law based on the Westphalian discourses 
did not prove sufficient to prevent states from attacking each other. The horrors of the 
First World War led many world leaders to think about creating an international 
system that might prove effective in preventing similar international conflicts in the 
future. This desire led to the creation of the The League of Nations in 1920 (Rothwell, 
2012). The most significant development in the system of international law occurred 
with the creation of the United Nations in 1945. Because the formation of the United 
Nations was a direct response to the atrocities of the two World Wars, its Charter 
emphasises the organisation’s role in arbitrating disputes between sovereign states, 
according to international law:  
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The Purposes of the United Nations are: 
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take 
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the 
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the 
peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the 
principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of 
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of peace.   
                  (United Nations, 1945: Article 1) 
Thus, the discourse of international legal order, enshrined most pre-eminently in the 
Charter of the United Nations is a very important one. As discussed in the previous 
sub-section many critics of the ‘war on terror’, especially the invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
drew on the discourse of international legal order that confers the status of legitimate 
authority for declaring wars on the Security Council of the United Nations. I have 
found, from my experience of living in both countries, that the discourse of 
international legal order is more widely used in Pakistan than in England.  This is 
because the United Nations occupies a special place in the Pakistani imagination. The 
reason for this is that the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution to 
resolve the longstanding Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India through a 
plebiscite – an option much favoured by Pakistan and opposed by India because of its 
expected likely outcome. School textbooks and popular media often refer to this 
resolution by drawing on the discourse of international legal order, which posits the 
UN as the supreme arbiter of international disputes. 
 The Discourse of Legitimate Authority 3.2.3
The previous sections have shown that both the nation state and the international 
order, symbolised by the UN, can be seen as legitimate authorities for declaring 
initiating international hostilities. This section further discusses the tension between 
the two. On March 20, 2003 the US and UK launched an attack on Iraq because of its 
failure to comply ‘fully’ with the demands of the Security Council to destroy its 
stockpile of chemical and biological weapons. This invasion led to widespread criticism 
because it was carried out without a mandate from the Security Council (Glen, 2009). 
This criticism was predicated on the international consensual discourse of 
circumscribed, legalist justum bellum that underpinned the Charter of the United 
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Nations. The Charter of the United Nations acted as a constraint on Westphalian 
sovereignty by appropriating for the Security Council the role of the legitimate 
authority that could approve and initiate the use of force against a sovereign member 
state. However, in the wake of the September 11 attacks, the US adopted the 
discourse of unilateralism instead of multilateralism, whereby it appropriated the right 
to act on its own if it deemed necessary for its strategic national interests (Glen, 2009). 
The 20th century saw the emergence and consolidation of the discourse of 
multilateralism in international politics whereby the UN Security Council and earlier 
the Council of the League of Nations constituted the legitimate authority to approve 
the declaration and initiation of the use of force against a sovereign member state: 
. . . the concept of legitimate authority has traditionally been tied to the 
principle of state sovereignty, the founding of the United Nations altered this 
relationship with regard to war. By signing the Charter, states agreed that they 
will seek and obtain Security Council authorization before initiating conflict, 
notwithstanding the self-defense exception.            (Glen, 2009: 317) 
Thus, the unilateral decision by the US, supported by the UK, to attack Iraq came as a 
shock to many and was widely criticised (Glen, 2009). The critics of the Iraq war drew 
on the discourse of legitimate authority, which, as discussed above, was vested in the 
Security Council. Since the US and UK failed to get an approval from the Security 
Council, many people argued that their actions constituted an unjust invasion of a 
sovereign state. 
The discourse of legitimate authority goes back to the Medieval Christian Episteme. 
According to Saint Augustine, wars represented the Divine will and were fought to 
subdue human hubris and pride (Christopher, 2004). Since, the ruler was ordained by 
God to bring order and peace in the world, a war initiated by him ipso facto became a 
just war. Saint Thomas Aquinas also suggested that the ruler constituted the legitimate 
authority to declare war (Christopher, 2004). President Bush very often drew on 
religious discourses of just war, avoiding recourse to the international legal order of 
the Modern Episteme and his rhetoric in the context of the ‘war on terror’ often had a 
moral tenor and seldom displayed any compunction about overriding international law 
(O’Driscoll, 2008).  Addressing the American people, on March 18, 2003, he (Bush, 
2003) said: ‘The United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities, 
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so we will rise to ours.’ Thus, the discourse of legitimate authority was an important 
one in the context of the ‘war on terror’. President Bush in his speeches and The 
National Security Strategy of the United States of America (The White House, 2002), 
appropriated the authority to declare war to the office of the president of the United 
States in situations that involved threat to the country. However, the detractors of the 
‘war on terror’, especially in the context of the invasion of Iraq, also drew on the 
discourse of legitimate authority to portray the invasion of Iraq as illegal and unjust. 
The tensions and debates about who or what constitutes a legitimate authority were in 
wide circulation during the period when I collected my data.      
 The Discourse of Secular Nationalism 3.2.4
The key discourses in national and international politics during the Modern Episteme 
had secular bases and orientations. However, the Post-Cold War Episteme saw an 
unprecedented resurgence of religious discourses in national and international politics. 
In this section and the next, I briefly analyse these two discourses. During the Modern 
Episteme, the discourse of secular nationalism was the dominant one. This discourse 
had a profound impact on the nature of international conflicts. Very few wars and 
international conflicts during this episteme were driven by religious reasons. The 
discourse of secular nationalism has a long history. The political developments that led 
to the emergence of the modern nation state approximately coincided with the 
Scientific Revolution and the European Enlightenment both of which made Western 
European societies increasingly secular. The Treaty of Westphalia gave the secular 
ruler, rather than the pope or the Church, absolute authority over affairs within his 
geographical dominion (Mingst, 2008; Devetak, 2012). Thus, the very origin of the 
notion of the nation state was the result of various processes that were essentially 
secular. Shah and Philpott (2011) argue that the discourse of political secularism can 
be traced as far back as the European Reformation and the Peace of Ausburg in 1555. 
The latter was an emblematic moment that resulted in a gradual shift in the locus of 
temporal power from the church to the prince and was summed up by the principle 
‘cuis regio, euis religio’(Shah and Philpott 2011: 31) which may be translated as ‘whose 
realm, his religion’. 
The discourse of secular nationalism was further augmented during the French 
Revolution of 1789 when ‘Rousseau and his Jacobin acolytes openly identified the 
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church and Christianity as implacably hostile to any free and flourishing republic’ (Shah 
& Philpott, 2011: 38). Thus, one of the defining features of the Modern Episteme was 
the belief that public affairs should largely be decided by a popular consensus rather 
than by referring to a religious authority. Discussing the growing influence of 
secularism on national and international politics in the post-Westphalian world, Shah 
and Phlipott (2011: 37) write:  
From the late eighteenth century to the late twentieth century, political 
secularism continued its dramatic global expansion…the form of secularism 
that continued to build with great momentum during this period was the 
doctrine, reflected in thought and practice, that the state should actively 
subordinate religious authority to political authority, religious institutions to 
political institutions, and religious claims to political claims, all in the interest 
of promoting the wellbeing of society. 
The discourse of secular nationalism did not remain confined to Europe. During the 
19th century, some of the emerging secular powers of Western Europe went to 
colonise extensive parts of non-European world. These imperial powers spread the 
powerful idea of ‘secular nationalism…to the newly colonized areas of Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America as part of the ideological freight of colonialism’ (Juergensmeyer 2008: 
15). In 1917, the Bolshevik revolution resulted in the powerful apparatus of the Soviet 
state to subsume the Russian Orthodox Church within it. In the 20th century when 
many countries of Africa and Asia gained independence from colonial rule, their rulers 
enthusiastically continued with the discourse of secular nationalism as the defining 
characteristic of the nascent political systems in these countries. Some parts of the 
developing world where the discourse gained ascendency and the states subjugated or 
controlled religion included Turkey, Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia (Shah & Philpott 
2011) and Pakistan. In Turkey, the Ottoman Empire ended and Kamal Atatürk replaced 
the Caliphate with a defiantly secular system of governance. In Egypt, Gamel Abdel 
Nasser, after unsuccessfully wooing the Muslim Brotherhood, tried to break its popular 
support, by drawing on discourse of the nation state as secular, and the process 
culminated in the execution of its leader Sayyid Qutb (Juergensmeyer, 2008; Shah & 
Philpott, 2011).  
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In India, Jawaharlal Nehru, influenced by the discourse of nation state as secular, 
envisioned the newly independent Indian state along aggressively secular lines. His 
western education, the trauma of the assassination of his inspirational mentor 
Mohandas Gandhi by a right wing Hindu fundamentalist and his own opposition to the 
partition of India along religious lines were the important factors that contributed to 
Nehru’s commitment to the discourse of political secularism.  
The discourse of nation state as secular was dominant in Pakistan, too, during the first 
twenty years of its existence as an independent country. The case of Pakistan is quite a 
unique one as it is one of the only two countries in the world that have been created 
on the basis of a religious ideology – the other being the state of Israel. The creation of 
a separate country for Indian Muslims was spearheaded by Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Like 
Gandhi and Nehru, Jinnah studied in Britain and trained as a barrister from the 
Lincoln’s Inn. On return from London, Jinnah started practising as a barrister and 
entered politics by becoming a member of the Indian National Congress. 
Notwithstanding leading the political movement for a separate homeland for Muslims, 
Jinnah was a man of thoroughly secular thinking. Whereas Jinnah passionately 
believed in the cause of a separate homeland for Indian Muslims, he never envisioned 
the new state of Pakistan as a theocracy (Ahmad, 1994). Drawing on the discourse of 
nation state as secular, he envisioned Pakistan as a secular democracy.  In his 
Presidential address to the First Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Jinnah (1947) was 
clearly drawing on the discourse of the nation state as secular when he declared: 
 You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your 
mosques or to any other place or worship in this State of Pakistan. You may 
belong to any religion or caste or creed -- that has nothing to do with the 
business of the State . . . you will find that in course of time Hindus would 
cease to be Hindus, and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the 
religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the 
political sense as citizens of the State.  
The discourse of the nation state as secular continued to hold sway during the 
governments of Field Marshal Ayub Khan (1958 – 1969) and General Yahya Khan (1969 
1971). The 1971 elections installed Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto as first civilian president and 
subsequently the fourth prime minister of Pakistan. Bhutto, like many of his 
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predecessors, was not a religious man and was enthused by a leftist-socialist vision of 
politics; he once famously admitted drinking alcohol in a public rally (Kalasha, 2012). 
Thus, the discourse of the nation state as secular remained the dominant one in 
Pakistan untill 1977, when Bhutto was deposed through a military coup d’etat by 
General Zia-ul-Haq. 
 The Discourse of Religion in National and International Politics 3.2.5
Notwithstanding the tide of secular nationalism that swept the world in the Modern 
Episteme discussed in the preceding two sub-sections, the discourse of religion in 
national and international politics surfaced with an unprecedented force in the Post-
Cold War Episteme and captured popular consciousness when iconic US targets were 
attacked on September 11, 2011 (Juergensmeyer, 2008; Shah & Philpott, 2011; Snyder, 
2011). The emergence of this discourse has been hailed by international relations 
scholars (e.g. Juergensmeyer, 2008; Shah & Philpott, 2011; Snyder, 2011, Haynes, 
2007/2013) as a major challenge to the hegemonic discourse of secular nationalism 
that defined national and international politics in the Modern Episteme. 
Juergensmeyer (2008: 18) argues that the discourse of religion offers a social and 
political framework that is comparable and similar to secular nationalism in terms of its 
existential function and coverage of ‘civic values’. He argues that the discourse of 
secular nationalism offers a kind of ontological anchor that ‘locates an individual within 
the universe’ (Juergensmeyer, 2008: 20). As such secular nationalism fulfils the human 
need for belonging to something greater than his/her own self. He posits that this 
discourse also legitimises the exercise of power and ultimately locates it in the 
construct of national sovereignty. The religious discourse also operates at both these 
levels. Firstly, it offers its followers a transcendental system of values and identity. 
Secondly, it posits a legitimate system for the exercise of power which has a divine 
source but mortal agents of execution.  
As discussed above, the Western discourse of secular nationalism was adopted 
enthusiastically by the nascent nation states of Asia and Africa around the middle of 
20th century. However, in many of these countries the alternative discourse of religion 
began to emerge and challenge the discourse of secular nationalism in the latter half 
of the 20th century (Juergensmeyer, 2008; Shah & Philpott, 2011; Snyder, 2011). 
Various reasons have been cited for the emergence of this discourse of which I will 
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briefly outline only two. Firstly, many people of these third world countries saw the 
discourse of secular nationalism as ‘a mask for a certain form of European Christian 
Culture’ (Juergensmeyer, 2008: 26). It has been argued that the notion of secularism is 
essentially a Christian one (Leeuwen, 1964; Juergensmeyer, 2008). Secondly, the 
failure of secular regimes in many of these countries left people, especially from the 
disenfranchised classes, looking for alternatives and ‘has become a banner for 
movements demanding more responsive governments’ (Snyder, 2011: 3). 
This search for alternatives occurred in many countries of the world, not least in the 
Islamic World. For example, in Egypt, successive secular governments have had to 
grapple with the challenge posed by Islamic Brotherhood. In India, the Bharatiya 
Janata Party and the Sikh uprising have posed major challenges to the secular Indian 
National Congress. The Iranian revolution of 1979 became a major embarrassment and 
perpetual headache for the Western World, especially the US, which is seen by many 
in the Islamic World as the source of secular nationalism. The installation of the 
Taliban government in Afghanistan in 1996 became an example of a theocratic state, 
which rejected virtually every aspect of the discourse of secular nationalism. Finally, in 
Pakistan even though a religious party never even came close to winning a national 
election, successive secular civil and military governments have appeased the 
orthodox religious groups. And now the country is haunted by its own brand of Taliban 
that demand the establishment of a theocracy.  
Arguably, the discourse of secular nationalism is still the most dominant one in 
national and international politics in the vast majority of the world. However, the 
discourse of religion in national and international politics that emerged in the latter 
half of the 20th century has challenged the undisputed hegemony of secular 
nationalism in many parts of the world. This challenge is, indeed, a serious one 
because ‘every major religion is far older than the modern nation state and is based on 
a legitimacy claim far more encompassing than the state (Shah and Philpott, 2011: 
51).’ The international conflicts in the 21st century, especially the ones purportedly 
driven by religious ideologies cannot be fully comprehended without analysing the 
discourses of secular nationalism and religion in national and international politics. 
Moreover, even in secular states leaders such as President Bush and Prime Minister 
Blair increasingly called on religious discourses to justify the ‘war on terror’.  
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 The Discourse of Hierarchy of Nation States 3.2.6
As I have shown in an earlier section, the discourse of sovereignty of the nation state is 
an important one in relation to international conflicts. When the United Nations was 
created in 1945 it was driven by an egalitarian vision for the community of nations. The 
Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations (United Nations, 1945) states that ‘The 
Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.’                                                 
However, it is also important to recognise that there is a longstanding discourse of 
hierarchy among nation states, with some wielding considerably more power and 
influence than others.  The US is considered to be the world hegemon followed by 
other nations organised in hierarchical order.  Moreover, there are wide and increasing 
inequalities of income within and between nation states of the world (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2013). Brown (2007: 44) argues that there is a ‘widespread 
perception that we live in an unjust world’. The inequality amongst nation states is 
based not just on an unequal distribution of wealth; there are various other 
dimensions of inequality such as military power, moral standing (Pogge, 2008) and 
level of human development (United Nations Development Programme, 2013). The 
wide and entrenched international inequalities are often reflected in what I have 
termed as the discourse of hierarchy of nation states.  
Pogge (2008) maintains that a country’s political power in the international arena is 
determined by three factors: military power, economic strength and international 
moral standing. He argues that the US scores much higher on military power compared 
to the other two indices. Pakistan too enjoys disproportionate military strength 
compared to other indices like human development and economic prosperity. The 
country was ranked at 146th position in terms of human development index (United 
Nations Development Programme, 2013) and at 12th position in terms of its military 
capability (Global Firepower, 2013). This uneven profile of Pakistan partly explains the 
enormous power the armed forces wield within the country. 
The discourse of hierarchy of nations is a significant one internationally as well as 
nationally in many countries, including Pakistan. Pogge (2008) argues that the strength 
profile of a country can be used to understand the actions and underlying motives of 
leaders of different countries. He posits that countries with high military power ‘tend 
to benefit from heightened insecurity and tension by enjoying greater freedom of 
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action due to greater acquiescence on the part of their own citizens and other 
countries’ (2008: 3). He cites the example of the US as a country whose military power 
is much higher relative to its economic and moral standing in the international arena. 
He argues that the ruling politicians in the US stand to gain from an insecure 
international environment. From my own experience of living in Pakistan I know that 
the discourse of hierarchy of nations is a widely used by ordinary people, the media 
and the politicians. This discourse presents Pakistan as an economically poor country 
that has a strong military.     
 The Discourse of American Imperialism 3.2.7
In this section, I focus in greater detail on the position of the US as world hegemon, 
drawing together various arguments touched on in earlier sections. Many writers (e.g. 
Leaman, 2004; Billon & Khatib, 2004; Ferguson, 2004; Chomsky, 2006; Acharya, 2007; 
Mazari, 2009a, 2009b; Adriaensens &Baker, 2009) have drawn on the discourse of US 
imperialism while analysing US policies and actions in the Modern Episteme. The 
modus operandi and actions of the US were somewhat constrained in the bipolar 
world where its strategic international policy was predominantly defined by the 
discourse of containment. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US did not feel 
the need to act as cautiously as it had done during the Cold War period and there was 
a qualitative shift in its policies, actions and modus operandi in the Post-Cold War 
Episteme. According to Leaman (2004: 235), this was because ‘with the end of the cold 
war and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States assumed a position of 
military dominance unparalleled in world history.’ 
The discourse of US imperialism became much more prominent after the September 
11 attacks due to ‘the fact that it [US] seized on 9/11 as an opportunity to take radical 
action to in an effort to expand U.S. power’ (Leaman, 2004: 239). Leaman (2004) 
argues that the September 11 attacks provided the US establishment an opportunity to 
grant themselves a licence to use unrestrained violence to achieve their strategic 
objectives across the world and simultaneously sustain domestic military spending 
which was becoming increasingly untenable in the Post-Cold War Episteme. Actions of 
the US in its ‘war on terror’ have been criticised by people drawing on the discourse of 
US imperialism. Billon and Khatib (2004: 120) argue that besides toppling the Taliban 
government ‘because of the demonstrated presence of Al-Qaeda’ in Afghanistan, 
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another strategic objective of the US invasion of the country was facilitating the 
interests of a Californian company UNOCAL which was awarded a contract to lay a gas 
pipeline from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan to Pakistan. By doing so, the US was able 
to contain the Russian and Iranian influence over the energy resources of the region. 
As discussed in an earlier section, many conflicts have an economic basis and the US 
imperialism, too, has a strong economic motive.  
The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was criticised even more strongly and widely by people 
drawing on the discourse of US imperialism. This was because, firstly, the evidence for 
Iraq’s links either to the September 11 attacks or to the Al-Qaeda were, at best, 
tenuous, and, secondly, Iraq, unlike Afghanistan, was a resource rich country. Bilon and 
Khatib (2004: 122) argue that Iraq posed a two-fold problem for the US in its quest for 
unrestrained access to cheap oil. On the one hand, Saddam Hussein had a track record 
of embargoing oil exports on political grounds and trying to manoeuvre high prices for 
oil through the OPEC, and, on the other hand, Iraq, due to the UN sanctions, ‘was 
heavily underinvested’ and had one of ‘the lowest production/reserve ratio’.  By 
invading Iraq and toppling Saddam, the US conveniently resolved both these problems; 
by doing so, there remained no threat of a capricious dictator manipulating oil supplies 
and prices, and with a ‘free’ Iraq, there was no need for UN sanctions and new 
investment in the oil infrastructure could go ahead. Leaman (2004: 240) argues: 
Making Iraq the rhetorical center of the so-called axis of evil had nothing to do 
with 9/11. It was instead a continuation of the internal administration 
discussions of January and February 2001 that matched a desire to ‘‘dissuade’’ 
countries from engaging in ‘‘asymmetrical challenges’’ to the United States 
with plans for the division of the world’s second-largest oil reserves among 
the world’s contractors. 
As discussed in an earlier section, President Bush tried to legitimise the invasion of Iraq 
by using the discourse of promoting democracy. Leaman (2004: 244) argues the Bush 
administration used the attacks to pursue long term foreign policy objectives of the US 
and by doing so they aimed ‘to dominate the region and control Iraq’s oil over the long 
term’. Acharya (2007: 288) also argues that the US tried to legitimise the invasion of 
Iraq by ‘hang[ing] the war on terror and regime change and democracy promotion 
agendas on the prior and evolving justifications for humanitarian intervention’.  
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Acharya (2007) maintains that the US used the Report of the International Commission 
for Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty (International Commission for 
Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001) to garner support and present 
a façade of legitimacy for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. He goes on to argue that the 
Report does not include the restoration of democracy as a just cause for military 
intervention and violation of a state’s sovereignty. 
From my own experience of living in Pakistan, I know that the discourse of US 
imperialism has been quite common in the country. One heard this discourse in 
everyday conversations, the media and the academic circles. Mazari (2009b), a senior 
Pakistani academic, argues that the US seized the September 11 attacks as an 
opportunity to operationalize its strategic agenda in Pakistan. She wrote (Mazari, 
2009b):  
Clearly the Americans are suffering from an overdose of arrogance, especially 
when it comes to Pakistan and Afghanistan and no one exemplifies it better 
than Holbrooke [US special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan 2009-
10] who shows no interest in learning anything about Pakistan or its people, 
but comes over far too frequently to push our compliant leaders into doing US 
bidding or simply to show the imperial colours. 
An important implication of this discourse is that the conventional modern principles 
of national sovereignty and legitimate authority have been significantly compromised, 
especially in the case of states that were invaded by the US as part of its ‘war on 
terror’. Thus, the discourse of US imperialism has been a very significant one in the 
Post-Cold War Episteme and has been used commonly to analyse and criticise the US 
actions in the context of the ‘war on terror’. 
 Discussion – The Discourses of Legitimate Authority – the Nation State and 3.2.8
the International System 
In this section, I discussed some of the key discourses related to the notions of the 
nation-state and the international system and the issue of legitimate authority in the 
context of declaring and waging wars. I also discussed the discourses of secular 
nationalism and religion in national and international politics. I concluded the section 
by discussing the discourse of American imperialism. Doing so was important because, 
notwithstanding the challenge posed by American imperialism and globalisation to the 
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international system that developed during the Modern Episteme, the discourses of 
the sovereign nation-state and the international system continue to be central in any 
discussion of international conflicts in the Post-Cold War Episteme. In the next section, 
I analyse some salient discourses related to ethical conduct of wars or jus in bello.  
3.3 The Discourses of Ethical Conduct in War – Jus in Bello 
In the previous sections, I have discussed discourses related to the causes of war and 
the legitimate authorities who can declare wars. In this section, I engage with some 
discourses and counter-discourses related to ethical warfare or jus in bello that were 
used by Western politicians and the critics of the ‘war on terror’ respectively. These 
include discourses of the rights of lawful combatants, permissible weapons, prevention 
of harm to non-combatants and collateral damage. Finally, in this section, I consider 
the discourse of ‘supreme emergency’ that has been used to justify conduct of war 
that was previously considered unethical.   
 The Discourse of the Rights of the Lawful Enemy Combatants  3.3.1
One of the important discourses of ethical warfare is the discourse of the rights of the 
lawful enemy combatants. The key sources of this discourse in the Modern Episteme 
comprise The Hague and Geneva Conventions of 1907 and 1949 respectively. The 
Hague Convention stipulates that a lawful enemy combatant belongs to a 
hierarchically organised institution, usually a country’s army, bears a distinct and 
visible emblem, carries arms in full view of others and ‘conduct[s] their operations in 
accordance with the laws and customs of war’ (International Committee of the Red 
Cross, 1907: Chapter1, Article 1) . The Geneva Convention (International Committee of 
the Red Cross, 1949a) stipulates that members of the armed forces and other non-
combat personnel of the opposite side who get wounded or fall sick ‘shall be respected 
and protected in all circumstances’.  
The discourse of rights of enemy combatants can be traced back to the writings of 
Saint Ambrose in the Medieval Christian Episteme discussed earlier in this chapter. 
Saint Augustine maintained that soldiers of both sides fighting a war were morally 
equal, even the ones fighting an unjust war. Therefore, as soon as a soldier got 
wounded or surrendered it become incumbent upon the soldiers of the opposite side 
to care for and protect him.  
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The actions of the US-led forces in the ‘war on terror’ were strongly criticised by 
people drawing on the discourse of the rights of lawful enemy combatants. Michaelson 
and Shershow (2004: 293) argue that the US is in ‘flagrant violation of international 
law’ because of its policy to indefinitely detain terrorism suspects at Guantanamo Bay 
without a judicial trial and treating them as unlawful enemy combatants who did not 
have to be accorded the status of prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions. 
Thus, the discourse of the rights of lawful enemy combatants is an important one in 
the context of the ‘war on terror’ because the US government tried to sidestep the 
constraints imposed by The Hague and The Geneva Conventions by declaring the 
opposite side as entirely comprising unlawful combatants.    
 The Discourse of Permissible Weapons 3.3.2
Another important discourse of ethical warfare is the discourse of permissible 
weapons. This discourse gained salience in the Modern Episteme with the creation of 
international humanitarian law (e.g. International Committee of the Red Cross, 2004a 
and 2004b). The discourse of permissible weapons is based on a two-point criterion for 
differentiating between permissible and non-permissible weapons and includes:  
(1) the requirement that a distinction be made at all times between 
civilians and combatants; and (2) the prohibition of the use of weapons 
which inflict excessive injury or suffering on combatants or render their 
death inevitable.  
(International Committee of the Red Cross, 2004b: 6) 
According to this discourse, any weapon that violates this criterion is considered illegal 
under international humanitarian law. Some conventional weapons which are 
considered illegal include landmines, incendiary weapons and blinding laser weapons.  
More recently, in 2008 the use of cluster munitions was also made illegal (Diplomatic 
Conference for the Adoption of a Convention on Cluster Munitions, 2008).  
According to the discourse of permissible weapons, another category of weapons that 
are considered illegitimate are the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (Christopher, 
2004). WMD include biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. The use of chemical 
and biological weapons was declared illegal through the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and 
the biological weapons convention in 1972 respectively (United Nations Office for 
Disarmament Affairs, 2013 a & b). Although many writers consider the nuclear 
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weapons as violating all principles of jus ad bellum as well as jus in bello, the use of 
these weapons has not been outlawed per se.   
The US-led ‘war on terror’ was criticised by people drawing on the discourse of 
permissible weapons. For example, Northcott (2008) argues that in the 2003 invasion 
of Iraq, US planes killed and injured many people, including children. Very recently, US 
drone strikes have been criticised by Amnesty International (2013) as contravening 
international humanitarian law: 
. . . the USA has unlawfully killed people in drone strikes, and that such killings 
may amount in some cases to extrajudicial executions or war crimes and other 
violations of international humanitarian law.  
Thus, the discourse of permissible weapons is an important one in the context of my 
research as it was used extensively in Pakistan as well as internationally by people to 
criticise the US-led ‘war on terror’. 
 The Discourse of Preventing Harm to Non-Combatants 3.3.3
The discourse of protecting non-combatants or civilians from harm during war is 
another important discourse of ethical warfare or jus in bello. Many critics of the ‘war 
on terror’ have criticised the actions of the US-led coalitions, drawing on this 
discourse. For example, Northcott (2007: 91) argues that the implications of the 2003 
invasion of Iraq by the US-led forces ‘have been terrible’ for Iraqi civilians. He goes on 
to argue that post-Saddam, Iraq became one of the most lawless places on earth, 
where ordinary people could not go about their daily lives without extreme fear of 
violence of the worst kind. He claims: 
On this account American forces have been terroristic in their provocation of a 
state of lawlessness and violence throughout Iraq, and in their use of 
indiscriminate force, such as in the brutal siege and destruction of the city of 
Falluja, and in the frequent resort to aerial bombs and mortars in civilian areas 
said to house insurgents.  
(Northcott, 2007: 91) 
Many instances of such behaviour have been reported. For example, in the context of 
Afghanistan, On Friday, July 11, 2008, The Guardian Newspaper (Sturcke & Agencies, 
2008) stated: 
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A US air strike killed 47 civilians, including 39 women and children, as they 
were travelling to a wedding in Afghanistan, an official inquiry found today. 
The bride was among the dead.  
Lichterman and Burroughs (2004) argue that US-led forces inflicted severe harm on 
non-combatant civilians during the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. They argue that 
the ‘war on terror’ brought untold suffering to civilian, non-combatant populations in 
both the countries by killing ‘hundreds or thousands in the initial onslaught and often 
many more as a result of disease and privation caused by the destruction of essential 
services’ (2004: 260). Such actions have been widely criticised in the Pakistani media. 
The discourse of preventing harm to non-combatants has existed in all three 
epistemes. As discussed earlier, the discourse of protecting the innocent in a conflict 
appeared in the writings of Saint Ambrose in the Medieval Christian Episteme.  
The discourse of protecting civilian non-combatants emerged formally in the Modern 
Episteme after the two World Wars and became enshrined in international 
humanitarian law through the Fourth Geneva Convention in 1949 (International 
Committee of the Red Cross, 1949b). Whereas the Fourth Geneva Convention 
provided significant protection to civilian non-combatants, the advances in technology 
of warfare in the 20th and the 21st centuries posed heightened threats to the same 
group of people. 
As discussed above, there have been discourses related to preventing harm to civilian 
non-combatants in all the three epistemes. However, civilians have suffered harm, 
including physical injuries and death, in many conflicts, especially those involving 
advanced warfare technology (Lichterman & Burroughs, 2004). The states responsible 
for harming civilians often explain their actions by drawing on the discourse of 
‘collateral damage’. Collateral damage can be defined as unintentional harm caused in 
an international conflict to civilian targets (Kiernan, 2003). The origins of the discourse 
of collateral damage can be traced back to the discourse of ‘double effect’ introduced 
by Saint Thomas Aquinas. According to him, in a war actions with good as well as bad 
effects were permissible as long as the bad effects were unintended and proportional 
to the good effects and there was no way to produce the good effects without the 
accompanying bad effects (Christopher, 2004).  This discourse of ‘double effect’ was 
taken up by Francisco de Vitoria (Christopher, 2004; Kinsella & Carr, 2007) at the 
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beginning of the Modern Episteme and transformed into the discourse of ‘collateral 
damage’, which we often encounter in the context of contemporary warfare. 
Even though the discourse of collateral damage was used extensively by belligerent 
parties in the Modern Episteme, it encountered stiff resistance in international 
humanitarian law which posits that ‘parties to a conflict must at all times distinguish 
between the civilian population and combatants in order to spare the civilian 
population and civilian property’ (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2002: 6).  
Lichterman and Burroughs (2004) argue that the discourse of collateral damage has 
been used by the US establishment to sanitize and neutralize the terrible effects on 
civilian populations of the ‘war on terror’. They write: 
. . . when ordinary people with no conceivable connection to any attack on the 
United States—families asleep in their beds, or celebrating at a wedding, or 
failing to understand orders shouted in a foreign language at a checkpoint—
are killed by nervous troops, an errant bomb, or for that matter a completely 
accurate strike informed by poor intelligence, it can be portrayed as a 
regrettable, but legal, consequence of warfare.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                        (Lichterman & Burroughs, 2004: 259) 
Kiernan (2003) argues that US establishment’s discourse of collateral damage, in the 
context of the ‘war on terror’, does little to make its actions resulting in harm to 
civilian, non-combatants appear legitimate and justified because they clearly 
contravene international humanitarian law. This is because Article 8 (2) (b) (iv) of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998/2002) states that: 
serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed 
conflict [include] … Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that 
such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to 
civilian objects . . . 
Thus, the US establishment’s discourse of collateral damage, in the context of the ‘war 
on terror’, has been widely criticised, because it sanitized strategies and actions that 
led to very significant civilian casualties in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan and, as such, 
contravened international humanitarian law. While the US explained much of the 
damage they caused as collateral, they also justified it in terms of the critical 
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importance of the situation they faced, which could be seen as a supreme emergency. 
This is discussed in the next section.  
 The Discourse of Supreme Emergency 3.3.4
The discourse of supreme emergency has been used to justify the violation of the 
normal principles of ethical warfare generally by intentionally targeting the civilian, 
non-combatant population. In his book Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer (1977: 252), 
introducing the discourse of supreme emergency, asks the question: ‘What is it that 
defeat entails?’. The answer to this question, according to Walzer, determines whether 
a wartime situation can be classified as a supreme emergency. He posits a two-
pronged criterion for evaluating whether a situation merits to be classified as a 
supreme emergency. The two points are: imminence and the nature of the danger. 
Either one on its own, for Walzer (1977), does not constitute a supreme emergency. 
In order to elaborate the discourse of supreme emergency, Walzer (1977) cites the 
decision of Allied Forces to terror bomb German cities, during World War II, killing 
hundreds of thousands of civilian, non-combatant, German citizens.  Explaining why 
the Nazi threat constituted a supreme emergency, Walzer (1977: 253) wrote: 
…Nazism was an ultimate threat to everything decent in our lives, an ideology 
and a practice of domination so murderous, so degrading even to those who 
might survive, that the consequences of its final victory were literally beyond 
calculation, immeasurably awful…Here was a great threat to human values so 
radical that its imminence would surely constitute a supreme emergency… 
For Walzer (1977), Nazism was a classic case which justified suspension of principles of 
ethical warfare and hence could be classified as a ‘supreme emergency’. The discourse 
of supreme emergency posits that certain situations are different from ordinary 
wartime dangers and threats because they not only entail defeat, resulting in the 
death and imprisonment of the surrendering army’s soldiers, but the destruction of a 
whole political community along with everything they believe in and value. Therefore, 
when Winston Churchill (Walzer 1977: 254) said that German victory would not only 
be disastrous for the British but also for the ‘independent life of every small country in 
Europe’, Walzer argued that he was ‘speaking the exact truth’ and, hence the situation 
constituted a ‘supreme emergency’. Walzer (1977: 254) wrote: 
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For the survival and freedom of political communities—whose members share 
a way of life, developed by their ancestors, to be passed on to their children—
are the highest values of international society. Nazism challenged these values 
on a grand scale, but challenges more narrowly conceived, if they are of the 
same kind, have similar moral consequences. They bring us under the rule of 
necessity (and necessity knows no rules).                                                                                                             
                                 [emphasis in original] 
And when Walzer said ‘necessity knows no rules’ he meant that the rules pertaining to 
jus in bello do not hold in ‘supreme emergencies’. The discourse of ‘supreme 
emergency’ allows the suspension of one of the cardinal principles of the just war 
tradition – non-combatant immunity. President Bush (2001a) in an address to the joint 
session of the Congress said: 
We have seen their kind before. They're the heirs of all the murderous 
ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical 
visions, by abandoning every value except the will to power, they follow in the 
path of fascism, Nazism and totalitarianism. 
It is clear from excerpt from President Bush’s speech that he equated the danger 
posed by Islamic militants to that of Nazism in the first half of the 20th century and, 
hence, it merited a response that could ignore principles of ethical warfare. For 
example, Lichterman and Burroughs (2004: 260) argue that in the Post-Cold War 
period, the US forces often used the tactic of “shock bombing” to induce extreme fear 
in the target population such that the adversary would ‘crumble quickly’. Therefore, 
the discourse of supreme emergency was highly relevant for understanding President 
Bush’s construction of the September 11 attacks and for contextualising many of the 
actions he initiated as part of the ‘war on terror’ in the Post-Cold War Episteme. 
 Discussion – The Discourses of Ethical Conduct of War or Jus in Bello 3.3.5
In this section, I have discussed some key discourses related to ethical conduct of 
warfare or jus in bello. The US-led ‘war on terror’ was strongly criticised (e.g. by 
Lichterman and Burroughs, 2004; Michaelson & Shershow, 2004; Northcott, 2007) 
drawing on the discourses of ethical warfare, briefly analysed above. However, part of 
the justification for the use of non-ethical strategies has been that the nature of 
warfare has changed, in that attacks are often initiated by terrorists rather than 
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sovereign nations.  In the next section, I discuss the discourses of terrorism and 
specifically Islamic terrorism. This discussion is important because these have become 
the most important political discourses of the Post-Cold War Episteme and are crucial 
for understanding the evolution of the discursive formation of international conflicts 
during this period.      
3.4 The Discourse of Terrorism 
The discourse of terrorism is a very important one in the context of my research as it 
was carried out when the memory of the September 11 attacks was still fresh and the 
US-led ‘war on terror’ was in full swing.  Schmid (1988, cited in Weinberg, 2005: 3) 
defines terrorism as: 
An anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi) 
clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or 
political reasons … whereby the direct targets of the violence are not the main 
targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen 
randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic 
targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators.  
The origins of the discourse of terrorism in the Modern Episteme can be traced back to 
late 18th century to the ‘Jacobin rule (1793-94) under Robespierre, which became 
known as the “Reign of Terror” (Weinberg, 2005: 18).  The discourse of terrorism, as 
we understand it today, emerged in the wake of an assassination attempt on Napoleon 
in Paris in 1800 (Keane, 2013a). Weinberg (2005) argues that actions of certain groups 
even before the French Revolution would have met the criteria that emerge from the 
modern discourse of terrorism. He gives the example of Zealots-Sicarri in the 1st 
century A.D. whose aim was to initiate a Jewish revolt against Roman control in Judea. 
In order to do so, they encouraged use of violence against Romans in order to incite 
violent suppression of Jews by the Roman rulers, which they hoped would lead to a 
Jewish uprising. In the Modern Episteme, another example of a group of people who 
resorted to terrorist violence was that of the Fenian Dynamiters – a group of Irish 
revolutionaries who planted bombs on the London Underground and mainline railway 
stations in the late 19th century (Keane, 2013b). Their main objective was to instil fear 
in the heart of the imperial metropolitan centre and galvanize their demand for an 
independent Irish Republic. 
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Weinberg (2005) maintains that people who resort to terrorist violence hope to 
achieve a number of objectives through their actions. Firstly, they aim to instil fear in 
the target population, which they hope would pressurise the relevant authorities to 
concede to their demands or agenda. Secondly, through their actions, they seek 
attention to highlight their causes. Thirdly, they aim for the authorities in control of 
the target territories to overreact and clamp down on the groups associated with the 
perpetrators of terrorism as this would further galvanize negative sentiment amongst 
other members of the group who normally desist from resorting to terrorist tactics. 
Fourthly, they aim to raise morale of their own group members by successfully 
perpetrating terrorist violence and achieving one or more of the above-stated 
objectives. Fifthly, in certain circumstances, they use their actions to disrupt the 
chances of political settlement of disputes through negotiations between relatively 
moderate groups of the opposite sides.   
The discourse of terrorism posits some key differences between terrorist violence and 
conventional warfare (Christopher, 2004). As discussed earlier, one of the key 
discourses of just cause of war relate to legitimate authority. However, terrorist 
violence, since it is, in most cases, carried out by non-state actors, does not meet this 
criterion. The discourse of terrorism posits that the perpetrators of terrorism do not 
subscribe to various discourses of ethical warfare like the discourse of caring for 
wounded soldiers or those who may have surrendered. Most importantly, the 
discourse of terrorism posits that, unlike conventional wars, terrorists do not 
differentiate between military and non-military targets. In fact, in most cases civilian 
targets are preferred by terrorists as this strategy has the capacity to instil greater fear 
in the members of the target population. 
The discourse of terrorism, in the final analysis, is a judgemental discourse. Very few 
groups of people who are labelled as terrorist accept the label and usually respond by 
presenting a counter-argument and paint the authorities who are their actual targets 
as brutal and oppressive (Weinberg, 2005). Weinberg (2005: 2) illustrates the knotty 
problem of classifying people or groups as terrorist: 
Those of us living in the wealthy Western democracies call “terrorists” the 
same people many inhabitants of the impoverished parts of the world would 
think of as “freedom fighters” – viewing them in virtually the same way, for 
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example, that young Americans and Britons learn to think of Robin Hood and 
his Merry Men.  
Since the September 11 attacks, the discourse of terrorism has become increasingly 
important in the context of Pakistan. This is because the decision of successive 
Pakistani governments to become an ally in the US-led ‘war on terror’ has enraged 
various extremist groups in the country, especially the tribal areas, who, in turn, 
unleashed unprecedented attacks in all parts of the country.    
 The Discourse of State Terrorism  3.4.1
In the previous section, I mentioned that terrorist violence in many cases is 
perpetrated by non-state actors. This does not preclude the use of this form of 
violence by nation states. However, whether resort to violence by sovereign nation 
states, in certain circumstances, can be classified as terrorism is a moot point 
(Blakeley, 2009). Notwithstanding the debate around the issue, I argue that the 
discourse of state terrorism is a valid and useful one to understand contemporary 
international conflicts. If we look at the definition of terrorism by Weinberg (2005) in 
the previous section, it does mention state actors as possible perpetrators of terrorist 
violence. The United Nations’ (1999: Article 2, 1b) International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism also does not preclude nation states in its 
definition of terrorism, which it articulates as:  
… [an] act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to 
any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of 
armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to 
intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act. 
(1999: Article 2, 1b) 
According to the definitions offered by the United Nations (1999) and Weinberg 
(2005), state activities, in certain cases, can be classified as terrorism. In fact, Blakeley 
(2009: 1), a reader in international relations at the University of Kent, argues that: 
State terrorism is one of a number of coercive tools that have regularly 
featured in the foreign policy practices of liberal democratic states from the 
North. State terrorism should be understood as a threat or act of violence by 
agents of the state that is intended to induce extreme fear in a target 
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audience, so that they are forced to consider changing their behaviour in 
some way.  
Blakeley (2009) argues that there has been resurgence in the use of state terrorism by 
the neoliberal democracies of the West, especially by the US and the UK, in the years 
following the September 11, 2001 attacks. She suggests this spate of state terrorism 
has included support for regimes that regularly use repression and terrorist violence 
against their own citizens, excessive use of force by the coalition forces during the 
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, unlawful detentions of terrorism suspects and 
inhumane treatment of prisoners.  
This section has demonstrated that the ambit of the discourse of terrorism can and 
does go beyond the unethical resort to violence only by non-state actors. In fact, the 
discourse of state terrorism, albeit contested by scholars, has been there for a long 
time within the discursive formation of international relations. Since the US initiated 
the ‘war on terror’ in response to the September 11 attacks, there has been 
resurgence in the use of this discourse in popular media as well as the academia. Thus, 
the discourse of state terrorism would have potentially been available to the 
participants of my study.  
 The Discourse of Islamic Terrorism 3.4.2
While terrorist groups have come from a wide range of backgrounds and have 
espoused many different causes, an increasingly dominant discourse has been that of 
Islamic terrorism. In this section, I consider the origins of the discourse of Islamic 
terrorism, the categories and labels it uses and the ways in which it has been 
problematized and challenged. The discourse of Islamic terrorism has become one of 
the defining features of the Post-Cold War Episteme (Jackson, 2007a). In his veterans’ 
day address in Pennsylvania in November 2005, President Bush (2005) said: 
. . . their attacks serve a clear and focused ideology, a set of beliefs and goals 
that are evil but not insane. Some call this evil "Islamic radicalism," others 
"militant jihadism" and still others "Islamofacism . . . These extremists distort 
the idea of jihad into a call for terrorist murder against Christians and Hindus 
and Jews and against Muslims themselves who do not share their radical 
vision.  
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President Bush in the above extract sets out the nature and the gravity of the 
challenge posed by Islamic terrorism.  
Jackson (2007a) argues that the discourse of Islamic terrorism, which captured public 
attention in the wake of the September 11 attacks, has deeper roots. Firstly, it can be 
traced back to the formal study of religious terrorism, heralded by David Rapoport’s 
(1984) influential article titled ‘Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious 
Traditions’.  Secondly, the discourse borrows many of its central terms and key 
constructs from the discourse of orientalism, which came to the fore with some key 
events across the world like the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Rushdie affair. The 
September 11 attacks on the US acted as a catalyst for the discourse of Islamic 
terrorism to precipitate and capture popular consciousness. Thirdly, the discourse of 
Islamic terrorism draws on certain cultural stereotypes of the religion and its followers. 
These stereotypes present Muslims as violent, extremist, backward and mysterious. 
Jackson (2007a: 400-1) argues that by drawing on these sources, the discourse builds 
on: 
. . . the ‘good war’ narrative surrounding the struggle against fascism during 
the Second World War; mythologies of the Cold War, including the notion of 
‘the long war’, the deeply embedded civilization-versus-barbarism narrative, 
the cult of innocence, the language and assumptions of the enemy within, the 
labels and narratives of ‘rogue states’, and the discourse surrounding the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
The discourse of Islamic terrorism implicitly presents violence as a fundamental part of 
Islam, primarily because the Islamic doctrine makes no clear cut distinction between 
the religious and the secular and offers guidance on the personal as well as the social 
aspects of life (Jackson, 2007a). Jackson (2007a) argues that the very term Islamic 
Terrorism links Islam to terrorist violence, an association that works powerfully at an 
unconscious level. This implicit association suggests that terrorist violence gains 
legitimacy from Islamic doctrine itself. Therefore, the discourse implicitly presents 
religious war or ‘jihad’ as a key component of Islamic polity.  
Schwartz (2004) challenges a simplistic interpretation of the notion of ‘jihad’ because 
the notion has been a contentious one in Islamic history. According to him, external 
interference in Muslim territories has not always led to a violent reaction: 
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The dominant tendency has been to interpret ‘‘the greater’’ jihad as a 
personal quest for religious rectitude (jihad’s most literal translation is 
‘‘struggle’’) (Euben 2003, 6–7). The predominant reaction to Western 
colonization of the Islamic world—from the religious schools, or madrasas, of 
South Asia to the Wahhabist traditionalist reaction to colonization in the 
Arabian Peninsula—has been a retreat into private moral rectitude.                                                              
(Schwartz, 2004: 279) 
Halliday (2002) also questions the tendency to establish a causal link between religious 
doctrine and actual resort to violence as all religions offer precepts that sanction 
violence as well as pacifism.  
Schwartz (2004) problematizes some underlying assumptions of the discourse of 
Islamic terrorism that aim to link terrorist violence to Islamic doctrine. He posits that 
contemporary Islamic terrorism can be better understood as a reaction to geopolitical 
events that took place in Middle East and Southeast Asia in the latter half of twentieth 
century.  He argues that the anti-Soviet policies pursued by the US in Afghanistan 
created conditions conducive to the development of extremist Islamic ideology that 
was subsequently operationalized through violent terrorist tactics. The genesis of the 
Taliban lay in ‘the mass Afghan exile in Pakistan in 1980s’ (Schwartz, 2004: 280). 
Hundreds of thousands of Afghan refugees encountered the narrow and strict Wahabi 
interpretation of Islamic doctrine in religious seminaries, supported and funded by the 
Saudi government, in the north west of Pakistan. This interpretation of Islam was very 
different from the indigenous version of the religion in the Indian subcontinent which 
had a strong mystical tradition that valued non-violent and peaceful coexistence with 
other religious communities. The radicalised Afghan and Pakistani youth gathered 
under the banner of the ideology of Wahabi Islam to form the Taliban movement with 
its focus on purging Afghanistan of corruption and violence that resulted from the 
infighting of various factions of the erstwhile Afghan mujahedeen, who had been at 
the forefront of fighting the Soviet Union and were supported by the US and Pakistani 
establishments (Schwartz, 2004).  All the mujahedeen fighting the Soviet Union were 
not of Afghan origin. Many of them had come from the Middle East, including Saudi 
Arabia, and had links with Al-Qaeda. After the retreat of Soviet Union from Afghanistan 
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in 1988, these foreign fighters became the allies of the Taliban government and used 
the Afghan soil to plan attacks on Western targets. Leaman (2004: 243) writes: 
. . . the U.S. effort to recruit, train, arm, and supply volunteers from several 
Muslim countries to fight the Soviet Union and its allies in Afghanistan began 
in July 1979. Following the logic that the enemy of my enemy is my friend, the 
United States supported militant Islamic organizations fighting in Afghanistan 
in an effort to harm the Soviet Union, in cooperation with the governments of 
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, and China.    
Many writers (e.g. Billon and Khatib, 2004; Leaman, 2004; Schwartz, 2004; Chomsky, 
2006; Jackson, 2004, 2007a) have argued that the discourse of Islamic terrorism has 
been used by the ruling elite in the US, for obfuscating their questionable geopolitical 
policies and interventions in the Middle East and Southeast Asia and as a façade for 
legitimizing their imperial ambitions in the Third World countries in the Post-Cold War 
Episteme.  In Pakistan, there was a widespread feeling that what was dubbed as 
Islamic terrorism was actually a response to US actions, driven by its imperial 
ambitions, in various parts of the world. Sattar (2002), writing in one of the leading 
English newspapers of Pakistan, asserts: 
President Reagan turned the Afghan struggle against Soviet occupation into a 
crusade, and a covert American war against the Soviets, and called them an 
“evil empire.” CIA pumped billions of dollars into Afghanistan, fanning the 
war, and unwittingly, Islamic “fundamentalism.” The rise of the Taliban and 
Islamic fundamentalism was the bitter harvest of this modern crusade. 
Thus, the discourse of Islamic terrorism has a long history, but it captured popular 
consciousness in the context of the US-led ‘war on terror’. It has been used by the 
establishments of various Western countries, most notably the US, to articulate the 
danger posed by a transnational network of militant extremists operating on the fringe 
of Islam. However, its critics (e.g. Billon and Khatib, 2004; Leaman, 2004; Schwartz, 
2004; Chomsky, 2006; Jackson, 2007a) have challenged it as a façade for questionable 
policies of the US in the past and its imperial ambition in the Post-Cold War Episteme.  
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have identified and analysed some key discourses related to 
international conflicts that were potentially available to the participants of my 
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research. I showed how these discourses were used by the politicians, academics, and 
the media. Some of these were discourses of just causes of war. Other discourses 
related to the idea of the nation state, the international system and ethical warfare. 
Finally, some discourses, like that of American imperialism, can be best classified as 
counter-discourses that were used by people to resist the discourses used by 
politicians to present the ‘war on terror’ as legitimate and just. These discourses 
informed my research design and, very importantly, the analysis of data.    
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4 Research Methodology 
In this chapter, I discuss the research process itself and some significant decisions that 
I took and their implications for the study. I describe and reflect on issues relating to 
the design of the study and the actual process of data collection. I begin with briefly 
outlining the ontological and epistemological basis of my study and the paradigm of 
research that I used. After this, I discuss the method of data collection that I used. I 
outline some key advantages of using focus groups in the context of my research. 
Subsequently, I explain some key methodological decisions, like the selection of the 
site and participants of research, which I took.  This is followed by reflection on my 
own role in the research process and how my own subjectivity might have influenced 
various aspects of this study. I then discuss some ethical considerations relevant to my 
research and how I addressed these.  After this, I briefly explain how I analysed the 
data. Finally, I discuss some strengths and limitations of my research design.  
4.1 The Theoretical Framework 
Although in this chapter I discuss how and why the study was designed the way it was 
and the process of data collection itself, I have tried to ground these discussions within 
the broader theoretical framework developed for it in the previous two chapters. 
Doing this has helped me in developing a coherent methodological narrative for the 
study, anchored within the appropriate ontological and epistemological frameworks. 
The study is grounded in an ontological discourse that posits that rather than there 
being a fixed, objective external reality, the objects in the human world are socially 
constructed through discourses that people use to talk about them. The 
epistemological implication of this is that knowledge about the world rather than 
comprising objective facts consists of versions of events and objects in the world that 
are constructed through discourse and as such is culturally and historically contingent 
and located. This is in line with what Cohen, Manion & Morrison (2007: 5) advocate: 
…ontological assumptions give rise to epistemological assumptions; these, in 
turn, give rise to methodological considerations; and these, in turn, give rise 
to issues of instrumentation and data collection. This view moves us beyond 
regarding research methods as simply a technical exercise and as concerned 
with understanding the world; this is informed by how we view our world(s), 
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what we take understanding to be, and what we see as the purposes of 
understanding. 
As discussed in the previous chapters, this study has been carried out within a social 
constructionist framework, using the qualitative paradigm of social research. These 
facts and the way the study was conceptualized during the initial stages have had a 
significant impact on the research process. The research question itself alludes to 
some important assumptions underpinning the study and its ideological location. 
Researchers working within the positivist paradigm aim to make and present their 
work as value-neutral, not affected by the person of the researcher and hence not 
ideologically driven. However, qualitative research, especially which is carried out 
within a social constructionist paradigm, questions the possibility of such value-neutral 
social enquiry. I also believe that every investigation is ideologically driven and 
culturally and historically located and so is this study. Along with describing the 
process of the research, I will also try to reveal the locatedness of the study – 
historically, culturally, ideologically, and personally.   
Most social research is, arguably, concerned with the interpretation of meaning. And 
the creation and the interpretation of meaning is basically a subjective process 
affected by the personal history of the relevant actors and the social environment that 
they inhabit. The research question that this study aims to answer is: How do middle 
class Pakistani young people construct contemporary international conflicts? The term 
‘construct’ in the question alludes to some key assumptions and ideological moorings 
of the study. The term points to the possibility of multiple, varied, contrasting and 
even opposing versions of the then recent and relevant international and national 
events that were constructed subjectively by individuals who participated in this study. 
Thus, the idea of a fixed, stable, and objective version of events relevant to this study 
is problematised. Instead, the key events that have arguably defined and shaped the 
international conflict are taken to be discursively produced.  
In the sections that follow, I provide a rationale for the method of data collection used 
by me for this research. I used focus groups to collect data for my research and this 
decision was driven by some key ontological and epistemological considerations. It is in 
the context of these considerations that I developed the rationale for using focus 
groups for my research.  
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4.2 The Method of Data Collection – Focus Groups 
During the early stages of designing the study, contrary to popular tendency to talk 
about the relevant international events in essential and clear-cut terms, I wanted to 
know more about how young people attending private schools in Pakistan interpreted 
and assigned meaning to contemporary international conflicts. Due to this interest in 
looking at the subjective and personal construction of relevant key events, adopting a 
qualitative paradigm of research appeared to make good epistemological sense. This is 
because in contrast to quantitative research qualitative enquiry is historically and 
culturally grounded and aims to understand the representations of the social world 
and the meanings individual actors ascribe to these (Denzin and Lincoln, 2008). The 
next stage in the design process involved deciding upon the methods of data 
collection. In line with Cohen, Manion & Morrison’s (2007) idea of basing such 
decisions in ontological and epistemological considerations, I wanted to select a 
method of data collection that would sit comfortably with the theoretical orientation 
of the study. 
Using a method of data collection that would encourage the participants to talk about 
contemporary international conflicts and key issues related to these seemed 
appropriate. Qualitative interviews and focus groups provide opportunities for 
participants to talk relatively more freely about chosen issues as compared to 
structured interviews. I decided to select focus groups because, in relation to the topic 
of this research, they presented some key advantages over other qualitative methods 
of data collection, including individual interviews.  
The origins of focus groups have been traced back to the early 20th century for the 
purposes of market research where commercial organizations used this method to 
investigate the consumption patterns, effects of advertising campaigns, and the launch 
of new products within the target population (Bryman, 2004). However, towards the 
middle of the century it began to make inroads as a method of data collection within 
the field of social research (Parker and Tritter, 2006). It is now a well-established and 
popular method of data collection in social sciences. The reasons for the growing 
popularity of focus groups in social research are many and varied. These range from 
some fundamental ontological and epistemological considerations to more pragmatic 
reasons like making a more efficient use of time and other resources. 
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Parker and Tritter (2006) suggest that focus groups are a method of choice for 
collecting data where the aim is to explore and investigate the beliefs, values, and 
positions of a group of individuals who have certain common characteristics that are 
relevant to the focus of investigation. Focus groups are often used for studies where 
the aim is to explore, understand and develop deeper insights into matters pertaining 
to their key focuses (Krueger, 1994). Bryman (2004: 346) also states that focus groups 
are especially suitable where ‘the accent is upon interaction within the group and the 
joint construction of meaning.’ Since my aim in this study was to explore how a certain 
group of young people in Pakistan constructed their understanding of the international 
conflict in the wake of September 11 attacks, focus groups appeared to be an 
appropriate option. Therefore, the decision to use focus groups was significantly 
driven by the focus of my research. 
Focus groups seemed a good option because the topic of discussion was one that 
many young people in Pakistan were quite passionately interested in. Rather than 
being a ‘personal trouble’, it was more of a ‘public issue’ (Mills, 2000: 8) that was 
publicly debated in different locations. Since all the young people who participated in 
the study were from middle-class families, they had access to a range of sources of 
information, including newspapers, cable television, and the internet. Therefore, 
arguably, they had access to a range of discourses about the September 11 attacks and 
the subsequent international events like the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. During 
the years when the fieldwork for the research was carried out, the September 11 
attacks and the ensuing international conflict were popular topics of discussion in 
many Pakistani families and social gatherings. Therefore, the substantive issues were 
actively discussed in the social world inhabited by the participants of the study. During 
the years when the data for the study was collected, I was working in schools similar to 
the ones where the focus groups were conducted. On a number of occasions, I had the 
chance to overhear young people sitting in informal groups in the school ground, and 
common-rooms animatedly discussing the September 11 attacks and the subsequent 
international events. Therefore, it seemed that their constructions were to a significant 
extent informed by their social interactions with others, including their peers. Hence, 
focus groups rather than individual interviews seemed more appropriate to discuss 
these matters with the participants of the research. Thus, in a very real way, by using 
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focus groups I was trying to understand the personal investment of individuals in an 
issue that was essentially and originally a public one – the antecedents, the dynamics, 
the politics, and the power relations of the contemporary international conflict. 
As discussed above, the nature of the topic of investigation was such that it could be 
best investigated using a method that replicated the social situations in which the 
relevant issues would have been discussed and debated by the participants of the 
study. Since the key point in this was the social interaction amongst the participants, 
there was a need for relinquishing control by me and giving it to the participants 
themselves. Focus groups seemed a good platform for doing so.       
I want to clarify another related decision that I made – using focus groups rather than 
group interviews. Although these two terms are sometimes taken to be synonymous, I 
believe that there are clear distinctions between the two methods. Parker and Tritter 
(2006) have argued that the key difference between the two methods relates to the 
role of the interviewer. The interviewer in the group interview plays a more active role 
in the discussion and more proactively steers the course of discussion. The interviewer 
is more clearly in the driving seat during the session in a group interview. The fact that 
the researcher is referred to as the moderator in a focus group points to the essentially 
different role s/he is expected to play during the session. Rather than directing the 
discussion, the moderator facilitates discussion among the participants and 
consequently exercises a significantly lesser control over the substantive content of 
the discussion itself. This feature of focus groups made them more suitable for the 
purposes of my study because, as discussed above, there was a clear need to 
relinquish control and let the discussion be steered by the participants themselves.  
My aim was not to find out what was there in the mind of a given individual. In line 
with the theoretical framework of this study, what I was really interested in finding out 
was how the young people who participated in this study constructed their 
understanding of the then current international conflict in a social context. Doing this 
seemed appropriate because, as discussed in chapter 2, I believe that people actively 
construct their understanding through their social interactions with other people. 
Using focus groups where the dynamics of the discussion were less influenced by the 
person of the researcher seemed to be closer to the actual scenarios in which these 
young people talked about such issues and constructed their personal positions. 
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Bryman (2004) also maintains that a key feature of the focus group method is the 
relinquishing of the control by the moderator in favour of the participants.  
As discussed earlier, the key focus of the research rather than being a ‘personal 
trouble’ was first and foremost a ‘public issue’ – an issue of collective significance. 
Therefore, talking about these issues in a setting that was relatively closer to the actual 
situations in which the young people who participated in this study discussed these 
matters seemed a better choice. Due to this reason, I selected focus groups to collect 
information about how middle class young people in Pakistan constructed their 
understanding of the then recent international conflict.  However, I acknowledge that 
the advantage of using focus groups was only relative in relation to other possible 
ways of collecting data such as individual and group interviews. No research setting 
can claim to exactly replicate the actual social environment that it aims to investigate. 
This is especially true for research projects using focus groups to understand how a 
certain group of individuals construct meaning in a social context (Bryman, 2004).  This 
is so because the focus groups are specifically commissioned to collect data about a 
chosen topic – they are at best a replication of a naturally occurring social scenario. 
This obviously has implications for the group dynamics and the substantive content of 
these sessions; and the sessions organized for my research were no exception. The 
focus groups, however, afforded clear relative advantages over other methods of data 
collection in the context of my research. 
Another factor that affects the focus group sessions is the presence of the moderator. 
This is further compounded when there is an obvious power relation between the 
participants and the moderator. Both the above mentioned factors had an impact on 
the research process for my study. Haugh (2008) has argued in detail for 
acknowledging and recognising the impact  of other participants and the person of the 
moderator on the discursive positions that are constructed by an individual in the 
course of a focus group. He says that what the participants say in a focus group is 
taken by researchers unproblematically to be their position on relevant issues. Many 
studies do not adequately take into account the role social dynamics, including the 
presence of the researcher, play in the discursive constructions that take place in focus 
group sessions. Throughout this study, I have made an effort to be conscious and 
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reflexive of my own person in the research process, including the focus group sessions 
for collecting the data.   
Like all focus groups, the sessions that I conducted were removed from the actual 
social settings in which these young people and others like them debated and 
discussed the relevant matters. I recognize that the focus groups were essentially not a 
natural setting; they were contrived scenarios that were recreated exclusively for the 
purpose of my study. Moreover, my presence as the moderator further affected the 
dynamics of the group and the process of discussion itself. I was not an ordinary adult 
but I was recognized as an individual in a position of authority within the broader 
system of which the schools where the participants studied were a part. Therefore, the 
focus groups cannot claim to replicate the actual social scenes within which such 
discussions actually would have taken place. The fact that the groups were formed 
specifically for the purpose of this study and were moderated by an adult who was 
seen to be in a position of authority all affected the dynamics of the sessions and the 
contributions of the participants.  
I clearly acknowledge the effect of my presence on the dynamics of the focus group 
sessions that I conducted. However, like Barbour (2005), I also believe that the focus 
group method can reduce the effect of power imbalance between the interviewer and 
the interviewees. This is because the sessions reproduce the naturally occurring peer 
group formations in which young people discuss issues such as these ones. The 
presence of peers also reduces the perceived risk for the individual participants. 
Therefore, in addition to the advantage in terms of quality of data that was collected, 
using focus groups also afforded methodological and ethical advantages. The 
methodological advantage came from the fact that the method offered a 
comparatively relaxed and safe environment for the participants to talk about key 
issues related to the focus of my study. The presence of their peers made the 
participants feel more relaxed and at ease. Pfefferbaum et al. (2006) chose focus 
groups instead of individual interviews while talking to investigate the responses of a 
group of New York children to the September 11 attacks. They presented the rationale 
that the children would feel more comfortable in a group situation compared to a one-
to-one encounter with an adult.    
92 
 
The ethical advantage related to the reduction of the power imbalance between me 
and the participants. Rather than one individual constantly responding to my questions 
and probes, there was a group of young people who discussed among themselves 
issues introduced by me. Although the key issues were introduced by me at specific 
points in the sessions, the subsequent discussions were then significantly driven and 
steered by the participants themselves. They responded to what others in the group 
said; this included agreeing with what others said, extending what someone else 
talked about, building upon another person’s arguments, disagreeing with what 
someone else said, and challenging other participants’ constructions etc. Thus, using 
focus groups seemed to be the appropriate method of data collection for my study as 
it partially mitigated the power imbalance between the participants and me and as 
such afforded clear methodological and ethical advantages. 
Another reason that made focus groups a suitable method for data collection was 
related to the theoretical framework for my research. As discussed in chapter 2, 
people construct their positions about issues, especially the ones that have a collective 
significance in their social interactions with other people by drawing on the discourses 
available to them. Building on this idea, I have argued that people also construct their 
personal positions using discourses and discursive practices that are available to them. 
However, as discussed in chapter 2, people do not construct their positions and 
understandings drawing on discourses in a simple and straightforward way. In addition 
to accepting the dominant discourses, they, at times, also contest and resist the 
discourses that they encounter. Therefore, it made good sense to use a method of 
data collection that would allow the participants to articulate their positions by 
drawing on available discourses while engaging with each other. This would have 
allowed them to not only draw on existing discourses but also resist and contest 
discourses used by other participants. Thus, the focus groups organized for this study 
to some extent replicated the social settings in which the participants discussed and 
debated issues related to world politics and international conflicts. However, as 
acknowledged above, no research methods, including the ones used in this study can 
accurately reproduce the actual settings in which people go about their normal daily 
lives.   
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4.3 The Sample 
In this section, I discuss some important decisions that I made regarding the study in 
terms of its geographical, cultural, socio-economic, political, and institutional location, 
the composition of the focus groups, and my role as the researcher. Doing this is 
critically important for any rigorous piece of qualitative research. This is because 
instead of aiming to generalize its claims, qualitative research recognises, 
acknowledges, and even celebrates its locatedness. It is this locatedness of my study 
that I aim to bring to the fore in this section. In the sections that follow, I discuss some 
key aspects of the sample of young people that was used for this research.  
I begin by discussing why I carried out this research with young people attending 
private schools. I then discuss the salient features of the background, in relation to the 
focus of this research, of the cities in which the schools were located where the study 
was carried out. Next, I discuss the number of focus groups that I carried out. 
Subsequently, I briefly present a rationale for selecting the participants from a certain 
age group. Then, I discuss the gender composition of the focus group sessions. Finally, I 
discuss how the actual participants for various focus group sessions were selected. 
 Researching Students attending Private Schools  4.3.1
As stated in the research question, the research for this study was carried out with 
young people attending private schools in Pakistan. This was a conscious choice and 
was based on some important considerations. Most importantly, the decision to study 
how a certain group of middle class young people in Pakistan constructed their 
understanding of the then contemporary international conflict was to a significant 
extent influenced by my own personal history.  
My relationship with the West, especially the UK is a long and significant one. I studied 
English literature for my first degree and finally came over to the UK for a postgraduate 
degree in Education at a highly charged and significant time in world history – 2001. 
The September 11 attacks were a regular feature of the informal discussions in the 
university cafeteria and were also discussed and debated at length in the electronic 
and print media. Perhaps, resuming my studies at this juncture was one of the reasons 
that led me to investigate this area. Edward Said (1978/1995) in his book Orientalism 
also refers to his personal background as one of the key motivations behind the book. 
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Said (1978/1995) also cites his simultaneous investment in two cultures – Palestinian 
and American – as one of the reasons that led him to write the book Orientalism. He 
also refers to the tension and pain of this simultaneous investment.  Many of the 
research participants seemed to have a background similar to mine – middle-class, 
studying in an English medium school, possibly moving on to study for degrees at 
Western universities. I therefore wanted to explore how these young people 
constructed their understanding and subsequently positioned themselves in the 
debates surrounding the then recent international conflict.  
There is a high level of inequality in Pakistani society. There is a relatively small 
prosperous upper middle class, a larger lower middle class, followed by a very big 
working class. These socio-economic divisions are mirrored, supported, and 
perpetuated by a multi-tiered education system (Ghazi et al. 2010). Commenting on 
the multiple systems of education that mirror the socioeconomic divisions in Pakistani 
society, Ghazi et al. (2010: 12) write: 
Unfortunately, in Pakistan there are many kinds of educational institutions at 
all levels. In this way people have been introduced to many standards of 
education. There are basically three kinds of schools: the elite private 
institutions that cater to the upper class; the government-run schools those 
are commonly known as public schools, serving the lower echelons of the 
population and the religious schools which are known as Madrassas.  
The vast majority of children from the upper middle class attend private schools. Most 
children from lower middle class and working class families attend state schools. These 
children represent the vast majority of Pakistani children. Finally, a small proportion of 
children from working class backgrounds, especially those coming from rural areas 
attend the religious seminaries or madrassas.  I chose to carry out my research with 
young people attending private schools rather than those from the other two types of 
schools. Therefore, this decision was partly driven by my own background which was 
quite similar to the participants of the study. Another advantage of doing research with 
middle class young people attending private schools was that it was from this group 
that the future decision makers of Pakistan would come. At one stage during the 
fieldwork, I considered doing focus group sessions with madressah students also. 
However, I decided not to do so because, firstly, doing so might have been inadvisable 
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on security grounds, secondly, this would have entailed more time and resources and, 
thirdly, doing so would have introduced a level of complexity which would have been 
beyond the scope of this research.  
 The Choice of Schools 4.3.2
I decided to conduct the focus groups in four schools located in the cities of Islamabad 
and Rawalpindi. Four out of six focus groups were conducted in two schools in 
Islamabad – two in each of the schools. The other two focus groups were carried out in 
two different schools in Rawalpindi. In this section, I outline some basic demographic 
and historical information about these two cities, which will help in contextualising the 
data and its analysis in later chapters. 
Islamabad is the capital city of Pakistan and is adjacent to the city of Rawalpindi. 
Notwithstanding their geographical proximity and the two being referred to as twin 
cities, they are very different from each other. The sharp differences and the marked 
contradictions that can be seen in various aspects of life in Pakistan are also reflected 
between these two cities. The social, economic and cultural differences between the 
two cities are significant from the perspective of this study. In this section, I briefly 
elaborate upon some of the salient differences between them, especially the ones that 
had a bearing on this research by virtue of having an effect on the participants of my 
focus groups. 
Islamabad is a modern city that was planned and built during the 1960s. It was 
envisaged as the new capital of the country –presenting the modern face of Pakistan to 
the rest of the world. The city is located on the foot of the Margalla Hills which are a 
continuation of the Himalayas. Islamabad started off as a very small town, housing all 
the federal government departments and providing residential accommodation to the 
employees of these offices. Islamabad benefits from a naturally beautiful topography 
and a planned, modern built up environment. Due to these factors and also because of 
the relatively good law and order and security situation, Islamabad came to be seen as 
a destination of choice for building a second home by the well-off segments of 
Pakistani society living in other financial and industrial centres of the country. Many 
Pakistanis who immigrated to various countries in 1950s and the 1960s, also 
considered Islamabad favourably as a city where they could re-establish their roots in 
the country of their original heritage. Thus, the city which began as a small town, home 
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predominantly to civil servants and members of the diplomatic corps, became a much 
more diverse city, with relatively more affluent people from all parts of the country 
shifting there. I conducted three of the six focus groups in schools in Islamabad. All 
participants of these focus groups came from middle class families. Their parents were 
either civil servants, well to do entrepreneurs, or people of Pakistani origin who had 
returned after living for many years overseas. 
The other three focus groups were conducted in the city of Rawalpindi. Rawalpindi in 
contrast to Islamabad has a long history – going back a couple of thousand years BC. It 
is not very far from the town of Taxila where rich archaeological remains of a town of 
the ancient Gandhara civilisation were found. During the British Raj, Rawalpindi 
developed as a military cantonment. At the time of the partition of the Indian 
Subcontinent, Rawalpindi became the seat of the military headquarter of Pakistan. The 
presence of the General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army has been the defining 
feature of the city. Due to this reason, Rawalpindi has traditionally been the home of 
the serving as well as retired army officers. Many of the pupils studying in the schools 
where the focus groups were carried out came from army families.  
Traditionally, the army has played a significant role in the politics of Pakistan. Military 
intervention in the politics of the country has been the norm rather than the exception. 
By and large the military officers are suspicious and critical of the politicians and they 
see it as their ‘moral’ and ‘professional’ responsibility to intervene in the affairs of the 
government whenever they deem appropriate (Haqqani, 2006; Siddiqa, 2007). As a 
result, most army officers and their families have been supportive of the various 
military dictators and their political, albeit unconstitutional, adventures. However, in 
the case of General Pervaiz Musharraf and his government this relationship was far 
from straightforward. Traditionally, the army has supported the social status quo as it 
allowed repeated military interventions and opportunities to gain control of the 
government of the country.  
During the military government of one of the previous military dictators, General Zia-
ul-Haq, Pakistan was pushed at the forefront of the American resistance to the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. In fact, through the acquiescence and support of the Pakistan 
Government of the time Pakistan fought a proxy war for the USA against the Soviet 
Union in Afghanistan, which arguably contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
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During this time the Pakistan Army actively supported the indigenous resistance in 
Afghanistan to Soviet occupation (Chomsky, 2007; Kean et al., 2004). The members of 
the Afghan population that offered this resistance were referred to as the 
‘mujahedeen’ (holy warriors). The Taliban are actually the next generation of the so 
called ‘mujahedeen’ or at least have strong ideological links with them. Over the last 
three decades the Pakistan Army developed a close relationship with various factions 
of the mujahedeen and the Taliban. It was partly these links to and sympathy with the 
Taliban of the more conservative factions of the Pakistan army that led to this 
ambivalent relationship of some officers and soldiers of the Pakistan Army with 
General Pervaiz Musharraf.  They saw General Musharraf’s support of the war on terror 
as servile submission to the highhanded policies of the American Government of that 
time (Bennet-Jones, 2002). Therefore, some army officers saw General Musharraf as 
the saviour of the country from corrupt and inefficient politicians while others saw him 
as the obsequious agent of the American Government. This complex and complicated 
relationship of the army officers and their families with General Pervaiz Musharraf 
could possibly have had an impact on what the participants of the focus groups said as 
many of them came from either army families or that had close links with the army. 
Ascertaining such a causal link between the possible family background and the 
participants’ constructions in the focus groups is not possible in the context of my 
research study. However, I will use this awareness to be sensitive to any differences 
that may emerge from the analysis of the data.  
 The Number of Focus Groups 4.3.3
As part of this research, I conducted six focus groups. The number of participants in the 
groups varied from four to six. A total of 32 individuals participated in these focus 
groups. Cohen, Manion & Morrison (2007) suggest that the number of participants in a 
focus group can vary from 4 to 12. They also warn about some of the issues that can 
emerge if either the group size is too small or too large. During the course of my study, 
I found 5 to 6 to be a good number of participants. In the session where I had only 4 
participants I felt that at times the group dynamic became somewhat weak. A group 
size larger than 6 I feel would also not be appropriate for a study like mine because the 
aim of the sessions was to bring out the richness of the participants’ constructions 
rather than merely increasing the number of voices. Finch and Lewis (2003) maintain 
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that smaller group size is suitable for sensitive and complex issues. If a study was 
commissioned to explore the attitudes of a certain segment of population about a 
certain product or service then perhaps a larger group may be more appropriate.  
I conducted six focus groups because they provided a range of perspectives on some of 
the key issues relevant to the focus of the study. I could have possibly done a couple of 
more sessions but constraint of time and resources made me decide otherwise. 
Moreover, I also felt that the range and depth of arguments made by the participants 
were quite rich and I was beginning to reach a point of saturation. A relatively small 
sample size in qualitative research is not seen as a problem. Ritchie, Lewis and Elam 
(2003: 83) suggest that in qualitative research by increasing the sample size beyond a 
certain point leads to ‘diminishing return’ from each new case that is added. 
Pfefferbaum et al. (2006) also, while investigating the emotional responses of American 
adolescents to September 11 attacks, used a small sample size. They conducted only 
one focus group comprising five participants. The only caveat Cohen, Manion and 
Morrison (2007) offer regarding the sample size in case of a focus group study is that 
the number of sessions should be more than one.                                 
 Age of the Participants 4.3.4
All participants in my research were studying in A-level. Therefore, they were mostly 
17 to 18 year olds. I decided to do my research with this age group because these 
young people stood on the threshold of adulthood. I know from my experience of 
working with them that they usually had a passionate interest in national and 
international politics. The schools where I carried out the focus groups had a strong 
tradition of organizing model United Nations conferences. Many of the participants 
had participated in these events, which was a clear benefit from the perspective of my 
research because they had previous experience of talking about international affairs in 
a public forum. It will be pertinent to mention that out of the four schools where this 
research was carried out three schools – school A in Islamabad and schools C and D in 
Rawalpindi – were older and had more well-established traditions of organising model 
United Nations Conferences. However, it is quite likely that at least some of the 
participants from school B in Islamabad where two focus groups were conducted 
would have had the opportunity to participate in these conferences in other schools.   
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 Gender of the Participants 4.3.5
Four out of the six focus groups were mixed sex groups whereas the remaining two 
were girls only. The composition of the focus groups in terms of gender of the 
participants reflected the wider organization of the schools where the participants of 
each group studied. The four mixed sex groups were conducted in mixed sex schools 
and the two girls only groups were conducted in a girls only school. The reason for 
mirroring the gender composition of the schools was that I wanted the focus groups to 
reproduce the actual social situations and circumstances in which the young people 
discussed and debated the issues relevant to my investigation.  Finch and Lewis (2003 
171) also cite this as one of the key strengths of the focus groups: 
A further feature of focus groups is the spontaneity that arises from their 
stronger social context. In responding to each other, participants reveal more 
of their own frame of reference on the subject of study. The language they 
use, the emphasis they give and their general framework of understanding is 
more spontaneously on display. 
The schools where I carried out this research were either mixed-sex or girls only; there 
were no boys-only schools. In case of the all-girls school there was no other choice but 
to do focus groups with female students only. However, it seemed to make good sense 
to do mix sex focus groups in the rest of the schools. Not doing so would have created 
an additional layer of artificiality in the research design.    
 Selection of Participants for the Focus Groups 4.3.6
The participants for the focus groups were selected by the head teachers of the 
respective schools. In each case, a few days prior to the actual session, I spoke with the 
head teachers and requested them to select students for the sessions. I asked them to 
look for students who they thought would participate actively in the sessions and 
would be happy to talk about issues relevant to the focus of the study. Thus, the 
composition of the groups was not random and was influenced by the head teacher of 
the school based on some broad guidelines provided by me. Finch and Lewis (2003) 
suggest that the composition of focus groups should not be left to random selection as 
is the case with the sampling for certain other methods of data collection. Cohen, 
Manion & Morrison (2007) also make a similar argument regarding the selection of the 
participants for focus groups.  Non-random selection of participants for focus groups is 
100 
 
due to specific nature of this method. Since focus groups are basically a method of 
data collection that encourages discussion of substantive issues by the participants 
themselves, with limited intervention and steering by the moderator, the selection has 
to be made quite carefully. Random selection can lead to a number of potential 
problems. For instance if the participants know each other too well they can become 
complacent, which can adversely affect the flow of the discussion. Similarly, a group of 
total strangers can create an uncomfortable and awkward environment which can also 
inhibit free and open discussion (Finch and Lewis, 2003). Table 4.1 gives lists the 
participants, date, and name of school for each of the six focus groups. It also provides 
some additional information about the participants who had either lived abroad 
or/and had other nationalities. This information is not comprehensive because I did 
not ask the participants about their life histories and any such information was 
incidentally volunteered by them.  
Table 4.1 – List of Focus Groups, Participants, Schools, Dates and Cities 
School A- Focus Group 1 – March 2005 – Islamabad 
Pseudonym Gender Other information 
Maher M  
Ahmer M  
Salma F  
Haniya F  
Asma F  
Amin M  
School A – Focus Group 2 – September 2006 – Islamabad 
Pseudonym Gender Other information 
Mansoor M  
Harris M  
Fahad M  
Fareeha F  
Wafa F She was an American national and had shifted to 
Pakistan a few years back. 
Saima F  
School B – Focus Group 3 – October 2007 – Islamabad 
Pseudonym Gender Other information 
Afreen F She was a British national and her family had shifted to 
Pakistan a couple of years back. 
Saba F  
Hafsa F  
Annum F  
Malihah F  
Iman F  
School C – Focus Group 4 – February 2008 – Rawalpindi 
Pseudonym Gender Other information 
Saeed M  
Adil M  
Komal F  
Zoha F  
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Farah F  
School D – Focus Group 5 – September 2008 – Rawalpindi 
Pseudonym Gender Other information 
Nawira F  
Aamer M  
Babur M  
Tabish M  
Saira F  
School B – Focus Group 6 – December 2008 – Islamabad 
Pseudonym Gender Other information 
Natasha F She was a British national and had moved to Pakistan a 
few years back. 
Aan F  
Mysha F She had lived for most part of her life in Saudi Arabia 
and moved to Pakistan a couple of years back. 
Huma F  
The participants of each focus group that I conducted knew each other quite well but 
were not necessarily close friends. They were also seen as individuals who were 
expressive and were forthcoming in talking about various issues. Therefore, the 
selection of the participants was essentially driven by some key pragmatic and 
methodological considerations.   
4.4 Conducting the Focus Groups 
In this section, I discuss some salient aspects of the focus group sessions that I 
conducted for this research. I begin by discussing some important issues related to the 
substantive content of the discussion that took place in the sessions. I then discuss my 
role in the process. 
 Language used in the Focus Group Sessions 4.4.1
All focus groups were conducted in English. Before each session, I gave the participants 
the option to speak either in Urdu or English. However, all participants in all sessions 
chose to speak in English. Occasionally, they used Urdu words and phrases which I 
translated into English while transcribing the sessions. 
 The Substantive Focus of Discussions in Various Focus Groups 4.4.2
The data for the study was collected over a period of four years from 2005 to 2008. 
This was a turbulent time in world politics, especially the aspects of it relevant to the 
main focus of my study. This period in my research was also interesting in terms of its 
emerging focus and my own development and progress as a researcher. In fact, the 
extraordinary and significant events that unfolded on the international stage which 
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also had a direct bearing on Pakistan significantly shaped the final focus of this study 
and are reflected in the topic guides used for different focus group sessions for this 
study. (An example is provided in the Appendix.) These factors had a significant 
influence over the design of the focus group sessions and the direction that the 
discussion in each session took. The key issues that were discussed in each session 
were affected by some of the momentous events that unfolded on the national and 
international stage at that time. For example, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in 
December 2007 significantly influenced the discussion that took place in the focus 
groups conducted during 2008, and it was initiated by the participants themselves, 
without any suggestion from me.  Table 4.2 shows a timeline of focus groups for my 
research in relation to some important, relevant international events. 
Table 4.2 – A timeline of focus groups for this study and important international 
events. 
 Dates Key National and International Events Preceding the Focus 
Group and Issues Discussed during the Sessions 
Events September 
2001 to March 
2005 
Key National and International Events 
 September 2001 – Attacks on iconic US targets  
 December 2001 – US led coalition attacked Afghanistan  
 March 2003 – US led coalition of the willing attacked Iraq  
 June 2004 – Drone strikes began in Pakistan’s tribal areas 
Focus 
Group 1 
March 2, 2005 Issues Discussed 
 911 attacks & US led war on terror  
 US hegemony & imperialism  
 ‘war on terror’ in relation to international law and the UN 
Charter  
 the partition of India & the creation of Pakistan  
 narrow and inflexible history curricula 
 legitimate authority in international relations 
 national sovereignty 
 social inequality & capitalism 
 social inequality in Pakistan 
 democracy in Pakistan 
Events March 2005 to 
September 
2006 
Key National and International Events 
 The ‘war on terror’ continues. 
 Low-level hostilities continue between Pakistan and India. 
 Although this was a highly volatile time for the region and 
the world at large, no major new national or international 
events took place immediately before the focus group that 
might have had a bearing on the issues that were discussed.  
Focus 
Group 2 
September 
2006  
Issues Discussed 
 two nation theory and Pakistan 
 Pakistan-India Conflicts 
 ethical warfare & terrorism 
 US anti-Muslim policies 
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 conspiracy theories  re 911 attacks 
 US imperialism 
Events September 
2006 to 
October 2007 
Same as for focus group 2.  
Focus 
Group 3 
October 2007  Issues Discussed 
 poverty & feudalism in Pakistan 
 being a Muslim means being a terrorist? 
 terrorism and Islam   
 use of violence should be the last resort 
 some terrorists are brainwashed 
 terrorism and conventional wars 
 the Kashmir dispute 
Events October 2007 
to February 
2008 
 Key National and International Events 
 The ‘war on terror’ continues.  
 Low-level hostilities continue between Pakistan and India. 
 November 2007 – A state of emergency declared by General 
Musharraf 
 A sharp rise in terrorism in Pakistan 
 Benazir Bhutto was assassinated in December 2007. 
 
Focus 
Group 4 
February 14, 
2008 
Issues Discussed during the Focus Group 
 conspiracy theories re 911 
 US imperialism 
 the ‘war on terror’ 
 rising insecurity in Pakistan 
 Pakistan-India conflicts 
 Pakistan & the ‘war on terror’ (PK was forced) 
 US anti-Pakistan agenda 
 national sovereignty 
 lack of upright & capable political leaders 
 Benazir Bhutto’s assassination 
 deteriorating security situation in Pakistan 
 Pakistan and poverty 
 dysfunctional democracy in Pakistan 
Events February 2008 
to September 
2008 
Key National and International Events 
 The ‘war on terror’ continues. 
 Low-level hostilities continue between Pakistan and India. 
 A high level of terrorist violence continued in Pakistan. 
 February 18, 2008 – general elections held in Pakistan 
 Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) led government took over in 
March 2008. 
 August 2008 – General Musharraf resigned under the threat 
of imminent impeachment 
 September 6, 2008 – the husband of the slain PPP leader 
Benazir Bhutto’s husband Asif Ali Zardari was elected to the 
office of the President of Pakistan 
Focus 
Group 5 
September 25, 
2008 
Issues Discussed 
 ‘war on terror’ 
 US imperialism 
 US’s anti-Islam agenda 
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 conspiracy theories re 911 
 terrorism 
 ‘war on terror’ 
 ‘war on terror’ & international law 
 lack of competent and honest politicians 
 dysfunctional democracy in Pakistan 
 Pakistan army is not corrupt 
Events September 
2008 to 
December 2008 
Key National and International Events 
 The ‘war on terror’ continues. 
 Low-level hostilities continue between Pakistan and India. 
 A high level of terrorist violence continued in Pakistan. 
 November 3, 2008 – Barack Obama won the US presidential 
elections 
 November 26, 2008 – Key targets in Mumbai attacked by 
terrorist, allegedly supported by Pakistan. 
Focus 
Group 6 
December 2, 
2008 
Issues Discussed 
 conspiracy theories re 911 
 US’s anti-Muslim World agenda 
 ‘war on terror’ 
 US imperialism 
 national sovereignty 
 Pakistan’s deteriorating security situation  
 Pakistan as a nuclear power 
 Lack of committed honest and upright leaders in Pakistan 
 ‘war on terror’ has isolated Pakistan 
 endemic poverty & the gap between rich & poor in Pakistan 
 partition of India and the creation of Pakistan 
 Pakistanis have a bad image overseas 
 Pakistan-India conflicts 
 2008 Mumbai bombings by terrorists 
 
The data collected through the focus groups reflects on the one hand the rapid 
changes and turbulent developments in international politics and on the other the 
emerging focus of the study and very importantly my development as a researcher. For 
example, in the first couple of focus groups the discussion mainly revolved around the 
participants’ construction of morality and a sense of right and wrong and their views 
on the use of violence. However, in the subsequent focus groups the discussion 
focused more specifically around September 11 attacks and the events on the 
international scene in the wake of these attacks.  In the initial focus groups I thought 
that talking about personal morality would be a good way of introducing wider issues 
of morality in international conflicts. However, the early focus groups tended to be 
about occasions when the participants had been ‘naughty’ rather than genuine moral 
issues, and that there seemed to be little in common between what they said about 
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personal and international issues. Therefore, I decided to drop the personal bit, which 
took up a lot of time, and focus more strongly on international conflicts.  
 I amended the topic guide for each new focus group as a result of reflecting on my 
experience of conducting previous sessions and the rapidly changing international 
geopolitical situation. In some of the later focus groups the assassination of Benazir 
Bhutto and the deteriorating security situation in Pakistan formed the substantive foci 
of the discussions. I have included as appendix 1 the complete transcript of the fourth 
focus group, conducted soon after Bhutto’s assassination, as an example. 
The substantive content of each focus group discussion was influenced by the 
emerging focus of my research, which in turn was influenced by some of the then 
recent key political events, and also by the interest and preoccupations of the 
participants. These labile foci of the focus group sessions have significant implication 
for my thesis as a whole. Very importantly, they reveal the contingent and located 
nature of study as it was significantly influenced by my own evolving research 
interests, the preoccupations of the participants, and also the volatile events that 
unfolded on the international and national scenes during the years when the data for 
this was collected. I feel using focus groups as the instrument of data collection was 
also suitable because of the reason that the focus of the study developed and evolved 
along the way. The very nature of the focus group method makes it conducive for 
investigations that are tentative and emergent in nature (Cohen, Manion and 
Morrison, 2007). This is because along with the reflective practice of the researcher, 
the dynamics of the focus groups give significant freedom to the participants, which in 
turn helps the researcher to continually realign and refine the focus of the subsequent 
discussions. Barbour (2005) also alludes to this feature of focus groups in the context 
of medical education research. She discusses how focus groups have been used by 
other researchers to identify items for inclusion in a subsequent survey.  
Thus, focus groups by their very nature allow a degree of flexibility that is seldom 
possible in other methods of data collection, including the individual interview. The 
initial focus group sessions that I conducted helped me develop a focus for my study 
that became its key preoccupation: How do middle class young people construct their 
understanding of the contemporary international conflict? Krueger and Casey (2009) 
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also support this use of focus groups to develop a clearer understanding of the issues 
at hand. Commenting on this they write (2009: 8): 
There are three points in the development of a product or program when 
focus groups are helpful. At the first point, focus groups are used by the 
researcher to gain understanding—to see the issue (for example, 
breastfeeding, recycling, getting a mortgage) through the eyes and hearts of 
the target audience. The researcher’s goal with these focus groups is to learn 
how a target audience sees, understands and values a particular topic and to 
learn the language used to talk about the topic. 
In the first focus group the discussion revolved mainly around issues of right and 
wrong and their views on Jihad (the Arabic term for holy war). In the subsequent 
sessions the issue of terrorism and the international conflict in the wake of September 
11 attacks occupied a more central position in the discussion. 
The full transcript of Focus Group 4 is included in the Appendix as an example. 
 My Role in the Focus Groups 4.4.3
As mentioned above, I chose focus groups as the method of data collection due the 
specific advantages they brought to the study by closely mirroring the actual social 
situations in which the participants of the study would have discussed issues relevant 
to the key focus of my research. Moreover, the fact that in the sessions a group of 
young people discussed the issues amongst themselves shifted the power balance 
somewhat in their favour. Notwithstanding these and other potential advantages, my 
presence in the focus group sessions had a significant impact on the course and the 
substantive content of the discussions. Qualitative research instead of purporting to be 
value neutral and unaffected by the person of researcher acknowledges and even 
celebrates the subjectivity of the researcher. The data collected in a research study 
does not appear from a vacuum. In fact all data is generated in response to conscious 
planning and intervention by the researcher. Commenting on this Holliday (2007: 133) 
writes: 
The accounts and talk produced by the people in the research setting are done 
so in response to the elicitations of the researcher and then incorporated into 
her own narrative. 
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Therefore, even though the participants had the flexibility and freedom to steer the 
discussion themselves, the broad parameters of the discussion were determined by 
me. Their discussions started as a direct response to the questions that I asked. Had I 
asked different questions I am sure the ensuing discussion would have been 
significantly different. My influence was not restricted merely to the framing of the 
questions. My interventions during the course of the discussions also had an impact on 
the data that was generated. In the earlier focus groups, my interventions were more 
frequent and directing. This was partly due to my own professional background as a 
teacher, head teacher, and principal. It was only gradually during the course of the 
fieldwork that I developed the skill of limited intervention and being less ‘teacherly’. 
The following explanation by me in the first focus group conducted in school A 
demonstrates my inclination to talk to and guide the participants as a teacher would. 
Naveed: But I feel every human being has…at some point or the other, he or 
she feels, yes, that was something I shouldn’t have done. Or that something I 
did was wrong. I think it is part of being a human that… 
As I progressed with my research, I learned to resist the urge to offer explanations and 
unintentionally direct the participants in certain directions. Limited intervention from 
me in the later sessions led to more spontaneous and natural discussions in the focus 
groups.   
4.5 Transcription and Analysis  
In this section, I discuss the process of transcribing the discussions that took place 
during the focus group sessions. Subsequently, I briefly outline the procedure that I 
adopted to analyse the transcribed data.  
 The Transcription of the Focus Group Sessions 4.5.1
The discussion in each focus group was recorded using a tape recorder. The 
participants were informed about the purpose of the sessions and also the fact that 
the discussion would be recorded. The focus groups lasted on average for a duration of 
about 75 minutes each. The whole discussion in each focus group was later transcribed 
verbatim by me. I found this to be the most difficult aspect of the process of data 
collection. This was because it took extremely long to transcribe each session. The 
transcription of a focus group that lasted an hour and half took approximately 15 to 18 
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hours. This was because of the very nature of a focus group session. Since I wanted the 
participants to ‘freely’ and ‘naturally’ engage and interact with one another and also 
due to the nature of the topic, the participants, very often, became quite passionately 
involved in the discussion and interrupted, challenged, and built on what other 
individuals said. Therefore, determining who said what at times became quite 
challenging during the transcription stage. Parts of the discussion I had to replay 
numerous times to accurately understand the details. This made the process quite 
difficult and laborious. At the time when the focus groups were conducted, I was 
working fulltime and the transcription of the recorded sessions was possible only over 
the weekends and, therefore, the transcription of each session stretched over several 
weeks. 
I decided not to employ a transcriber because of a number of reasons. The most 
important was the fact that if I was at places finding it hard to understand and 
transcribe what was said then this problem would have been amplified much more for 
a person who was not present during the discussion. Also, transcribing the focus 
groups also gave me an opportunity to familiarise myself with the data. Krueger and 
Casey (2009) also recommend that when possible moderators should transcribe the 
focus group sessions themselves as it would allow them to gain a greater degree of 
familiarity with the data. Notwithstanding the hard work, transcribing the sessions 
helped me become familiar with the data, which might not have been possible if 
someone else had done the transcription. 
 Data Analysis 4.5.2
I analysed the data that I collected using the method of discourse analysis. Discourse 
analysis has gained popularity as a method of qualitative data analysis in the last 
couple of decades (Daymon and Holloway, 2002/2011). It ‘is a set of broad 
methodological principles’ (Daymon & Holloway, 2002/2011: 165) that is used to 
analyse and interpret various forms of linguistic data. There are variations in the way 
the term is understood and used. However, there is a broad consensus that the 
method is used to make sense of ‘social life through language and social practice’ 
(Daymon & Holloway, 2002/2011: 165). In this study, I have used the method as 
suggested by Ritchie, Spencer and O’Connor (2003: 200) who write: 
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Discourse analysis [which] is concerned with the way knowledge is produced 
within a particular discourse through the use of distinctive language (for 
example, legal discourse, medical discourse) or through the adoption of 
implicit theories in order to make sense of social action (for example, poverty, 
power, gender relations). Discourse analysis may also focus on what is going 
on in interaction in terms of performances, linguistic styles, rhetorical devices 
and ways in which talk and text set out to convince and compete with 
alternative accounts. 
I tried to make sense of what the participants said during the focus group sessions by 
identifying the discourses that they may have been drawing upon or the counter-
discourses that they employed to resist or challenge certain hegemonic constructions 
of international conflicts.  
The data that I collected through the focus group sessions was quite comprehensive 
and rich. Therefore, I needed to devise a strategy to manage and reduce the data. The 
analysis of data comprised two stages. First, I identified key issues discussed by the 
participants. This required me to read and reread the data several times in order to 
make sure that the broad areas that I had identified related closely to the original data 
and I did not miss out any key issues. Once I had identified the broad areas, I examined 
these in greater detail as they occurred in different transcripts. This helped me identify 
key themes within each broad area. Once I had identified the themes, I coded each 
one of these. After doing this, I read through the transcript of each focus group and 
identified where each of the theme occurred. I created an index of key themes by 
recording in excel tables the page numbers of the transcripts where different themes 
occurred in each of the six focus group sessions. I did this to ensure that my analysis 
was grounded in the data itself. 
In the second stage of the analysis process, I used the key themes that I identified to 
structure the analysis of the data. In order to develop an explanatory account for each 
of the themes, I then revisited the data and reflected more closely on what was being 
said. In order to develop the explanatory accounts, I examined what was being said by 
the participants in relation to the key themes that I had already teased out; I 
subsequently used the key discourses related to international conflicts that were in 
wide circulation at the time of the fieldwork, some of which have been outlined in 
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chapter three, to identify the discourses and the counter-discourses that the 
participants may have been drawing upon. 
4.6 Ethical Issues 
Ethical considerations are important for all research studies no matter which research 
paradigm is used. However, these become all the more significant in qualitative 
research due to the flexible structure of the research design and its potential for 
generating rich and, at times, unanticipated insights (Lewis, 2003). Therefore, it is quite 
critical for anyone undertaking qualitative research to keep the ethical dimension of 
the study at the fore at all stages of the project. Throughout my collection of data, I 
adhered to the principle of informed consent. First and foremost the schools where 
the focus groups were conducted were given detailed information about the purposes 
of the research, what will be required from the participants and how the collected 
information will be used. All the schools where the data was collected had a strong 
tradition of teachers carrying out small scale investigation for their own professional 
and academic development. Therefore, the headteachers were quite comfortable with 
the idea of a colleague coming in to collect data for academic research. This made the 
whole process of gaining access significantly easier to negotiate. The schools identified 
and selected the participants of the focus group on the basis of voluntary participation 
from the students. Once the students accepted to the invitation to participate, the 
headteacher informed and asked for consent from the parents of the participants.  
As discussed above, much of the process of informed consent had already taken place 
before the actual sessions. However, before beginning each session, I gave to the 
participants a detailed introduction to the research study, explaining the purpose of 
the research, how the data will be used, and very importantly that all information 
would be made anonymous. They were also given the option to opt out at any stage of 
the research process, including after the focus groups had been conducted. They were 
also informed that to retain the richness and detail of the discussions the sessions 
would be recorded. Before switching on the voice recorder, I asked the participants if 
they were happy to have the session to be recorded. The actual sessions only began 
once the participants were fully satisfied and had a good understanding of the 
research study. In most sessions the students asked questions about academic aspects 
of the research and the experience of doing a PhD, especially from a UK university. 
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These questions from the participants were important because, as mentioned earlier, 
they all belonged to middle class families and a significant proportion of them aspired 
to pursue higher education overseas.  
It is quite interesting to note that none of the participants in any of the focus groups 
decided to withdraw from the research. However, it is possible that the participants 
found it difficult to withdraw because they saw the sessions as a school activity and me 
as an authority figure. They all seemed quite eager to participate and wanted to know 
more about the research project. This fact further augments the locatedness and 
contingent nature of my study. Had I conducted this research in any other type of 
educational institution the response of the school leaders, the participants and their 
parents could have been quite different which would have had significant implications 
on the data that would have been collected. I will, therefore, try to be careful about 
any claims that I will make because they will be specific to the circumstances in which 
this study was carried out.  
All references to the young people who participated in my research and the schools 
where the focus group sessions took place were made anonymous. I did this to make 
sure that no one will be able to trace either the research participants or the schools 
where the data were collected.  
I encountered another dilemma during the focus group sessions. This related to the 
decision whether to intervene and correct when one or more participants said 
something that was either factually incorrect or was based on unreliable evidence. Had 
I been only a researcher this decision would have been comparatively easier. I could 
have easily justified myself that my role was simply to collect the data. However, since 
all the participants saw me a figure of authority, this decision was much more 
complicated. I decided to resist the urge to correct what the participants said because 
doing so would have inhibited the discussion and would have compromised the 
authenticity and richness of the data. Notwithstanding my decision to do so, it posed a 
significant professional dilemma for me.  
4.7 The Strength and Limitations of the Research Design 
In this section, I briefly discuss some of the key strengths and limitations of my 
research. I was interested in finding out how young people construct their 
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understanding of contemporary international conflicts. Doing focus group sessions 
with a sample of young people gave me a detailed and thorough insight into how they 
constructed their accounts of key aspects of contemporary international conflicts. I 
was able to capture what they said in their interactions with one another, which to a 
significant extent replicated the natural environments in which they constructed their 
positions on such matters. I was also able to see which of the discourses and counter-
discourses, which were in wide circulation at the time of the fieldwork, the research 
participants drew or did not draw upon. Therefore, this research helped get an in-
depth and comprehensive understanding of how the young people who participated in 
my study constructed their understanding of contemporary international conflicts. 
Like any research study, my study has some limitations. Like most qualitative research, 
my study is based on small sample that was purposively selected. Therefore, it cannot 
be said to be representative of all Pakistani young people. Had this study been carried 
out with another group of young people, especially those attending another type of 
educational institution like the state schools or the madrassas, the findings would have 
been significantly different. The focus groups for this research were carried out at 
different points in time when a lot was happening in world politics. Therefore, 
different issues were discussed in different focus groups. Another limitation of the 
study was that because it employed focus groups, it was not possible to quantify or 
report in depth about what individual participants said. This also constrained the 
opportunities for contextualizing what individuals said against their personal life 
histories. Moreover, in focus group research there is the issue of one or more 
participants dominating or leading the discussion. Finally, my personal life story 
worked as strength as well as a limitation. The former because being from the same 
cultural background or being an ‘insider’ allowed me to interpret the data at a level of 
sophistication which otherwise would have been difficult. The latter because at places 
I might have made assumptions which a person from another cultural background 
might not have made.  
4.8 The Structure of the Data Chapters 
Chapter five discusses the participants’ constructions of Pakistan. Doing this was 
important because this formed the prism through which they looked at the wider 
world. Chapter six analyses their constructions of the wider world and the 
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international space. The next three chapters focus on conflicts. Chapter seven 
examines the participants’ constructions of the causes and conduct of the Pakistan-
India conflict. Chapter eight analyses their constructions of the causes and conduct of 
the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US, and chapter nine addresses the ‘war on 
terror’.  
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5 Constructions of Pakistan 
In this chapter, I discuss the participants’ constructions of Pakistan and their 
perception of their country’s role in international politics against the backdrop of 
geopolitical circumstances prevailing at that time. Given that there is a discourse of 
hierarchy of nations, as discussed in chapter 3, it is important to analyse their 
perceptions of their own country and its place in the world. Moreover, in order to 
contextualise the participants’ constructions of international conflicts, it is helpful to 
look at their constructions of Pakistan – where all of them lived at the time of the 
research and with which they had a close, albeit, at times, ambivalent, relation.  
The participants’ constructions of Pakistan were varied and complex. It is hard to 
summarise their constructions of the country because of the variation in their accounts 
and the multiplicity of discourses that they used to describe it. However, I aim to 
outline some key themes that were discussed in relation to Pakistan. Hopefully, these 
themes will help in bringing to the fore how these young people viewed their country 
from the perspective of their own everyday lived experiences and also against the 
wider backdrop of international politics. As I have discussed in chapter 1, issues related 
to international politics gained greater salience in the lives of ordinary Pakistanis ever 
since Pakistan started playing a key role in the so called ‘war on terror’ and the violent 
repercussions of doing so started becoming increasingly obvious.  
As mentioned in chapter 4, the fieldwork was carried out in the cities of Islamabad and 
Rawalpindi, situated in the northern half of the country. Both the cities are 
geographically located within the province of Punjab. The research participants were 
cognisant of the variation and diversity of the people inhabiting different parts of the 
country and tried to position themselves as moderates. For example, Adil (M, FG4) said 
that people in the Punjab and Sind were ‘moderate’ and ‘the problem lies … in the 
North . . .’   
Significant references to Pakistan were made in all six focus groups, even though 
specific questions regarding it were asked in only the last three. A significant part of 
the data discussed in this chapter rather than coming out of questions focussing 
explicitly on Pakistan was sifted out of general discussions that took place in the focus 
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group sessions. I reproduce below the specific questions related to Pakistan that I 
asked in various sessions. 
 What do you think of the way Pakistan has played its role in the war on terror 
since 9/11? (FG 4: February 2008) 
 In your opinion what were the factors that led to the assassination of Benazir 
Bhutto? (FG 4: February 2008) 
 Do you think it was reasonable for America to attack Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
now the Tribal Areas of Pakistan? (FG 5 & 6: September & December 2008) 
 Pakistan in the last couple of years has seen an unprecedented increase in 
violence. What do you think is happening? (FG 5 & 6: September & December 
2008) 
In view of the above, it makes sense that I begin my discussion with how the 
participants of this research perceived Pakistan. I also discuss the problematic nature of 
their identifications or lack thereof with the country and how they viewed Pakistan’s 
role in the conflict and the so called ‘war on terror’ led by the USA. Doing so is also 
important for another reason because as human beings we are bound to make sense of 
the world from a certain position and I recognise that the constructions of the young 
people who participated in this study were contingent and located and were the result 
of an exposure to a complex network of representations surrounding these conflicts 
and the position of Pakistan in these representations.  
I begin by analysing the participants’ constructions of poverty and socio-economic 
disparity in the country and their own privileged position within it. Then I analyse their 
views on the relationship between Pakistan and Islam and their own identities as 
Muslims. After this, I discuss their views on democracy and Pakistan. Next, I analyse 
their constructions of Pakistan’s political leadership. In the final section, I analyse the 
participants’ references to an important national institution – the Pakistan Army. 
5.1 Poverty and Socioeconomic Disparity in Pakistan 
In this section, I discuss the research participants’ constructions of the wide gap 
between rich and poor in Pakistan; of their own socio-economic position; and of the 
relationship between poverty and the rise of extremism. 
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In four out of six focus groups, the issue of widespread poverty and social and 
economic inequality was brought up by the participants. It is pertinent to mention that 
these views about their country were expressed by the participants not in response to 
any direct question.  The fact that this issue was discussed in these focus groups 
without any direct prompt from me shows that this was an important dimension in 
their constructions of Pakistan. Salma (F, FG 1) said: 
The rich, the rich…Let’s talk of the rich. In Pakistan 5% of the top, of the top 
cream that were rich then. This quota, percentage of people has only risen to 
about 6 or 7%. The rest of them some have come into the middle class, but 
most of them are still in the lower class, most of them are still in the working 
class. Those conditions have not changed. Statistically speaking, factories’ 
working conditions have not changed, firstly.  
In the above extract, Salma commented on the widespread poverty and social 
inequality that existed in Pakistani society. She argued that with time the situation had 
not improved for the vast majority of people who were still working class. Similarly, 
Afreen (F, FG 3), said: ‘The living standards are just not enough – forget enough they’re 
not even, you know – the basic, the common man, he cannot lead his life.’ 
Hafsa (F, FG3), said that Pakistan was still a feudal society with the local feudal lords 
controlling all the local resources in the rural communities and, thus, perpetuating the 
cycle of poverty and social deprivation. She said that the vast majority of ordinary 
people in the rural areas were at the mercy of the feudal chiefs who she said ‘have the 
poor people come to them and they beat them to have them agree with them.’ The 
issue of the perpetuation of the feudal system has often been highlighted as the 
underlying cause of many problems confronting the country, including poverty 
(Haqqani, 2006; Shuja, 2007). For example, Haqqani (2006) cites the persistence of the 
feudal system as one of the main causes of entrenched poverty in Pakistan. He argues 
that the feudal lords who traditionally have dominated the political leadership in the 
country have tried to maintain status quo with the vast majority of the local population 
continuing to be dependent on them for their bare subsistence. Kleiner (2007: 12) 
maintains that nearly two thirds of people in Pakistan live below the poverty line and 
any patchy improvements in the economy ‘did not trickle down to the country’s poor.’   
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Widespread poverty was an issue that was mentioned by many research participants. 
Aan (F, FG6) said ‘We have so much poverty in our country that in order to get fame 
and money we have to do all these vices.’ Aan made this comment in the context of 
the sharp increase in the socio-economic and political problems faced by Pakistan in 
the first decade of the 21st century.  Against this backdrop of excessive poverty in the 
country, they constructed their own positions as privileged. Salma (F, FG1) said: 
Secondly, rich who work…okay, I, for example, am not studying in this school 
group - if I were in a government school, I would have never applied to Yale, I 
would have never applied to Harvard. I don’t think, if I go to America and 
come back with a degree – I am intelligent enough, I am exposed enough, I am 
equipped enough to start my own company – I start my own business – that’s 
where the rich factor comes in, I start getting rich, I start getting business.  
Paul Willis (1977) provides an incisive analysis of how middle class children end up in 
middle class jobs and how working class children end up doing working class jobs. He 
argues that that a range of complex factors come together to perpetuate this 
seemingly anomalous state of affairs. One of these is the fact that middle and working 
class children develop essentially different relationships with their schools. Clearly, in a 
society like Pakistan where the education system is highly stratified, children attending 
private schools come from the affluent middle class and usually have high aspirations 
for their future academic and working careers. Salma was clearly aware of the head 
start that her private education gave her in terms of her future academic and career 
prospects. The private schools in Pakistan are seen by the vast majority of the people 
as offering better education, ultimately leading to better career prospects. Nearly all 
private schools in the country use English as the medium of instruction and are seen as 
the passport to economic prosperity and material security in later life. Salma argued 
that when she would return from the US after completing her education, she would be 
ready to embark upon a successful career. This she said would not be due to any 
inherent quality within her per se but rather due to the social advantage that she had 
as a result of being from small, privileged class within the highly unequal Pakistani 
society.  As discussed in chapter 4, the already deep social divisions in Pakistani society 
are further exacerbated by the parallel systems of education (Ghazi et al., 2010).  
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In Pakistan an important indicator of the social position of a young person is the school 
s/he attends. Since all the research participants attended an upper middle class private 
school, they said that they were aware of their position within the socioeconomic 
hierarchy. Huma (F, FG6) said:    
We have two extremes in Pakistan – there are completely rich ones and then 
there are the totally poor ones. We don’t experience the poverty; we don’t 
know what hunger is; we don’t know what deprivation is. We cannot say how 
much poverty there is in the country. The point is we have everything and 
there is a 50% of the population who doesn’t have anything.  
Salma (F, FG1) argued that a person’s success in life, to a very significant extent, was 
dependent on the social environment in which they grow up. She said:     
The one thing that was important was the environment that I grew up in. 
There are exceptions; we always say that there are many exceptions. But in 
the majority of the cases, your interactions, your demeanour, whatever you 
do, that is directly the product of – can you imagine yourself out of the 
environment? You can’t, because you are the product of your environment. 
So, in the majority of the cases whatever happens to you, whatever you act, 
happens because there is a backup to you… 
Salma continued to argue that in most cases success in life depended on the social 
environment in which one grows up. Bourdieu (1983: 47) presents the notion of 
cultural capital ‘to explain the unequal scholastic achievement of children originating 
from the different social classes’. Bourdieu (1973, cited in Dumais, 2002: 44) writes: 
By doing away with giving explicitly to everyone what it implicitly demands of 
everyone, the educational system demands of everyone alike that they have 
what it does not give. This consists mainly of linguistic and cultural 
competence and that relationship of familiarity with culture which can only be 
produced by family upbringing when it transmits the dominant culture. 
The young people who participated in my research constructed themselves as having a 
privileged position, and argued that the advantages they enjoyed would help them 
succeed in their future lives.   
Some of the research participants referred to endemic poverty as one of the key 
reasons for the rise of terrorist activity in Pakistan. Aan (F, FG6) mentioned the extreme 
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poverty in the country and cited it as a reason for the rise in terrorist and militant 
activity in Pakistan and why some deprived people resorted to illegal practices. She 
said: 
You know, what happens is people out here are very poor. So in order to have 
a lavish life and they want to give the, umm, poor and own family – comfort 
for the own family – they start doing all the wrong vices. They say, okay we 
will do this you can give us the money. And they train the people out there 
and they say okay you are doing jihad. Instead of telling them you are going to 
be killed, they do – they tell – they say we will give you this amount of money 
– are you ready to do all this bomb blasts, explosions? They say yes.  
She went on to argue that there was a wide gap between the rich and the poor, which 
caused resentment amongst the latter. In order to provide for their families, they were 
willing to even die:   
There is a lot of gap – difference – see I’m living a very comfortable life and 
the person who is not living a comfortable, they see our lives like this. They 
say why can’t we give all the comforts to our children rather than having the 
same thing? So, they do all the wrong things which they can. They lose their 
lives also in it.  
Aan seemed quite preoccupied with the issue of social deprivation and poverty and 
suggested it as one of the main causes of Pakistan’s myriad problems, including its 
slippage into militancy and religious extremism. Various writers have highlighted 
poverty and social deprivation as one of the main causes of Pakistan’s slide into 
extremism. For example Shuja (2007: 30) writes: 
While many Pakistanis, especially the middle class, favor a secular state and a 
moderate form of Islam, growing numbers of others are calling for a 
theocratic Islamic state. Militant groups have presented Islam as an 
alternative model of political organization to Pakistani youth. Unable to find 
employment, a number of young Pakistanis are listening to their message. 
In the same focus group as above, the participants linked poverty and religious 
extremism more directly and explicitly. One participant, Huma (F, FG6) argued that 
people in extreme poverty were easily tempted by promises of a more comfortable 
life: 
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Huma (F, FG6): They say fine, your family will be safe – your family will be as 
comfortable – you’re doing this for us. Those people are so hand to mouth – 
they’re so frustrated – they’d do anything. They agree to anything they can do 
to make life comfortable for themselves, for their families. [Mysha (F): 
Exactly.] It doesn’t matter – at the moment…  
In the same focus group, Natasha (F, FG6) argued that due to extreme poverty and 
rising inflation, people found it impossible to meet their basic needs. Inability to do so 
made them angry and they used violence to show their frustration. She said: 
Look at the inflation in our country now. Inflation is so high that it is 
impossible – it’s impossible for a poor person to even buy flour for himself – 
atta [Urdu word for flour] for himself – it’s impossible. Okay? This is why they 
go crazy. They did not make no mistake to deserve this. Just because they’re 
poor, doesn’t mean that they won’t be able to live – they won’t be able to get 
food. That’s why they’re angry. They want to show their anger. And they want 
to tell the people that look – look at us – we’re not getting any food, we’re not 
getting any electricity, we’re not – where are we? Are we still in the Stone 
Age?   
Huma and Natasha traced the origin of various types of violence and aggression, 
including terrorist violence, to poverty and social deprivation. As mentioned above, this 
is a credible thesis that has been discussed and documented by various writers, both of 
Pakistani and Western origins (e.g. Chomsky, 2007; Qadir 2001). Qadir (2001: 338-9) 
reporting his research on ‘international terrorism’ wrote: 
From my study, presently confined to Pakistan (and, to some extent, of 
Afghanistan), it is apparent that the bulk of the people that enter such 
seminaries and, later take to ‘Jihad’, belong to the deprived class. They are, as 
I stated earlier, from families which cannot afford to feed or house them. The 
parents find it convenient to admit them to seminaries, where they are 
housed, fed, clothed and educated. The parents are content that their 
children are dedicated to the Almighty, the young children go the way they 
are taught. 
The participants described Pakistan as a country that was sharply divided along the 
lines of income and economic prosperity. They acknowledged their own privileged 
situation. They said that a very large proportion of the population was desperately 
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poor and did not have means for even bare subsistence. They identified this as one of 
the major underlying causes of the problems that confronted the country, including 
deteriorating law and order and the dangerous slide into militancy and religious 
extremism in Pakistan in the first decade of the 21st century.  
5.2 The Islamic Basis of the Pakistani State and the Muslim Identities of 
the Participants 
In this section, I discuss the participants’ constructions of the relationship between the 
state of Pakistan and Islam and their own identities as Muslims. During five out of the 
six focus group sessions, references, howsoever tangential and brief, were made to the 
relationship of the State of Pakistan to Islam. In many instances, this was in the context 
of the creation of the country in 1947 when the Indian subcontinent gained 
independence and the British Government agreed to divide it into two sovereign 
nations – Pakistan and India. As mentioned in chapter 3, Pakistan is one of the only two 
countries in the world that were created on the basis of religion. In the following 
extract the participants were discussing the longstanding issue of Kashmir – a source of 
major contention between the Pakistan and India: 
Fahad (M): … if you look at British plans for the partition of India, you really 
find out that Kashmir is actually part of Pakistan. 
Fareeha (F): Exactly! 
Harris (M): But, India does not look at it this way –  
Fareeha (F): The point is that if you look at history, there are records, which 
tell, it was to be part of Pakistan. 
Harris (M): Yes, it was to be – the majority was Muslim –  
Fareeha (F): Yes, the majority was Muslim. You’re not talking of, that’s 
where—evidence is there that Kashmir basically belongs to Pakistan! 
 (FG2) 
In the early 20th century, in the wake of the rising Indian nationalism and the 
increasingly vociferous demands by the Indian National Congress and the All India 
Muslim League to quit India and divide and quit India respectively, the British 
Government finalized the division and independence of British India through the Indian 
Independence Act 1947 (Emory, 2012). As per the partition plan of the British 
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Government, Muslim majority areas became the independent dominion of Pakistan 
and the Hindu majority areas became the independent dominion of India. British India 
at the time of partition also comprised many princely states of which Jammu and 
Kashmir was one (Akhtar, 2010). Kashmir at the time of partition was ruled by a Hindu 
prince who delayed the decision to accede to either Pakistan or India. However, later 
on he decided to accede to India. This indication by the Hindu Raja of Kashmir created 
a lot of anxiety within Pakistan because the Pakistan Government expected it to accede 
to Pakistan, since 78% of the Kashmiri population comprised Muslims (Akhtar, 2010).  
Figure 5.1 (Boundless, 2013) highlights the demarcation of British India into two 
independent dominions and the location of the princely state of Kashmir. 
 
Figure 5.1 – The Division of British India into Independent Dominions and the Location 
of the Princely State of Kashmir 
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In the above excerpt, Fahad and Fareeha argued that Kashmir was lawfully part of 
Pakistan because it was a Muslim majority area. The discourse that Kashmir should 
lawfully be part of Pakistan is dominant in the country and is predicated on the so 
called ‘two nation theory’ that is often used as the raison d’être for the creation of 
Pakistan through the division of British India into two separate sovereign countries.  
From my own experience of growing up in Pakistan, I know that the mainstream 
discourse of Pakistani nationalism constructs Pakistan as a state predicated on the ‘two 
nation theory’, carved out for the Muslims of India. People of this school of thought 
argue that the Indian subcontinent was partitioned into two independent countries 
because two separate nations lived in it who found it increasingly difficult to 
harmoniously coexist with one another.  
The mainstream discourse about the Kashmir issue posits that the region should be 
part of Pakistan because of its overwhelming Muslim population – the criteria used by 
the British Government for demarcating the boundaries of the two independent 
dominions created out of united India. For example Mohan (1992: 283) writes: 
‘Pakistan contends that, since the majority of the Kashmiri people is Muslim, they 
naturally belong with an Islamic state like Pakistan.’ 
This discourse is also adopted and endorsed by the history textbooks in the country 
(e.g. Rabbani, 2009). In their discussion, Fahad and Fareeha, constructed Pakistan as a 
Muslim State and because the majority of the people in Kashmir was Muslim, it should 
have been part of Pakistan. However, Harris tried to look at it from a more neutral 
perspective by trying to acknowledge that India did not look at the situation in that 
way. 
It should be noted that the participants’ constructions of the Islamic bases of Pakistan 
were complex and varied. Some participants took positions that were quite similar to 
the mainstream discourse in Pakistan and the one that is inevitably communicated in 
the official textbooks in the country (e.g. Khan, 2004; Rabbani, 2009). On the other 
hand, some participants had a somewhat different take on the issue. For example, 
Wafa (F, FG 2), like Harris in the above extract, took a somewhat different position on 
the disputed region of Kashmir: ‘The way I really look at this is that, it’s like, it’s just 
disputed.’ Instead of talking of it as being rightfully part of Pakistan, she referred to it 
as simply ‘disputed’. Her assertion does not unequivocally endorse the mainstream 
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ideology of ‘two nation theory’ that posits a taken for granted relationship between 
the Pakistani State and Islam. The dispute with India over Kashmir is more often than 
not articulated using various discourses of religion. It is interesting to note that Wafa 
had lived a significant part of her life in the US. She and her family moved back to 
Pakistan six years before the research for this study was carried out. She was born in 
the US where she completed her primary school and part of her secondary school. The 
mainstream discourse about Kashmir in the country, endorsed by the official textbooks, 
takes an essentialist view of the matter and argues that Kashmir is rightfully part of the 
Pakistani State. Therefore, the somewhat different views of a young Pakistani, who 
lived a significant part of her life in the West, are noteworthy because it was likely that 
she would not have come across, at least in the early stages of her schooling, the 
dominant discourses about the Kashmir, predicated on a religious ideology, which 
circulate through the media and the school curricula in Pakistan.   
The substantive content as well as the general tone of discussions about matters like 
the Kashmir dispute and the ideological basis of Pakistan were in contrast to views 
expressed on similar issues during the focus group sessions conducted by Durrani and 
Dunne (2010) with state school children in the North West Frontier Province of 
Pakistan. The children in their study expressed more essentialist and inflexible views 
about such matters. Reproduced below is what one male student in one of the focus 
groups conducted by Durrani and Dunne (2010: 228) said: 
Asghar (RB): India occupied Kashmir. Fighting is still going on there. Muslims 
are in the majority and Hindus in the minority there but the Hindus are 
powerful. We should send our army and weapons there to keep the Kashmiris 
going. This way Kashmir can be liberated.  
The views expressed by Asghar in the above extract are in contrast with those aired by 
most participants in my study. Whereas Fareeha (F, FG2) and Harris (M, FG2) argued 
that Kashmir should have been lawfully part of Pakistan, nowhere did they recommend 
a military solution to the problem. Asghar, on the other hand, in the above excerpt, 
took an essentialist and view of the dispute between Pakistan and India and argued for 
an overt military action to keep the Kashmiris ‘going’ and ultimately getting Kashmir 
‘liberated’. Notwithstanding the different approach to the Kashmir issue taken by the 
participants of my research, they drew on the ‘two nation theory’, predicated on the 
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Islamic identity of the Pakistani state and used it to argue for Kashmir’s accession to 
Pakistan. 
There were also other references to the Islamic basis of the Pakistani State. For 
example, Babur (M, FG5) commenting on the General Pervez Musharraf’s idea of 
‘enlightened moderation’ – the term introduced to counter the perception about the 
rising fundamentalism in the country – said:  
There is another reason for this increase in violence is that whenever you 
destroy your cultural values in the name of enlightened moderation, you 
know, there are people who are conservative and you have to care for them. 
You know, they are there, and they are a reality. You know, if you start 
destroying it in such a short time, you know, this will happen. And it will 
happen in every country. You know, the Americans and the, umm, the British 
they have evolved over a period of, you know, centuries. And we say that we 
should get modernized and all that in just ten or eight years – this is 
impossible. And this will destroy the entire basis of our society. 
In the above extract, while talking about the then recent upsurge of violence in 
Pakistan, Babur said that the destruction of the cultural values, driven by a desire to 
modernise, contributed to an increase in violence. He referred to the policy of 
‘enlightened moderation’ advocated by the government of the military dictator 
General Musharraf. This policy of ‘enlightened moderation’ was taken by the 
conservative sections of society as a euphemism used by the Musharraf  government 
for its unconditional support for the US and hence abandoning the ideological 
moorings of the country which they saw as essentially Islamic.  Babur linked the rise in 
violence to government’s policy of ‘enlightened moderation’. Such views have also 
been expressed by some Western writers. For example, Schofield (2009: 244) writes: 
So, when evaluating Pakistan’s evolution as a democracy, we must realize how 
diverse its society is. We are fooling ourselves if we think that a country which 
has conservative traditional societies is going to become democratic 
overnight, or even in 60 years. 
Salma (F, FG1) challenged the way history was taught in the school curricula. She 
argued that there were no opportunities to discuss ideas like the ‘two nation theory’: 
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…you read about how Pakistan was formed, you read about the bloodshed 
and the massacres. And considering that, the independence concept, the 
whole independence concept, you don’t discuss the intellectual aspects of 
that, you don’t discuss the two nation theory, you don’t discuss the 
implications of that, you don’t discuss that! ... I remember, a page on the two 
nation theory – we were supposed to remember that, we were supposed to 
write about that. And we were not allowed to discuss it. We never get 
analytical questions on discussing, whether the partition was right or not, 
whether independence was right or not. 
Salma’s critique of the way history is taught in schools was bold and unorthodox, given 
the fact that she had studied all her life in Pakistan, where debating the ‘two nation 
theory’ would ordinarily be considered out of bounds because on the one hand it is 
predicated on Islamic ideology and on the other it is seen as the raison d’être for the 
creation of Pakistan.  Durrani (2008) and Durrani & Dunne (2010) argue that Islam is 
presented as the key marker of national identity in school textbooks. This they posit is 
due to the fact that, like many postcolonial countries, the Pakistani state was created 
before the Pakistani nation came together and there was an urgent need to create a 
discourse of shared nationalism.  The ‘two nation theory’ plays an important role in 
creating this shared sense of nationalism. Durrani (2008: 597) writes: 
The melding of religious and national identities is … evident in the 
construction of the Pakistani nation. Pakistan was created on the discourse of 
‘two-nation theory’ which constructed Indian Muslims as a homogenous 
nation and in bipolar opposition to Hindus … Islam has therefore been widely 
promulgated as a source of legitimacy and coherence for the Pakistani state.  
All schools, including private, are required to teach history textbooks either provided 
or approved by the official textbook boards. The ‘two nation theory’ is presented as a 
sacrosanct ideology in these books (e.g. Khan, 2004; Rabbani, 2009). Therefore, 
Salma’s argument for providing curricular space for debating and evaluating ideas like 
the two nation theory and the partition of India was, indeed, bold.  
For all participants of my research, Islam was an important dimension in the way they 
constructed their worlds. They made references to Islam in a variety of contexts and 
while talking about different issues. However, in most cases they did not use Islamic 
discourses to construct their personal identities. For example, Farah (F, FG4) said that 
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in response to the September 11 attacks, the US was waging a war against ‘Islamic 
countries’. Komal (F, FG4) said that she would be reluctant to go to the US for higher 
education because she was ‘not an extremist but … could be looked upon as one’. She 
said that ‘post-911 [there were] more stricter rules on Muslims’. 
Fahad (M, FG2) while talking about ethical warfare said: 
‘Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) never did that [fight wars for acquisition of 
wealth]. Hazrat Omar [the second caliph of Islam after the Prophet] when he 
used to conquer, he used to pray in the church’.  
Thus, most participants used Islamic discourses to construct accounts of different 
aspects of the world. They seldom used such discourses to articulate their own 
personal identities. In most cases, they used Islamic discourses to make sense of the 
world around them.  
However, a couple of participants in focus group 3 stood out from all other participants 
as they explicitly and rhetorically used the discourse of Islam to construct their own 
identities:  
Afreen (F): . . . every single Muslim person – citizens of England, citizens of 
America – wherever Muslims are living – the only misunderstanding is that 
they have to choose between their nationality and their religion. I am a dual 
national – so, being a British I am a terrorist, but being Pakistani I am a 
terrorist too! But if being a terrorist means being a Muslim then I’ll put my 
hand up and I’ll say yes I’m happy to be a terrorist – if being a terrorist means 
being a Muslim – because I can’t change that, I don’t want to change that at 
all … 
…  
Saba (F): Because we are Muslims. And when they think that all Muslims are 
terrorists then fine they can call us terrorists! We’re fine with that – we won’t 
deny that we’re Muslims. 
(FG3) 
Afreen had lived all her life in England and was sent by her parents to study in Pakistan 
so that she would become familiar with her heritage culture. It is interesting to note 
that none of the other young people used Islam to construct their personal identity in 
such a direct and rhetorical manner. Durrani and Dunne (2010: 217) have argued that 
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‘identity is reinforced with reference to an ‘other’.’ Living in a culture different from 
her own heritage culture could have worked to produce a stronger Muslim identity for 
Afreen. 
Notwithstanding the rhetorical use of the discourse of Islam by Afreen and Saba to 
construct their identities, the way most participants in my research used Islamic 
discourses was quite different from the way students in Durrani and Dunne’s used 
these. Commenting on their research participants, Durrani and Dunne (2010: 223) 
write: 
Students defined ‘being Pakistani’ as ‘being Muslim’, by which they meant 
complete adherence to Islamic rituals. Students had very little to say about 
their Pakistani identity apart from their Muslim identity. 
Thus, being Muslim was a key part of their personal identity. To summarise, the young 
people who participated in my research talked about Pakistan as being an Islamic 
state. In most cases the references to this were indirect and implicit such as drawing 
on the discourse of the two nation theory and critiquing the discourse of ‘enlightened 
moderation’. Instead of drawing on the discourse of Islam to construct their personal 
identities, the participants of my research used the discourse of Islam as a perspective 
or worldview to make sense of and talk about the world around them. However, in one 
focus group, two participants drew on the discourse of Islam to construct their 
personal identities. On the whole, the use of the discourse of Islam by the participants 
of my research was in contrast to that in a research study carried out by Durrani and 
Dunne (2010) in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan, who used it as almost 
exclusively to construct their personal identities and also used it to argue that Kashmir 
should be part of Pakistan.     
5.3 Democracy in Pakistan 
This section discusses the participants’ constructions of democracy in Pakistan, and the 
reasons they put forward to explain why it did not work effectively. The democratic 
system and the entrenched problems of the electoral process were discussed in four 
out of six focus group sessions, without my asking any specific questions about the 
matter.  For example, the following discussion took place in focus group 5: 
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Tabish (M): Actually, people who vote don’t have any thinking skills and don’t 
have any analysis of what is going on around. They just vote for the person 
they’re told to – they’re just ordered to by the Chaudhry or Wadaira [the Urdu 
terms for the feudal lords in some rural areas of Pakistan]. And the people 
who actually have some sort of thinking or whatever, like educated people, 
they just sit at home.  
Shehrbano: Very minute proportion of educated people who actually…  
Tabish (M) and the proportion that is there doesn’t actually vote; they just sit 
at home and enjoy the holiday. 
(FG 5) 
Tabish referred to the feudal system in which the local feudal lord controlled the 
ordinary people and forced them to vote for either himself or a person that he 
supported. The issue of dysfunctional democracy was often discussed in conjunction 
with the high level of illiteracy and an inadequate system of education in the country. 
Tabish gave lack of education as a cause of poor track record of democracy in the 
country. He argued that since the vast majority of the population in the country was 
uneducated, they could be easily swayed by politicians, who in many cases were the 
feudal lords. Either by coercion, by offering financial incentives or both, they 
influenced the voters in their respective constituencies. He also said that the small 
minority of educated people by and large remained aloof from the democratic process 
and did not even care to cast their votes. 
Tabish’s construction of the democratic system echoed the ideas expressed by local 
and international political commentators. For example, Schofield (2009: 247) in her 
article on Pakistan’s democratic history said: ‘leaders have only paid lip service to 
democratic procedures and have themselves resorted to old tribal feudal relationships 
of kinship.’  Such views expressed by the participants on the one hand indicated that 
they had a sophisticated understanding of relevant issues and on the other hand 
revealed their middle class upbringing and the range of views they might have heard in 
their homes. 
Haqqani (2006) argues that the persistence of the feudal system in the rural areas is a 
major cause of the distortions in the democratic process in Pakistan. Commenting on 
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the negative role played by the feudal lords in the political system, Haqqani (2006: 223-
4) writes: 
Politics has become a game for the rich and this is a result of the power and 
influence that feudals enjoy in the country. It is almost impossible for a 
middle-class individual to consider standing in elections. Thus has the feudal 
system impeded the growth of democracy in Pakistan. 
Nawira (F, FG5) remarked that the problem with democracy in Pakistan was the low 
rate of literacy:  
We have very low literacy rate, which is why – and that’s why we have very 
little options, you know. Either it’s Nawaz Sharif [two-time, former, Prime 
Minister of Pakistan and the leader of one of the two major political parties of 
the country] or it was the PPP [Pakistan People’s Party – Benazir Bhutto’s 
party]. 
She argued that the low literacy rate was also responsible for the domination of 
politics by a small group of individuals. This, according to her, seriously limited the 
available choice of political leaders and people had ‘little options and we do not know 
who to vote for. I mean, everybody is confused, because everybody is involved in 
corruption – all our politicians are involved.’ Haqqani (2006: 219-20) argues: 
By indulging in corruption, these politicians have not only smeared their own 
reputations but have also given rise to increasing public disenchantment with 
politics and the political process. 
Salma (F, FG1) argued that the democratic process in Pakistan did not truly reflect the 
will of the majority because the rich could manipulate the results: 
If you have an equal footing, then you have, then you can take majority into 
consideration, then you can say that the majority decision is right. But, right 
now, for example, in elections and all of that, you can’t, you can’t say that 
majority is right, because whatever majority, that’s, that’s a said majority. A 
person who can put in the most money in his campaign, or the person who 
can exercise most influence in his area, he just comes to the front. 
In the above extract, Salma problematized the notion of democracy in a country like 
Pakistan. She argued that democracy, based on the rule by people who have the 
support of the majority of the population, existed in a corrupted form in Pakistan. 
131 
 
According to her, the person who had the most resources and could pump in a lot of 
money into his campaign usually won the election. Therefore, for her, this was not true 
democracy as it did not reflect the true will of the majority. The process was distorted 
by a powerful few who controlled wealth and resources in their respective 
constituencies. Schofield (2009: 245) argues that it is unrealistic to expect the Pakistani 
polity to achieve overnight what she refers to as the ‘Westminster style democracy’ 
because: 
The natural hierarchy in the order of things, at the grass-roots level and 
upwards, has meant, exactly as it did for us in Britain several hundred years 
ago, that the concept of one man, one vote, goes against customary practices, 
which are linked by ties of kinship and, in some regions, virtual serfdom. 
(Schofield, 2009: 246) 
Komal (F, FG4) argued that Pakistan was not ready for democracy: 
I think, Pakistan is not ready for true democracy because the definition of 
democracy is here I’ll pay 1500 you vote for me, I pay 2000 you vote for me 
too. First of all you have to change people who are actually talking about 
democracy. They need to know how you, let’s say, exactly, what is [inaudible], 
what is democracy and how you make sure that people – it is a true 
democracy. One pays somebody to vote for me – that’s not democracy!  
Komal (F, FG4), like Salma (F, FG1), argued that Pakistan at that time was not ready for 
democracy. She referred to the fact that the person who could use money to satisfy 
the people in his constituency was most likely to win. Therefore, according to her, the 
political system in Pakistan was not real democracy. She went on to argue: 
In Pakistan, 70% of our population lives in the rural areas. There you have 
queues of – record out numbers, let’s say, for the polling. It’s because they 
have increased 1500 to 2000 for voting for one person. And because you have 
record turnout it’s not because people believe in their leader, it’s because 
they can have their money to feed their children! And secondly, you just said 
change the mind-set, we can’t, even our generation, let’s say five generations 
down the lane, they probably won’t be able to do it, because it takes…years 
and years. 
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Komal asserted that developing true democracy needed time; according to her, that 
may take a few generations for true democracy to take root in Pakistan. Komal’s 
comments about the state of democracy echoed what was frequently discussed in the 
Pakistani and international media at that time. The authors of such views are either 
Western journalists or Pakistani writers most of whom hail from the (upper) middle 
class. Therefore, such views expressed by the participants in my research were not 
unexpected as they also came from upper middle class backgrounds and would have 
been likely to hear such views at home. An article published in The Economist (2011) 
discusses the dysfunctional nature of the democratic system in Pakistan where the 
parliament was full of feudal lords who once in power remained preoccupied with 
rewarding and looking after the people who voted them in. Pakistanis were reported 
as disillusioned with democracy:  
Given the government's failings, it is hardly surprising if Pakistanis take a dim 
view of democracy. In a recent Pew poll of seven Muslim countries they were 
the least enthusiastic, with 42% regarding it as the best form of government... 
(The Economist, 2011: no page number)  
Siddiqa (2007) asserts that the feudal system helps the powerful elite to gather 
economic and political capital which they use to reward their supporters who help 
them gain access to these forms of capital in the first place.   
The views expressed by Komal are also interesting because these were expressed in 
focus group 4 that was conducted in a school in Rawalpindi, situated only a few 
kilometres from the Headquarters of the Pakistan Army. Many of the pupils in this 
school were either the children of army officers or were from a family with some 
significant connection with the military. Pakistan has been under military rule for a 
substantial part of the time since its creation. The military, therefore, has developed 
considerable clout within the political system of the country (Siddiqa, 2007). The vast 
majority of military officers defend this position of the military by presenting 
pragmatic justifications for its sustained unconstitutional role in national politics and 
governance of the country. This may very well be one of the factors influencing the 
views of the pupils in this focus group. Nawira (F) in focus group 5, which was also 
conducted in a school in the Rawalpindi cantonment, close to the army headquarters, 
indirectly defended the former military president Musharraf by questioning the role 
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played by the Pakistani media in exposing and taking the politicians to task. She said 
that the media had been very vocal and vociferous in its criticism of General Pervaiz 
Musharraf. However, the same media and the news channels had never pointed a 
finger at ‘Nawaz Sharif or Zardari for that matter, although they have corruption cases 
against them – Zardari has been in jail – is he a role model to follow?’ Zardari became 
the leader of the Pakistan People’s Party after the assassination of his wife Benazir 
Bhutto. He got elected as the president of the country in 2008 after Pervaiz Musharraf 
resigned under the threat of imminent impeachment by the parliament after the 
Pakistan People’s Party led civilian government took office.  
I did not ask the participants about their parents’ occupations and their wider family 
connections and circumstances. However, I now feel that doing this would have 
revealed interesting information and would have provided useful contextual 
information to look at the views of the participants. Siddiqa (2007) provides a 
trenchant critique of the military’s penetration into all aspects of the Pakistani polity. 
Schofield (2009) also writes that it is not uncommon in Pakistan to encounter the 
discourse of the country being better off under military rule.   
On the whole, the young people who participated in my research were quite critical of 
the state of democracy in Pakistan. They argued that the democratic system as it 
existed in Pakistan was dysfunctional because a powerful group of elite, especially the 
feudal lords in the rural areas, manipulated the system to perpetuate their own 
stranglehold on the area. They cited illiteracy of the masses, poverty, which made 
people susceptible to bribes, and the corruption of the politicians as important reasons 
for the dysfunctional nature of democracy in the country. Some of them posited that 
the media were less critical of the civilian politicians as compared to the military 
government of General Pervez Musharraf. In the next section, I analyse the 
participants’ constructions of the Pakistani politicians. 
5.4 Participants’ Constructions of Political Leadership in Pakistan 
In this section, I discuss the participants’ constructions of political leaders and rulers of 
Pakistan. Issues related to the lack of effective and honest leadership were discussed in 
the last three focus groups. 
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The participants argued that the political leaders, especially those who managed to get 
into power were dishonest and corrupt. Natasha (F, FG6) said: ‘They steal from 
Pakistan – they, they steal from us – they steal from us! If they steal from Pakistan, 
they steal from us.’ Aamer (M, FG5) talking about rampant corruption said that ‘A 
weak political leadership is to blame for this. They don’t have the guts, you know, to 
stand up. And they don’t have the character to stand up.’  
Adil (M, FG4) said that politics in Pakistan was a dirty man’s business. He mentioned 
that in national elections most of the candidates had a nefarious and questionable 
track record. He claimed that they would have been involved in all sorts of illegal 
activities like dealing in drugs and would also have spent time in the jail. He said, ‘I 
think, that’s the problem, if the National Assembly is full of criminals, then how the hell 
you suppose that you’re going to run a country in very smooth manner.’ This 
perception that most politicians had a dubious, even a criminal past, was quite 
common amongst the middle class Pakistanis and augmented the military’s ambitions 
to ‘sort out the mess’ that the corrupt and inefficient politicians created in the country. 
The discourse of corruption of politicians has been strong in Pakistan. Khan (2007: 
230), analyzing the widespread corruption in all aspects of Pakistan’s national life, 
writes: 
By the 1990s, corruption was no longer sporadic, isolated or petty; it was 
systemic: corruption was the norm and honest behaviour by politicians or civil 
servants was rapidly becoming the exception. 
When the fieldwork for this research was carried out the discourse of corruption of 
civilian politicians was in wide circulation. In Pakistan, often unlawful military 
interventions have been seen by the people as a relief from the corrupt and dishonest 
rule of civilian politicians (Schofield, 2009). When I began my fieldwork, General Pervez 
Musharraf was the president who had wrested power from the civilian Prime Minister 
Nawaz Sharif. Analysing the effects of successive military interventions on the Pakistani 
state, Farooq (2012) writes: 
All the military regimes were welcomed with the hope that they would 
improve the deteriorating security environment by resolving socio-economic 
problems facing the country, including corruption, maladministration and 
misuse of power. 
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When the last three focus groups were carried out, democracy had been restored and 
the government of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) led by Asif Ali Zardari had been 
installed. As a result of the rising militancy and other myriad problems faced by the 
country at the time of the fieldwork, the discourse of corruption of the politicians was 
quite common. Saira (F, FG5) argued that the politicians were no good and frivolous: 
The politicians are just messed up – that’s the whole problem! Our politicians 
are messed up – how can we blame the world for that? If you have a person 
like Yousuf Raza Gillani [then prime minister of Pakistan] who goes on to say 
that my favourite actress is Aiswariya – he used to watch her films in the jail – 
what more do you want? He is that kind of a – what kind of a person is he? 
Saira argued that the country’s politicians lacked personal and professional mettle and 
stature. She cited the example of the then newly elected Prime Minister, Yousuf Raza 
Gillani, who, according to her, professed being a fan of a glamorous Indian film actress. 
The discourse of Pakistani civilian politicians lacking maturity and professional acumen 
is commonplace. It has been argued that Pakistani politicians lack maturity because 
the political institutions and processes could not take root in the country due to 
frequent military interventions (Haqqani, 2006; Schofield, 2009; Farooq, 2012; 
Rabbani, 2013). 
Adil (M, FG4) argued that the country did not get appropriate leadership after 
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who spearheaded the movement for a separate homeland for 
the Muslims of British India: 
I think the lack of leadership after Quaid-e-Azam [Jinnah] has been the factor. 
There has never been anyone who could unite the, you know, four provinces 
together.  
When Pakistan came into being in 1947, Jinnah was already an ailing man. Unlike the 
Indian National Congress, the All India Muslim League proved ill-prepared to bequeath 
to the nascent state of Pakistan much-needed political traditions and institutions. 
Except for Jinnah, very few leaders in the Muslim League were committed to 
democracy. Therefore, when Jinnah passed away in 1948, the country was left without 
any well-developed, substantial democratic institutions (Haqqani, 2006). Due to lack of 
able and mature leadership, the country’s military started meddling in the affairs of 
statecraft.   
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Huma (F, FG6) said that the one of the main reasons for the problems confronting the 
country was ‘having bad leaders’. Aamer (M, FG5) argued that the precarious situation 
faced by Pakistan at the time when the research was carried out was because of weak 
leaders: ‘A weak political leadership is to blame for this. They don’t have the guts, you 
know, to stand up. And they don’t have the character to stand up.’ 
In the final focus group, the participants argued that the leaders had sold the country 
to the US: 
Natasha (F): Because our leaders – our leaders they sold our country to them. 
Naveed: How? 
Natasha (F): Because, look, umm, we are listening to everything they say. We 
follow – like, when Musharraf –  
Aan (F): Why Musharraf, when, like the treaty… 
Huma (F): It really started with the Afghanistan war, when Musharraf refused 
to help Afghanistan and allowed the American troops in.  
Aan (F): He sold Pakistan for something!  
Huma (F): That doesn’t mean that you should sell yourself to someone just 
because they’re giving something to us.  
Aan (F): Why did Musharraf give the base? Why – because he took something 
from the Americans.  
Huma (F): See that’s the point, when Musharraf gave the base he also lost all 
the friends that Pakistan had. 
(Focus Group 6) 
The discourse of Pakistan Government acquiescing to US diktat was a common one at 
the time when I collected data for this research. General Musharraf’s support to the 
US led ‘war on terror’ was seen by people as surrender to the US diktat: 
Musharraf government [sic] provided all support by fulfilling all demands of 
Washington unconditionally by providing logistic and military support even by 
ignoring the large anti-American demonstration across the country. Musharraf 
who was known to be a dubious dictator became strongest strategic ally of 
the US in the war on terror. 
(Akbar, 2011: 156) 
137 
 
The cost of Pakistan’s involvement in the US led ‘war on terror’ has been incalculable. 
The country has suffered tremendously in terms of economic growth and 
development, internal law and order, national cohesion, the image and morale of the 
armed forces, and its foreign relations with other countries (Akbar, 2011). Many 
Pakistanis were not happy with the decision of the government of General Pervez 
Musharraf to join the ‘war on terror’. They maintained that it constituted an abject 
surrender by the ruling elite to the diktats of the US government which was pursuing 
an anti-Islam and anti-Pakistan agenda (Chomsky, 2007).   
Saeed, (M, FG4) argued that to resolve the issues faced by Pakistan, it needed a ‘true 
leader’: 
I think, what we truly need is a true leader – the right leader, who can really 
guide us. Like, we don’t need Zardari [the husband of Benazir Bhutto, who 
became the co-chairman of the Pakistan People’s Party after her 
assassination]. I heard the news that he’s going to be the next Prime Minister 
of Pakistan. We need a programme. We need a true…a true leader like Imam 
Khomeni [the Iranian spiritual leader who spearheaded the Iranian revolution 
in the 1970s] who brought the revolution in Iran, we need the same thing in 
Pakistan.  
Saeed said that they needed a ‘true leader’ who could ‘guide’ them and take them out 
of the then prevailing difficulties. He also stated that they did not need leaders like Asif 
Ali Zardari. The PPP won the general elections in 2008 and at the time of this focus 
group there was a strong speculation that he will either become the president or the 
prime minister of the country. This speculation turned out to be well-founded when 
Zardari was democratically elected as the 11th President of Pakistan in September 
2008. Saeed rejected Zardari, even before he was elected president and said that they 
needed a ‘true’ leader like Imam Khomeni. He advocated an Iran-style revolution in 
Pakistan. This rejection of the existing political leaders is commonplace among the 
middle class Pakistanis. From my own experience of living in Pakistan and discussing 
the issues confronting the country, I know that the discourse of upright and selfless 
Iranian revolutionary leadership was used frequently. However, most middle class 
Pakistanis when use this discourse, do not usually advocate a theocratic state; the 
main focus is on the austerity and integrity of the political leadership. 
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In focus group 5, two participants mentioned the then Iranian President Ahmedinejad 
to present a contrast with Pakistani politicians: 
Saira (F): Listen Ahmedinejad still comes on his own car; he drives himself, 
then he goes back home for his lunch, and then he comes back.                
Babur (M): Well, there is a hell of a lot of difference between Ahmedinejad 
and our President.  
Saira (F): Well, there’s no difference – Ahmedinejad is as big a President— 
Saira cited the example of the Iranian President to contrast and highlight the lavish and 
corrupt lifestyles of Pakistani leaders. She also referred to the Indian leaders’ simple 
lifestyle, which is discussed in greater detail in section 6.1.1. The discourse of Indian 
leaders’ austerity is again a common one amongst middle class Pakistanis and the 
media. It is quite likely that these young people would have heard such ideas discussed 
in their homes and extended social worlds.  
By the time I conducted the final focus group, Asif Ali Zardari had been elected as the 
President of Pakistan in September 2008. In focus group 6, two participants, while 
discussing the issue of corruption in the country said: 
Natasha (F): There’s an example, right, that our leader – our President – he 
has for some reason – for whatever reason – he has been in jail for eleven 
years okay? And we elect that person who we know that is corrupt – we know 
he’s corrupt – we have proof that he’s been in jail for eleven years – he said 
himself that I’ve been in jail for eleven years – how then we— 
Mysha (F): How do we elect our President a person, who is a criminal, you 
know? 
Natasha (F): He’s a corrupt person – we all know that – anybody knows that 
and still we elect him. 
Asif Ali Zardari has a reputation tainted by numerous corruption scandals and cases 
There was widespread consternation and disbelief amongst middle class Pakistanis 
about the fact that he was elected to the highest office of the land. Reporting his 
election as president, Perlez (2008) wrote: 
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 It is a startling comeback for a man who, though never convicted here, spent 
11 years in jail here on corruption and murder charges as one of Pakistan’s 
most ostracized figures.  
Saira (F, FG5) also criticised Zardari and said that if they had leaders like him then 
surely the country was ‘confused’.  
The participants maintained that there were very few options available in terms of 
political leaders. Therefore, people were forced to vote for the same people over and 
over again. Nawira (F, FG5) said: 
We have very little options and we do not know who to vote for. I mean, 
everybody is confused, because everybody is involved in corruption – all our 
politicians are involved. 
The discourse of limited political leadership is a common one in Pakistan. There have 
been two major political parties in Pakistan for the past 40 years – the Pakistan Muslim 
League and the Pakistan People’s Party. From my own experience of living in the 
country, I know that there is a sense of general cynicism amongst the middle class who 
argue that members of a select group of families hold offices in the major political 
parties and, hence, remain in power no matter who forms the government. 
Commenting on the domination of politics by the elite, Rabbani (2013: 5) writes: 
…in this case the elites seemingly prevent and/or disrupt meaningful sharing 
of the political pie with the majority commoners, which has acquired 
frightening proportions, causing immense socio-political instability and 
potentially can dissolve the nation itself, if not arrested immediately.  
To summarise, the participants argued that the political leaders of Pakistan were 
corrupt and dishonest and lacked personal and professional mettle. They posited that 
after Jinnah, the country did not get appropriate leadership. Some of them asserted 
that the leaders had sold the country to foreign powers. They argued that in order to 
sort out the problems confronting the country upright and honest leaders were 
needed. They argued that there were limited options available for choosing political 
leaders who could form an effective government.  
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5.5 Pakistan Army 
In this section, I discuss the participants’ constructions of the Pakistan Army. It is 
important to mention that the data analysed in this section is from only one focus 
group. However, the specific circumstances surrounding this session, including its 
timing make it significant enough for meriting a separate section. The data discussed 
here is from the fifth focus group that was conducted in a school located just outside 
the cantonment limits of Rawalpindi, very close to the headquarters of the Pakistan 
Army. A high proportion of the students in this focus group either had a parent in the 
armed forces or had some other connection with this powerful national institution. 
Most participants in this focus group made an unsolicited conscious effort to support 
Pakistan Army. The fourth focus group was also conducted in a school in the same 
area. However, participants in that session did not explicitly support the army. The 
most probable reason for this was that when this focus group was conducted the 
military government of General Pervez Musharraf was still in power. However, by the 
time the fifth focus group was conducted a civilian government had been elected and 
General Musharraf had been forced to resign under the threat of imminent 
impeachment by the national parliament.  
This discussion about the Pakistan army, even though based on only one focus group, 
was significant for a number of reasons. Firstly, the military has traditionally played a 
highly significant role in both the internal and external affairs of the country. 
Therefore, any notable references to it merited appropriate exploration and analysis. 
Secondly, as mentioned above, the geographical and chronological location of this 
focus group was important in the context of this discussion. Chronologically, the 
session took place soon after the ousting of the government of the military dictator, 
General Pervez Musharraf. This was a time when the popular support for the army was 
at its lowest point ever. The arguments made by all participants except one in this 
group could be understood better in the context of that political environment. Finally, 
this discussion about the Pakistan Army was not the result of any direct questions, 
which highlights the preoccupation of the young people, who participated in this focus 
group, with this subject.  
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Support for the army in conjunction with a rejection of the civilian politicians 
appeared as a recurrent theme in this focus group. The following extract highlights 
this point. 
Aamer (M, FG 5): …you know, when there was the government of PPP in the 
nineties and also in the – after the death of Zia-ul-Haq – 1988 onwards. In 1998 
Pakistan was one of the most corrupt nations – countries in the world, 
according to every sort of organization that conducted the research.  
Saira (F, FG 5): And, you know, now the army doesn’t come in the number – 
the top five, even. It doesn’t even come in the top hundred most corrupt 
organizations in Pakistan. And it is supposed to be on top.  
Naveed: It doesn’t? 
Saira (F, FG 5): It doesn’t. It doesn’t come even in the top hundred. 
After 11 years of General Zia-ul-Haq’s martial law, the civilian governments of Prime 
Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif alternated in office each twice from 1988 to 
1998. According to Aamer, by the end of this decade of civilian governments, Pakistan 
had become one of the most corrupt countries in the world.  He posited that this 
descent started in 1988 and resulted in Pakistan being ranked as a highly corrupt 
country in 1998. The two dates that he mentioned are noteworthy because the earlier 
one marked the end of the military government of General Zia-ul-Haq and the latter 
the end of the decade of civilian rule in the country when General Pervaiz Musharraf 
once again imposed martial law by deposing the democratically elected government of 
the Pakistan Muslim League led by Nawaz Sharif. What he seemed to be implying was 
that the descent into corruption began with the beginning of civilian rule in 1988 and 
culminated in Pakistan being ranked as one of the most corrupt countries in the world 
in 1998 – the year before another martial law was imposed in the country. 
Hussain (2009) has argued that Pakistan’s performance on the economic and social 
fronts was one of the worst during the 1990s. He cites ‘widespread misgovernance by 
the two major political parties ruling the country during this period’ as one of the key 
reasons for the country’s exceptionally weak economic and social indicators during this 
period. All four civilian governments were dismissed from office either by the 
President or through the imposition martial law, citing political corruption as one of 
the key reasons for it. Thus, the discourse of political corruption was a strong one 
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during the first decade of the 21st century. Political corruption was frequently 
discussed in social gatherings and the media. It is very likely that the young people who 
participated in my research encountered this discourse.    
In the above quoted excerpt, Saira quickly tried to vindicate the military by stating that 
the Pakistan Army did not figure even in the top one hundred most corrupt 
organizations in the country. She tacitly supported Aamer’s views on rampant 
corruption in the country but quickly qualified it by absolving the military of 
involvement in any corrupt practices. She also lamented the fact that the Pakistan 
Army was generally perceived to be corrupt.  
The extensive penetration of the military in the political and economic systems in the 
developing countries, especially in Pakistan, has been comprehensively exposed by 
Ayesha Siddiqa (2007). Siddiqa (2007) maintains that whereas the penetration of the 
military in the political and economic systems of Pakistan has been extensive, there 
has also been a concerted effort on part of the military establishment to conceal this 
involvement in order to portray itself as much more ‘clean’, and ‘honest’ compared to 
its civilian counterparts and hence present itself as irreproachable and immune from 
criticism and scrutiny.  
In the same focus group, Babur (M, FG5) reiterated Aamer and Saira’s views about the 
integrity of the Pakistan Army. 
Well, I don’t think there is much corruption in the army and the judiciary. The 
main corruption lies with our civil departments like FBR – the Federal Board of 
Revenue – the biggest corruption department. And then Customs, and then this 
clerk office and all that. 
To drive home the point, Babur compared the army with a few civilian departments 
that have a strong reputation for corruption in the country. He tried to deflect any 
potential charge against the army by highlighting the corruption in various civilian 
departments. Invariably the army’s successive seizures of the government came ‘with 
the support of the citizenry, who are often relieved that whatever kleptocratic 
government preceded it has been ousted’ (Fair, 2011: 576). Notwithstanding the 
discourse of army as the internal saviour of the country, the discourse of its 
institutional corruption and entrenched vested interests in all aspects of national life 
was becoming increasingly audible in the public domain. One of the most notable 
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sources of this discourse was Siddiqa’s (2007) book titled Military Inc: Inside Pakistan’s 
Military Economy.    
Supporting the army, Aamer (M, FG5) said: 
The problem with the army is the image problem. People say that a General 
was moving around and he was using an A series (BMW). This happens all 
around the world. Why are we, you know, so sensitive about it?   
In the above excerpt, Aamer was referring to the widespread criticisms of the Pakistan 
Army towards the end of the first decade of the 21st century when this focus group 
was conducted. People were getting fed up of General Pervez Musharraf’s illegitimate, 
military rule. His unconditional support to the American ‘war on terror’ had won him 
many critics, especially in the more conservative, North-Western tribal belt of the 
country. By the time this focus group was conducted, many middle class Pakistanis also 
saw Musharraf as part of the troubles confronting their country. As mentioned above, 
the publication of Siddiqa’s book brought the economic and financial stakes of the 
army in many fields of national life to public consciousness. Commenting on these, 
Siddiqa (2007: 139) writes: 
During the years under study, the senior generals acquired the political power 
that allowed them to engage in predatory financial acquisition. The economic 
power, in turn, is what deepened their appetite for political power. The 
growth of Milbus1 during the period under study marks the GHQ’s efforts to 
re-establish the military’s financial autonomy, and also shows how senior 
generals used their greater power to manipulate resources for their personal 
advantage.  
This book by Siddiqa (2007) provided one of the most systematic and well-argued 
critiques of the entrenchment of the military in all aspects of national life. It exposed 
the financial and economic enterprises of the army and how these were used to 
benefit its personnel, especially the senior officers. The participants in the same focus 
group further defended the army: 
Nawira (F): Comparatively, there is less corruption in army – you just can’t 
deny that.  
                                                             
1 Milbus (denoting military-business) is a term used by Ayesha Siddiqa in her book Military Inc.: Inside 
Pakistan’s Military Economy, to denote the massive economic and financial interests of the military in 
the national economy. 
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Saira (F): At the same time there are groups of people – there are types of 
people in every organization for that matter. I have seen…I know these two 
generals – one of the generals would be misusing his opportunities, you 
know, and his car – his son is driving his official car – it’s not allowed. And 
things like that go on. And there is one person completely honest about it…  
Nawira (F): But you can’t spoil the image of an organization for one person. 
Aamer (M): It is blown out of proportion. Actually if you take hundred army 
people or these officers – khakis [term for army personnel] – only ten of 
them would be corrupt.  
Babur (M): Very less.  
Aamer (M): But they would come out in the front and those 90% who are 
doing their job would sit back and no one would look at them.  
(FG5) 
All the four participants in the above excerpt were trying to support the military and 
absolve it of any significant corruption. These views can be better understood by 
looking at the political circumstances prevailing in the country at the time when this 
focus group was conducted. This focus group was conducted in September 2008. It had 
been only six months since the installation of the first civilian government after nine 
years of military government of General Pervez Musharraf. Benazir Bhutto was 
assassinated less than a year ago, the law and order situation was the worst ever, since 
the creation of the country, and the support for the army was at its lowest ebb. The 
emergence of the discourse of army’s institutional corruption and entrenched vested 
interests in all aspects of national life, mentioned earlier, coupled with the 
unpopularity of the military government of General Musharraf, a counter-discourse 
began to emerge that presented army personnel as relatively ‘clean’ and ‘honest’ 
compared to civilian politicians. Army officers and people sympathetic to the 
institution often drew on this discourse of army as a relatively honest organisation that 
often played the role of the saviour of the country, saving it from the malpractices and 
excesses of civilian politicians. It is likely that the young people who participated in this 
focus group came across this discourse in their homes. 
There was, however, one exception to the general tendency observed in this focus 
group. One of the participants, Tabish (M, FG 5) did not offer any direct support for the 
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military. In response to Aamer’s comment, in above-quoted excerpt, about the 
corruption in the army getting ‘blown out of proportion’ he said: 
I think, the problem with army is that they are trained in a way that they are 
instructed to dominate. They think that they are the ones running the system.    
Tabish here was expressing the views shared by many middle class Pakistani civilians, 
who argued that the army officers’ training included a strong  discourse that presented 
them as the saviours of the country, not just from external threats but also from 
internal problems and dangers – in most cases, posed by the inept and corrupt 
politicians. This discourse legitimised the domination of the country’s political system 
by the army. Aamer (M, FG5) immediately responded to this assertion by Tabish and 
said: 
The army is not to blame for this. A weak political leadership is to blame for 
this. They don’t have the guts, you know, to stand up. And they don’t have the 
character to stand up. On what basis can Zardari say that this general is 
corrupt, and this general is corrupt, when he himself is the biggest, you know, 
absconder? 
Given the focus of what Tabish was saying, Aamer’s response seems somewhat out of 
context. Whereas Tabish was referring to the training of the army officers where they 
were presented with the discourse of army as the saviour of the country, Aamer 
replied by the referring to the lack of character and courage of the civilian politicians. 
He asserted that the politicians had no right to call the generals corrupt. This response 
of Aamer also makes sense in the context of widespread disenchantment with the 
military and its role in the internal affairs of the country and can be seen as drawing on 
a counter-discourse.  
A little later in the same focus group, Babur (M, FG5) made an argument about the 
importance of the army for Pakistan: 
Well, the problem with Pakistan is that army is a, you know, an essential thing. 
We can’t have – we can’t just say that downsize the army, make it small and 
put the budget on things like health and schooling. You know, we have 
security issues – we are surrounded by adversaries on all sides on all sides of 
the border, except for China and Iran. 
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Over here Babur was arguing that army was an essential institution for Pakistan. He 
claimed that the country could not afford to cut down the army and divert the freed 
up resources to public services like health and education. The discourse of cutting 
down the military expenditure has been common in the Pakistani civil society. 
Advocating this course of action Shah (2011: no page number) writes: 
It is worth noting that Pakistan's economic difficulties are the result not just of 
bad luck and poor management, and therefore they cannot be fixed with 
development aid alone. They are rooted in fundamental structural problems 
as well: military expenditures dwarf spending on development. Pakistan has 
one of the world's largest out-of-school populations, yet it spends seven times 
as much on the military every year as on education, an investment with a 
higher national security payoff in the long run. Thus, the country must find a 
way to rationalize its military expenditures. 
Deteriorating law and order situation, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, and the 
unpopular decision of the General Musharraf to sack the Chief Justice of Pakistan were 
all factors that were fairly recent and fresh at the time when this focus group was 
conducted. The army’s role in national politics was widely condemned and there were 
frequent discussions about cutting down expenditure on the armed forces. Babur’s 
assertions about the importance of the army for the country can be understood 
against this background. Babur (M, FG5) further on also claimed that the money 
allocated to the Pakistan army was spent efficiently: 
…the money allotted to army has been, you know, spent efficiently. You know, 
when a person is assigned a task, he does it. If money has been given to 
education department for building a school, they wouldn’t just buy air-
conditioners for their office. So, mismanagement and corruption is the main 
issue in civil departments… 
Further to his argument about the need for maintaining the army, Babur in the above 
excerpt said that Pakistan army used the money allocated to it efficiently. As discussed 
earlier, Siddiqa’s (2007) book on Pakistan army was an influential academic critique of 
its dominant role in the economic and entrepreneurial spheres of the country.  
The discourse of army’s efficiency is often used by the military leadership and sources 
supportive of the military to legitimise its pervasive control of various key domains of 
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national life. Building on Babur’s argument about the army being more efficient and 
honest, Saira (F, FG5) said: 
And why are we having wheat crisis this time? The President, so called, said 
that we had a bumper crop this time! When he said that we had a bumper 
crop, we exported all the wheat out. Now we are importing it back in on 
double the price. And he is making money out of it. Of course I am not saying 
that every person is not a patriot – every army person is not a patriot. We 
have people like sepoy [the Urdu term for a soldier] Maqbool Hussain who 
was a diehard patriot until – he has still been awarded with an award or 
something…of an award – Sitara-e-Jurat [a military award for gallantry].   
Here Saira was referring to a specific incident that happened in Pakistan. In 2007 
Pakistan had a bumper crop of wheat. This was a time when global prices of wheat 
were spiralling upwards and the cost of wheat in two of Pakistan’s immediate 
neighbours – Iran and Afghanistan – were significantly higher than they were in 
Pakistan. Motivated by a desire to reduce the deficit in the balance of payment the 
then government of Pakistan exported a substantial part of the country’s wheat stock. 
This led to a severe shortage of wheat in the subsequent year when the crop wasn’t as 
good as in the previous year (Kardar, 2008). However, this fiasco actually occurred at a 
time when General Musharraf was in power. What the newly elected government had 
to do was to control the damage by importing wheat at a much higher price. Asif Ali 
Zardari was the President of the country at the time when this focus group was 
conducted. Drawing on the discourse of corrupt civilian politicians, Saira referred to 
him as the ‘so called’ president who, according to her, was making money out of it. She 
did qualify this by adding that she was not claiming that every person (civilian) was 
unpatriotic. She then went on to say that neither every army officer was a ‘patriot’. 
However, the example of an army person that she brought up was that of a Pakistan 
Army’s wartime hero – Sepoy Maqbool Hussein. Hussein was taken prisoner of war in 
the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war and remained in Indian jails for forty years. He suffered 
inhumane treatment and extreme forms cruelty and torture in Indian jails. He became 
a national hero and was awarded the Sitara-e-Jurat (Star of Courage) – the third 
highest military award in the country – by the Pakistan Army for his gallantry and 
courage. The selection of Maqbool’s example was a skilful manoeuvre by Saira, 
drawing on the discourse of army personnel sacrificing their lives for the country. She 
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stated that not every army person was a ‘patriot’ yet the example that she cited was a 
person who had become an icon of sacrifice and pathos in the national consciousness. 
I know from my experiencing of living in the country that the general resentment 
expressed by a vast majority of people in the country was rarely, if ever, directed 
against the ordinary soldiers who endangered their lives for the country. The main 
thrust of that resentment was against the senior officers who were then increasingly 
seen as involved in reaping economic benefits and as being responsible for the 
deteriorating political, economic and security situation in the country at that time.  
Like earlier on in the focus group, Tabish presented a position that was challenged and 
resisted by others: 
Tabish (M): If anyone speaks up he is no more! So, you shouldn’t expect me to 
speak up in front of ISI. I saw this person, umm, he lives near my place. He was 
once sitting…standing outside the mosque he disappeared. And, he was, 
umm, talking crap about Mr. Musharraf. And all of a sudden that person was 
lost and he was nowhere to be found – it’s near my place. Someone told me 
that he was taken by ISI but I don’t know where he went.  
Aamer (M): We always blame the ISI. We don’t realize the fact… 
Babur (M): ISI has been working for Pakistan – all the time!  
Aamer (M): Why would ISI be bothered that someone is insulting Musharraf? 
You know, they are, they’re not bothered by this fact. They just want to do 
their job of defending this country internally and externally. And the main job 
of an intelligence agency is to destabilize the adversaries and to keep a check 
on the internal matters of the country. And we just blame ISI all the time – I 
mean, why would they bother to do all this? 
In the above extract, ISI is an acronym for Inter-Services Intelligence. ISI, as the name 
suggests, is the intelligence organisation of Pakistan Armed Forces. ISI gained 
increased salience in national affairs since the 1980s when it was used by the US and 
the then military President of Pakistan, General Zia-ul-Haq to fight against the Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan (Siddiqa, 2007). Tabish in the above extract alluded to the 
not so favourable view of the ISI, held by some people, regarding its role in ‘silencing’ 
the opponents and critics of the military establishment. However, Babur and Aamer 
both offered a robust defence of the ISI. ISI’s controversial role in the internal affairs of 
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the country is well-documented. Providing a scathing critique of the ISI during the ten 
year civilian rule from 1988 to 1998, Sidiqqa (2007: 95) posited:  
The military’s intelligence apparatus played a key role in encouraging the 
divisions between the political actors. The intelligence agencies gained 
strength through their enhanced role in regional and global geopolitics, and 
through greater involvement at home. Political horse-trading was rife during 
these ten years, as part of the manipulative mechanisms used by the ISI and 
other intelligence outfits, and resulted in an increase in political and economic 
corruption. 
To summarise, four out of five participants in this focus group explicitly supported and 
defended the Pakistan Army. They argued that the civilian politicians and the 
governments they formed were responsible for corruption in the country. They said 
that the army was largely not a corrupt institution. Any corruption that existed was 
blown out of proportion by the media, which, some of them maintained, were biased 
in favour of civilian politicians. They also argued that army ran various national 
institutions more efficiently and honestly. They argued that given the geopolitical 
situation the army should not be downsized. Notwithstanding the overwhelming 
support for this important national institution, one participant tried to criticise some 
aspects of the army and its intelligence wing – the ISI. However, other participants 
robustly responded to what he said and defended the army.  
5.6 Discussion 
In this chapter, I have analysed the participants’ constructions of some aspects their 
own country – Pakistan. They argued that there was widespread poverty in the country 
and it was sharply divided along lines of income and economic prosperity. They posited 
that the wide gap between the rich and poor showed no sign of decreasing and was 
one of the important reasons for the country’s slide into militancy and religious 
extremism. They also acknowledged their own privileged position within Pakistani 
society. 
The participants made indirect references to the Islamic basis of the Pakistani state, 
drawing on the two nation theory. Most participants used Islam as a perspective to talk 
about the world. Except for a couple of participants in one focus group, most 
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participants did not draw on the discourse of Islam to construct their personal 
identities. 
The participants were critical of the state of democracy in the country. They argued 
that the democratic system was dysfunctional because a powerful elite group 
manipulated it to perpetuate their hold on power. The participants criticised the 
political leadership of Pakistan, arguing that they lacked personal and professional 
integrity and mettle. They maintained that the problems confronting the country could 
only be solved if there were honest, upright and committed political leaders.  
In one focus group, the participants tried to support and defend the Pakistan Army 
without being solicited to do so. They argued that the widespread corruption in the 
country was due to civilian politicians. They said that the allegations of the army’s 
corruptions were exaggerated and out of proportion. They also opposed any 
suggestion to downsize the army.      
On the whole, discussions pertaining to Pakistan gained greater salience in the later 
focus groups. The reasons for this were twofold. Firstly, as mentioned above, specific 
questions pertaining to Pakistan were asked in the last three focus groups. Secondly, 
and perhaps more importantly, the increased focus on Pakistan during the later 
sessions also reflected the changing geopolitical situation in Pakistan and the region. 
There had been a sharp rise in terrorist violence in the country because of the Pakistan 
government’s support for the US-led ‘war on terror’. The violent repercussions of this 
policy of the Pakistan government were being felt by all Pakistanis in very real and 
immediate ways. 
Benazir Bhutto’s assassination was arguably an event of momentous proportions and 
a watershed moment in the way issues like terrorism and the domestic and 
international politics were perceived by ordinary Pakistanis. The assassination of the 
twice elected, former Prime Minister of Pakistan and the country’s modern and liberal 
face for the international community brought home the brutal reality of terrorism for 
all citizens of the country and they realised that far from being a distant issue, 
terrorism and associated violence was a menace lurking in the very streets where they 
lived, worked, and spent their leisure time. Komal, one of the girls, in the focus group 
conducted in school 4 in February 2008 said: 
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Komal (F, FG 4): Looks like there is nothing safe in the world – not even your 
own home, not even your own town – is Rawalpindi safe after Benazir’s 
assassination? No it is not! Is Pakistan safe? No it is not! Is any country in the 
world safe now? No it is not! 
Terrorism had come to the very heart of the country – the cities of Islamabad and 
Rawalpindi – where the fieldwork for this study was carried out. Before this, for the 
residents of these two cities, terrorist violence was somewhat removed and distant. 
They read about and saw images of terrorist violence in other parts of the country, 
mostly in the North West Frontier Province, especially in the areas close to the border 
with Afghanistan. Further to what Komal said above, two other participants further 
extended her apprehension: 
Zoya (F, FG4): Rawalpindi was the sleeping town – the sleeping town – now 
we have bomb blasts.  
Adil (M, FG4): I think, we as Pakistanis feel it the worst. I don’t know, the rest 
of the world is treating us fine, but as we are going through such trauma, 
recently, I think our views would be very much different. 
When the fieldwork for this research was carried out Pakistan was going through a 
tumultuous and rapidly changing period. The implications of the Pakistan government 
to participate in the US led ‘war on terror’ were being felt by all Pakistanis and this was 
reflected in the discussions that took place in the last three focus groups. 
Having discussed the participants’ constructions of Pakistan, in the next chapter I 
analyse their perspective on the wider world. 
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6 The Participants’ Constructions of the Wider World 
This chapter builds on the previous one in which the participants’ constructions of 
Pakistan were discussed. Here, I discuss their perspectives on the wider world. I 
analyse how they conceptualised the wider world along certain geopolitical and 
ideological lines.  Like the previous one, this chapter sets the scene for the subsequent 
chapters that focus on international conflicts. It does so by providing an insight into 
how the research participants constructed the world beyond Pakistan.  They talked 
about various historical events that contributed to the then prevailing configuration 
and dynamics of the international space.  Their constructions of the international 
space were varied, complex, and subtle. It is pertinent to mention that most of the 
data discussed in this chapter did not come up as a result of specific, directed 
questions; most of it was mentioned by the participants while discussing other issues. 
Therefore, in many cases only a few and in some cases only a couple of individuals said 
something about the topics analysed in this chapter. However, since specific questions 
were not asked by me, it cannot be assumed that other participants would not have 
said similar things if asked about these issues.  
I begin by discussing the participants’ reference to individual countries. This is followed 
by a detailed analysis of their constructions of three countries – India, England and the 
US. Next, I discuss their references to various blocs of countries like the EU and the 
Islamic world. Subsequently, I analyse their references to various supranational 
organisations like the United Nations (UN) and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA). Finally, I analyse their discussion about certain socio-economic perspectives like 
Marxism, socialism and capitalism.   
6.1 Countries 
In this section, I discuss the participants’ references to individual countries. Doing this 
helps in providing an insight into their constructions of the wider world, based on the 
references they made to different countries and significance they attached to each of 
these. There was a high level of variation in the frequency, detail and depth of 
references made to these countries. Of some, only names were mentioned, whereas in 
the case of others detailed discussion took place. References to many countries were 
made not in response to specific questions. There was also great variation in the 
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number of participants who mentioned various countries listed in this section. For 
example, references to the US were made by nearly all participants but places like 
Cuba, Equatorial Guinea and Macau were mentioned by only one participant in each 
case.  
The following is the list of countries that the participants made references to: 
Asia 
 Afghanistan 
 Bangladesh 
 China 
 India 
 Iran 
 Japan 
 Kazakhstan 
 Macau 
 North Korea 
 Pakistan 
 Russia 
 South Korea 
 Uzbekistan 
Asia Pacific 
 Australia 
Middle East 
 Iraq 
 Israel 
 Lebanon 
 Palestine 
 Saudi Arabia 
 Syria 
 United Arab Emirates 
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Europe 
 Britain 
 France 
 Germany 
 Scandinavia 
 Spain 
Africa 
 Egypt 
 Equatorial Guinea 
 Libya 
North America 
 Cuba 
 The United States of America 
Figure 6.1 shows a world map with countries mentioned by the participants 
highlighted in red. 
 
Figure 6.1 – World map with countries referred to by the participants highlighted in 
red  
Iran was mentioned mostly in reference to its leadership which the participants 
constructed as independent and not pliant to the Western, especially the US, diktat. 
Reference to Syria was made in the context of it receiving military support from Iran. 
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References to Israel were made mainly against the backdrop of Middle Eastern 
international politics. It was constructed as an aggressor state that was backed by the 
US. Saudi Arabia was mentioned mainly by one specific participant, Mysha (F, FG6) 
who had lived there for seventeen years. She said ‘Saudi Arabia is actually a very good 
resource – natural reserve for oil.’ She argued that since it was an oil rich country the 
US had a special interest in it. Babur (M, FG5) posited that, along with the United Arab 
Emirates, Saudi Arabia was economically dependent on the US.  
Cuba was mentioned by Aan (F, FG6) as a small country which had a very high literacy 
rate. Adil (M, FG4) referred to North Korea, Libya and Iran in the context of the role of 
Pakistan’s nuclear scientist Dr. A. Q. Khan, who had allegedly facilitated these 
countries in acquiring nuclear technology: 
A. Q. Khan…gave the nuclear technology to Libya, North Korea and Iran. I 
think, umm, Iran and Libya are, probably, justified because they are Muslim 
countries – Muslim brothers. But North Korea was, it was purely – I think it 
was a very bad thing. And even for a person who is nationalist and patriotic 
like me, that is not on – it shouldn’t have been done! 
Adil argued that Dr. Khan was justified in facilitating Libya and Iran in acquiring nuclear 
technology but not North Korea because the former two were Muslim countries and 
the latter wasn’t. Adil’s argument drew on the discourse of Muslim countries united 
through a supranational religious ideology (Crockatt, 2004).  
As can be seen from the list of countries and figure 6.1, the participants mentioned 
countries mostly located in Asia and the Middle East.  No countries in Central and 
South America, except Cuba, were mentioned by them. In Africa only three countries – 
Egypt, Libya and Equatorial Guinea – were mentioned.  The former two are Muslim 
countries and the latter a Christian one. Most of the countries mentioned by the 
participants were geographically close to Pakistan. The countries that were discussed 
at some length by the participants included Afghanistan, Britain, India, Iraq, and the 
US. In the following sections, I analyse participants’ constructions of three countries: 
India, Britain and the US. I do not discuss Afghanistan and Iraq in this chapter because 
these were mentioned almost exclusively in the context of post September 11 
international conflicts, which comprise the focus of chapters 8 and 9.  
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 India  6.1.1
In this section, I discuss the participants’ constructions of India. I chose to begin with 
India because frequent references were made to it in all focus groups. The contexts of 
these references were varied. In this section, I only discuss participants’ constructions 
of India as a country and its impact on the Pakistanis’ national identity. References to it 
in the context of its conflicts with Pakistan will be analysed in the next chapter. 
Importantly, the participants used India as a reference point to look at the position of 
their own country – Pakistan – in the international space. In all focus groups numerous 
references were made to India – the eastern neighbour of Pakistan. India figures as an 
important country in the imagination of most Pakistanis. This is partly due to the fact 
that the two of them were one country till about six decades ago. Since the partition of 
the Indian subcontinent in 1947, the two countries have seen each other as 
adversaries and have fought three wars. Suedfield and Jhangiani (2009: 939) have 
referred to the Pakistan-India relationship as a case of ‘enduring rivalry’.  Most 
participants of my research saw India as an adversary. For example, Fahad (M, FG2), 
said ‘India and Pakistan are classic examples’ of two parties not being able to see 
things from each other’s point of view. Similarly, Malihah (F, FG2) said that Pakistan 
and India ‘are in a constant conflict since 1947’.  
Not all references to India were in the context of it being an adversary, enemy state. In 
focus group one, Maher and Salma made references to India in relation to its system of 
democracy. Maher argued that democracy in India was different from that in Pakistan: 
Maher (M, FG1): … I just said you’re talking about Pakistani democracy, where 
voters can be fed, where you can put in money and win elections. But this 
does not actually happen in other parts of the world… Give me an example an 
example from India.  
In the above extract, the reference to India was made in the context of a broader 
discussion regarding the relationship between social inequality and democracy. Maher 
(M, FG1) said that in India ‘BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] which was – which had perfect 
reasons to win, it had brought about an economic revival in India, it was ousted.’ In 
response to this, Salma (F, FG1) said that the reason that the BJP lost was that ‘the 
social development factor was extremely low in all of the region. BJP [was not able to 
improve India’s] social HDI – the human development index –’ Both these participants 
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talked about Indian politics and issues related to social development. Maher was 
arguing that the Indian democracy was sound and people and did not cast their votes 
merely for short-term economic gains. According to him, the BJP brought about an 
economic revival in the country but was still ousted from the government. Salma 
argued that the economic successes of Bhartiya Janata Party did not translate into 
social development which, according to her, became one of the reasons for its defeat 
in 2004. They talked about not only the outcomes of the general elections in India but 
they were also analysed some other relevant substantive political and social issues in 
that country. Adil (M, FG4) said that India had many more provinces compared to 
Pakistan: 
I think it’s very nice excuse to say we’re divided along lines, along lines of 
culture, lines along provinces, we have four different – their reputation says 
that Pakistan is basically four bulls tied with their tails together. I think there 
are worse cases. India has like so many provinces… I think it’s no longer an 
excuse that democracy doesn’t work in Pakistan and we are divided along 
sectarian lines. I think, basically, what’s hampering the growth is basically us! 
Some of the participants argued that Indian leaders maintained a much more down-to-
earth and modest profile compared to the leaders in their own country: 
Saira (F, FG5): It doesn’t happen all around the world. You still see the Indian 
President going around in a Hindustan 10 – that’s the smallest car, that’s an 
Indian made car. 
Saira made this remark in the context of discussion about the relatively ostentatious 
and indulgent lifestyles of the Pakistani political leaders. Some of the participants also 
referred to the fact the wider world, especially the West, had different attitudes 
towards India and Pakistan. In focus group 6, the following discussion took place: 
Natasha (F): There’s so much racism just because I am a Pakistani. Why so 
much racism? Not with Indians – nobody says anything to Indians – never! It’s 
always because you are a Paki! Everybody – if you are brown, that’s it you’re a 
Paki!  
Mysha (F): Not even Paki – even if you’re an Asian… 
Aan (F): All Asiatic countries – just Pakistan or other places as well? 
Mysha (F): India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, China 
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Natasha (F): If an Indian is corrupt, right? They won’t look at their background 
– they won’t be like he’s an Indian. They just be like you’re a Paki.  
Mysha (F): Exactly. 
Natasha (F) They won’t ever, ever blame anyone – Indians or Gujratis – they 
would always blame Pakistanis.   
This discussion drew on quite a common discourse in Pakistan about the different 
attitudes of the West towards Pakistan and India. Natasha, quoted in the above 
extract, was a British national who had moved back to Pakistan sometime back. This 
discourse became more prevalent in Pakistan in the years after the September 11 
attacks, especially in the wake of the American establishment’s increasingly ambivalent 
and distrustful relationship with Pakistan. Tabish (M, FG5) said:  
And now when it comes to India which is a non-Muslim state, they’re ready to 
accept it as a nuclear power. And they’re ready to make agreements with it, 
make nuclear reactors and products related to that, so that they can improve 
upon their technology, and not – ignoring Pakistan!! 
I know from my personal experience that the American sanctions against Pakistan due 
the latter’s nuclear explosions in the 1998 were viewed unfavourably by the majority of 
Pakistanis and the national media. This resentment was fuelled by the fact that 
Pakistan detonated its nuclear devices only in response to India’s doing so for the 
second time in 1998. Many Pakistanis felt that the West, especially the US, unfairly 
targeted Pakistan by levying various sanctions against it. Mazari (2009d), an academic 
and writer, writing in one of the most popular English newspapers argued: 
It has now become routine for the US to focus on Pakistan's nuclear weapons 
whenever there is trouble within the country. Clearly, the US has not 
recovered from its trauma of seeing a developing Muslim state acquire 
nuclear capability. Moreover, as one of the greatest proliferators since 1945 
to Israel, the US has always maintained hypocrisy over its non-proliferation 
stance and this has now been fully exposed with its 123 nuclear agreement 
with India1. 
                                                             
1The 123 nuclear agreement refers to section 123 of the United States Atomic Energy Act 1954, which 
was amended by the US government in 2008 to enter into an arrangement for cooperation with India in 
matters related to developing nuclear technology for civilian purposes. 
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The participants drew on the discourse that Pakistan and its citizens were treated 
unfairly by the West, especially in comparison to India. Natasha (F, FG6), said Pakistanis 
were themselves responsible for their negative image because: 
…when I used to go in the street then it was full of Pakistanis – Pakistanis used 
to live there all the time – it was a whole Pakistani street. When I used to go 
there, there was trash everywhere. There was litter everywhere.  
Mysha (F, FG6) said that Pakistanis had ‘no discipline, no organisation’. In response to 
Mysha’s statement, the following exchange took place. 
Huma (F): Indians are the same – I mean they are no different.  
Aan (F): Look, why do people have respect for Indians?  
Mysha (F): Indians can hide – that’s what they do.  
Natasha (F): They are intelligent – they are very intelligent – they hide what 
they can do… 
(FG6) 
From my personal experience of living in Pakistan, I know that the participants in the 
above exchange were drawing on the discourse of Hindus in India being clever people. 
This discourse posited that the Hindus were street-smart and were able to cover their 
tracks more effectively, when they did anything wrong.  
The participants were quite strongly critical of their compatriots, especially the way in 
which they conducted themselves overseas. However, they also argued that Pakistan 
was unfairly treated because there were clear parallels with India but the latter was 
seldom the target of the West’s censure and criticism. This discourse of duplicity in the 
West’s policies and attitudes towards the two countries has been highlighted by 
different writers (e.g. Bahree, 2009; Choudhry, Mahsud, and Hasan; 2008, Mazari 
2009f). Choudhry, Mahsud, and Hasan (2008) have argued that there is a qualitative 
difference in the relationships of the US and Britain with Pakistan and India. They 
maintain that this is because of economic and strategic benefits that Britain and the US 
perceive in their relationship with India. The Western world generally sees India as 
economically and militarily stronger than Pakistan and this relates to the  discourse of 
hierarchy of countries discussed in chapter 3.   
160 
 
Notwithstanding the feeling of being treated unfairly in comparison to India, some 
participants expressed admiration for India and its people. For example, Aan (F, FG6) 
said: 
Very lazy people [Pakistanis] – and you know, they are not hardworking at all. 
Like the Indians are very hardworking and they are always making things in 
their own country rather than importing it from other countries. So, when you 
start importing from other countries, you have to beg other people – we want 
money, because within the country you can’t produce anything.  
The discourse of India being a self-reliant country that was less dependent on foreign 
exports was a common one in Pakistan. This discourse posited Indians as hardworking 
people who were happy to use indigenously produced goods. This discourse presented 
India and its people in a position of strength as they were self-reliant and did not have 
to ask others for financial assistance.  
In this section, I have demonstrated the participants’ constructions of their country’s 
eastern neighbour – India. They talked about the socio-political situation in that 
country and realised that on certain counts India had surpassed Pakistan. However, 
they also posited that Pakistan was often judged harshly and unfairly by the West, 
especially the US, in comparison with India. Even though India did not figure directly in 
the plethora of challenges that confronted Pakistan in the Wake of September 11, the 
difference in the US attitudes towards the two countries came into greater relief in the 
minds of most Pakistanis during that period. In the years following the September 11 
attacks, most Pakistanis came to see the US as a fair-weather friend that had been 
highly manipulative and exploitative in its relations with their country. This perception 
was often sketched against a starkly different trajectory of the relationship between 
the world’s lone superpower and an increasingly powerful India. This feeling was also 
perceptible in the discussions with some of the participants of this research. 
Notwithstanding drawing on the discourse of preferential treatment to India by the 
West, especially the US, some participants also admired the Indian people for their 
hard work and self-reliance. 
 Britain 6.1.2
In this section, I discuss participants’ constructions of Britain. Britain occupies a special 
place in the imaginations of most Pakistanis, primarily due to the colonial connection. 
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In five out of six focus groups participants made references to Britain. The context and 
foci of these references were varied and complex. 
Some participants used their understanding of British colonialism to make sense of 
some of the more recent international events. This they did this primarily in reference 
to the recent domination of the world by the US. British colonialism was something 
that the participants were familiar with and, therefore, used to understand the policies 
and actions of the US. For example, Maher (M, FG1) argued that what the US was doing 
was qualitatively different from British colonialism: 
…the United States of America colonizing Iraq and Afghanistan – I think 
drawing that parallel with an imperialist power like Britain or France, I think 
that is incorrect…like Britain… went on explorations, on missions, and on their 
way, while going back, they realised there were a lot of resources, especially 
in the subcontinent and they decided to colonize those nations…that was 
what colonialists were doing but we are under the international system. 
The above was said by Maher when a couple of other participants argued that what the 
US was doing was a new form of colonialism. A similar point was highlighted by Said 
(1978/1995: 285) when he said ‘France and Britain no longer occupy center stage in 
world politics; the American imperium has displaced them.’ Mysha (F, FG6) saw Britain 
and US in recent times as complicit in their attempts to gain control over the rest of the 
world. She said ‘The main mission I believe for the British or the Americans is just to get 
power – gain power all over’. The constructions of the participants of the US foreign 
policy will be discussed in greater detail in one of the subsequent chapters.  The 
participants demonstrated that they were aware of some of the fundamental features 
and dynamics of the colonization of the Indian Subcontinent. All Pakistanis are aware of 
their country’s colonial past. There is a general realization that the relationship 
between their country and the erstwhile colonial power was exploitative and worked 
mostly to the advantage of the latter. However, there is little in the way of active, 
persistent resentment against Britain as a result of its past colonial exploits in the 
region. The following extract about Kashmir demonstrates this point. 
Fahad (M): But, the British demarcated India. So, it is their plan that we have to 
follow. [Various: They gave it to Pakistan.] 
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Naveed: But, had they (British) felt so strongly about it, they wouldn’t have left 
it like that. 
Wafa (F): They gave it to the Indians themselves. 
Saima (F): It was in a way because Mountbatten was there. Did he do 
something? If he so strongly felt that Kashmir was a part of Pakistan, he should 
have done something about it. 
(FG2) 
This acceptance, even legitimization, of the British intervention may very well be due to 
the fact that the political foundations of the Pakistani state are predicated upon a 
sharp distinction from India. It has been argued that Pakistani nationalism has its roots 
in Jinnah’s efforts to rally the Indian Muslims as a separate nation based on their 
distinct religion and cultural heritage (Durrani and Dunne, 2010; Toor, 2005). Arguably, 
colonial control of India and the subsequent decision by the British government to 
grant India independence provided the Indian Muslims the opportunity to demand a 
separate state for themselves. Therefore, British colonialism rather than being seen 
primarily as an infringement of sovereign rights is seen by many Pakistanis as a political 
stage that paved the way for the creation of an independent state for the Indian 
Muslims.      
Some references were also made to Britain in contexts other than its colonial link with 
Pakistan. In the first focus group, Salma said: 
England is a welfare state, where, umm, where right now they have enough 
money to ensure that people are on a semi-equal footing, and then that is 
fine. See, that’s the thing, people are on a semi-equal footing, that’s fine. 
Elections and democracy is fine, as long as people are on an equal footing. 
Salma was discussing with other participants in the group the problems associated 
with democracy in societies that were highly stratified and unequal. She knew that 
England was a welfare state and demonstrated awareness of the implications of this 
for a democratic system of governance. She argued that democracy worked well when 
there was at least a certain degree of equality in society. 
In the fourth focus group, conducted quite soon after the assassination of Benazir 
Bhutto, references were made to Britain in the context of the London bombings. As I 
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have discussed in the previous chapter, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto made 
terrorist violence much more real and proximal in the consciousness of most 
Pakistanis. In the focus groups conducted after the assassination, issues of national 
and international security gained greater salience. Komal, one of the participants of 
focus group four said: 
…it’s not just limited to one country, it’s influencing millions of miles away. 
Troops are in Iraq but you have bombing in Madrid, you have bombings in 
London, troops are in Iran, you have bombings let’s say in Pakistan… No it’s 
not just us, even the London bombings. Is London safe now? It’s not!   
Komal argued that terrorist violence had become a problem in many parts of the world, 
including Britain. However, such constructions of the larger world need to be 
contextualised by appreciating the atmosphere of shock and vulnerability that 
prevailed in the country as a result of instances of terrorist violence that shattered the 
peace and tranquillity of middle class urban Pakistan when some of the later focus 
groups for this study were conducted.      
Another participant, Farah (F, FG4) referred to BBC television where she saw a talk 
show about issues related to terrorism where the audience comprised Arab citizens. 
This reference, as discussed in the methodology chapter, shows that the young people 
who participated in this study had access to various sources of information, including 
cable television because BBC is available for viewing in Pakistan only through this 
medium. 
Two other participants’ references to Britain are especially noteworthy. One of these 
was Afreen (F, FG3) and the other Natasha (F, FG6). Both these participants were 
British nationals and their families had moved back to Pakistan sometime back. 
Afreen’s constructions of her relationship with Britain were complex and fraught with 
contradictions. Afreen in the focus group discussion very clearly identified with Britain 
and saw this as an important part of her personal identity. This is evident from the 
following extract: 
But when someone asks me about being Pakistani and being British, what 
would you like to choose, on the basis of that I think I will just have to go with 
England.   
164 
 
Not only did Afreen very clearly identify with Britain but she also actively tried to 
distance herself from her Pakistani roots. She argued that ‘…Pakistan does not have 
any meaning – I don’t think much of Pakistan – personally’. These views were 
somewhat paradoxical given the fact that she talked at some length of her own and 
her peers’ experiences of Islamophobic attacks in Britain in the wake of the 
September 11 attacks: 
And we did suffer back in home. Actually, we did suffer quite a few blows – 
our houses – our windows were broken. And some girls and some boys they 
were actually – it was actually a gang of friends who wore scarves and wore 
jubas [a special loose outer dress worn by some orthodox Muslim women], it 
was on that basis – violence, because quite a few people were injured, some 
broke their arms. I was just… 
Like Afreen, Natasha (F, FG6) was also a British national and she too commented on 
her experiences of racism in Britain. She said that ‘When I go, like, back to England – 
when I go to England – when people call, like, they just look at you – if you are brown 
you are Paki – that’s it! You’re a Paki!’ 
In this section I discussed participants’ constructions of Britain. They made references 
to it in the context of the colonial connection between it their own country. Other 
topics mentioned by individuals were British democracy, the BBC, and racism against 
Pakistanis. 
 The United States of America 6.1.3
In this section, I discuss the participants’ constructions of the US as an economically 
and militarily powerful country, which had achieved the status of the world hegemon 
in the post-Cold war period. In all focus groups, references were made to the US as a 
powerful country that dominated the world.  
Asma (F, FG1) said: ‘…America is powerful, it’s strong, it has the freedom, it has 
freedom of action’ Asma said this in the context of US invasion of Iraq. She was 
arguing that since the US was powerful it could do whatever it wanted, including 
attacking other countries. Asma constructed the US as a country that was militarily 
and economically powerful and, therefore, could attack other countries. Saira (F, FG 5) 
referred to the military might of the US that it used against other countries. She said 
that it was ‘the only country in the world that has actually used an atomic bomb’. She 
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said this in the context of US response to the September 11 attacks and its desire to 
restrain other countries from acquiring nuclear capabilities. Babur (M, FG 5) argued 
that America wanted the world to recognise its economic and military might: 
America wants people to accept its might and its god-like status in the 
world. That is what America aims to do. And they even themselves say that 
we have the military might, we have the economic power and we want to 
rule the world in a way that, you know, benefits us and our people.      
Babur said this in response to a question about the then prevailing international 
situation. According to him, the turmoil in the world at that time was a result of the 
US wish to dominate the world. Like Asma and Saira, he commented on the military 
and economic might of the US that it used to achieve its strategic objectives 
internationally. Natasha (F, FG 6) said that ‘America controls everything’. She said this 
while discussing how the world could be made a safer place. Asma, Saira, Babur and 
Natasha while talking about the US being a powerful country were drawing on the 
discourse of hierarchy of nations, discussed in chapter 3. 
Whereas most participants referred to the economic and military might of the US, 
some of them also referred to its status in the world as a superpower. Maher (M, FG 
1) said ‘…at this point in time, we are living in a unipolar world, where one country has 
the power.’   
Babur (M, FG 5) also referred to the US as a superpower, although his take on this was 
somewhat different; he said ‘I think the superpower status of America will one day 
end because of its own mechanism.’ Babur said this during a discussion about ways to 
resolve the international conflicts prevailing at that time. Earlier in the session, he 
argued that unless the economic and military power of the US declined there was no 
way to resolve those conflicts. Babur and other participants, referred to above, 
suggested that economically and militarily the US was a very powerful country and it 
was the sole superpower in the world.  Layne (2006: 11) argues that after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, the US became the world hegemon, which ‘by definition [can 
exists only in a] unipolar’ international space. In focus group 5, Tabish said that the US 
dominated the United Nations: 
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And now, umm, the entire UN, it is fully dominated by the US – fully 
dominated by the US, and a little bit by other countries who are supporters 
of US, in fact.    
Tabish argued that the United Nations was dominated by the US and some other 
countries that were its supporters. Frezzo (2010: 28) refers to the UN as ‘the most 
prominent offshoot of US hegemony’.  Nazemroaya (2012) argues: 
The Security Council above all has been used by the US as a means of 
protecting its interests. The purpose of the Security Council veto is to reject 
any international resolutions and consensuses against the national interests 
(or more precisely the interests of the ruling elites) of the US and the other 
major post-World War II powers. 
Many participants saw the US as a country that was economically and militarily strong 
and, hence, could do whatever it wanted, including influencing the UN. They argued 
that the US, capitalising on its economic and military might, pursued aggressive 
international policies to achieve its own strategic objectives. 
Some participants posited that owing to its economic and military might and its status 
as the world hegemon, the US influenced the internal affairs of Pakistan. Commenting 
on the US role in Pakistani politics, Adil (M, FG4) said: 
…we all know for a fact that we have to get in power in Pakistan, you are 
either pro-establishment or you have links with the USA. Besides that you 
can’t come into power.  
Adil’s argument in the above excerpt drew on the discourse of US hegemony and its 
control over internal affairs of Pakistan. According to this discourse, Pakistan’s internal 
affairs were controlled and manipulated by the US establishment. Shafqat (2009: 90) 
argues that there have been long-term strategic interests of the US in Pakistan: 
…the U.S. has had an abiding interest specifically in Pakistan because of 
Pakistan's role in Cold War policies of containment, present-day concerns over 
Iran, the global war on terror, a Central Asian energy corridor and Pakistan's 
nuclear assets. 
Komal (F, FG 4) said that what happened in the US elections was more important for 
Pakistan than the results of its own elections: 
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I think US elections are very crucial for us as well. Because our elections do 
not count for that much as American elections. It’s not about who rules in 
Islamabad as much as it is about who rules in the Oval office. So, that’s 
more important. 
I know from my experience of living in the country that the discourse of US 
establishment manipulating the internal politics of Pakistan has been common. This 
discourse captured the imagination of many Pakistanis in the years after the 
September 11 attacks, especially when the Pakistan government decided to become an 
ally in the US led ‘war on terror’. The US was able to manipulate the internal politics of 
Pakistan because:  
The United States has traditionally been seen as a lender of the last resort by 
nearly all Pakistani rulers after the death of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali 
Jinnah in September 1948, hence gifting the world super power a golden 
opportunity to achieve its regional and strategic goals against pea-nuts only. 
(Shah, 2013) 
Thus, many participants argued that the US was a powerful country that had 
manipulated the internal affairs of Pakistan to achieve its strategic objectives in the 
region.  
This section has demonstrated the participants’ constructions of the US as a powerful 
country that was at the top of the hierarchy of nations. They argued that this position 
of the US was based on its military and economic strength, which gave it the status of 
the world’s only superpower after the end of the Cold War. They also suggested that it 
wielded considerable political power internationally and exerted significant influence 
and control over the internal affairs of Pakistan. In the data analysed in this section, the 
participants drew on the discourses of hierarchy of nations and the US manipulation of 
the internal affairs of Pakistan. 
6.2 Blocs of Countries   
In this section, I discuss some blocs of countries that were referred to by the research 
participants. One of the participants, Maher (M, FG1) said: 
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…the world is unipolar… we might have powers coming up, like China, or even 
the EU, which might in future might come up, and, and establish a balance of 
power between America and rest of the world. 
In the above excerpt, Maher was arguing that the world at that time was unipolar and 
the EU might at a later point time become a source of balance of power. Bloomfield 
(2008: 69) presents EU as a possible dominant player in the imminent ‘demise of the 
unipolar world’. Maher (M, FG1) later on made another reference to the EU and said 
‘…look at the Iran issue, where you have EU’s three major players – Britain, Germany, 
and France mediating in the issue’. Here he was drawing on the discourse of the EU 
comprising of a hierarchy of countries – some more powerful and influential than the 
others. This discourse was discussed in chapter 3. 
The participants referred to the idea of ‘the West’ as a group of countries comprising 
the industrialised countries of Europe and North America. Saima (F, FG2) said:  
‘…look at Iran…they had their differences with America and with most of the 
Western world… what they are doing right now is that they are developing 
these – nuclear capabilities’.  
She was arguing that even though Iran had differences with the West, it did not resort 
to terrorism and focused instead on developing their ‘nuclear capabilities’. She 
constructed the ‘Western world’ as a distinct entity, which included the US besides 
other countries. Komal (F, FG4) posited that the ‘Western world’ and ‘Al-Qaeda’ 
justified their actions using the discourse of protecting one’s self-interests: 
So you can’t say we’re wrong we are justified as long as we are protecting our 
interest, just like the US was doing it, just like as any other European nation or 
the Western World does it, so we’re doing the same thing. It’s justified from 
their end because they’re sitting on the other table, on the other end of the 
table. 
Zoya (F, FG4) argued that after the 911 attacks thousands of Muslims were rounded 
‘with no proof’. This according to her: ‘would turn their hearts against the Western 
world’. She too maintained that the ‘Western world’ stood in opposition to the Muslim 
world. Another participant, Adil (M, FG4) said that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
transformed into ‘a war between the West and Islam’. Komal (F, FG4), Zoya (F, FG4) 
and Adil (M, FG4) were drawing on the discourse of difference and antagonism 
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between the West and the Islamic world. This discourse captured popular imagination 
with the publication of Samuel Huntington’s (1996/2002) controversial book The Clash 
of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. 
Another bloc of countries that the participants referred to was the Islamic world. 
Harris (M, FG2) said that in retaliation to 911, the US attacked ‘all Muslim countries’. 
Farah (F, FG4) argued that in response to 911 the US declared war against ‘Islamic 
countries’. Farah identified the Islamic countries as a distinct bloc that had become 
pitched against the US in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. Komal (F, FG4) 
also made a reference to this bloc. She posited that ‘even…Muslim 
countries…admitted’ that Afghanistan was controlled by a terrorist group. In this 
extract, Komal presented the Muslim countries as a distinct bloc of nation states. 
Tabish (M, FG5) and Aamer (M, FG5) also referred to ‘Muslim nations’ as a distinct bloc 
of countries that had become pitted against the West, especially the US. Huma (F, FG6) 
referred to all the Muslim countries as a distinct political entity who she lamented 
would not help Pakistan because it had isolated itself and by betraying them in order 
to appease the US. Natasha (F, FG6) and Aan (F, FG6) also referred to Muslims across 
the world as one group of people. The idea of Muslim nations as comprising a distinct 
bloc of countries joined together by a religious ideology draws on the discourse of 
Islam being not only a religious ideology but also a political ideal which unites all its 
followers into the ‘Nation of Islam’ (Crockatt, 2004: 127). 
Maher (M, FG1) referred to Middle Eastern countries by using the concept of ‘Greater 
Middle East’. He said:  
...what I feel is that reasons for invading Iraq have…been varied, varied, have 
varied from finding weapons of mass destruction to ousting Saddam Hussain 
as a tyrant and his regime and even establishing the Greater Middle East 
concept which in…which would definitely, what the Americans say would 
inculcate democracy into the Middle East. 
The discourse of ‘Greater Middle East’ was not what one would hear very commonly in 
everyday discussions and in the media when this focus group was carried out. Güney 
and Gökcan (2010: 22) argue that the idea of a Greater Middle East reflects a profound 
change in the ‘geopolitical imagination of the USA’ in the wake of September 11 
attacks. Thus, Maher in this excerpt was drawing on a relatively less common 
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discourse, albeit an important one, related to September 11 attacks and the changes 
that took place in international politics as a result of these events. Just before referring 
to this, Maher also mentioned ‘Greater Israel’ by drawing on the discourse of 
enhanced American support for Israel in the context of the ‘Greater Middle East’. 
One participant, Fahad (M, FG2) referred to the Persian Empire and said that it did not 
allow trade with Muslims as a result of which the latter had to attack it. Fahad in this 
excerpt was drawing on the discourse of Muslim territorial expansionism during the 
early medieval period. Natasha (F, FG6) mentioned the Mughal Empire and cited their 
corruption as one of the main reasons for the decline of Muslim control over the 
Indian subcontinent.   
Thus, the participants referred to various international political blocs, which included 
the EU, the Western world, the Middle East, including the notion of ‘Greater Middle 
East’, the Islamic countries. A few references were also made to political formations of 
the past which included the Persian and the Mughal Empires. It is pertinent to mention 
that the Islamic countries are usually mentioned as a distinct bloc of countries in 
Pakistan Studies textbooks (e.g. Rabbani, 2009). However, references to the EU and 
concepts like the ‘Greater Middle East’ are relatively rare (e.g. Khan, 2004; Rabbani, 
2009). An association of countries that is frequently discussed in textbooks (e.g. 
Rabbani, 2009) but was not referred to by the young people who participated in my 
research, is the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), comprising 
Bangladesh, Nepal, India, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bhutan and Pakistan.  Therefore, 
arguably, the participants made a selective use of the bloc of countries usually 
mentioned in the Pakistan Studies textbooks. This demonstrates that these young 
people drew on various sources of information and were not limited to their school 
textbooks for constructing their understanding of the world beyond Pakistan. The 
references to various political and ideological blocs represent the participants’ 
constructions of political alliances and groupings in the international arena and serve 
as a backdrop for their analysing their constructions of international conflicts, 
discussed in the subsequent chapters.  
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6.3 Supranational Organisations 
The participants’ discussion of the international space was not confined to just other 
countries and blocs of countries. They also made numerous references to various 
supranational organisations like the United Nations and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). In this section, I analyse the participants’ constructions of some 
supranational organisations. These references demonstrate not just a good 
understanding of the geographical and territorial make-up of the international space 
but also their understanding of this space along political and legal lines. 
Tabish (M, FG5) criticised the United Nations: 
The United Nations – first of all I have objection to the veto powers of this. 
The entire world is equal. Why do you say that if this country had developed 
nuclear industries at first, so they have the right to veto the entire world – to 
go opposite to the entire world?! This is no logic! 
Tabish in the above excerpt was criticizing the UN being dominated by the five 
permanent members of the Security Council, who have the veto power. He was 
particularly critical of the US who objected to other countries acquiring nuclear 
capabilities. Komal (F, FG4) referred to the IAEA while talking about Benazir Bhutto, 
who, according to Komal, shortly before her assassination, said that, if voted to power, 
she (Benazir) ‘will hand over A. Q. Khan [Pakistan’s controversial nuclear scientist] to 
IAEA and help the international inspectors to protect the nukes of Pakistan’. 
Maher (M, FG1), while talking about the US response to the September 11 attacks, 
argued that the US was not justified in attacking Iraq and Afghanistan in the wake of 
the September 11 attacks. He distinguished that state of affair from an ideal 
international situation ‘where every country lives by those laws, as perhaps prescribed 
by the United Nations Charter’. He argued that individual nation states, specifically the 
US, should not resort to use of violence against other countries as there were well-
defined systems and institutions in place that they could take recourse to. He said: 
Maher (M): What I feel is that you have a system of international law, under 
which we currently function – we have United Nations in place, we have 
International Court of Justice in place, we have International Court of 
Arbitration, criminal courts, and war crimes tribunals, lots of international 
systems, humanitarian laws, Geneva Convention etc.  
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In the above excerpt, Maher was talking about the international space and the various 
supranational bodies that existed in order to arbitrate disputes and conflicts between 
the various sovereign states. He argued that there were supranational agencies whose 
primary role was to arbitrate disputes between different countries. Maher over here 
was drawing on the legalist discourses of jus ad bellum and jus in bello of the modern 
episteme, discussed in chapter 3. Amin (M, FG1) asked Maher whether he still would 
have been against the Iraq war even if the United Nations had authorised it. By 
referring rhetorically to the UN as the international legal authority, he too was 
drawing on the legalist discourses of jus ad bellum of the modern episteme discussed 
in the literature review. 
This section demonstrates some research participants’ constructions of some of the 
supranational bodies that were relevant in the context of international conflicts.  
6.4 Marxism, Socialism and Capitalism 
In this section, I discuss the use of the discourses of Marxism, socialism and capitalism 
by the participants of one focus group. In focus group one there was an extended 
discussion about widespread inequality and social disparity in the world. In this 
discussion the participants used ideas like capitalism, Marxism, and socialism to make 
their point. For example, Salma (F, FG1) said: 
I’m still a socialist, I was a semi-Marxist sometime ago. Umm, I think it’s 
important that, umm, you have laws that ensure that people or competition, 
whatever happens, it happens on an equal footing. 
Salma’s recourse to the Marxist discourse was remarkable, considering that she was 
an A-level student and would not have come across it in her Pakistan Studies 
textbooks (e.g. Khan, 2004; Rabbani, 2009). Moreover, it was quite unlikely that she 
encountered the discourse on popular media. Most likely, she came across this either 
in discussions within her families or through reading of relevant literature. Her 
recourse to the Marxist discourse demonstrates her privileged, upper middleclass 
upbringing. Salma was arguing about some of the issues that had plagued the 
democratic system and institutions of Pakistan. Drawing on the classical Marxist 
discourse, she criticised the capitalist system: 
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Salma (F, FG1) : In the case, in the case of socialism, umm, I mean, okay, if 
you have, if for example, if you’re talking from a perfect capitalistic world, the 
world we live in today, we see these wide gaps between the rich and the poor. 
She used the Marxist discourse to criticise the social inequalities and injustices 
inherent in Pakistani society. In order to substantiate her point, she compared 
Pakistan with England and highlighted that the latter was a welfare state and people 
there were to some extent equal. Salma used the discourses of Marxism and 
capitalism to analyse and talk about the socio-economic organisation of different 
societies and the implications of these for systems of governance and democratic 
processes. Maher (M, FG1) tried to counter Salma’s argument and said ‘the whole 
idea of capitalism is giving everyone a chance.’ 
Maher (M, FG1) challenged Salma’s claim that socialist societies are more egalitarian 
and free. 
We have examples of China, where in the Tiananmen Square students were 
protesting and tanks came and rolled over those students. And why? They 
were simply protesting! I think, when you’re saying that freedom only exists in 
Marxist, communist systems… Marxism and communism cannot guarantee 
equal footing… 
Maher challenged Salma’s discourse of Marxism and the benefits of living in a Marxist 
society. It is pertinent to mention that when the Tiananmen Square massacre took 
place in 1989 – a time when the participants of my research would have been only a 
couple of years old. Maher could not have remembered the media reports of the 
incidents but must have either heard or read the accounts later on. Moreover, events 
like the Tiananmen Square massacre were not very directly relevant to the everyday 
lives of the research participants and they would not have come across these in their 
school textbooks (e.g. Khan, 2004; Rabbani, 2009). Maher used the discourse of the 
Tiananmen Square incident to counter Salma’s discourse of the benefits of Marxism. 
Salma, however, did not give up and presented further arguments to augment her 
original position: 
The problem right now is that for example, our proletariat, the working class, 
or the lower class, or the middle class, which forms a very large part of our 
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population, today what happens is that they work for survival. They work for a 
right that should be given to them without having to work for it. 
The above excerpt demonstrates that Salma was not using the Marxist discourse in a 
superficial and simplistic way. She used it in a way that showed her understanding of 
some of the basic tenets of the classical Marxist theory. For example, in the above 
extract she employed the discourse of the exploitation of the workers by the owners 
of the means of production in a capitalist society. Using this discourse, she made a 
profound philosophical argument that people should be able to survive without 
having to work for it. This is one of the key features of the classical Marxist discourse 
critiquing the capitalist societies where workers have to toil and labour arduously to 
earn mere sustenance for themselves and their families (Marx, 1891/1933, 
1865/1965; Althusser, 2008). Salma argued that the ‘the fundamental thing that is 
wrong with this world is that you have to work to survive’. The solution that she 
offered to this problem was ‘a redistribution of wealth’.  
Another participant, Ahmer (M, FG1) took issue with Salma’s position and said:  
Salma, Russia had been an egalitarian society for so long, eventually the 
system collapsed, and…Now we have the gaps widening again. We have the 
gaps in China widening… 
Ahmer argued that Russia and China which were communist countries had begun to 
encounter social and economic problems. Whereas the communist ideology that 
purportedly underpins the social organisation in these countries champions an 
egalitarian society, the reality has not always been so. For example, Fuchs and Demko 
(1979) argue that in the USSR and various Eastern European socialist countries there 
were widespread geographical inequalities.    
Maher (M, FG1) argued that in a socialist society individuals lose their freedom: 
… [in] socialism, … Amin and I are going to be the same individuals. We’re 
going to have the same kind of shoes, the same kind of shirts, the same kind 
of watches, and we are going to be the same kind of individuals. We are not 
going to have any – in proposing that kind of system – we’re not going to have 
any political freedoms at all.  
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Ahmer added ‘that you lose your political freedom when you accept such a system’. 
Salma countered these criticisms by attributing these views to ‘the propaganda that 
America and the western world has launched against socialism for a very long time’.  
This section has shown that participants in one focus group analysed the then 
prevailing socio-economic situation of Pakistan by drawing on the discourses of 
Marxism, egalitarianism, and capitalism. They discussed the socio-economic 
organisation of various countries to analyse the conditions prevailing in Pakistan when 
the focus group was carried out. They used this discussion to appraise the state of 
democracy and political governance in Pakistan. This section demonstrates some of 
the complex sociological discourses that the participants drew while talking about 
their own countries. As discussed in chapter 5, participants in other focus groups also 
discussed issues related to social inequality in Pakistan without explicitly drawing on 
the discourses of Marxism and capitalism. However, since specific questions related to 
these were not asked in any of the focus groups, it cannot be assumed that 
participants in other focus groups would not have used these discourses if specifically 
asked to do so. 
6.5 Discussion 
In this chapter, I have analysed the research participants’ constructions of the wider 
world, beyond Pakistan. While talking about the wider world they made references to 
numerous countries. There were wide variations in the frequency, detail and the 
context in which these references were made. Numerous references were made to 
countries in Asia and the Middle East. Five countries were mentioned very frequently. 
These were India, Britain, the US, Afghanistan and Iraq. I discussed the first three in 
this chapter. References to the other two were almost exclusively in the context of 
post-September 11 conflicts and are analysed in chapters 8 and 9.   
I also discussed the participants’ constructions of various blocs of countries like the EU 
and the Western and the Islamic worlds. At times, they constructed the Islamic 
countries as a unified entity by drawing on the discourse of a supranational religious 
ideology. They often argued that the Western countries, especially the US, were 
pursuing an anti-Muslim agenda. They often did this by drawing on the discourse of 
antagonism between the West and the Islamic world.  
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I analysed the participants’ constructions of some supranational organisations like the 
United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency. In the final section, I 
discussed the use of the discourses of Marxism, socialism and capitalism by the 
participants of one focus group. They used these discourses to analyse the then 
prevailing socio-economic conditions in Pakistan and the implications of these for 
political governance and democratic processes in the country.  
This chapter has shown that the research participants’ constructions of the world 
beyond Pakistan were varied and complex. Whereas religion was a significant factor in 
their articulation of international affairs, they did not use it as the sole perspective to 
frame the wider world and the interaction of nation states within it. Their 
constructions of the world beyond Pakistan were in contrast to those of the children 
who participated in the research study conducted by Durrani and Dunne (2010) in 
state schools in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. These children 
constructed the wider world almost exclusively along the lines of religion. As discussed 
in chapter 5, their national identities were secondary to their religious identities. Islam 
was used by them to divide the world into two binary oppositions – the Muslim and 
infidel camps. In the case of the young people who participated in my research, 
religion comprised one significant dimension that they used to talk about the world. 
They drew on a range of other political, sociological geographical and economic 
discourses to construct the wider world.   
This chapter along with chapter 5 forms the backdrop for the discussion in subsequent 
chapters which focus on international conflicts.  
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7 Pakistan-India Conflicts 
The main focus of my research was on the young people’s constructions of 
international conflicts. The conflict that they talked about the most included the 
September 11 attacks and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq by the US and its allies 
as part of the ‘war on terror’. Analysis of this is the main focus of the next chapter. 
Another conflict that they talked about, albeit not in as much detail as the September 
11 attacks and the subsequent ‘war on terror’, was that between Pakistan and India, 
which is analysed in this chapter.  In five out of six focus groups, the participants 
referred to the longstanding conflict between their own country and its eastern 
neighbour – India. Many of them also saw India as a traditional adversary and they 
made frequent references to the longstanding conflict and disputes with it. The data 
related to Pakistan-India conflicts, which is analysed here, did not come out of any 
specific questions focused on the issue. In most cases, the participants talked about 
this conflict to illustrate points they had been trying to make in response to questions 
about international conflicts in general. While doing so, they drew on many of the 
discourses discussed in chapter 3. I begin by presenting a brief historical backdrop for 
and a timeline of some of the salient events in the relationship between the two 
countries. Next, I analyse the participants’ constructions of the causes of Pakistan-India 
conflicts. This is followed by a discussion of their arguments about how these conflicts 
have been played out – warfare, terrorism and destabilization.  
7.1 Salient Events in Pakistan-India Relations 
In this section, I provide brief background information about the hostile relationship 
between Pakistan and India since their independence from British colonial rule in 
1947. This will help in contextualizing and understanding the data, especially for those 
readers who might not be very familiar with the complex international dynamics 
between the two countries. Pakistan and India are located in South Asia and share a 
long border with one another. The socio-political circumstances that led to the 
creation of these two independent, sovereign countries are outlined in chapter 5.  
The bitter resentment of Hindu nationalists against the division of India based on the 
‘two nation ideology’ set the scene for the subsequent relationship between the two 
nascent countries. The Indian nationalists saw Pakistan as an irreparable loss to their 
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homeland’s geographical and ideological integrity whereas the Pakistanis articulated 
their national identity by distancing and distinguishing themselves from India. The 
discourse of there being a distinct Muslim identity, predicated on a fundamental 
ideological difference from the Hindus, is common in Pakistan Studies textbooks. For 
example: 
The Indian Muslims had a distinctive national identity of their own which they 
wanted to preserve and promote at all cost. All the Muslim leaders from 
Mujadid Alf Sani to Quaid-e-Azam struggled hard for the protection and 
safeguard [sic] the national identity of Muslims and the demand for Pakistan 
was, in fact, made in 1940 for the protection and safeguard of the national 
character of the Muslims of India.  
(Rabbani, 2009:66) 
This ideological conflict between the two countries was further aggravated by a 
dispute over the princely state of Kashmir which started soon after the creation of the 
two countries and remains a highly contentious issue well into the 21st century, when 
this thesis was written. The timeline in box 7.1 highlights some key moments in the 
tumultuous relationship between the two countries which share a long geographical 
border, cultural traditions and natural resources like rivers. 
Box 7.1 – A timeline of salient events in the turbulent relationship between Pakistan 
and India 
1940: Jinnah appropriated the two nation theory into the manifesto of the All India Muslim 
League.  
1947: The parliament of the United Kingdom passed the Indian Independence Act, 
announcing the partition of India into two sovereign states – Pakistan and India. 
1947: The first Pakistan-India war over the disputed state of Kashmir, ending with the 
creation of ceasefire line, dividing Kashmir into two, one controlled by Pakistan and the other 
by India.  
1948: UN Security Council recommended plebiscite in Kashmir through resolution 47. 
1965: The second Pakistan-India war, started along the South-Western border, later shifting 
to the ceasefire line between the Pakistan and Indian held Kashmir. 
1971: The third Pakistan-India war. India supported to separatist insurgents in East Pakistan, 
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leading to the creation of Bangladesh in December 1971. 
1972: Pakistan and India signed Simla Agreement, agreeing to resolve longstanding disputes 
through negotiations. Ceasefire line renamed as the line of control (LOC)  
1974: India detonated its first nuclear device. 
1989: Formal movement for independence began in Indian held Kashmir. Pakistan extended 
political, diplomatic, and moral support to the movement. New Delhi argued that the armed 
insurgents had military and logistic support from Islamabad. 
1998: India conducted underground nuclear tests. Pakistan responded with similar tests.  
1999: Indian air-strikes against Pakistani forces along the LOC, followed by Pakistan counter-
offensive. This ultimately led to General Musharraf’s coup d’etat removing Prime Minister 
Nawaz Sharif’s government.  
2001: Indian Parliament attacked. New Delhi blamed Pakistan-based militants.      
2008: Attacks and sieges in Mumbai. New Delhi blamed Pakistan-based militant 
organizations. Bilateral peace talks suspended. 
(summarized from BBC News, 2011) 
Having provided a brief time line of key events in the tumultuous relations of Pakistan 
and India, I now discuss in the participants’ constructions of the conflict between India 
and Pakistan. 
7.2 Pakistan and India – Causes of Conflict  
In this section, I analyse the participants’ constructions of the causes of conflict 
between Pakistan and India. They saw Pakistan and India as inevitable adversaries. 
Babur (M, FG5) said: 
You know, we have security issues – we are surrounded by adversaries on all 
sides of the border, except for China and Iran. Afghanistan is a security 
problem for us; India has been since our independence. 
As indicated above, the modern Pakistani and Indian states are predicated on a 
discourse of mutual hostility that positions them as each other’s traditional, 
permanent adversary. Adil (M, FG4) said: ‘…you see, we tend to forget that India has 
been our number one enemy, and it will be our number one enemy despite whatever 
we think it is.’ Adil said this during a discussion about the deteriorating law and order 
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situation in Pakistan at the time when this research was carried out. As can be seen 
from the timeline of Pakistan-India relations, the two nations have not only fought 
three major wars but they have also tried to covertly destablise each other internally. 
This is a conflict that started with the creation of the two countries in 1947 and 
continued well into the 21st century. Thus, India is etched as an unrelenting foe on the 
Pakistani consciousness.  
Malihah (F, FG3) said ‘…for example, Pakistan and India – there is no use of war – 
Pakistan and India are in a constant conflict since 1947’. As illustrated in an extract 
quoted in chapter 5, the participants referred back to the pre-partition period and the 
British thinking about the accession of the princely state of Kashmir. In response to a 
question from me about two parties not being able to see each other’s point of view, 
Fahad (M, FG2) said ‘India and Pakistan are classic examples.’  
The participants referred to various causes of conflict between Pakistan and India. One 
of the causes of conflicts mentioned by the participants related to the way in which 
India was partitioned. At the time of the partition, there were 580 princely states in 
India (Global Perspectives, 2014). The last Viceroy of India, Lord Mountbatten left the 
decision regarding the accession of these states to the discretion of their respective 
rulers at that time. Whereas many of these states acceded either with India or Pakistan 
in a straightforward manner, the process turned out to be extremely complicated and 
fraught with difficulties for the princely state of Kashmir. Saba (F, FG3) identified the 
princely states of Kashmir and Hyderabad as a cause of conflict and argued that 
Pakistan was justified in fighting India because the latter had taken something that was 
rightfully Pakistan’s: 
Like we fight for Kashmir – why – because it was our right. Like when the 
boundaries were drawn, you know, at partition, it was our right. We never, 
but, still India, like many…Hyderabad – the princely states – if that was taken 
that was wrong. Like that is not wrong when it’s our right and we have to fight 
– then we have to fight. 
Saba argued that the use of violence was justified when another country usurped the 
right of one’s own country. She legitimized Pakistan’s acts of aggression towards India 
by drawing on the discourse of punishing the wrongdoer and taking back what was 
rightfully one’s own, discussed in chapter 3.  
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At the time of the partition, Lord Mountbatten took the position ‘that the ruler of each 
princely state should decide whether to merge his state with India or Pakistan, taking 
into account the geography of the state and the wishes of the population’ (Global 
Perspectives, 2014). The criteria for the accession of these states was left vague and on 
the discretion of the respective rulers by the British establishment at the time of the 
partition of India (Global Perspectives, 2014). However, Pakistan Studies textbooks 
often contain discourses that present the issue of accession of princely states in black 
and white terms: 
In the partition plan, it was unanimously decided regarding independent 
states like Kashmir, Hyderabad, Junagadh, that the future of these states 
would be determined by the peoples of these states by plebiscite. But 
contrary to all rules of ethics, India backed out of the plan, and forcibly 
occupied a considerable portion of Kashmir, which is still run by Indian 
Government. 
(Rabbani, 2009: 204-5) 
Thus, when Saba claimed that Kashmir ‘was our right’ she was drawing on the 
discourse of India usurping Kashmir, as presented in the Pakistan Studies textbooks 
that the young people who participated in my research would have studied. 
Maher (M, FG1) identified another cause of conflict between Pakistan and India. He 
referred to the dispute over water resources. He said ‘even Pakistan has the right to 
attack India on the premise that it is building Baglihar Dam’. India started building the 
Baglihar dam in 1999, on the river Chenab that flows through the Pakistani and Indian 
sides of the Punjab. Pakistan maintained that through building this dam India had 
violated the Indus Water Treaty (World Bank, 1960).  In the above-quoted excerpt, 
Maher (M, FG1) was speaking rhetorically. In fact, as he continued to speak, he 
rejected the building of the Baglihar dam as a just cause of war for Pakistan.  He 
argued that a nation’s self-interest did not constitute a just cause of war because the 
contemporary world had a ‘system of international law’.  Thus, Maher challenged the 
discourse of national self-interest as a just cause of war by drawing on the discourse of 
international legal order discussed in chapter 3.  
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Adil (M, FG4) identified another cause of conflict between Pakistan and India – the 
latter’s actions resulting in the decline of Pakistan’s economy because of the loss of 
East Pakistan. He said: 
As a Pakistani I would like to say that we tend to forget the fact that Pakistan 
was a very booming economy during the 1970s and after that we couldn’t 
recover from the loss of Bangladesh. 
Adil (M, FG4) argued that Pakistan had been doing quite economically till the country 
lost its eastern half in 1971. He posited that Pakistan could not recover from this loss. 
Commenting on the loss of East Pakistan Yadav and Barwa (2011) write: 
With the loss of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh, Pakistan 
suffered not only a significant decisive military defeat but also lost an 
important economic base, given the importance of fiscal contributions by East 
Pakistan which was disproportionately used to benefit investment in West 
Pakistan and to fund military expenditures. 
The loss of East Pakistan was, indeed, a very serious economic, political, strategic and 
military blow to Pakistan which exacerbated the feeling that ‘India dwarfs Pakistan in 
population, economic strength and military might’ (Stern, 2000: 115). Thus, the 
secession of East Pakistan has been etched as a painful reminder of Indian hostility 
against Pakistan. Many Pakistan Studies textbooks (e.g. Khan, 2004; Rabbani, 2009) 
contain the discourse of Indian hostility in the context of the loss of East Pakistan: 
In August 1971, India…became fully equipped for dismembering Pakistan. In 
November 1971, Indian troops started crossing the international boundary 
and entering East Pakistan. ‘Mukhti Bahini’, the terrorist wing of the Awami 
League, started attacking Pakistan Army’s positions with the help of Indian 
army.  
(Khan, 2004: 60)   
In the third focus group, the participants identified another cause of Pakistan-India 
conflict – the repeated failure of peace talks:  
Naveed: Then what you are saying is that there are some wars that are 
justified? 
Malihah (F): There are some justified wars. 
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Saba (F): …like peace-talks and peace-talks – we’ve done a lot of peace-talks 
with India. Fine? About Kashmir, I think, after every two months a convention 
is held on Kashmir…people [Hafsa: They’re suffering.], you know, nothing is 
happening. So, what can…and then a war is going to take place – that’s it! 
As can be seen from the above excerpt, the participants were discussing situations in 
which war could be a justified course of action. Saba presented the Kashmir issue as a 
case in point where resort to war might have been justified because nothing came out 
of the ‘peace talks’. She argued that in the case of Kashmir war was the only option 
because other options had repeatedly failed. In arguing so she was drawing on the on 
one of the discourses of just causes of war – the discourse of war as the last resort, 
which was discussed in chapter 3. It would have been interesting to follow up with 
Malihah and ask her to explain why she said that some wars were justified because in 
an extract quoted earlier, she said that wars between Pakistan and India were quite 
pointless, whereas, here she claimed that there were some wars that were ‘justified’. 
It would have been interesting to ask her which wars she considered ‘justified’. I 
decided not do this, as it would have curtailed the spontaneous flow of the discussion, 
which, as discussed in chapter 4, is an important feature of focus groups.  
This section has demonstrated the participants’ constructions of the causes of 
Pakistan-India conflicts as relating to the original partition of India, to economic issues, 
and the repeated failure of peace talks. While talking about the causes of conflicts 
between Pakistan and India, the discourses of causes of conflict that they drew upon 
included punishing the wrongdoer, taking back what is rightfully one’s own, the 
international legal order, and war as the last resort. 
7.3 The Conduct of Pakistan-India Conflicts  
In this section, I discuss participants’ constructions of the conduct of Pakistan-India 
conflicts. They talked about three different ways of conducting international conflicts – 
conventional wars, terrorism and destabilization of the adversary state. I discuss each 
of these in turn. 
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 Pakistan India Conflicts as Conventional Wars 7.3.1
In this section, I analyse the participants’ constructions of the Pakistan-India conflicts 
as conventional wars. In focus group two a discussion about ethics of warfare was 
taking place and one participant, Fareeha (F, FG2) said: 
…if you take the war of for example 1965 – Pakistan-India War that would be 
classified as a war, because it happened on the border. There, no direct 
civilians were affected in it. It was between the armies.      
Fareeha argued that the 1965 India-Pakistan conflict was a war that was fought along 
the border and neither of the two armies targeted civilian populations. She was 
drawing on one of the discourses of ethical conduct in war or jus in bello – the 
discourse of preventing harm to non-combatants – discussed in chapter 3. She 
maintained that the 1965 Pakistan-India conflict was a war because the civilian 
population were not harmed.  
In the same focus group as above, the following discussion took place:  
Saima: (F): The ethics come in when the civilians, and when the people who 
are not directly involved they are attacked.  
… 
Fahad (M): When Pakistan and India were having a war, they were using –  
tanks, grenades and everything. There are some villages, you know, on the 
border, they were affected. And, I guess, both the armies just could not help 
it. 
Harris (M): One thing – why they couldn’t help it? Why didn’t India and 
Pakistan come to some agreement that this shouldn’t happen? [Fareeha: 
Exactly!] 
Saima (F): To some extent it is understandable, but don’t go to a major level, 
you know, don’t let destruction happen to innocent people. 
(FG2) 
Fahad argued that during Indo-Pakistan conflict some villages along the border were 
affected. But this, according to him, was beyond the control of the two warring armies; 
the damage that occurred in the civilian areas was unintentional and unavoidable. 
Fahad was drawing on the discourse of collateral damage, discussed in chapter 3. 
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However, Harris and subsequently Fareeha challenged what he said and argued that 
civilians should not have been affected. In doing so, both of them were drawing on the 
discourse of preventing harm to non-combatants. In the above excerpt, Saima said 
that some harm to civilian noncombatants was understandable but this should not be 
on a large scale. Here, like Fahad, she was drawing on the discourse of collateral 
damage.    
In focus group 2, the participants also drew on an example from medieval Indian 
history to talk about harm to non-combatants and civilian property. They cited the 
example of Mahmud Ghaznavi who was the ruler of the state of Ghzani – a region in 
modern Afghanistan – during the 11th century.  Ghaznavi, who was a Muslim, invaded 
India on seventeen occasions, each time returning with the valuables that he and his 
army seized (Story of Pakistan, 2003). The following discussion took place: 
 Fahad (M): …the people who think that Mahmud Ghaznavi was, you know, an 
Islamic warrior [Fareeha: …that was wrong] that was wrong. He was just a 
Fareeha (F): That was wrong. He was plundering!] – He was just a 
plunderer…He made sixteen raids to India. He used to come, he used to take 
people to go, to back to Afghanistan with him, along with their belongings. 
They used to slaughter the people – the men – and used to keep their 
womenfolk. 
… 
Mansoor (M): You aren’t supposed to just kill, take their belongings –  
Fareeha (F): Exactly, pick up all the gold from the Somnaat Temple [a Hindu 
Temple in India that Mahmud Ghaznavi attacked, during his invasion of India]. 
The only reason he, like, attacked the Somnaat Temple was – fine, it might be 
at the background, like, yes, spread Islam, destroy the temple. But it was full 
of gold. 
Fahad (M): Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) never did that. Hazrat Omar [the 
second caliph of Islam after the Prophet] when he used to conquer, he used to 
pray in the church. 
Fareeha (F): How can you actually justify that – burning the temple? Hazrat 
Omar even got churches built, for the common public, in those areas. You 
can’t justify a person going and destroying holy places!  
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… 
Fahad (F): Yeah, exactly. If you had invaded the subcontinent, alright fine, 
then you should have sent a regional representative, you shouldn’t have 
plundered the subcontinent so many times. [Fareeha (F): Exactly!] 
Wafa (F): They go and kill innocent people, and –  
Fahad (M): Mass destruction – 
Wafa (F): Yeah. 
… 
Fahad (M): Wars are between armies, mostly, and that’s what we are trying to 
establish that, you know, there should be some ethics to war, and the civilians 
– the populated areas should not be affected. 
(FG2) 
Fahad, in the above quoted extract, was criticizing the actions of Mahmud Ghaznavi. 
He argued that Ghaznavi repeatedly invaded India and plundered its wealth, killed 
people and took away the women. Fahad (M, FG2) said this in the context of discussion 
of ethical warfare or jus in bello, especially the principle of preventing harm to enemy 
non-combatants. Killing people who had not committed any act of aggression and 
taking hostage the women constituted unethical violence for Fahad. For him, material 
gain and aggrandizement did not constitute a just cause of war – it was simply a case 
of plundering other people. 
In the above extract, the participants identified ‘plundering’ as unethical and 
contrasted this with the example set by Prophet Mohammad and Caliph Omar who, 
they said, had never done what Ghaznavi did, and respected the civilian population, 
including their places of worship. 
This section has demonstrated the constructions of the participants of one focus group 
of some of the Pakistan-India conflicts as constituting conventional wars because these 
were fought between armies and civilian non-combatants were usually not harmed. 
The participants also brought up an example from the medieval history of the Indian 
sub-continent to illustrate their position on the principle of preventing harm to non-
combatants. While doing so they cited the example of Prophet Mohammad and Caliph 
Omar who respected the civilian population, including their places of worship.  
187 
 
 The Genesis of Terrorism 7.3.2
In this section, I analyse the participants’ constructions of another form of the 
Pakistan-India conflicts – terrorism.   I do this by discussing the participants’ accounts 
of how the Pakistan-India conflicts over Kashmir evolved into unconventional warfare, 
including the use of terrorist violence. One participant, Saba (F, FG3) said: 
Like Kashmir issue has been there since, I think, Pakistan came into existence. 
So what’s the end – we have like thousands of talks. After every two-three 
months, like, no, in the news, every day, there is, I don’t know, like many 
Muslims in Kashmir are killed – and after two or three months there are talks, 
with, umm, no end and conclusion. So, the last thing is guerilla war. 
Saba, in the above extract, referred to the long history of the Kashmir dispute. She 
highlighted the futility of the peace-talks between the two countries. In an excerpt 
quoted in section 7.2, she maintained that Kashmir should have been rightfully a part 
of Pakistan. She argued that due to the repeated failure of the peace-talks and 
Pakistan’s rightful claim on Kashmir, there was no other option but to resort to guerilla 
war.  
Some other participants in this focus group also alluded to the failure of the peace 
negotiations between India and Pakistan. They cited the repeated failure of the peace-
talks and the continued agony and suffering of the Kashmiri Muslims as the main 
factor that led the Kashmiri freedom fighters to adopt unconventional strategies like 
guerilla warfare. During the course of a discussion about the repeated failure of peace 
talks between Pakistan and India regarding Kashmir, Annum (F, FG3) said: ‘Because 
they’re fed up of all these peace-talks and this and that. And, so, now they have to do 
suicide bombings.’  
The discourse of evolution of conventional war into terrorist tactics used by some of 
the participants is noteworthy because some writers and commentators have also 
analysed this metamorphosis (e.g. Gregory & Fair, 2008; Stern, 2000). For example, 
Stern (2000) argues that Pakistan on realizing its relative lack of economic and military 
strength compared to its archenemy, after the secession of its eastern half, 
increasingly started turning a blind eye to, if not actively supporting, guerrilla warfare 
and militant activity in the Indian held Kashmir. Similarly, Bhatt (2003) argues that 
much of the militant insurgency in the Indian held Kashmir is a direct and inevitable 
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result of years of brutal and inhumane oppression perpetrated by the Indian 
government through its large contingent of troops in the Kashmir valley. According to 
Bhatt (2003: 219) at the turn of the century the Indian government had ‘deployed over 
600,000 soldiers in the valley’. This made Kashmir, with a total population of 13 
million, the place with the highest troops to civilian population ratio anywhere in the 
world.   
When some of the participants explained the metamorphosis of the Kashmir conflict 
into guerilla warfare and other unconventional strategies in terms of the repeated 
failure of peace-talks and continued suffering of the Kashmiri people, I asked them if 
terrorist tactics were then justified in the context of Kashmir: 
Naveed: So, then any terrorism that goes on in Kashmir then you feel that 
is justified? 
Hafsa (F): No. 
Saba (F): No, that’s not justified.  
Naveed: But aren’t they doing it for a cause? 
Various: They are –  
Saba (F): That’s the wrong way. If you have no answer then you fight with 
your country, so that, you know, like…The mujahideen (freedom fighters) 
they fight – they should come to Pakistan Army and then, you know, they 
have, like, terrorist people if they are very interested in suicide bombings 
then they should join the Pakistan Army and then serve their country. And, 
then, they – if there is a war or something, then they can, you know— 
(Focus Group 3) 
Even though the participants in focus group 3 said that there was no tangible outcome 
either of the continual peace talks or of the conventional wars the two countries had 
fought over Kashmir, they were quite unequivocal about denouncing the use of 
terrorist violence in Kashmir. They said that the use of terrorism by the Kashmiri 
people could not be justified to achieve their aims.  Saba (F, FG3) argued that the 
insurgents were adopting the wrong way for achieving their objectives. She was of the 
view that if they felt so strongly about the issue then they should have joined the 
Pakistan army and fought the Indian occupation forces. In making this argument, she 
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was drawing on the discourse that legitimate wars are the ones that are fought 
between armies of sovereign states, which, in turn, is part of the wider discourse of 
national sovereignty and legitimate authority that emerged in the Modern Episteme as 
a result of the Treaty of Westphalia (see chapter 3). Notwithstanding the fact that they 
identified credible reasons underlying the adoption of terrorist tactics by the Kashmiri 
freedom fighters, participants in the group argued that the use of such strategies was 
unacceptable. While denouncing the use of terrorist violence they were drawing on 
the various discourses of jus in bello that emerged in Medieval Christian and Modern 
Epistemes discussed in chapters 3. Barring the discourse of supreme emergency, all 
other discourses of ethical warfare construct the use of terrorist tactics as ethically 
unacceptable. I specifically asked this group about the use of suicide bombing by the 
Kashmiri insurgents: 
Naveed: All right you’ve mentioned suicide bombings. So, do you think the 
use of suicide is a reasonable tactic to achieve your goals? 
All: No…  
Naveed: No it isn’t? 
Iman (F): Not at all. 
Naveed: Not at all? All of you feel that? 
All: Yes! 
(FG3) 
Whereas the participants in this focus group said they sympathized with the plight of 
Kashmiri people and understood their reasons for extreme desperation, they did not 
agree that this justified the adoption of terrorist tactics. The participants 
problematized the Kashmir issue and argued that notwithstanding being victims of 
extreme forms of torture, the use of terrorism was unacceptable.  
Bhatt (2003) argues that in the context of the Kashmir dispute and the related 
violence, the Kashmiri insurgency and Pakistan’s covert support for it cannot be seen 
merely through the simplistic lens of terrorism and Jihadi violence. He argues: 
‘Kashmiri youth, finding no recourse for their political disaffection, have readily turned 
to Islamic militancy as a moral and political refuge’ (Bhatt 2003: 221). He argues that 
demonizing the response of the Kashmiri people to their disenfranchisement and the 
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aggression of the Indian army is to overlook the complexity and the multilayered 
nature of the situation in the valley.  
Participants in focus group three made no attempt to describe India as the evil, 
aggressive ‘Other’. What they did, however, was identify the factors that led to the 
metamorphosis of the Kashmir conflict into an unconventional warfare. 
Notwithstanding the reasons, drawing on the discourses of jus in bello, they 
unanimously and unequivocally denounced terrorism. I then asked them what led 
people to use tactics like suicide bombings: 
Naveed: So, what do you think are reasons that drive people to use such 
extremely violent ways and tactics? 
Annum (F): Like, for example in Kashmir, if there are no – if there is no, 
umm, like final opinion of the politicians –  that they are not reaching to 
the point. Now, so, the people living there are just fed up of this because 
their children, their mothers and their sisters, they all are insulted.  So, 
they – the army of India, they are just treating them as animals of some 
kind. So, they have to – I think, they are suicidal just to self or self-defence 
– 
Iman (F): I think, it’s the emotions – you use your emotions and you have 
to be rational – when you use your emotions then you go for suicide 
bombings.  
Malihah (F): Because you see the terrorists they aren’t the, you know, 
solution…  
(FG3) 
It was clear that the participants said that they understood the reasons why some 
Kashmiri people resorted to terrorism as a strategy for self-defence and revenge but 
they argued that that was unacceptable because it was an emotional rather than a 
rational response and it did not result in a solution to the problems.   
Thus, the participants talked about terrorism in relation to the conflict in Kashmir. 
While they identified some of the factors that resulted in people turning to terrorism, 
they rejected it as unethical. 
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 The Destabilization of Pakistan  7.3.3
In this section, I analyse some participants’ arguments about India playing out its 
conflict with Pakistan by trying to destablise it. In addition to conventional wars and 
terrorisms, some of the participants identified a third way in which conflicts are played 
out – destabilization. In focus groups five and six, participants mentioned India, while 
discussing the then recent deterioration of law and order situation and the sharp rise 
in terrorist activities and the resultant destabilization witnessed in Pakistan. For 
example, Tabish (M, FG 5) alluded to India as one of the possible backstage players 
responsible for orchestrating the violence in Pakistan as an act of retaliation: 
Tabish (M, FG 5): Yeah, that’s what I mean. You can see it as a retaliation of 
India – they might blame the Delhi bomb blasts at Pakistan – the ISI [Inter-
Services Intelligence – Pakistan Army’s intelligence wing] did it and the RAW 
did that, let’s do the same to Pakistan 
Here Tabish was arguing that the violence in Pakistan could be seen as a retaliation of 
the Indian Intelligence Service (RAW). Pakistan and India have a history of secretly 
trying to destabilize each other (Stern, 2000). There are clear parallels between the 
Indian tactics in East Pakistan in the 1960s and the Pakistani strategy in the Indian-held 
Kashmir since the large-scale independence movement that started there in the late 
1980s. India has blamed a number of terrorist activities on its soil on militants 
sponsored by Pakistan. In response, Pakistan has pointed the finger at India for many 
of the incidents of violence within its own borders. These accusations are frequently 
reported in the electronic and print media of the two countries. Thus, when Tabish 
alluded to India as one of the forces behind the unrest Pakistan, he was drawing on a 
common discourse in Pakistan about India trying to destabilize Pakistan by supporting 
militant insurgency in the country. Aan (F, FG 6) also mentioned that ‘India is waging a 
war – they say that they are going to…retaliate for what they’ve done in Mumbai’.  
Similarly, Natasha (F, FG6) mentioned that India was trying to destabilize Pakistan and 
‘break us apart’.  
 A more complex example was given by Aamer (M, FG5):  
Actually, we should seal the Afghanistan border and tell them that no one will 
cross the border…they [the militants operating in Pakistan] are provided that 
ammunition by the Afghanistan government. [Babur: That US$1billion per 
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year was funded to Pakistan through ISI – it was transported to Afghanistan.] 
And once they seized arms from the Taliban people and what they found was 
that it was made in India. And, you know, we also should realize the fact that 
India is working against our interest and helping people it keeps against us. 
Aamer said this in the context of increasing terrorist violence within Pakistan. 
He alluded to Indian support of the militants entering Pakistan from the border 
with Afghanistan. I know from my personal experience that the discourse of 
India trying to destabilize Pakistan through various militant organisations, 
including the Taliban, was quite common when the fieldwork for this study was 
carried out. Mazari (2009e), a Pakistani academic and writer, criticized the 
Pakistan government over: 
…the questionable manner in which our official institutions declare that there 
are Indians/US links to militant outfits in Pakistan, but then fail to give details 
or to take up these issues with the countries concerned. What is the Pakistani 
state playing at or fearful of? Is it not time the nation was told about the 
sources of funding and weapons for the militants in specific terms to give 
credibility to these allegations? Or will all the "militants" be "killed" before we 
can learn crucial facts about US double dealing and Indian destabilisation of 
Pakistan. That is why arrest and trial of the militant leadership in anti-terror 
courts, rather than their killing, is essential for our nation and state's long 
term security. 
 The idea of India playing out conflict through destabilization can be understood in the 
context of the discourse of relational control. According to Yadav and Barwa (2011), 
relational control is a strategy adopted by a country to maximize its strategic national 
advantage in a region without directly control and coercion. In many cases, relational 
control takes the form of development aid, cultural, trade diplomatic initiatives. Yadav 
and Barwa (2011: 94) state: 
The particular objective(s) of relational control may vary but is likely to involve 
an effort to increase or consolidate the principal’s power in relation to the 
subjects concerned over the long term. 
Yadav and Barwa (2011) argue that India and Afghanistan enjoyed close and cordial 
relations, during the decades following Indian independence. Some of the reasons for 
a close strategic partnership between the two included their shared experience of 
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border disputes with Pakistan and their common tilt towards the Soviet Union. The 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 changed the geopolitical dynamics and placed 
Pakistan in a remarkably advantageous position because of the US backing for 
Pakistan’s then military government, which supported Islamic militants in Afghanistan 
in their fight against the Soviet occupation. This made Pakistan the dominant ‘player’ 
in Afghanistan. Soon after the fall of the Taliban government, the Indian government 
enhanced its aid, trade, cultural and diplomatic activities in Afghanistan to reduce its 
reliance on Pakistan because: 
An autonomous Afghanistan is India’s best route to maximizing its relational 
control over Pakistan. The denial of Pakistani hegemony and domination in 
Afghanistan directly corresponds with stability and security in India. India 
realizes that if Pakistan were once again able to make Afghanistan into a client 
regime, it would be able to focus its military on the border with India. 
(Yadav and Barwa, 2011: 117) 
Adil (M, FG4) alluded to the possible Indian involvement in the then current, 
unprecedented spate of violence in Pakistan. He said: 
…the number of Indian consulates along the Pakistan-Afghan border is beyond 
belief. There are like six/seven Indian consulates right next to our border to 
Afghanistan.  What I am going to say is that someone could be using Taliban 
here – could be using Taliban to destabilize Pakistan. It could be India, it could 
be somebody else. 
Adil said in the context of a discussion about the deteriorating law and order situation 
and the unprecedented rise in terrorist activity in Pakistan. Adil’s comments about the 
enhanced Indian diplomatic activity along the Pakistan-Afghan border relate to India’s 
foreign policy towards Afghanistan in the post-Taliban  years, whereby it tried to 
curtail Pakistan’s ‘strategic depth in Afghanistan’ and increase its ‘relational control’ 
over Afghanistan and Pakistan (Yadav and Barwa, 2011: 105). Whereas, much of the 
violence in Pakistan at the time of this focus group was commonly attributed to the 
Taliban, Adil claimed that someone else could possibly have been using the Taliban to 
destabilize Pakistan. Notwithstanding the fact he was careful and remained tentative 
in his claim, he did mention India as one of the possible forces using the Taliban to 
destabilize Pakistan.   
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This section has shown that the participants argued that India was using the post-
September 11 geopolitical situation in the region to destabilize and undermine the 
Pakistani state. I used the discourse of relational control, put forward by Yadav and 
Barwa (2011), drawing on Chadda, about Indian foreign policy in the region, to analyse 
the participants’ arguments regarding India playing out its conflicts with Pakistan 
through destablisation. 
7.4 Discussion 
In this chapter, I have analysed the research participants’ constructions of the 
Pakistan-India conflicts that have defined the relationship of the two countries ever 
since they gained independence as two sovereign nation states in 1947. 
The participants argued that Pakistan and India were traditional adversaries who were 
engaged in conflicts ever since they gained independence. They used the discourse of 
perpetual, mutual hostility between the two countries. They identified four main 
causes of conflict between the two countries – the geopolitical circumstances in which 
the two countries came into existence, disputes over water resources, Indian acts of 
hostility and aggression towards Pakistan, and the repeated failure of peace talks. They 
talked about the causes of conflicts between the two countries by drawing on various 
discourses of jus ad bellum which included punishing the wrongdoer and taking back 
what rightfully one’s own and war as the last resort. They also drew on the discourse 
of India’s usurpation of Kashmir that is often found in Pakistan Studies textbooks (e.g. 
Khan, 2004; Rabbani, 2009). One participant challenged the discourse of national self-
interest by drawing on the discourse of international legal order. While talking about 
the causes of conflicts between the two countries, some participants drew on the 
discourse of Indian hostility and aggression against Pakistan, especially in the context 
of secession of East Pakistan.  
The participants identified three different ways in which the Pakistan-India conflict was 
played out – conventional wars, terrorism and destabilizing the adversary. They used 
the example of these conflicts to illustrate the difference between conventional, 
ethical wars and terrorism.  They did this by drawing on various discourses of ethical 
warfare or jus in bello, which included the discourses of preventing harm to civilian 
non-combatants, collateral damage, and international humanitarian law.  
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They argued that Kashmir was the main source of conflict between Pakistan and India. 
They talked about the Kashmir conflict by drawing on the discourse of evolution of 
conventional warfare into terrorist tactics. They explained this metamorphosis by 
drawing on the discourses of helplessness of the Kashmiri people and self-defence. 
They rejected the use of terrorist violence by the Kashmiri freedom fighters by drawing 
on the discourse of ethical wars being ones that are fought between national armies 
rather than militant groups, coming out of the wider discourse of national sovereignty 
discussed in chapter 3.  
Finally, some participants suggested that India was involved in the destabilizing 
Pakistan in the Post-Cold War Episteme. They drew on the discourse of India playing an 
adversarial role through diplomatic and political activities in Afghanistan in the Post-
September 11 period, which related closely to the academic discourse of relational 
control. They also drew on the discourse of India trying to destablize Pakistan by 
supporting various militant organisations in Afghanistan and Pakistan.        
There are some important similarities and differences between what the participants 
of my research cited as the just causes of war against India and what the participants 
in Durrani and Dunne’s (2010) research said. Durrani and Dunne (2010) carried out 
research about schooling and conflict with children attending state schools in the 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. Like the participants of their study, my 
research participants identified India as the main adversary of Pakistan. However, the 
participants in Durrani and Dunne’s (2010: 228) study constructed Indians as 
presenting ‘an impending external threat to the integrity of Pakistan from the non-
Muslim ‘other’’. Their constructions of India and Pakistan were often in terms of binary 
opposites – non-Muslim others and Muslim citizens of an Islamic state. The discourse 
of religion played an important role in these children’s constructions of just causes for 
the resort to violence. However, the participants in my research did not construct 
Indians as the non-Muslim ‘other’. Their references to just causes of resort to use of 
violence against India were more circumscribed in terms of specific points of 
contention like its usurpation of Kashmir and the failure of peace talks between the 
two countries.  
There also was a notable difference between the positions adopted by the participants 
of my research and those who participated in Durrani and Dunne’s (2010) study about 
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militant activity. Durrani and Dunne (2010) did not include any specific analysis of their 
participants’ constructions of conventional warfare and terrorism. However, they 
mentioned that during one focus group session, a female participant strongly 
denounced the actions of the Pakistani state against the Taliban militants operating on 
its soil. She did this because she constructed the Taliban militants as the purported 
upholders of Islamic ideology. On the other hand, as demonstrated in section 7.3.2, 
whereas the young people who participated in my research said that they appreciated 
the reasons for Kashmiris’ resort to terrorist tactics, they were unanimous in rejecting 
such strategies as unacceptable.  
The children who participated in Durrani and Dunne’s (2010) study were mostly from 
working class families in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan and attended 
state schools, which use only textbooks from the official textbook boards that often 
present religion as ‘the chief marker that forms the boundary between Pakistanis and 
‘others’’ (Durrani and Dunne, 2010: 224). On the other hand, the young people who 
participated in my research were from middle class families and attended private 
schools. Private schools in Pakistan do not solely use official textbooks; they use books 
written by independent authors as well, who are not as constrained by government’s 
guidelines as their peers, writing for the official textbook boards. Moreover, since the 
participants of my research were from middle class backgrounds, they drew on a wider 
range of discourses about national and international issues as they had access to 
media like the internet and cable television.         
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8 Constructions of the September 11 Attacks 
In this chapter, I analyse the participants’ constructions of the September 11, 2001 
attacks on the US – who carried them out and why, and the ethics of the conduct of 
this conflict. In the chapter that follows, I will discuss the participants’ constructions of 
the US response to these and the ‘war on terror’. 
These attacks were discussed in all six focus groups. The participants put forward 
various explanations of who carried out the attacks. These explanations fall into two 
broad categories – those in line with the US government’s version of events and those 
based on various conspiracy theories.  
Their arguments about the reasons behind these attacks also depended on their 
explanations of who carried out the attacks. The participants who articulated an 
explanation similar to the US government’s account said that the people who carried 
out the attacks had some grievances against the US, which they hoped to avenge 
through these violent acts. On the other hand, the participants who presented a 
conspiracy theory and argued that the US itself had engineered these attacks 
suggested various reasons for doing so, which included US imperial ambitions, which 
motivated them to take over the Middle East because of its oil reserves, and to 
discredit Islam. 
In box 8.1, I present a time of salient events related to the 1979 Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan and the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US.   
Box 8.1 – A timeline of salient events related to the 1979 Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, September 11, 2001 attacks. 
1979: Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan 
1985: Afghan ‘Mujahedeen’ formed alliance in Pakistan against Soviet occupation. 
1986: US Military support for the Afghan Mujahedeen began 
1988: Afghanistan, USSR, the US and Pakistan sign peace accord & Soviet forces begin to 
withdraw 
1989: Completion of Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan 
1990: The US attacks Iraq for invading Kuwait. 
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1996: Taliban form government in Kabul. 
1997: Recognition of Taliban government by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. 
1998: US embassies are attacked in Tanzania and Kenya, allegedly by Al-Qaeda operatives. 
1998: Missile strikes by the US on Afghanistan for pressuring to hand over Osama bin Laden. 
2000: US warship Cole attacked in Yemen, allegedly by Al-Qaeda operatives. 
2001: Terrorists attack the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the US. 
(adapted and summarised from BBC News, 2013a, 2013b & 2014) 
8.1 Who was Behind the Attacks? 
In this section, I analyse the participants’ constructions of who carried out the 
September 11 attacks. Three different explanations were put forward and some 
individuals spoke of more than one of these.  
The first explanation suggested that Al-Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden, and supported 
by the Afghan Taliban, carried out the attacks. This explanation was largely in line with 
the official US version: 
On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against 
our country…The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of 
loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda…This group and its 
leader, a person named Osama bin Laden, are linked to many other 
organizations in different countries, including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. 
(Bush, 2001a: no page number) 
For example, Komal (F, FG4) said: 
You had Taliban, you had an upcoming terrorist group, breeding in the Arab 
countries, and who had a very influential leader… So, you had two militant 
groups – Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. And, you can’t say combined, but they had 
similar views and similar points, they followed similar conservative thinking – 
narrow thinking. And they channeled all that through the funds, the thinking, 
the aims and mission and you had 9/11 and other events – other terrorist 
attacks.   
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Komal referred to Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban as being behind the attacks. She 
said the Taliban in the post-USSR Afghanistan and the Al-Qaeda, which had a ‘very 
influential leader’, joined hands with the Taliban in Afghanistan to carry out the attacks 
on the US. Similarly, Adil (M, FG4) said ‘I think, it was done by Al-Qaeda.’  
Aan (F, FG6) also referred to Osama bin Laden as the main person who planned the 
attacks. According to her: 
…he [Osama bin Laden] went to Afghanistan and hid in some area of 
Afghanistan – I don’t know which place it was. And he said that he is going to 
wage a war against them [the US]. Then he started collecting people and 
training them like ‘mujahedeen’ [holy warriors]. And then the time came 
when he said I should wage a war against them. So, first he hit the Pentagon, 
the area with it. And there was a colossal amount of damage taken place. 
Then they hit the other area of the twin towers – there was a lot of damage. 
Then he said that he is going to finish the White House also. 
Aan argued that the Osama bin Laden, while hiding in Afghanistan, started planning 
and organising for attacks against the US.  Komal’s (F, FG4) and Aan’s (F, FG6) 
constructions concur with the version of events put forward by the US government.  
The second and a radically different explanation for the September 11 attacks 
presented by some participants suggested that the US itself was directly responsible. 
They did this by putting forward various conspiracy theories while talking about who 
carried out the attacks. In the second focus group, the following discussion took place: 
Fahad (M): Do you really think the Muslims really attacked the twin towers? 
 Fahad (M) & Saima (F): I don’t think so. 
Saima (F): There was this documentary about 9/11, and, basically, they were 
telling us that Bush did all this! So that in the future he can use the word 
terrorism and go and do whatever he wants to. 
In this excerpt, Fahad asked a rhetorical question about the 9/11 attacks being carried 
out by Muslims. He and Saima refuted this possibility; Saima referring to a 
documentary, said that President Bush himself was responsible for this attack. It seems 
likely that they were drawing these ideas from the internet documentary – Loose 
Change. This documentary challenged the US government’s account of the 9/11 
attacks (Butter and Retterath, 2010). The possibility of the participants drawing their 
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ideas from Loose Change is supported by the timeframe of the focus group and the 
release of the various editions of the film. This focus group took place in September 
2006 and the 2nd edition and 2nd edition Recut of Loose Change were released in 
December 2005 and June 2006 respectively. Butter and Retterath (2010: 26) write that 
‘Loose Change…challenges the official narrative of the events of 11 September 2001 
and suggests that forces other than al-Qaida were at work that day.’ Each subsequent 
edition of Loose Change aimed to augment this central argument by ‘replacing claims 
from previous editions that had been found insupportable’ (2010: 29). 
Another participant, Saeed (M, FG4) said: 
I think it is part of a long conspiracy…And as a part of this conspiracy, 2001 
they did this thing – they did this attack on…And, I am not sure which source, 
but I read it that 48% US citizens – Americans believe that it was America that 
did this attack. And internet is filled with documentaries that US did it 
themselves.  
Like Saima (F, FG2), Saeed also referred to internet based documentaries claiming that 
the US itself had carried out the attacks. By stating that he had read somewhere that a 
significant percentage of US citizens believed that the US was behind the attacks and 
by referring to the documentaries, he was presenting his claims as free of personal 
bias and investment.  
Babur (M, FG5) also questioned the official US explanation of who carried out the 
attacks: ‘They haven’t provided us with an irrefutable evidence about Al-Qaeda being 
involved in that incident.’  Though Babur did not explicitly say that the US did the 
attack itself, he argued the evidence of Al-Qaeda’s involvement was inadequate. As the 
discussion progressed, he cast further doubts on the authenticity of the US 
government’s version of events. 
Knight (2008: 170) reports that the proposition that the September 11 attacks were ‘an 
inside job’ circulated in the public domain through a range of media like websites, 
books and films:  
At one point in 2006 Loose Change was the most popular item on Google 
Video; it has been downloaded more than ten million times to date, bringing 
9/11 conspiracy theories to the MTV generation.  
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The conspiracy theories about September 11 have not been confined to internet-based 
and non-internet based popular sources. Academic journals have also contributed to 
burgeoning accounts of who carried out the attacks. For example, Everett (2010: 134) 
writes: 
…evidence suggests the attacks were a "false flag operation," which is a kind 
of covert operation designed to appear as though it was carried out by some 
group other than its actual perpetrators. In this case, Arab Muslims have been 
blamed, when the real culprits were most likely rogue individuals working in 
the U.S. government and military. 
The participants put forward various types of ‘evidence’ to substantiate their claims 
about the perpetrators of the attacks. For example, in the following excerpt from focus 
group 2, the participants supported these claims by arguing that the planes that hit the 
twin towers were not commercial aircraft as reported by the US government: 
Fahad (M): Besides, the planes that attacked, eyewitnesses were telling in the 
documentary, they were all white, they were plain. They did not have any 
commercial logo. 
Fareeha (F) & Harris (M): Yeah! 
Naveed: You mean the ones that hit the buildings?  
Fahad (M): Yeah. When they were about to strike the buildings there were 
some eyewitnesses, who saw the planes, and they were, like, they did not 
have any commercial logo… 
Saima (F): Such as, I mean Emirates or American Airlines.  
Fahad (M): Exactly! 
Naveed: You mean that the planes that flew from – to America were different 
planes? 
Fareeha (F): They were different planes? Where did all the passengers from 
those planes go?  
Fahad (M): No, no what I am trying to tell is that they were not commercial 
planes that were hijacked – and that is what is being fed to our minds since 
9/11. 
Wafa (F): But all those people who died in those planes?                                        
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Fahad (M): That is all an embroidered story yar [an Urdu term, the rough 
equivalent of which in English would be ‘buddy’]. 
Harris (M): All those people are not real people. Not many people have come 
to claim the bodies – not many people have come to claim the bodies.   
It is likely that the participants were again drawing on Loose Change, which cited 
eyewitness accounts to prove that the aircraft that hit the twin towers were not 
ordinary, commercial, passenger carriers. Through their articulation of what happened 
on September 11, 2001, the participants put forward ‘logical’ and ‘credible’ ‘proof’ or 
‘evidence’ for their version of the 9/11 attacks. Like the official American explanation 
of the attacks, the interpretation of the participants in my research served a real 
function – deflecting the onus of responsibility away from Muslims, to the American 
establishment itself. This idea that the language which people use serves a specific 
function rather than transparently representing reality is discussed in chapter 2.  
Fareeha and Wafa appeared quite surprised by the assertion made by Fahad. They 
asked about all the victims in the planes that crashed into the twin towers. Fahad said 
that it was a fabricated story that was presented by the Bush administration. Wafa’s 
question is noteworthy because, during this focus group, she often presented 
alternative perspectives or the ‘other side of picture’ in her arguments, rather than 
taking one specific position. This tendency of could partly be explained by her personal 
history. She was a US national and was born and had completed the earlier part of 
school career in that country. Most of her contributions were quite restrained as she 
presented more nuanced interpretations of events (For example, see her comments on 
the Kashmir dispute in chapter 5). Her constructions relate to the idea, discussed in 
chapter 2, that a person’s use of language does not neutrally represent reality, but 
rather, constructs a specific version of events, drawing on the dominant discourses 
available to her/him, which form what Shotter (1993: 54), drawing on Vico, refers to as 
‘sensus communis’ or a ‘culture’s common sense’.  
The participants in focus group 2 presented further evidence for a conspiratorial 
account by arguing that the manner in which the twin towers collapsed could not have 
been caused by the aircraft that crashed into them: 
Fahad (M): Besides – a plane hits the pinnacle. 
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Saima (F): They show the films of many buildings on fire – they didn’t just 
collapse, like that.  
Harris (M): Some people suggested that there were bombs in different storeys 
of the building, which were blown after the planes crashed into the building.  
Saima (F): The building was made up of some high standard, really high 
standard steel –  
Fahad (M): I was watching at National Geographic how people demolish high-
rise buildings. What they do is that they place explosives in the basements, 
and when these go off then the buildings fall. 
Saima (F): And some people who were near the building say that they heard 
some blasts like a bomb, from the basement.  
(FG2) 
As in the earlier extracts, the participants presented a counter official, conspiratorial 
version of how the twin towers came down. Saima was probably drawing on the 
information presented in Loose Change, which showed similar high-rise buildings on 
fire and, which, she said, did not collapse in the way the twin towers came down. 
Harris referred to the suggestion that bombs were planted in different floors of the 
twin towers. Fahad supported this line of argument by referring to a documentary that 
he watched on National Geographic, which he presented as a source of authentic, 
unbiased, and scientific explanation of events and phenomena. By presenting their 
accounts as free of personal interests and beliefs, the participants in the above excerpt 
used what Wetherell (2001: 21), drawing on Potter, refers to as the strategy of ‘stake 
inoculation’. Thus, by referring to what a film showed, eyewitness accounts and a 
National Geographic documentary they were presenting their constructions of what 
happened on September 11 as objective and unbiased.    
Harris (M, FG2) provided more evidence to challenge the official US version of attacks: 
Even the impact on the Pentagon – the airplanes didn’t do that! It was such a 
great impact – the Pentagon is supposed to be made of steel. And they say 
that missiles – there is speculation about missiles being launched into the 
building because the impact was massive. An airplane could not have done 
that.  
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Here Harris was supporting and extending what Fahad and Saima said about the 
September 11 attacks being carried by the US establishment itself. In Loose Change, it 
was claimed that the Pentagon was hit by missiles rather than a passenger aircraft 
(Butter and Retterath 2010). Commenting on that part of the documentary, Butter and 
Retterath (2010: 31) write: 
…images of buildings hit by cruise missiles are put next to images of the 
damaged Pentagon in order to imply that it is much more likely that a US-
controlled rocket hit the building than a jet hijacked by terrorists. 
Participants from focus group 2 put forward further evidence challenging the official 
US government’s version of the attacks: 
Fahad (M): The documentary also proves that before 9/11 attacks, America’s 
defence policy was so high, that they were practising, you know, defence 
measures, planes and everything.  
Saima (F): Yeah!  
Fareeha (F): It was, it was even there, when initially the thing happened, after 
a few days, I mean, the way the planes just came at the point it was totally 
unexpected. Their defence policy is not such that suddenly those planes could 
have come. [Fahad: Yeah] They already knew, they already had an idea about 
it – their reactions were such. 
(FG2) 
In this extract, the participants argued that what happened on September 11 was 
inexplicable given the high level of defence preparedness in the US to counter such 
emergencies. Commenting on this, Everett (2010: 144-5) writes: 
…the failure of the U.S. military to successfully intercept any of the four 
aircraft targeted on September 11 and prevent them reaching their targets 
has raised much suspicion. Particular attention has been paid to the actions of 
the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), the military 
organization responsible for monitoring and defending U.S. airspace…In the 
days after 9/11, it was reported that the two fighters on alert at Otis Air 
National Guard Base could, when called upon, "be in the air within five 
minutes." The two fighters on alert at Langley Air Force Base were at the same 
high state of readiness. As author Lynn Spencer pointed out, the pilots for 
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those aircraft were "always just five minutes away from rolling out of the 
hangars in their armed fighters. They live, eat, and sleep just steps from jets." 
And yet NORAD appears to have performed abysmally on September 11, 
failing to successfully deal with situations it was more than adequately 
prepared to handle. 
The third explanation of the attacks, put forward by a few participants, suggested that 
there was an Israeli involvement in the attacks. For example, Komal (F, FG4) said: 
Another thing is that the day 9/11 happened, the newspapers printed that 
around 93,000 Jews were not in the world trade centre – they were on a 
national holiday – that’s what the newspapers said. It’s not a coincidence that 
93,000 people are not coming to work on one single day. 
According to this conspiracy theory, thousands of Jews stayed away from the World 
Trade Center on the fateful day of September 11, 2001. This claim by Komal (F, FG4) is 
especially noteworthy because she was one of the very few participants who initially 
gave an explanation of the attacks that was quite similar to the official US version. 
Another participant Huma (F, FG6) said: 
No one even knew that Osama bin Laden existed. No one knew he was there. 
It was only after 9/11 that Osama bin Laden was coined…It’s propaganda – it’s 
just propaganda…And there was also this – I don’t know if it’s a rumour or 
what, but it did happen, there were no Jews in the building when the World 
Trade Centre collapsed. Why is that? Why was it sabotaged when there were 
no – when there was not even one Jew in the building? 
She challenged the official version of the events and argued that Osama bin Laden was 
a myth created after the September 11 attacks and questioned why the attacks took 
place on a day when there were no Jews in the World Trade Center. This conspiracy 
theory was in common circulation on the internet after the attacks: 
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, 
a rumor circulated on the Internet claimed that 4,000 Jews did not report to 
work, or "called in sick" that morning. It suggested that no Jews died because 
they somehow had foreknowledge of the attack. There are several variations 
of this rumor, including one suggesting that Israel was behind the 
attacks…These rumors appear to have originated in the Arab world. They are 
among several conspiracy theories being circulated in the Arab and Muslim 
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media, as well as on Web sites and bulletin boards, that Israel or the Jews - 
and not Arab terrorists - were responsible for the attacks on September 11. 
(ADL, 2013) 
This section has shown some of the participants’ constructions of who carried out the 
September 11 attacks on key US targets. Participants in two focus groups (4 & 6) 
echoed the US government’s official version that the attacks were carried out by 
Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network, supported by the Afghan Taliban. These 
responses were brief and succinct.  However, some participants in four focus groups 
(2, 4, 5 & 6) articulated various conspiracy theories about the attacks. They spoke in 
greater detail and at more length. This appeared to be because they found talking 
about conspiracies more interesting and stimulating. While articulating the conspiracy 
theories, they presented evidence, in many cases, probably drawn from Loose Change, 
to substantiate their claims. The participants used various strategies like ‘stake 
inoculation’ (Potter cited in Wetherell 2001: 21) to make their constructions appear 
unbiased and objective.  
8.2 The Reasons for the September 11 Attacks 
In this section, I discuss what the participants said about the reasons that motivated 
people who carried out the September 11 attacks. As discussed in the previous section, 
the participants’ explanations of who carried out the attacks fell into two main 
categories – one similar to the US government’s account and another based on various 
conspiracy theories, suggesting that the US carried out the attacks itself. Similarly, 
while talking about the reasons that motivated the people who did these attacks, 
some participants identified factors as if the attacks were perpetrated by Al-Qaeda 
operatives and some of them proposed considerations as if the US government itself 
was behind the attacks. I analyse each of these sets of reasons in turn.  
As discussed in the previous section, Komal (F, FG4) argued that Al-Qaeda and the 
Afghan Taliban were behind the September 11 attacks, and she also articulated their 
possible motivations:  
You could have Afghanistan, you could have other Arab countries who had 
their differences with the Western world. So, these militant groups take these 
groups take these differences personally and make it their aim to – if the 
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government is not fighting for the wrong that the West is doing, they make it 
their aim to do it themselves – and they do it by hook or by crook.  
Thus, Komal suggested that the militant groups which carried out these attacks wanted 
to avenge the ‘wrongs’, about which the governments of their respective countries had 
not been willing to take any action. Thus, according to Komal, the main reason for the 
9/11 attacks was the sense of being wronged felt by those people, who hailed from 
Afghanistan and some Middle Eastern countries. The idea that the 9/11 attacks were a 
form of ‘revenge’ was also supported by Adil (M, FG4): 
It was basically their kind of revenge. They wanted America’s cultural 
imperialism that goes on around the world and we all know it is the only super 
power for the past so many years. It was kind of grudge they had after the 
Russian war in Afghanistan – it was totally destroyed… 
Adil attributed the reasons that led to the 9/11 attacks to ‘America’s cultural 
imperialism’ that went unchecked because of its status as the world’s lone 
superpower. He argued that the reason for the September 11 attacks related to the US 
policies in Afghanistan, especially in the wake of the Soviet invasion of the country in 
1979, and the destruction these had caused.  
Saeed (M, FG4) also referred to the US policies in Afghanistan while talking about the 
reasons for the September 11 attacks: ‘…the USA fed these Taliban during that Russian 
War and they invested on the Taliban, made them extremists.’ Similarly, Fareeha (F, 
FG2) argued: 
America itself is responsible for this attack, even if we say that Al-Qaeda did 
these – who was the one who created them?! If America hadn’t done the 
stupidity of bringing all of these people of different nations and just throwing 
them in Afghanistan, after using them, they wouldn’t have faced this problem! 
Another participant, Komal (F, FG4) said: 
It probably started as after, post Afghanistan and Russian war. You had 
Taliban, you had an upcoming terrorist group, breeding in the Arab countries, 
and who had a very influential leader [Osama bin Laden], and they had the 
specific aim of destabilizing the West. 
Thus, Komal also pointed to the Russian War in Afghanistan as the precursor of various 
acts of terrorism, including the September 11 attacks.  
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Commenting on the US policies in Afghanistan and how these led to the circumstances 
which precipitated the September 11 attacks, Paul (2010: 15-16) writes: 
America’s new friends…were the Islamic guerrillas known as mujahedeen, or 
“holy warriors”, battling the Soviets. In 1986, the US and its allies began 
arming the mujahedeen…By the late 1980s, the mujahedeen had battled the 
mighty Red Army to a stalemate…The war had taken a terrible toll on both 
sides…Back in Afghanistan, chaos reigned…From this anarchy emerged the 
Taliban…Other mujahedeen leaders joined forces with the Taliban, 
including…Osama bin Laden…After being expelled from Saudi Arabia for his 
anti-government activities, he was welcomed back to Afghanistan by the 
Taliban. Working with a growing group of other angry Islamic fundamentalists 
who became known as Al Qaeda, bin Laden began plotting against the U.S. 
and the West…[culminating in the] attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon on Sept. 11, 2001… 
When I carried out the fieldwork for my research, the discourse of US policies being 
one of the factors that precipitated the September 11 attacks was common in 
Pakistan.  Saleem (2001: 6) in an article published in the most widely circulated English 
newspaper of Pakistan, The News, wrote: 
In 1985, Reagan had invited a group of bearded Afghan mujahideen to the 
White House. Reagan introduced them to everyone as the “moral equivalent 
of America’s founding fathers”. Back then, the mujahideen were pals with the 
Americans fighting Reagan’s ‘evil empire’.  
Like various participants in my research, Saleem (2001) argued that during the 1980s 
the ‘mujahideen’, the forerunners of the Taliban, were close allies of the US, when its 
prime objective was to fight the communist threat posed by the USSR. However, once 
the Soviet forces withdrew and a civil war erupted in Afghanistan, the Taliban emerged 
as a potent force in the country. Around the same time, Osama bin Laden was expelled 
by the Saudi government, and, on finding convenient allies in the Afghan Taliban, he 
shifted to that country and started planning attacks on Western targets, especially 
those belonging to the US.  
Some participants, especially those who posited a conspiracy theory regarding the 
perpetrators, argued that the US had either carried out these attacks themselves or 
orchestrated these for ulterior reasons. For example, Saira (F, FG5) argued: 
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I think it was done for oil – all the oil that Iraq has. It’s still not – it’s an irony 
that it’s still not a very rich country. What the Americans wanted to do though 
was that they wanted to take over all the oil. So that, I mean, they didn’t have 
to pay for the all the oil, so took over all the region. 
Saira said this in response to a question about the reasons for the September 11 
attacks. She argued that these were carried out by the US itself to provide a valid 
reason for taking control of the oil in Iraq. 
Tabish (M, FG5) gave another reason for the US carrying out the September 11 attacks: 
I feel that in the years before all this 9/11 incident America had developed 
itself quite good economically and otherwise. And now they felt that it was 
their time to dominate the world. So, it was, umm, umm, properly planned 
incident to start this spread all over the world and to influence the world with 
their thoughts and force themselves on others. 
Tabish was arguing that the September 11 attacks were planned by the US to extend 
its hegemony over the world. US imperial ambition, which it was argued by some of 
the participants, had motivated the US to carry out the attacks on itself, will be 
discussed in the next chapter.  
Some participants in focus group five articulated a different reason for the US carrying 
out the September 11 attacks – to discredit Islam and Muslims. They argued that Islam 
was the fastest growing religion in the world and the US wanted to stop this trend. This 
desire of the US establishment made it orchestrate the September 11 attacks: 
Babur (M): To destroy the image of Islam. And, umm, to provide a reason to 
the Americans to occupy the region – to attack Afghanistan. It was basically – 
they were framed – they wanted the region, they attacked it. 
Tabish (M): …In fact, I feel that it is part of that religious, umm, umm, clash of 
religions. And it has been a little bit modified, in fact, given a different angle to 
the world – represented to the world as a war on terror. But I feel it is 
something created by itself and to dominate – that’s all!  
Aamer (M): … Islam was growing very fast, on a very rapid scale.  
Saira (F): It’s still growing very fast. 
Aamer (M): They thought they could stop it – they thought that they could 
stop it.  
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Saira (F): More people are converting to Islam than ever before.  
Aamer (M): Yes, they are – but they didn’t realize that at that time. What they 
thought was that if they portray Islam as a religion of hatred and extremism, 
they would actually stop the growth of Islam in America.  
Tabish (M): …Their main objective was to disintegrate the image of Islam, and 
that they are successful in. When we say we’re Muslims – we have a beard, 
we have cap on our head – we’re recognized as – we might be a terrorist – put 
him aside then we’ll have a look at him. And they are successful in the way 
they wanted to do it. 
(FG5) 
The participants were responding to a question about why the September 11 attacks 
were carried out. They argued that discrediting Islam was the main aim that motivated 
these attacks, which they went on to argue were engineered by the US establishment 
itself. The discourse of the US trying to discredit Islam was a strong one in Pakistan in 
the years following the September 11 attacks. According to this discourse, the 
September 11 attacks were executed by the US establishment to discredit Islam, which 
it saw as a threat, especially in the post-Cold War era. 
In this section, I analysed the participants’ articulations of the reasons that motivated 
the people who carried out the September 11 attacks.  The reasons that the 
participants cited depended on their explanations of who carried out the attacks. 
Those who argued that Al-Qaeda, supported by the Afghan Taliban, carried out the 
attacks maintained that these done to retaliate against the West, especially the US. On 
the other hand, the participants who argued that the US carried out these attacks itself 
suggested two sets of reasons – American imperial ambition and the aim of 
discrediting Islam. These are discussed in detail in the next chapter, in relation to the 
US response. 
8.3 The Participants’ Constructions of the September 11 Terrorist 
Attacks 
In this section, I briefly discuss the participants’ constructions of the conduct of 9/11 
terrorist violence. Participants in three focus groups (2, 3 and 4) talked about terrorist 
violence. For example, in focus group four the following exchange took place:  
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Adil (M): I think it was done by Al-Qaeda but the reasons were just not 
justified…I think it was sort of a revenge but totally unjustified.  
Naveed: Totally unjustified? 
Adil: Yes.  
Zoya: I would say the same, definitely – not justified, even if, I mean, umm, 
whatever the Western world does to you, you have no right to go and kill so 
many innocent citizens, just for no reason at all. I mean, for personal revenge, 
even if, umm, the US comes and kills 3000 of your people, it is not justified to 
go and kill tens of thousands of theirs in such a senseless act of –  
(FG4) 
Both Adil and Zoya denounced the September 11 attacks as ‘totally unjustified’. 
Similarly, in focus group two, some participants rejected the September 11 terrorist 
attacks:  
Fareeha (F): …actually there are some norms in life, like, which you have to 
follow – if everybody starts acting on what we feel, and how we feel, then, 
this world won’t exist. There are some norms of life, some set rules written 
which we have to follow, in one condition or the other. 
Harris M): It is not your fault that you’re born in a particular country. 
Fareeha (F): Exactly! It’s not your fault that you are born in America –  
Fareeha and Harris were speaking in the context of September 11 attacks and they 
rejected whatever motives the people who were responsible for these might have had.  
Some participants in focus group three expressed concern about identifying terrorism 
with Muslims, especially in the wake of the September 11 attacks, For example 
Malihah (F, FG3) said:   
A terrorist is not – he belongs to no religion. Because no religion allows 
terrorism, no religion allows such hate with people, no religion allows suicide 
bombing – no religion says that it is fine – not Islam, not Hinduism, not 
Christianity, not Jewish – none of them say that it’s right…And the other thing 
is that a terrorist – a terrorist can be anyone. I can be a terrorist, you can be a 
terrorist, anyone can be a terrorist, but that does not mean that every Muslim 
is a terrorist or every Christian is a terrorist just because one Christian did 
something wrong – that does not make the whole community wrong…So, 
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saying that all Muslims are terrorist or all Christians are bad – even us as 
Muslims, if we say that all Hindus are bad or all Christians are bad that’s 
wrong! Because even our religion says do not criticize anyone else – look at 
yourself and then blame other people.  
Building on this, Malihah suggested that the terrorist ‘belongs to no religion’ as no 
religion ‘allows such hate with people’. She maintained that a terrorist could be 
anyone and suggested that linking terrorist violence with a specific faith was wrong. 
Thus, the participants quoted in this section, notwithstanding the motivations for and 
circumstances of terrorist violence rejected it as being unjustified and unacceptable.       
8.4 Summary 
In this chapter, I analysed the participants’ constructions of the September 11 attacks 
– who carried these out and why. While some participants said that the attacks were 
carried out by Al-Qaeda operatives, led by Osama bin Laden, and supported by the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan, many presented conspiracy theories arguing that the US 
itself had engineered the attacks. Those who suggested conspiracy theories spoke in 
much greater detail. It appeared that in constructing their explanations they drew on 
various documentaries available on the internet, most notably Loose Change. 
The participants who suggested that the US itself had engineered the attacks 
articulated various reasons which included US imperial ambitions and the aim of 
discrediting Islam. Thus, the constructions of the participants of my research of 
September 11 attacks were varied. Whereas some suggested explanations regarding 
the perpetrators of and the reasons for the attacks that were similar to the official US 
government’s version of events, others presented counter-narratives, based on various 
conspiracy theories. 
I also briefly analysed some of the participants’ constructions of the conduct of 
terrorism. Notwithstanding the motivations for and the circumstances of terrorist 
violence, they denounced it as being unjustified and unacceptable. Some participants 
suggested that linking terrorism with a specific religious faith was wrong. They argued 
that stereotyping the followers of a religion as being bad was unhelpful.  
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9 The War on Terror 
In this chapter, I analyse the participants’ constructions of the ‘war on terror’. In all six 
focus groups, the ‘war on terror’ was discussed. The participants talked about the 
causes as well as the conduct of this war led by the US. I discuss each of these in turn.  
Box 9.1 outlines some of the salient events related to the US led ‘war on terror’. 
Box 9.1 – A timeline of salient events related to the US led ‘war on terror’ 
2001: Terrorists attack the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the US. 
2001: Following September 11 attacks, the US attacks Afghanistan to topple the Taliban 
government. Pakistan’s military government joins the US led ‘war on terror.’ 
2002: President Bush & Prime Minister Blair announce that Iraq poses a serious risk. 
2002: UN weapons inspectors start work in Iraq. 
2003: Hans Blix asks for more time for his team to complete its task. 
2003: The US led ‘coalition of the willing’ attack Iraq without a UN mandate. 
2004: The US begins drone strikes in the tribal areas of Pakistan, targeting Taliban and Al-
Qaeda militants.   
(adapted and summarised from BBC News, 2013a, 2013b & 2014) 
9.1 The Causes and Justifications of the War on Terror 
In this section, I analyse the participants’ constructions of the causes of the US led ‘war 
on terror’ – the reasons for which it was initiated. I use the term ‘justification’ to refer 
to the reasons that the US put forward for starting the ‘war on terror’. I use the term 
‘causes’ in a more general sense, including the underlying motives that the participants 
of my research attributed to the US for initiating the ‘war on terror’.  The participants 
were often very critical of the justifications of the ‘war on terror’ put forward by the US 
government. They talked about the justifications for the war and critiqued these and 
they also suggested underlying causes for it, based on ulterior motives of the US 
establishment. I discuss each of these sets of causes of the ‘war on terror’ in turn. I 
begin by discussing the participants’ references to the justifications for the ‘war on 
terror’, which the US government put forward. Next, I outline and analyse the 
underlying ulterior causes for the ‘war on terror’ mentioned by the research 
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participants. In each section, I identify the relevant discourses that the participants 
drew upon.  
 Justifications of the ‘War on Terror’ Put Forward by the US Government 9.1.1
Some participants made references to the justifications of ‘war on terror’ put forward 
by the US government. Discourses used by President Bush and his team to justify the 
‘war on terror’ are discussed in chapter 3. Adil (M, FG4) argued that the US started this 
war in self-defence and retaliation:  
I think they panicked because they had reason to panic as well because if they 
did not do anything about it, they probably would have skinned them alive…I 
think they had no option really. I mean, just imagine that they had not 
attacked Afghanistan or Iraq. Right now Saddam Hussain in Iraq and Taliban in 
Afghanistan – we all know that Taliban right now, even after all the losses that 
they suffered they are so strong that they are basically the pain in the neck of 
two governments. The Pakistani government is so [inaudible] and they still 
can’t tackle them. And in the south Afghanistan – it belongs to them – so, I 
think it’s a war that could have been better planned, it could have been better 
executed, but it was a war that was inevitable, especially the Afghanistan war. 
But, I think, the Iraq war it could have been – there could have been other 
ways to do that – the regime change – Saddam Hussain – it could have been 
done in a very better and a very peaceful way. 
Adil (M, FG4) argued that the US had to attack Afghanistan and Iraq because they were 
under dire threat from the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks. He was drawing 
on the discourse of self-defence as a just cause of war, which is discussed in chapter 3. 
However, he distinguished between invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. He argued the 
US had ‘no option’ but to attack Afghanistan, which made it a just war. However, he 
maintained that there were alternatives to the Iraq war; the objectives behind Iraq’s 
invasion could have been achieved through peaceful means. By arguing ‘there could 
have been other ways to do that’, he was drawing on the discourse of war as the last 
resort as a just cause of war. And, since, according to him, in the case of Iraq, invasion 
was not the last resort, it was not a just war. 
Komal (F, FG4) said that the US launched the ‘war on terror’ against militant groups 
like Al-Qaeda and the Taliban who posed a grave danger to the West because: 
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…they [terrorists] have no limits – terrorism has no boundaries, it has no 
limits, it has no borders. So, there are people – the militant group is breeding 
in the Arab world, and they attack the Western World. You can see how 
influential and widespread they are, and how operational they are. They were 
able to conduct the second attack and successfully. 
She argued that the terrorists behind the September 11 attacks were highly effective 
and active and the September 11 attacks were a testimony to the danger they posed 
to the ‘Western World’. In making this argument, Komal was drawing on the discourse 
of terrorism, discussed in chapter 3. Similarly, as discussed in chapter 8, Aan (F, FG6) 
also mentioned the grave threat posed to the US by Osama bin Laden who wanted to 
‘finish [even] the White House’ – the official residence and headquarters of US 
presidents.  
Thus, Adil, Komal and Aan all referred to the grave risk the perpetrators of the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001 presented to the West, especially the US – one of the 
key justifications put forward by the US government for its ‘war on terror’. This 
existential threat confronting the US was used by President Bush and his close team to 
draw on the discourse of supreme emergency discussed in chapter 3. By equating the 
terrorists behind the September 11 attacks to the Nazis and fascists, President Bush 
(2001a) constructed the threat posed by them as constituting a supreme emergency.  
He and his aides used this discourse to present the ‘war on terror’ and the violations of 
international law that it entailed as justified and acceptable.   
Saira (F, FG5) criticised the ‘war on terror’ because the US did not have any ‘proper 
proof’: 
It was unjust. Even the people of America didn’t find it to be just. There were 
protests then in front of the White House. Even if the people of America feel 
that this is wrong – it has to be wrong! We also think that it is wrong. It was 
wrong. Because, you just can’t go on without any proper proof – without even 
proving anything – you can’t just go on and just attack a country. You are 
entering their boundaries – how can you do that?! 
Saira argued that since the US lacked proof, its actions could not be justified. She 
criticized the ‘war on terror’ by drawing on the discourse of national sovereignty. 
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According to her, violating other countries’ national sovereignty, without adequate 
proof, made the war unjust.  
The US in the post-September 11 years unilaterally redefined the discourse of national 
sovereignty. For example, Richard Haass, Director of Policy Planning for the State 
Department, during President Bush’s tenure as President said: 
What you’re seeing from this Administration is the emergence of a new 
principle or body of ideas…about what you might call the limits of sovereignty. 
Sovereignty entails obligations. One is not to massacre your own people. 
Another is not to support terrorism in any way. If a government fails to meet 
these obligations, then it forfeits some of the normal advantages of 
sovereignty, including the right to be left alone inside your own territory. 
Other governments, including the United States, gain the right to intervene. In 
the case of terrorism, this can even lead to a right of preventive, or 
peremptory, self-defense. You essentially can act in anticipation if you have 
grounds to think it’s a question of when, and not if, you’re going to be 
attacked. 
(Haass as cited in Lemann, 2002: no page no.) 
Thus, any state which was considered to have supported terrorism (as was said to be 
the case for Afghanistan) was seen as having lost its right to sovereignty. This discourse 
implied that the US invasion of Afghanistan was legitimate, and would invalidate 
Saira’s argument above. 
Similarly, Acharya (2007) argues that the US establishment used the discourse of 
humanitarian intervention, which gained prominence with the publication of the 
influential report The Responsibility to Protect by The International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001), to redefine the discourse of Westphalian 
sovereignty. However, he argues that the discourse of humanitarian intervention as 
articulated in this report: 
…would justify intervention, even that aimed at preventing large-scale loss of 
life and ethnic cleansing and undertaken through a legitimate multilateral 
framework, only as an ‘extreme’, ‘extraordinary’ and ‘exceptional’ measure. 
Yet few members of the international community would agree that Iraq 
necessitated such a response, especially when the evidence of its weapons of 
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mass destruction programme and links with al-Qa’eda had not been 
conclusive. 
(2007: 290) 
In focus group six, the participants argued that the US, before invading other countries, 
should have investigated the matter further: 
Natasha (F):  They overreacted. Basically, they should have calmed down – 
they should have investigated it more. 
… 
Mysha (F): But listen, the only thing that they did was straight away blame 
Osama bin Laden – they didn’t investigate it.  
Natasha (F): Like whatever happened five days ago, the Indian bombings, 
straightaway the Indians blamed Pakistan. They didn’t investigate it further. 
Exactly the same way, the Americans, when this happened, blamed Osama bin 
Laden. Nobody knew Osama bin Laden before that – who’s Osama bin Laden?  
… 
Huma (F): Blaming Muslims is just a way of eradicating out of the world – it is 
not possible. If being a Muslim means being a terrorist then fine, we’re happy 
being terrorists! [others join in too] But the point is that all Muslims aren’t 
terrorists and not all Americans are against other –  
Natasha (F): Maybe because of this, maybe because of this, because if you, for 
example if, if I bully someone so much that they go out of their mind, they will 
attack me, they will come against me because this is human nature  
Huma (F): Retaliation.  
Natasha (F): Retaliation exactly. So, America – if America is blaming 
Afghanistan for everything that has happened and going to war with them, 
even though America knows that Afghanistan isn’t a big country and it can’t 
really defend itself – and it isn’t – and it’s taking over it, so obviously the 
Taliban, whoever they are, even if they were in Afghanistan, they will 
obviously, they will retaliate, they will attack –  
(FG6) 
These participants argued that the US acted too hastily in apportioning the blame for 
the September 11 attacks. They should not have reacted the way they did and should 
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have investigated the matter further. They argued that almost as a reflex reaction the 
US government blamed Osama bin Laden as the one who masterminded the attacks. 
Natasha (F, FG6) argued that the US blaming Afghanistan pushed the Taliban against 
the wall and left no option for them except retaliation. By suggesting that Afghanistan 
could not ‘defend itself’, Natasha was drawing on the discourse of hierarchy of nation 
states. Not only did she question the justness of the Afghan war but she also implied 
that any retaliatory action by the Taliban in the future would classify as self-defence 
because bullying makes people ‘go out of their mind[s]’.  
This point has also been made by some academics, criticizing the US led ‘war on terror. 
For example, Baker (2007a: 23), an American professor of international politics, argues 
that ‘American imperial assertions’ have wreaked havoc and fear on countless people 
in the Islamic world including Afghanistan and Iraq.  And these unprecedented acts of 
violence on part of the US have given rise to new forms of resistance in the world. 
Some participants criticised the ‘war on terror’ by drawing on the discourse of 
international legal order, discussed in chapter 3. For example, Ahmer (M, FG1) said: 
Well, I think, what America did was unjustified. They went against the United 
Nations laws. They couldn’t invade a country without getting it approved by 
United Nations. They went against that. 
Ahmer said this in response to a question about the invasion of Iraq by the US and its 
allies. Drawing on the discourse of international legal order, he argued that invasion of 
Iraq by the US was ‘unjustified’. He was also drawing on the discourse of legitimate 
authority because he suggested that a country on its own could not attack another 
country; in order to do so, it needed a mandate from United Nations. Another 
participant, Asma (F, FG1) argued: 
…if America attacks Iraq, or if any country goes into another country, invades 
their country, they are exploiting somebody else’s right, a right that they 
themselves do have…Since America is powerful, it’s strong, it has the freedom, 
it has freedom of action, it should recognise that right in other countries as 
well. And in that trajectory, it was wrong for them to attack Iraq, because if 
they are free, then they should accept other countries’ freedom to act. 
Asma criticised the US invasion of Iraq because doing so violated the latter’s rights. 
Though she did not explicitly refer to the UN or any other supranational organisation, 
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she was drawing on the discourse of international legal order that conferred the right 
to protection from external aggression on every country. Maher (M, FG1) too criticised 
the US led ‘war on terror’ by drawing on the discourse of international legal order: 
…I think when you’re living, when you’re functioning in an international 
community, when you want peaceful coexistence to take, to take physical 
form in our world, you – the idea of the survival of the fittest, actually, is not 
in conjunction with what, what in this world we have. In this world we have 
laws. And, I think United States of America under those laws, looking at those 
laws, where she is not infringing the right of freedom of other people – it 
didn’t have the right – and it destroyed the right, and it destroyed the laws of 
the – international laws of humanity and of, of community, of 
nationhood…You cannot rationalize wars like that, the way America is doing. 
Ultimately it will create a scenario where they will have a world war III, which 
is, would be obvious, inevitable, where we would use nuclear weapons, and 
we will have a fourth world war with sticks and stones. 
He also referred to the US’ assertion that Iraq had a stock of weapons of mass 
destruction, which justified attacking it: 
Now considering Iraq as a separate example, where they said they are going 
to go in and find weapons of mass destruction. Where, when we even have 
United Nations weapons inspections team in Iraq, where Iraq’s regime and 
government was agreeing to let them work - it’s, it’s illegal basically. And, I 
think, when you, when you start saying that you can rationalize it morally, you 
get into destroying the system of law that we have in this world. 
He criticised the invasion of Iraq because the UN weapons inspection team was at that 
time still in Iraq. He argued that the invasion was illegal because the weapons 
inspection team of the United Nations was working in the country and the Iraqi 
government was cooperating with them. Maher’s comments echo Fisher’s (2011: 690) 
argument: 
UNSCR Resolution 1441, passed on 9 November 2002, while declaring Iraq in 
material breach of its disarmament obligations, had given Saddam a final 
chance to prove otherwise. The UNMOVIC [United Nations Monitoring, 
Verification and Inspection Commission] inspectors had arrived in Iraq only on 
28 November 2002 and had not yet had time to complete their work. In their 
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7 March report they had begun to report a greater degree of Iraqi 
cooperation. Many felt that the inspectors should have been given more time. 
On January 29, 2003 Hans Blix (2003), the chief of the UN weapons inspections team 
gave an upbeat assessment of the enhanced capabilities of his team and the prospects 
of its work in Iraq. He said that the UNMOVIC team had ‘built up its capabilities in Iraq’, 
which were ‘at the disposal of the Security Council’ (2003: 270). Thus, the decision on 
part of the US and the UK governments to invade Iraq at a time when the UNMOVIC 
team under Hans Blix was in Iraq, under a mandate from the United Nations, was seen 
by many people, including some of the participants in this study, as contravening the 
international legal order and as not taken by the legitimate authority, the locus of 
which, as discussed in chapter 3, is the Security Council.  
Maher (M, FG1) referred to another justification put forward by the US government for 
attacking Iraq in 2003 – liberating the Iraqi people from a dictator and introducing 
democracy. However, he suggested that this justification was conjured up later on to 
deflect public attention from the embarrassment caused by there being no weapons of 
mass destruction in Iraq: 
It’s very obvious. I mean, come on, you have to answer your own public – the 
American public, which, which the President goes on television, tells that Iraq 
has weapons of mass destruction. It’s a monster, it’s going to come up and 
attack us tomorrow. Three months after ousting Saddam Hussain, you have no 
weapons of mass destruction. The President comes up again, and says 
Saddam Hussain was a tyrant, he was, he was torturing Iraqi nationals, so, we 
ousted him. Then again coming up, and finally what we see recently is the idea 
of Greater Middle East, where they are going to inculcate democracy, 
establish democracy. 
Thus, Maher was highly critical of the US government’s discourse of liberating the Iraqi 
people and introducing democracy in Iraq as a justification for attacking it. He 
suggested that on finding no weapons of mass destruction, the justification of 
liberating Iraqi people and transforming Iraq into a democratic polity were presented 
to the world. 
Like Maher, Haniya (F, FG1) also alluded to the justification of liberating the Iraqi 
people put forward by the US: 
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…we can never justify the interference of some other country into the politics 
of some other country. Because, it’s their own political system, the way it’s 
working. Its, it’s the job of the people to rebel against Saddam, not America’s 
job. The people can take care of their politics themselves. For example if umm 
if George W Bush he comes here, and he starts saying that okay, Pervez 
Musharraf isn’t doing this right, we’re going to fight your case and stuff. It’s us 
who have to take a stand against Musharraf and not American people. 
Haniya argued that the justification based on the objective of liberating the Iraqi 
people from the tyranny and oppression of Saddam Hussein was not a valid one 
because it was the ‘job of the [Iraqi] people to rebel against Saddam’. In constructing 
this argument she was drawing on the discourse of national sovereignty. In denouncing 
US intervention, she also drew on the discourse of legitimate authority, discussed in 
chapter 3. Similarly, Natasha (F, FG6) also referred to the justifications of liberating the 
people of Afghanistan and Iraq from oppressive regimes put forward by the US  for its 
‘war on terror’:  
But that’s their country – they can do whatever they want in their country. 
They’re not forcing niqabs [veils] or forcing jubas [long, loose gown worn by 
conservative Muslim women] in America – they’re not doing that! They are 
doing it in their own country. There’s freedom, exactly, there’s freedom for 
everyone in their own country. And if they are doing it in their own country, 
fine! American didn’t have a right to go and attack Afghanistan or Iraq or 
Pakistan’s Tribal Areas. 
Natasha argued that what people did ‘in their own country’ did not give the US ‘a right 
to go and attack Afghanistan or Iraq or Pakistan’s Tribal Areas’. In criticising US 
invasion of other countries, as part of its ‘war on terror’, like Haniya (F, FG1) before 
her, she was drawing on the discourses of national sovereignty and international legal 
order. The US led ‘war on terror’ has often been criticised by people, drawing on these 
discourses. For example, Natarajan (2011: 802), a professor of International Law at the 
American University in Cairo, writes:  
When debating the merits of the Coalition’s case, most international lawyers 
argued over issues of interpretation and jus ad bellum. On a deeper level, 
however, they were arguing about the territorial and political sovereignty of 
Iraq. Coalition action was not confined to enforcing ceasefire conditions by 
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searching for and disarming alleged weapons of mass destruction. The 
Coalition went much further by instituting regime change, undertaking long-
term occupation and nation-building, and overseeing a transition to 
democracy. Therefore, the Coalition’s argument raises questions not only 
about SC [Security Council] authorization, but also about principles of 
sovereign equality and non-intervention that are traditionally regarded as 
foundational norms of the international legal system. 
Thus, the US led war on terror has often been criticised by people, including some of 
the participants of my study, by drawing on the discourse of national sovereignty. Both 
Haniya (F, FG1) and Natasha (F, FG1), quoted above, drawing on the discourses of 
national sovereignty and international legal order rejected the US justification for 
invading Afghanistan and Iraq based on the ideal of emancipating the people of these 
countries from oppressive regimes.    
In focus group one, the participants engaged in a complex discussion about the 
justification of the Iraq war. They talked about the meaning of sovereignty, legitimate 
authority and the difference and, at times, the tension between national and 
international law: 
Maher (M): …when you destroy the system of law that we currently live under 
in this world, we are going to create wars, more bloodshed…That’s what 
United States of America did, that’s what Saddam Hussain did. 
Salma (F): Umm, umm, no, no that is not what happened [Maher: 
Domestically –]. But, that’s internal affairs of the country. International law 
and internal affairs are different. 
Amin (M): But the point is that the people are still suffering, because 
somebody [Saddam Hussein] broke the law. How do you deal with that?  
Salma (F): Okay, listen. If for example, it’s your family and my family, and my 
mother disapproves of your brother, no, no, my mother disapproves of kids 
staying up till three at night. Your brother stays up till three in the night, she 
doesn’t like that. But she doesn’t have the right to tell your brother not to do 
that, because, that’s where your family’s freedom comes in, that’s where your 
parents’ freedom comes in. So, as my mother’s freedom to tell anybody to do 
anything is restricted to her family –  
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Amin (M): But, that’s different. Your mother is an accepted form of authority 
– Saddam Hussain was a dictator, he was not an accepted form of authority 
Salma (F): But, see –  
Maher (M): You are once again drawing an incorrect parallel. You are talking 
of United States of America attacking Iraq – one country attacking another 
country. And now you are saying that Saddam Hussain inside his domestic – 
they are two different scenarios –  
Amin (M): I am basically building upon the argument of war, where you said 
that, umm, United States broke the law. I said no, Saddam Hussain broke the 
international laws first.  
Maher (M) & Salma (F): And how do you know that? 
Amin (M): Well, okay, the internal laws, which I heard –   
Maher (M): There is a difference in –  
Salma (F): He has the right inside his territory –  
Amin (M): He has the right to break the internal laws? 
Maher (M): No, he didn’t have the right, but you are talking of different laws. 
One international laws, two, domestic laws. I think Iraq had its own domestic 
laws. Whatever Saddam Hussain was doing, we all agree it was wrong…The 
means that were adopted [to remove Saddam Hussein] were illegal. When we 
adopt illegal means, we are setting a precedent, and premise for other nations 
to do it as well. I think that the means were illegal… 
(FG1) 
I have included a detailed excerpt from the focus group to capture the complexity and 
nuances of the discussion that took place. Maher began by arguing that the US and 
Saddam Hussain both broke international law. He, in fact, equated the US actions to 
those of Saddam Hussain. Maher’s remarks sparked a complex discussion about the 
legitimacy of the US actions. Salma used the analogy of a family to support her claim 
about the problematic nature of US intervention in Iraq. She argued that her mother 
could not impose her will in Amin’s house because her authority was ‘restricted to her 
family’. By presenting this analogy she was drawing on the discourses of legitimate 
authority and national sovereignty. Amin challenged Salma’s analogy by stating that 
her mother was an ‘accepted form of authority’, whereas Saddam was not so because 
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he ‘was a dictator’. In constructing this argument he was drawing on the discourse of 
legitimate authority. Maher added another dimension to the debate by arguing that 
breaking internal laws (e.g. what Saddam had done), did not justify contravening 
international law (e.g. what the US did by attacking Iraq). Salma, Amin and Maher in 
the above excerpt drew on the discourses of international legal order, national 
sovereignty, and legitimate authority discussed in chapter 3. 
Amin argued that Saddam Hussein ‘was a dictator’ and, hence, did not constitute 
legitimate authority. Amin’s argument resonated with the discourse of responsibility to 
protect innocent citizens from the tyranny of an oppressive regime. As discussed in 
chapter 3, this discourse, predicated on the earlier discourse of protecting the 
innocent, gained prominence with the publication of the report The Responsibility to 
Protect by The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001). 
The report states: 
What has been gradually emerging is a parallel transition from a culture of 
sovereign impunity to a culture of national and international accountability. 
International organizations, civil society activists and NGOs use the 
international human rights norms and instruments as the concrete point of 
reference against which to judge state conduct. 
(2.18, 14: 2001) 
Maher maintained, notwithstanding the misconduct of Saddam Hussein within his own 
country, the US had acted illegally by attacking Iraq. Acharya (2007: 289) argues that 
the report Responsibility to Protect (2001) could not be used to legitimise the US led 
invasion of Iraq because in the report:  
The UN is designated as the most appropriate authority, the chief ‘applicator 
of legitimacy’ in humanitarian interventions. While acknowledging its 
limitations and imperfections, the Report leaves ‘absolutely no doubt’ that the 
Security Council remains the best place for authorising humanitarian 
intervention. The task of the Report is not to seek alternatives to the Council, 
but to make that mechanism work better. The Report mandates Council 
approval in all cases of intervention while urging it to act promptly to such 
requests. 
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The participants in the above extract referred to the justification put forward by the US 
government for invading Iraq in 2003 (i.e. removing a tyrannical and oppressive 
regime). Whereas, Amin, echoing the discourse of responsibility to protect, justified 
the US invasion because Saddam was a dictator and, hence, did not constitute 
legitimate authority who could claim sovereign immunity, Salma and Maher 
challenged this position by drawing on the discourses of international legal order, 
national sovereignty, and legitimate authority.    
 The Underlying Causes of the War on Terror 9.1.2
In this section, I analyse the participants’ constructions of the underlying, ulterior 
causes of the US led ‘war on terror’.  
Many participants in five out of six focus groups (focus groups, 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6) cited 
American imperial ambitions as the main underlying cause of the ‘war on terror’. 
Imperialism can take many forms – economic, military, geopolitical hegemony, and 
colonisation etc.  Some of participants argued that the US had embarked on the ‘war 
on terror’ to realise its imperial ambitions, especially to get control of the oil reserves 
in the Middle East. For example, Ahmer (M, FG1) said: 
…the fact is that they made a phoney case, for no reason at all. What they 
aimed – What I think, they aimed for is to secure, umm, raw material and 
resources. That’s what they aimed to do. As oil – oil is very – the price of oil 
keeps on increasing, and Iraq constitutes to a large – very large – portion –  
Drawing on the discourse of American imperialism, Ahmer argued that the US had 
made ‘a phoney case’ for invading Iraq because its real motive was to secure control of 
the rich oil reserves of the country.  
Another participant, Fareeha (F, FG2) also drawing on the discourse of American 
imperialism, mentioned oil as an ulterior motive behind the US actions in Afghanistan 
and Iraq: 
Which were the areas Americans basically attacked? What happened after 
attacking Afghanistan? All the American oil companies, including Bush’s own 
company, come there and take all the contracts on a very low price! Why did 
that happen? And then Iraq, again an oil-rich country – what happened in 
Iraq? Why was Iraq pulled in? 
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Drawing on the discourse of American imperialism, Fareeha argued that the invasions 
of Afghanistan as well as Iraq were driven by the US ambition to control oil resources 
in the Middle East.  Her assertion drew on criticisms of the US led ‘war on terror’ which 
were quite common at the time when the fieldwork for this research was carried out. 
These criticisms were based on allegations pertaining to the corporate interests of the 
US companies in Afghanistan and the US’ strategic objective of controlling the vast oil 
reserves of the Middle East. For example, Billon and Khatib (2004: 120) outline the 
case of a California based company UNOCAL which, after the ouster of the Taliban, was 
named by the then newly installed Afghan government as the main company to 
execute the project of laying a pipeline from the Turkmenistan gas fields, through 
Afghanistan, to Pakistan. 
Saira (F, FG5) also cited oil as one of the motives behind the US invasion of Iraq: 
I think it was done for oil – all the oil that Iraq has. It’s still not – it’s an irony 
that it’s still not a very rich country. What the Americans wanted to do though 
was that they wanted to take over all the oil, so that, I mean, they didn’t have 
to pay for all the oil, so they took over all the region. That shows American 
superiority throughout the world – they still want to remain a superpower. 
Saira not only cited access to Iraq’s oil as the US’ underlying motive but she also linked 
this to the country’s desire to retain its status as a world superpower. In making these 
assertions, she too was drawing on the discourse of American imperialism. 
Some participants in focus group six also mentioned both oil and power as the 
underlying causes for the US led ‘war on terror’:  
Mysha (F): The main mission I believe for the British or the Americans is just 
to get power – gain power that all.  
Aan (F): Gain power over all the world? 
Huma (F): Yes.  
Mysha (F): Yes. Look at the Iraq issue, what is it all about? It’s just oil –   
Aan (F): They wanted oil so they finished Saddam Hussain? 
Mysha (F): No, no – they want power, they want the natural resource –   
Huma (F): Exactly.  
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Mysha (F): I’ve lived in Saudi Arabia. I’ve heard this in many newspapers over 
there that, umm, these warning letters they are getting from Americans, the 
Kings of KSA that they can attack anytime, because Saudi Arabia is actually a 
very good resource – natural reserve for oil – just gaining power, I guess, is the 
only mission they have.  
Huma (F): Exactly. 
Mysha, who had lived in Saudi Arabia for a significant part of her life, led this 
discussion and said that the actual motives of the US government related to gaining 
power which she linked to controlling the oil reserves of the region. In making this 
argument, she was drawing on the discourse of American imperialism. Her claim about 
the apprehension related to the possible US intervention in Saudi Arabia seems 
anomalous because the Saudi Royal family have been generally seen to be pliant and 
appeasing partners in the US strategic operations in the region (Billon and Khatib, 
2004; Chomsky, 2006; Leaman, 2004).  However, given the fact that like many other 
Middle Eastern dictatorships, the Saudi Royal Family lacks any democratic legitimacy, it 
is easy to see possible reasons for apprehension and anxiety at the heart of the Saudi 
royal establishment. It is expected that the Saudi Royal Family would be cognizant of 
the fact that their claim to power and privilege was greatly dependent on the support 
from the Western powers, especially the US. Billon and Khatib (2004) argue that the 
favoured status enjoyed by Saudi Arabia in the Middle East, and its special relationship 
with the US, is contingent on the pliant acquiescence by the Saudi Royal Family to US 
diktat. Any action on the part of the Saudi Royal Family that frustrated US designs in 
the region could tilt the precarious balance in the country, precipitating the ousting of 
the regime. Iraq, along with other dissenters like Iran, were seen by the US and its 
allies as a potential threat to the stability and balance of power in the region (Leaman, 
2004). Maintaining this stability and balance of power has been an important part of 
the US government’s geostrategic policy in the region: 
Access to Middle East oil on favorable terms remains a national-security 
priority for the U.S. government, and Saudi Arabia will be a U.S. ally so long as 
the Saudi government cooperates with the U.S. efforts to maintain a steady 
flow of reasonably priced oil. 
(Leaman, 2004: 246) 
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The discourse of gaining control over Middle Eastern oil as an underlying cause of the 
US led ‘war on terror’ became increasingly common in the years after the September 
11, 2001 attacks. For example, according to an American philosopher, Leaman (2004: 
242-3), the main reason for the 2003 invasion of Iraq had nothing to do with terrorist 
threat or securing the weapons of mass destruction: 
…the Bush administration decided to invade Iraq for reasons that have 
nothing to do with 9/11, and that greed and a desire to extend American 
power are motives in U.S. planning…In Iraq thousands of people have been 
killed or wounded in demonstration of U.S. power and in pursuit of U.S. 
control of oil, and the destruction of lives continues with no end in sight. 
He argues that the intervention in Iraq with the view to oust Saddam Hussein was 
already on the cards when George Bush became the President earlier in 2001. 
Similarly, Baker (2007a: 10) also maintains that the plan to topple the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein’s government in Iraq ‘were in place before 
September 11’. The US government seized the September 11 attacks as an opportunity 
to implement these plans (Leaman, 2004; Baker, 2007a, 2007b). Similarly, Chomsky 
(2006: 26) claims that the: 
Bush administration had already decided to attack Iraq, well before Congress 
was “hoodwinked” into authorizing the war in October 2002 and also before 
the UN was invited either to endorse Washington’s plan to use violence or to 
become, according to President Bush, “irrelevant”.    
Thus, the discourse of American imperialism, suggesting US ambition to control the 
Middle Eastern oil reserves as an underlying motive behind the ‘war on terror’ was 
quite common when this research was carried out. Some of the participants of my 
study also drew on this discourse to criticise the ‘war on terror’, suggesting that the 
‘war’ was being used by the US as a façade for its imperial ambitions to secure control 
over oil reserves in the Middle East. 
The participants were critical of US actions as part of its ‘war on terror’ and regarded it 
as exploitative and unjust. For example, speaking in the context of invasion of Iraq 
Asma (F, FG1) said: 
…it’s wrong, and everybody feels resentment against the United States of 
America for doing so…it is the survival of the fittest around here…I mean they 
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are the most powerful thing around here…So, morally speaking it is definitely 
incorrect.  
Asma criticised the invasion of Iraq by arguing that what the US did was to follow the 
principle of ‘survival of the fittest’. By making this claim, she was drawing on the 
discourse of the hierarchy of nation states and the discourse of American imperialism.  
Asma’s criticism resonates with Leaman’s (2004) argument that powerful countries 
often resort to force to achieve their strategic objectives in the international space 
because they know that there is no one else powerful enough to challenge their 
actions. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US emerged as the world’s lone 
superpower. By virtue of being the world hegemon, the US appropriated certain 
privileges and prerogatives that enabled it to ‘force global economic integration on its 
terms’ (2004: 238). In order to achieve their imperial objectives, the successive US 
governments did not hesitate to take unilateral decisions to use of force in the 
international arena, many a time contravening international law: 
They view the exercise of power as its own justification, following the old logic 
that ‘‘large countries do what they wish, while small nations accept what they 
must.’’ This is the logic of empire, and there are no moral barriers to the use 
of force in such thinking, just the practical limits of available forces and 
resources. If the United States is successfully able to impose its will on Iraq, 
we should be prepared for further U.S. military action in other countries as 
part of a continuing effort to extend American power. This is morally 
unacceptable.  
(Leaman, 2004: 245) 
Tabish (M, FG5) suggested that the US dominated the UN and most countries of the 
world: 
…the entire UN, it is fully dominated by the US – fully dominated by the US, 
and a little bit by other countries who are supporters of US, in fact. I won’t say 
that they are like Britain. You can take the examples of other major countries 
like France. It almost supports America in every way. You can go to other 
examples – all other countries – 90% of the countries in the world are pro-US. 
And I feel it’s just because some are part of that theory that we have to 
dominate the world and the others are affected by them. They want to save 
themselves and they want to follow them – okay whatever you say we agree 
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to it but don’t affect us! And when someone stands up to it [the US] – Saddam 
Hussein did and he’s no more! Whenever Iran stands up to it and you can see 
what is happening to Iran. Whenever Pakistan stands up to it you can see 
what happens – 
Tabish argued that the United Nations was dominated by the US and its ‘supporters’. 
He argued that vast majority of the countries in the world supported the US. Some of 
them did this because they wanted to ‘dominate the world’ with the US and the others 
wanted to ‘save themselves’ and not antagonize the superpower. He suggested that 
the consequences of standing up to the US could be dire, as was borne out by the 
example of Saddam Hussein, Iran and even on certain occasions Pakistan. Thus, 
according to him neither the UN nor any other country was in a position to challenge 
US’ imperialist ambitions.   
Maher (M, FG1) argued that another underlying cause for the ‘war on terror’, in 
addition to the desire to control oil resources, was supporting Israel:   
I would say the whole action [the ‘war on terror’] basically is, has actually 
other ulterior motives which can range from oil on one hand to greater Israel 
on the other hand, where Israel want hegemony in the region, and wants its 
enemies and, umm, its opponents in the region to be cut down to a level 
where it can establish its hegemony.  
Maher’s arguments echo those of many writers (e.g. Billon and Khatib,2004;  Leaman, 
2004; Baker, 2007a, 2007b) who have argued that safeguarding Israeli interests in the 
Middle East has been high on the US strategic foreign policy agenda.  For example, 
Baker (2007a) argues that Saddam Hussein was seen as a significant impediment to 
Israel’s expansionist agenda in the Middle East. Therefore, removal of his government 
was an important priority of the US government, well before the September 11, 2001 
attacks. He writes: 
The most expansive version of the neoconservative agenda to advance US and 
Israeli interests found forthright expression in a position paper written for the 
newly elected Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu of the Likud party in 
1996, entitled ‘Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm’, published 
by the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies. The document 
calls for a ‘clean break from the peace process’, the annexation of the West 
Bank and Gaza and the elimination of Saddam’s regime in Iraq as a prelude to 
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regime changes in Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Iran. The authors all 
became influential players in the second Bush administration. 
(2007a: 10) 
Similarly, Tabish (M, FG5), said that the US’ hegemonic agenda was a key issue in the 
region and affected the ‘entire world’: 
I think it’s high time that the world has to realize what America is doing. 
America at the moment is just influencing the entire world. What has it done 
to Lebanon? What has it done to Iraq? What is it doing with Palestine using 
Israel? What is it doing with Iran?  What is it doing with Afghanistan? And 
what about Pakistan?! North Korea – they’re all infected by it! And, yet the 
world doesn’t realize and sees it as ‘war on terror’ and all that!  
Drawing on the discourse of American imperialism, Tabish argued that the US had 
pursued it strategic agenda in a number of countries. This included taking punitive 
actions against various countries, whenever it construed them as thwarting its imperial 
designs.  
Thus, some of the participants in focus groups one, two, four, five and six argued that 
US imperial ambitions were an important underlying cause of the ‘war on terror’. 
Drawing on the discourse of American imperialism, they cited self-interest, securing 
control over Middle Eastern oil reserves, maintaining its status as the world hegemon 
and facilitating Israeli hegemony in the Middle East as the underlying causes of the 
‘war on terror’. 
Another underlying cause of the ‘war on terror’ discussed in three focus groups (2, 5, 
and 6) was religion and the targeting of Muslims and the Islamic World. For example, 
in focus group two, some of the participants argued that the ‘war on terror’ was 
actually a ‘war on Islam’: 
Fahad: America is distorting the face of Islam [others voice their agreement]. 
And the war on terrorism has become, you know, more of a war on Islam.  
Fareeha: Exactly, war on Islam.  
Saima: They [the US] are just using the name.  
Fahad: It could be some other communist country that was bothering 
America, and America, you know, using this against Islam.  
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Fareeha: If some other country does something, they don’t even look at it! 
They are like okay fine, no problem…You can look at it logically. Look at all the 
countries that he attacked –   
Harris: They are all Muslim countries.  
Fareeha: Exactly!  
Drawing on the discourse of religion in national and international politics, discussed in 
chapter 3, the participants argued that the target of the ‘war on terror’ were all 
Muslim countries. Fahad and Fareeha, therefore, suggested that it was ‘a war on 
Islam’.   Saima suggested that the US was just using the term Islam as a ploy in the ‘war 
on terror’. Her claim resonated with Baker’s (2007a: 7) argument that the danger of 
radical Islam was conjured up as a useful ploy for justifying the ‘war on terror’: 
Islam today is most useful as the ‘enemy’ of choice in the so-called global war 
on terror. Today, when the logic of US withdrawal from Iraq gains support 
daily in America, only the Islamist imaginary provides arguments still found 
credible by a frightened American populace to sustain the occupation. The 
Islamist imaginary and the diffuse fears it evokes, unconstrained by logic or 
realism and quite unrelated to facts on the ground, is now more essential to 
empire than ever before. It is only reasonable to expect that the Islam 
imagined by empire will be with us for some time to come. 
Similarly, some of the participants in focus group six also cited targeting Muslims and 
Islamic countries as the underlying cause of the ‘war on terror’: 
Natasha (F): Then why – this is the question that comes in my mind all the 
time – why is it always a Muslim country? Why? Why does America always 
think that Muslims are terrorists?  
Aan (F): They want to kill all the Muslims.  
Naveed: Why? 
Aan (F): You know, because the Muslim states are all – they all have – it’s 
basically the natural resources – Americans – they do not want to use their 
own resources  - they don’t want to deplete them – they want to first finish 
off other countries’ or get the power from them.  
Natasha (F): Or maybe, America thinks that if all the Muslims come together – 
[Others: They have no power!] and to turn them against each other is the 
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biggest scandal, is the biggest thing that he is doing. And he – America or 
whatever – India – they’re all involved and they’re trying – Israel – they’re all 
trying to make us –   
Aan (F): It’s the Jewish lobby –  
Natasha (F): Exactly. They’re all trying to just, you know, break us apart, and 
then, break us apart, then break us into pieces – each piece break us – 
Mysha (F): You know, there is this prophecy told by our prophet that Muslims, 
umm, one day will unite and will make a very big power – that’s what America 
is afraid of – that it doesn’t let the Muslims unite.  
Huma (F): It’s obvious when all the Muslim countries do unite together they’re 
a much stronger power than America and I guess that is what they are afraid 
of. Once you have that is what you are scared of – the power being taken 
away. So, that’s the only thing that attack is leading against that their power 
might be taken away – they don’t even know if it’s going to be taken away or 
not. So, this killing of innocent people –  
In the above excerpt, the participants argued that all the countries that were targeted 
by the US as part of the ‘war on terror’ were Muslim ones. Huma argued that the ‘war 
on terror’ was driven by an apprehension on the part of the US that ‘their power might 
be taken away’, and the rest of the participants concurred and referred to the 
potential threat posed by a united Islamic World to US hegemony as an underlying 
cause of the war. Even though these participants cited attacking Muslim countries as 
an underlying cause of the US led ‘war on terror’, they did not draw on the discourse 
of the clash of civilizations proposed by Huntington (1996/2002). Instead, they drew on 
the discourses of religion in national and international politics and American 
imperialism. 
Similarly, Tabish (M, FG5) also referred to the policies and actions of the US, which, 
according to him, disadvantaged the Islamic countries:  
You can clearly see that America is the one breaking the non-proliferation 
treaty of the entire world, committing that they would not be transferring 
nuclear missiles and all that to any country...They’ve transferred, umm, the 
assets to Israel – they’ve used it. And now when it comes to India which is a 
non-Muslim state, they’re ready to accept it as a nuclear power. And they’re 
ready to make agreements with it, make nuclear reactors and products 
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related to that, so that they can improve upon their technology, and not – 
ignoring Pakistan!! What is that?! You can see that – the entire world should 
realize that what is happening all around! I feel the international powers are 
all mixed up and jumbled up with this and they’re probably closing their eyes 
at the moment and they’re behaving as if they did not notice. But, it’s 
something illogical that they can’t notice something going on around on such 
a massive scale. 
He maintained that, notwithstanding its professed nuclear non-proliferation 
commitment, the US had facilitated Israel in acquiring nuclear capability. He also 
argued that the US had accepted India, ‘which is a non-Muslim state’, as a nuclear 
power and ignored Pakistan. In constructing this argument, he was drawing on the 
discourse of religion in national and international politics. 
Thus, some of the participants in focus groups two, five and six argued that targeting 
Muslim countries was one of the underlying causes the ‘war on terror’. However, the 
participants in these focus groups developed a slightly different emphasis in this 
argument. The participants in both focus groups two and six argued that targeting 
Muslims and the Islamic world was an underlying cause for the ‘war on terror’. The 
participants in focus group six suggested that in targeting the Islamic countries, the US’ 
aim was to prevent the oil rich Muslim countries to unite and challenge US as the 
world hegemon.  
9.2 The Conduct of the ‘War on Terror’ – Jus in Bello 
In this section, I discuss the participants’ construction of the conduct of the ‘war on 
terror’ or jus in bello.  Participants in all six focus groups made references to the 
conduct of the US led ‘war on terror’. Before analysing the relevant data, I present a 
brief analysis of the unconventional nature of this ‘war’. 
 The ‘War on Terror’ – a War without Borders and an Enemy Army 9.2.1
In this section, I briefly analyse the nature of the ‘war on terror’. The ‘war on terror’ 
formally began soon after the September 11, 2001 attacks, when President Bush 
(2001a) said: ‘Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will 
not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and 
defeated.’ He suggested that this war will be like no other because the enemy against 
which this ‘war’ was being waged comprised ‘terrorists [spread] in more than 60 
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countries’ (2001a: no page number). Thus, the ‘war on terror’ marked the beginning of 
a protracted unconventional conflict in which the markers of traditional warfare – 
enemy states, combating armies, and international borders – were obliterated, giving 
rise to a range of novel discourses like those of surgical strikes within the territories of 
ally states (e.g. drone attacks in Pakistan), unlawful combatants and preventive strikes. 
Larrinaga (2011), a professor of political studies, argues that we need a novel approach 
to understand the geopolitical events in the post-September 11 era: 
…it is precisely through the way in which these events [related to 9/11 and the 
‘war on terror’] are effectively bound together through certain chains of 
equivalence that are articulated in their representation in relation to 
September 11th, that a vantage point can be created to provide an 
understanding of the governmental rationalities of security that underpin the 
war on terror and the contemporary global order at multiple sites of its 
production, with the intent of exploring how war beyond the battlefield has 
been rendered possible as a form of global governmentality through the “war 
on terror”. 
(2011: 310) 
Thus, the ‘war on terror’ created situations that are hard to understand using the 
prism of conventional warfare. For example, Pakistan has been a front line ally of the 
US in this conflict, yet the latter has regularly attacked the former diplomatically, 
politically and militarily, during this protracted ‘war’. In the next section, I analyse the 
research participants’ constructions of the way the ‘war on terror’ was conducted. 
 The Participants’ Critique of the Conduct of the ‘War on Terror’  9.2.2
The Participants were generally critical of the way the ‘war on terror’ had been 
conducted. Many of them criticised the hurting and killing of innocent civilians. For 
example, Farah (F, FG4) said: 
If you are fighting against terrorism, it does not mean that you spread 
terrorism. Afghanistan – the economy, everything in Afghanistan has been 
destroyed because of the attack – they said that the suspects are the Taliban 
and Osama bin Laden – it’s not justified that for that you kill innocent – 
millions of innocent lives… 
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Drawing on the discourses of preventing harm to non-combatants and terrorism, Farah 
criticised the ‘war on terror’ and equated it with terrorism because, according to her, 
as a result of it ‘millions of innocent lives’ had been lost and Afghanistan had ‘been 
destroyed because of the attack’.   
Similarly, the participants in focus group five also criticised the ‘war on terror’ because 
it had killed innocent non-combatants: 
Tabish (M): I don’t think they [the US] care that a lot of people in Pakistan die, 
when we hit a bomb. When we hit a bomb – now, umm, there is an American 
intelligence report of CIA – at first – when they were 90% sure that, umm, the 
people were, umm, the, the Talibans were over a spot they would say that 
now we’re gonna attack it; and now we’re using our military aids and bombing 
in this area. And now all of a sudden they have started doing this at 50% - now 
if they are 50% sure that there might be Taliban, there might not be, and they 
can attack that area. And this is a part of their strategy –   
Babur (M): Secondly, talking about sovereignty, they are also threatening 
Pakistan’s sovereignty – they’ve bombed Pakistan, like, four times using spy 
planes – killed more than 70 innocent people!  
Aamer (M): On the other hand they criticize Russia and other countries for, 
you know, destroying the sovereignty and integrity of other countries. But it’s 
quite ironic, ironic, that they themselves are, you know, forces – their forces 
are in two sovereign countries! And they’re killing people for nothing. 
(FG5)   
Tabish was referring to the drone attacks in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan, which the US 
government had initiated in 2004. Drawing on the discourse of preventing harm to 
non-combatants, he argued that the Americans did not care about Pakistani casualties 
as they had reduced the threshold for the likelihood of hitting militants substantially – 
the criterion that was used by the US military for launching a drone strike. Babur and 
Aamer criticised the ‘war on terror’ by drawing on the discourse of national 
sovereignty and the discourse of preventing harm to non-combatants.  
Similarly, in focus group six, two participants criticized the ‘war on terror’ because it 
had killed innocent people: 
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Mysha (F): And kill innocent people [in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan’s Tribal 
Areas] who weren’t even – most of them didn’t even know –  
Natasha (F): Exactly! Most of them were, like, kids basically.  
Mysha (F): Exactly.  
Natasha (F): Now we see kids with guns. Who’s done that? If you’re calling 
Osama bin Laden a terrorist, I think Bush is the biggest terrorist, because of 
him all these little, innocent children they’ve become orphans. The wives 
become widows – whose fault is that if it’s not Bush’s fault?!  
Mysha (F): The main terrorist according to me is Bush. Every crisis going on in 
the world is because of him. 
Mysha and Natasha were very critical of the ‘war on terror’ which had killed ‘innocent 
people’ in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan. Drawing on the discourse of preventing 
harm to non-combatants and the discourse of terrorism, Natasha and Mysha argued 
that President ‘Bush is the biggest terrorist’.   
In the second focus group, two participants, drawing on the discourse of state 
terrorism, discussed in chapter three, alluded to the perception in Iran about the US 
being a terrorist state. They implied that this perception was because of what it had 
done in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the ‘war on terror’, including killing of civilian 
non-combatants: 
Fahad (M): …In Iran, they say that the US is the biggest terrorist around, why 
do they say that?  
Saima (F): Exactly, why do they say that?  
Fahad (M) & Saima (F): Because of what happened in Iraq, what happened in 
Afghanistan. In Afghanistan there was this very innocent wedding going on, 
and they just dropped two bombs there! Why? 
(FG2) 
Like Farah in the previous excerpt, Fahad and Saima, drawing on the discourses of 
preventing harm to non-combatants, terrorism, and state terrorism argued that the 
Iranian perception of the US as the ‘biggest terrorist’ was due to its disregard of the 
principle of preventing harm to civilian non-combatants.  
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When the fieldwork for this study was carried out, discourses constructing the US’ use 
of force in various international conflicts as amounting to terrorism were not 
uncommon in the Pakistani media. For example, less than two months after the 
September 11, 2001 attacks, Saleem (2001) writing in the most widely circulated 
English daily of Pakistan suggested: 
When Nic Kynaston, Managing Editor of Guinness World Records, decides to 
allocate a separate chapter to terrorism he is bound to seriously consider both 
President Harry Truman and President Bush Sr as top contenders. On 6 August 
1945, at 8:15 am, an American B-29 bomber dropped ‘Little Boy’ over 
Hiroshima that incinerated at least 150,000 non-combatants. Sanctions 
imposed by Bush Sr have so far killed half a million Iraqi children.   
Such discourses have not been confined to popular media. These have also become 
common in academic journals. For example, citing the case of Iraq, Adriaensens and 
Baker (2012: 259) argue that the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 ‘will rank as one of the 
greatest war crimes of the twenty-first century’. The reasons they put forward for this 
claim were quite similar to the ones Farah suggested for equating US actions in 
Afghanistan with terrorism – killing of civilian non-combatants and the destruction of 
the Iraqi state 
Similar to the accusations of terrorism levelled against President Bush and the US 
made by some of the participants in focus groups two and six, Adriaensens and Baker 
(2012:278) argue that: 
The illegal Iraq War of indiscriminate bombings, genocidal sanctions and a 
devastating invasion without legal or moral justification was a horrendous 
crime. Those responsible should be held accountable. They should face war 
crimes trials.  
Thus, the ‘war on terror’ has been often criticised in popular media as well as academic 
journals, drawing on the discourse that portrays US actions in various international 
conflicts, including the ‘war on terror’, as constituting terrorist violence because of its 
disregard for one of the fundamental principles of just conduct of war or jus in bello – 
preventing harm to civilian non-combatants. Some of the participants in my study also 
criticised the ‘war on terror’ drawing on the discourses of preventing harm to non-
combatants, terrorism and state terrorism.  
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In focus group five, two participants criticized the ‘war on terror’ because the manner 
in which it was conducted demonstrated the US government’s disregard for non-
Americans lives: 
Aamer (M): Actually what they think is that if a person is an American he’s our 
responsibility and wherever he goes we should provide him security and 
everything – like welfare – everything that one can imagine. But if he is not an 
American he is an acceptable loss. You can kill him for the larger cause and 
benefit the country. So this is what the thinking is.  
… 
Tabish (M): … we see a lot of people dying in the Northern Areas or the Tribal 
Areas of Pakistan – on a daily basis 60, 70 killings – at least five or ten killings 
are done on regular basis [through the US drone strikes]. When we see that 
there was one, umm, reporter – Daniel Pearl – he was there and he was killed 
over there – it was hell – the entire world was like where is Daniel Pearl – 
where is it all? It was created into an international issue. And what about 
those dying people? Don’t they have any value?! Don’t they have any –  
(FG5) 
Tabish cited the killing of people in the Tribal areas of Pakistan on a ‘regular basis’ by 
the US, as part of the ‘war on terror’ and contrasted it with the case of the killing of 
the American journalist Daniel Pearl, which sparked severe protest from the US 
government.   Both Aamer and Tabish argued that the US regarded harm inflicted to 
non-American as an ‘acceptable loss’.  In making this argument, they were drawing on 
the discourse of preventing harm to non-combatants and the discourse of American 
imperialism. By arguing that the harm caused to non-Americans was seen as 
‘acceptable loss’, they were also problematizing and challenging the discourse of 
collateral damage.  
Tabish’s (M, FG5) comments, in the above excerpt, echo the insightful analysis by 
Butler (2004), a US academic and scholar, of how grieving over certain lives, 
considered valuable, serves to sustain violence in distant territories: 
But those lives in Afghanistan, or other United States targets, who were also 
snuffed out brutally and without recourse to any protection, will they be ever 
as human as Daniel Pearl?… he is so much more easily humanized for most 
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United States citizens than the nameless Afghans obliterated by United States 
and European violence. But we have to consider how the norm governing who 
will be a grievable human is circumscribed and produced in these acts of 
permissible and celebrated public grieving, how they sometimes operate in 
tandem with a prohibition on the public grieving of others’ lives, and how this 
differential allocation of grief serves the derealizing aims of military violence. 
(Butler, 2004: 37)   
In focus group four too, the participants criticised the ‘war on terror’ because the way 
it was conducted demonstrated disregard on part of the US government for the lives of 
citizens of the countries that were invaded: 
Komal (F): You can’t discuss it with somebody [the US] with such a closed and 
selfish mind. My self-interest is to go and invade Iraq, I’ll do that –  
Farah (F): Even if the UN does not allow you to do it –  
Komal (F): Exactly, I don’t care if you like it or not. I don’t care if it kills millions 
of other people, just in the neighbouring country – I don’t care! It’s just my 
self-interest!  
Farah (F): You are just saving yourself no matter at the expense of how many 
others – you just don’t care. It’s just – you save yourself.  
Komal (F): The American lives are worth more than just normal human lives 
anywhere in the world. Especially, if you are a Muslim your self-worth even 
reduces much more. 
(FG4) 
Drawing on the discourse of American imperialism and the discourse of self-interest, 
Komal and Farah criticised the ‘war on terror’ because the way it was conducted 
demonstrated a totally callous attitude of the US government towards citizens of the 
countries that had been invaded.   
Asad (2010) identifies a willingness, underpinning the Western liberal ideology, driving 
the successive US governments, to cause disproportionate casualties on their 
opponents:  
For [Western] liberalism the readiness to multiply death—ours and theirs, but 
especially theirs—is a condition of freedom, a readiness to shift nonviolent 
politics into the politics of force. 
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(2010: 18) 
Some research participants criticised the conduct of the ‘war on terror’ because it 
destroyed entire countries. For example, in focus group two, the following discussion 
took place: 
Fahad (M): They’ve started attacking everyone –  
Fareeha (F): What, what happened in Iraq? 
Fahad (M): No weapons of mass destruction! 
Naveed: They say that it was a case of misinformation. 
Fareeha (F): Oh, right! On that basis they destroyed the entire country!   
(FG2) 
Fahad and Fareeha criticized the ‘war on terror’ because it led to the invasion and 
destruction of Iraq and that too on the basis of an unfounded suspicion. 
Similarly, Farah (F, FG4) also denounced the ‘war on terror’ because of the havoc it had 
wreaked on Afghanistan and Iraq: 
…it’s not just [innocent] lives, it’s the country, the economy, the development 
they’ve had. Now where is Afghanistan? They will have to start from scratch. 
Where is Iraq? Where is Iran? There is no development going on – they’ve 
gone back in time, way back in time. And just because of Al-Qaeda, it’s a war 
for peace. Now, that I feel is an extremely absurd, umm, statement that they 
[the US government] have a war for peace – peace is not supposed to be 
associated with war. 
Farah argued that as a result of the ‘war on terror’ not just innocent lives were lost, 
but great loss was inflicted on the states of Afghanistan and Iraq. She criticized all this 
damage and loss of life on the ground that it was done to punish members of an 
extremist group – the Al-Qaeda. She also challenged the discourse of doing justice and 
establishing peace used by President Bush, discussed in chapter 3, to construct the 
‘war on terror’ as an instrument for establishing justice and peace in the world. 
Participants in two focus groups (1 and 4) criticized the ‘war on terror’ because it did 
not achieve the purposes for which it was started. For example, Ahmer (M, FG1) said: 
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So, taking over Iraq, or taking over Afghanistan, they’re like affecting a lot of 
people – that’s totally wrong. If you look at Iraq right now, it’s every other 
day, there is a suicide bombing, or there is something like that going on, 
people are getting killed –   
As discussed in chapter 3, President Bush drew on the discourse of doing justice and 
establishing peace to construct the ‘war on terror’ as a just war. However, Ahmer 
argued that after the 2003 invasion, Iraq had become a very violent country where 
‘every other day’ there was ‘a suicide bombing’. 
Like Ahmer, Adriaensens and Baker (2012: 261) are also very pessimistic about the 
outcome of the Iraq war: 
On a strategic level, it is now clear that the Iraqi war opened that devastated 
country both to intrusions by Iran and the infiltration for the first time of al-
Qaeda and other extremists. Clearly, neither development served the 
interests of the Iraqi or American people. At the same time, the violent ending 
of the state and shattering of Iraqi society released the terrible demons of 
sectarianism, death squads and violent civil strife in the land, adding 
immeasurably to the killing and destruction. 
Similarly, Komal (F, FG4) argued that even though the invasion of Afghanistan ousted 
the Taliban regime the militants spread to other countries: 
One thing that the US troops in Afghanistan did they broke the back of the 
Taliban. The Taliban spread over the Arab countries, in Pakistan – they went – 
they went out of Afghanistan and spread all over the Arab countries…for the 
short term, it was a good move because you were able to break down the 
Taliban…So, for the time being it did some good but the aftermath was 
terrible! You had Iraq, you had Pakistan, you had bombings even during those 
invasions in Iraq & Afghanistan, bombings never stopped in Madrid or in 
London or in Pakistan or in any other place. So it did continue; for a short time 
you had – you had victory for a short time because you thought you had done 
the right thing. But in the long term what happened postwar alliance or what 
happened immediately, umm, after, let’s say Iraq was attacked, that was 
terrible. It was not planned and you had unexpected events happening almost 
on daily basis everywhere – it’s not just limited to one country, it’s influencing 
millions of miles away. Troops are in Iraq but you have bombing in Madrid, 
you have bombings in London, troops are in Iran, you have bombings let’s say 
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in Pakistan. So, the burden is shifted towards – on the whole world – nobody 
is safe any more. 
Like Ahmer (M, FG1) in the previous extract, Komal also argued that the ‘war on terror’ 
had resulted in greater violence. She, in fact, claimed that as a result of the ‘war on 
terror’ violence had spread to ‘the whole world’ and ‘nobody is safe any more’. Like 
Ahmer and Komal, Chomsky (2006) also argues that American policies and actions 
have made the world a more dangerous place for everyone, including the US citizens. 
In addition to talking about the conduct of ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
participants in focus groups four, five and six were also highly critical of it because of 
its adverse effects on the region, especially Pakistan, resulting in a sharp increase in 
terrorist violence in the country. For example, Adil (M, FG4) criticised the ‘war on 
terror’ as it had destabilized the ‘whole region’: 
For the long term, it’s only three years and [inaudible] the situation has 
become tense even further. I think for the next fifty years the world politics 
will be defined by the two attacks – one in Afghanistan and the other in Iraq. 
The whole region would be destabilized for the coming so many years, just 
because –  
According to Adil, the ‘war on terror’ was a momentous event, the effects of which 
would be felt for a long time to come. He went on to say: ‘I think, we as Pakistanis feel 
it the worst…as we are going through such trauma…’. Adil was speaking in the context 
of unprecedented increase in terrorist violence in Pakistan, resulting in the 
assassination of Benazir Bhutto (see section 5.6 in chapter 5). Speaking in the same 
political context, participants in focus group four suggested that the enhanced terrorist 
violence in Pakistan was the work of some hidden forces:   
Adil (M): … I don’t know, just because they’re radical and fundamental – 
they’ve not become radical and fundamental overnight. I think, there is 
something that is motivating them – it’s probably money – I don’t know, there 
is some hand in the attacks which we cannot, umm, find out. There are 
terrorists there but there is something else as well. 
Komal (F): There is a missing piece of the puzzle that we can’t find. People 
can’t identify that – there is a missing piece in the puzzle.  
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Adil (M): Here the Chinese engineers are getting abducted, and they’re 
getting kidnapped, and they’re getting killed. I don’t know what Chinese 
engineers have got to do with terrorism…I think that should be an eye opener 
for us that we should realize that there is something else going on… So, I 
think, if we see a little deeper, we should realize that there is something going 
on, which we cannot decipher. 
(FG4)  
Thus, Adil and Komal argued that the spate of terrorism in Pakistan around the time 
when this focus group was conducted was not what it appeared to be. Komal (F, FG4) 
suggested that it was the US that was trying to destabilise Pakistan in order to create a 
pretext for drawing in troops like it had done in Afghanistan and Iraq: 
Certain people also believe that the US is trying to destabilize Pakistan that 
they will be able to draw in troops. You have presidential candidates in their 
foreign policy strategies stating they will draw out troops from Iraq into 
Pakistan. So, that clearly shows you what the mentality is. Even somebody 
running for the White House, even though he is not President, he still thinks 
that the right thing to do after getting into the White House is to draw troops 
in Pakistan and get them out of Iraq and Afghanistan. There is no difference 
between the Republicans and the Democrats – it’s the same thinking all over. 
And it takes a lot, a lot…to change that thinking – that attacking is not a 
solution to your [US’] problems. It’ll just increase our [Pakistan’s] problems 
much more and problems for similar countries face like we do. 
Saira (F, FG5) also suggested that Obama, the then US presidential candidate, had 
‘publicly said that we are going to attack Pakistan, if we feel there are insurgents.’ 
Similarly, Aan (F, FG6) also suggested that the US was behind the rise in violence in 
Pakistan: 
Aan (F): There’s somebody else behind all these things.  
Naveed: Who’s that? 
Aan (F): It’s the Americans, I think. I think it’s the Americans because they 
want to finish everyone – one by one they want to finish all countries, and 
they want to get the power. They put loggerheads – they, like, Indians – they 
want to make Pakistan fight against India – India should be at loggerheads 
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with Pakistan – then whatever happens the Americans are going to pacify 
both of them and then they are going to get whatever they want.  
Aan argued that the US wanted to ‘finish all countries’ including Pakistan. She 
suggested that it was trying to create instability in the region by pitting Pakistan 
against India.  
The discourse of US trying to destablise Pakistan has been quite common in Pakistan. 
Mazari (2009c: no page number), a former chairperson of the department of defence 
and strategic studies at the Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad writes: 
…[an]other cause for chaos [in Pakistan] can be resolved more readily – that 
of the growing intrusiveness and questionable role of the US within 
Pakistan…As if all these US military and undercover officials crawling all over 
the sensitive parts of the country were not enough, it appears that the US is 
also using private covert setups to further a dubious and threatening agenda 
within Pakistan. The centre of these suspicious covert operations is Peshawar, 
and the central organisation is Creative Associates International Inc. (CAII – as 
opposed to CIA)…CAII has been terrifying the residents of University Town 
Peshawar because of its US security guards – ostensibly from that notorious 
US security contractor Blackwater (now renamed Xe Worldwide) whose 
employees already face charges of murder, arms smuggling and child 
prostitution in Iraq.  
Thus, some participants in focus groups four and six suggested that as part of its ‘war 
on terror’, the US was instigating a spate of violence that had taken hold of Pakistan at 
that time. Zoya (F, FG4) articulated a somewhat different take on the rise of terrorist 
violence in Pakistan: 
I think, it’s the whole cycle of suffering. I mean, we suffer either way. We 
support them [the US] – how you suffer by supporting them is see all these 
religious groups within your own country are threatening your own security. 
Why are they against the government? They say the government is pro-
American. So, they target the innocent people, just to influence the 
government, right? And if you turn anti-American, then Americans will come 
in and threaten your security again. So, I think, you suffer either ways. 
Zoya was suggesting the rise in terrorism in Pakistan was because of its government’s 
decision to join the US led ‘war on terror’. This, according to her, had placed Pakistan 
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between a rock and a hard place. This was because if Pakistan had not joined the ‘war 
on terror’ it would have incurred the wrath of the US government and, because it had 
joined the ‘war’, the extremist groups operating in the country had starting attacking 
the people and the state of Pakistan.  
Huma (F, FG6) argued that because of the Pakistan government’s decision to side with 
the US in its ‘war on terror’, the country had been isolated: 
When the Afghanistan war happened Pakistan refused to side with 
Afghanistan – all the Muslims isolated us. Now that we are totally helpless – 
we’re in their [the US’] hands – they can do anything with us. 
According to Huma, the decision to side with the US had made Pakistan totally 
dependent on the US. Komal (F, FG4) argued that Pakistan had been coerced into 
joining the war on terror: ‘We were told to do something – we never had any 
choice…We didn’t have any option, I mean, other than to be pro-US.’ 
Adil (M, FG4) made a radical suggestion: 
I somehow would have no problem with US troops coming to Pakistan – I 
mean not attacking Pakistan but having troops in Pakistan – because our 
troops are getting killed for their war. So, I mean it would be better if they 
come in as well and they could get a first-hand experience of what’s going on 
here. 
He was arguing that Pakistan had had enough of following US diktat and fighting the 
militants. He suggested that the US should send their troops in Pakistan so that 
Pakistani soldiers were not ‘killed for their war’. 
Thus, some of the participants in focus groups four, five and six were very critical of 
the way the US had conducted the ‘war on terror’, especially because of the adverse 
impact it had had on the law and order situation in and the stability of Pakistan.   
This section has demonstrated how some of the participants from various focus groups 
criticised the US led ‘war on terror’ on the basis of how it was conducted. The grounds 
that they cited while doing so included that the ‘war on terror’ had harmed non-
combatant civilians, including children, demonstrated a callous disregard for the lives 
of the citizens of the countries which had been attacked, had destroyed entire 
countries on the pretext of punishing militant groups, had failed to achieve the 
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objectives for which it was started, had led more violence, which had spread to many 
parts of the world and had destabilised Pakistan. 
9.3 Discussion 
This chapter has demonstrated the participants’ constructions of the ‘war on terror’ – 
the causes for which it was started (jus ad bellum) and the way it was conducted (jus in 
bello). Most young people who participated in the study were highly critical of the ‘war 
on terror’ on both these grounds.  
In terms of the causes for which the ‘war on terror’ was started, some participants 
referred to the justifications put forward by the US government and some suggested 
underlying, ulterior causes. The justifications put forward by the US government that 
they referred to included self-defence and retaliation, findings weapons of mass 
destruction, liberating the Afghani and Iraqi people from oppressive regimes and 
introducing democracy in Iraq. In most cases, the participants were very critical of 
these justifications.   
The participants’ constructions of the ulterior causes of the ‘war on terror’ included 
American imperial ambitions related to control of Middle Eastern oil reserves, 
retaining its status as the world hegemon, facilitating Israel’s hegemony in the Middle 
East and persecuting Muslims and the Islamic World.  
By denouncing most of the justifications put forward by the US government and 
suggesting underlying, ulterior causes for the ‘war on terror’, the participants 
constructed the ‘war on terror’ as being an unjust war. In constructing their argument 
they drew on the discourses of self-defence, supreme emergency, national 
sovereignty, legitimate authority, hierarchy of nations, international legal order 
responsibility to protect and religion in national and international politics.   
The participants were also very critical of the way in which the ‘war on terror’ had 
been conducted. They criticised the conduct of the ‘war’ because it had destabilized 
Pakistan by unleashing an unprecedented spate of violence and terrorism, led the US 
government to coerce Pakistan into becoming its ally, killed civilian non-combatants, 
demonstrated total disregard for the lives of the citizens of the countries that had 
been invaded, destroyed entire countries, failed to achieve its aims, resulted in an 
increase in terrorist violence, and made the world a more dangerous place. They 
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constructed their arguments by drawing on the discourses of preventing harm to non-
combatants, terrorism, state terrorism and American imperialism. They also 
challenged the discourse of collateral damage. Some participants also problematized 
the discourse of doing justice and establishing peace used by President Bush. 
Very little, if any, research has been carried out with young people about their 
constructions of the ‘war on terror’. However, it would be interesting to analyse my 
finding in relation to two other pieces – Durrani and Dunne’s (2010) study, also 
discussed in chapters five, six and seven, and Shihade’s (2011) experience of teaching a 
course in one US and one Pakistani University. 
As discussed in this chapter, the young people who participated in my study were 
highly critical of the causes and conduct of the ‘war on terror’. In most cases, they 
criticised the US government for carrying out the ‘war on terror’ rather than the 
American people per se. This was in contrast to the participants in Durrani and Dunne’s 
(2010: 228) research, who constructed the Americans as the ‘other’ and presented 
them as ‘the enemy of Islam and Pakistan’. They used religion as the only criterion for 
constructing the US as the ‘other’.  
Shihade (2011) presents his experience of teaching courses that problematized the 
September 11 attacks and the ‘war on terror’ in two different universities – the 
University of California at Berkeley and the Lahore University of Management Sciences 
in Pakistan (LUMS). LUMS is a prestigious private sector university in Pakistan attended 
mostly by Pakistani middle class young people, like the ones who participated in my 
study. Similar to the participants of my study, the Pakistani students of Shihade’s 
(2011: 229) course saw ‘direct U.S. involvement in their country’. Shihade (2011: 230) 
suggests that the Pakistani students on his course did not ‘put much trust in the 
[Pakistan] government’. They were critical of the Pakistani government for doing ‘the 
bidding of the United States’. They also suggested that the militant attacks in the 
country were in retaliation to the Pakistan government’s joining the ‘war on terror’. 
However, Shihade does not report any analysis, by his students, of the September 11 
attacks and the ‘war on terror’ in the context of US imperial ambitions in the wider 
world, especially the Middle East.  
The American students who were enrolled on Shihade’s (2011) course at the University 
of California stood in contrast to the participants of my study in at least two respects. 
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Firstly, according to Shihade, the American students were generally not very ready to 
question the official narrative of events presented by the US government. Secondly, 
they were unwilling to engage with the adverse impact of the US government policies 
and actions in the Middle East. The Pakistani students’ more critical stance may have 
been due to the direct effects of the ‘war on terror’ on their country and their own 
lives. Moreover, as discussed in chapter five, young people in Pakistan are generally 
quite sceptical of the leaders and the government in their country.  
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10 Summary, Reflections and Implications 
In this final chapter, I draw together the threads of the argument that I have been 
constructing in this thesis by summarising the findings, reflecting on the process of 
conducting the research and considering the implications for education and future 
research.   
10.1 Summary of Findings 
In this section, I present a summary of my findings. (For a more detailed discussion of 
these, see chapters 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9).  By doing so, I aim to offer a response to the 
question that I set out to explore at the beginning of this research: How do middle 
class Pakistani young people construct contemporary international conflicts? I do so by 
first summarising the content of their constructions. Next, I discuss the process of 
construction.  
 Participants’ Constructions of Pakistan and International Conflicts  10.1.1
The participants argued that Pakistan was characterised by widespread poverty and 
social inequality, and that it had a chequered history of democracy. They suggested 
that the political leaders were inefficient and corrupt. They also constructed it as an 
Islamic state. (See chapter 5.) 
They described the world as sharply divided between a world hegemon – the US – and 
all other countries. They identified Pakistan as being at the lower end of the hierarchy 
of nations. They identified various groups of countries (e.g. the West, the oil-rich 
countries, the Islamic countries), and various forms of political organisation (e.g. 
communism, socialism, capitalism, dictatorship, democracy). (See chapter 6.) 
The discussion of international conflicts focused mainly on two current conflicts– the 
Pakistan-India conflict (see chapter 7) and the September 11 attacks and the 
subsequent ‘war on terror’ (see chapters 8 and 9). They discussed the causes as well as 
the conduct of both these conflicts. 
In the context of the Pakistan-India conflict, they suggested that the two countries 
were traditional adversaries. They put forward various reasons for the mutual hostility 
between them, which included the circumstances surrounding the partition of India 
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and the dispute over which country Kashmir be part of; competing economic interests; 
and the repeated failure of peace talks.  
In relation to the September 11 attacks, the participants put forward two sets of 
causes – one in line with the official US version of events and the other presenting a 
counter-narrative, based on various conspiracy theories (see chapter 8). Thus, some 
participants suggested that the attacks had been carried out by Al-Qaeda operatives 
because of the resentment they had had against the West, especially the US, as a 
result of its previous actions in the Middle East and Afghanistan, which they 
constructed as exploitative and unfair. Other participants argued that the attacks were 
orchestrated by the US establishment itself to provide a pretext for pursuing its 
imperial ambitions, especially gaining control over the rich Middle Eastern oil reserves, 
and to discredit Islam. 
The participants also discussed the causes of the ‘war on terror’ initiated by the US in 
response to the September 11 attacks. Their constructions of the causes of this conflict 
also fell into two categories – those in line with the US government’s version and those 
suggesting an ulterior, underlying cause (see chapter 9). Those participants whose 
constructions were close to the US government’s account suggested that the US 
initiated the ‘war’ in retaliation for the attacks and in self-defence. Participants spoke 
of many of the US government’s justifications for the war on terror (finding and 
destroying weapons of mass destruction; liberating the peoples of Afghanistan and 
Iraq from tyrannical regimes; and introducing democracy in Iraq), but problematized 
and challenged these, arguing that there were other underlying motivations. They 
argued that the ‘war on terror’ was being used by the US establishment as a façade for 
its imperial agenda, which included increasing its international clout and power, 
gaining control over the oil reserves of the Middle East, facilitating Israeli hegemony in 
the Middle East and targeting Muslims and the Islamic World. By drawing on the 
discourses of international legal order, national sovereignty, legitimate authority, 
American imperialism and religion in national and international politics, the 
participants argued that this was an unjust ‘war’.   
The young people also talked about the conduct of each of these conflicts, identifying 
a range of ways in which these had been played out – conventional warfare, terrorism, 
including state terrorism, and destabilisation. 
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In relation to the Pakistan-India conflict in Kashmir, the participants described the 
progression from conventional warfare to terrorism. Some of them also maintained 
that in the post-cold war episteme, India had been trying to destabilise Pakistan. 
Whereas many participants constructed Kashmir as a rightful a part of Pakistan and 
suggested that the Kashmiri people had been subjected to extreme torture, they 
denounced the resort to terrorist violence by the freedom fighters in Kashmir as being 
unethical and unacceptable. 
The participants who discussed the use of terrorism in the September 11, 2001 attacks 
on the US denounced it because they argued that terrorism was an unethical and 
unacceptable way of playing out a conflict.  
The participants were critical of the way the ‘war on terror’ had been conducted. They 
argued that it had harmed non-combatant civilians and, hence, amounted to state 
terrorism, showing disregard for the lives of people whose countries had been 
invaded. They argued that the invasions contravened international laws; violated 
national sovereignty; and had destroyed entire countries. It had also failed to achieve 
its aims; led to more violence and resentment against the US; made the world a more 
dangerous place; and had destabilised the region (Middle East and South Asia), and 
especially Pakistan (see chapter 9).  In particular, the participants were highly critical of 
US military activities in Pakistan, including the drone strikes in the Tribal Areas, and 
suggested that these had led to increased terrorism and destabilisation of the country.  
Thus, the participants identified very few just causes of war, but accepted that some 
wars were inevitable, especially when talks repeatedly failed, when one country 
usurped another’s territory, or when a country faced an existential threat. In particular 
they argued that it was wrong for rich and powerful countries to attack poorer 
countries for economic gain. All participants who spoke about terrorist violence 
denounced it as unethical and unacceptable. Similarly, they were very critical of all 
forms of violence and conflict that caused harm to non-combatant civilians. They 
constructed the consequences of war as a major concern because it destroyed 
countries, destabilised entire regions and bred resentment against the perceived 
aggressor.  
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 The Process of Construction 10.1.2
In this section, I discuss the process of construction:  the participants’ enthusiasm 
during the sessions; the sources they drew on; the judgments they made; and the ways 
in which they constructed arguments. 
10.1.2.1 Participants’ Interest in Politics 
The young people who participated in my research appeared very keen and 
enthusiastic to talk about issues pertaining to national and international politics. This 
finding is apparently in contrast to what many others (e.g. Henn and Weinstein, 2006; 
Fieldhouse, Tranmer and Russell, 2007; Berry, 2008; Zvonovskii, 2009) have reported– 
young people’s declining interest in politics. However, the picture is more complex 
than it seems to be because in most studies cited above the percentage of young 
people who turn out to vote is used as the litmus test of political participation. Actually 
voting and being interested in political issues are clearly two different things. Some 
writers (e.g. Jowell and Park, 1998; Kimberlee, 2002; Henn, Weinstein and Forrest, 
2005; Henn and Weinsten, 2006) have suggested that whereas there has been a 
decline in the percentage of young people who turn out to vote, they are not 
necessarily politically apathetic as their (dis)engagement with politics is qualitatively 
different from earlier generations in a variety of ways. Most young people who 
participated in my study were either not eligible to vote or would have just acquired 
the right to do so because the minimum legal age for voting in Pakistan is 18. 
Therefore, it would have been difficult to comment on their ‘engagement’ with 
politics, based on the criteria of exercising the right to vote.  However, all young 
people who were asked to participate in my research were willing to do so, and they 
talked very enthusiastically about national and international politics during the focus 
group sessions. 
Based on my experience of living in Pakistan and working with many young people, I 
know that there is a widespread disenchantment with mainstream politics and 
politicians and this was also borne out by the constructions of my research participants 
of political leaders and the institution of democracy in Pakistan (see chapter 5). 
Though I did not specifically ask them about their future ambitions, some of them did 
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talk about pursuing careers in business and other professions. None of them 
mentioned that they may want to become professional politicians. However, this 
disenchantment with the political process clearly does not signal a lack of interest in 
national and international affairs, which were discussed with enthusiasm and, at times, 
even passion.   
10.1.2.2 The Sources of the Discourses Used 
The young people who participated in my study drew on a range of discourses to 
discuss international conflicts. These included the discourses of international legal 
order, national sovereignty, preventing harm to non-combatants, terrorism and state 
terrorism (See chapters 7, 8 and 9 for a more detailed discussion of the discourses 
used.). While I did not ask participants explicitly to say anything about the sources of 
their ideas, I can suggest some possible sources. It seems likely that these included 
family discussions, the Model United Nations Conferences that many of the 
participants would have had the experience of participating in, school textbooks and 
cable television and the internet. 
The participants, at times, demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of 
international politics. Their use of the discourses of international legal order, 
legitimate authority, Marxism and capitalism are cases in point.  These sophisticated 
discourses were prevalent amongst middle class Pakistanis, and it is, therefore, likely 
they would have come across these discourses within their own extended families. 
These discourses sometimes reflected their family backgrounds. For example, 
participants in one school, located in a military cantonment, drew on discourses that 
exonerated the army of any blame for the problems confronting Pakistan at the time 
when I carried out the fieldwork for my study. Jowell and Park (1998) suggest that 
young people’s political orientations are significantly influenced by their parents’ 
political affiliations. My data suggests that they may also be influenced by parental 
occupations and milieu.   
A second source of sophisticated discourses, I would suggest, was the Model United 
Nations conferences which many of them had attended. From my own professional 
experience of working for many years in the field of education in Pakistan, I know that, 
over the years, such conferences have become an important part of the co-curricular 
calendar of many private secondary schools in the country. Groups of students are 
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allocated to perform the roles of the delegation of different countries of the world 
representing their respective nations in various organs of the United Nations like the 
Security Council, World Health Organisation and the United Nations Disarmament 
Commission. As delegates in such conferences, young people, like the ones who 
participated in my study, get to discuss real international issues like the Iraq war, polio 
eradication and US drone attacks. Thus, it is likely that the participants of my study 
came across some of the discourses that they used to talk about international conflicts 
while preparing for and attending these conferences. 
Some of the arguments they used were less sophisticated, either presenting conflicts 
in very simplistic terms, or drawing on flawed evidence.  
It is likely that some of the discourses of this sort came from their textbooks, especially 
those related to Pakistan-India conflict, which was often constructed by them in black 
and white terms (for example, demonising India and constructing it an enemy). 
Pakistan Studies textbooks often present the Pakistan-India conflict by drawing on 
discourses that often construct it in simplistic binary terms (e.g. Rabbani, 2009). For a 
more detailed discussion of this, see chapter 7. Durrani and Dunne (2010) have also 
commented on the way the social studies textbooks in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
province of Pakistan may have influenced students’ construction of the Pakistan-India 
conflicts.  
Since the participants of my research also had access to internet and cable television, 
these were also among the sources of the discourses which they drew upon. For 
example, while discussing the September 11, 2001 attacks, they said that the source of 
some of their arguments were documentaries on the internet. I suggested that Loose 
Change was a likely documentary that they would have seen (see chapter 8). They 
used these discourses with considerable enthusiasm, and very uncritically, generally 
accepting the evidence offered in the documentary. One explanation of this could be 
that the documentaries exonerated Muslims and blamed the US government – a 
perspective that resonated with the young people. Moreover, they may also have 
heard such discourses in their everyday lives.  Knight (2008) discusses the role of the 
internet as one of the most important sources of counter-discourses related to the 
September 11, 2001 attacks. 
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10.1.2.3 Ethical Judgments   
The young people who participated in my research made various ethical judgments 
while talking about international conflicts. Most of them rejected the ‘war on terror’ as 
an unjust war because, according to them, it did not have a just cause and was not 
conducted in an ethical manner and, as such contravened the principles of jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello. In fact, they argued that the ‘war on terror’ was being used a 
façade by the US for implementing its imperial agenda across the world. They censured 
the US for violating international law and showing disregard for the lives of people 
who lived in the countries that had been invaded. 
They also unequivocally denounced terrorist violence whether it was used by the 
freedom fighters in Kashmir, the perpetrators of the September 11, 2001 attacks, or a 
nation state, such as the US as part of its ‘war on terror’. 
In some cases, while making these judgments, they engaged in some very interesting 
and sophisticated debates. For example, in one of the focus groups, while discussing 
the justness of the Iraq war they engaged in an interesting discussion about who 
constituted the legitimate authority. Whereas some argued that Saddam was a 
legitimate authority within Iraq, another participant suggested that by oppressing and 
torturing his own people he had forfeited the right to sovereign immunity. They also 
debated the boundaries of national and international law and how the tensions 
between the two could, at times, make judging the justness of wars problematic and 
contentious.  For a more detailed discussion of this, see chapter nine.  
10.1.2.4 Use of Analogies 
The participants argued with each other and drew on a range of evidence and some 
analogies to persuade others of the validity of their arguments. For example, while 
criticizing the conduct of the ‘war on terror’ they contrasted it with the way wars were 
conducted in the early history of Islam. They also cited instances from medieval Indian 
history to substantiate and elaborate their ethical judgments about contemporary 
international conflicts. In one focus group the participants debated the justification of 
the US invasion of Iraq using the analogy of a family. They used this to discuss the 
notions like legitimate authority and national sovereignty. One participant gave the 
example of her mother’s authority and said that whereas her mother could advise her 
and her siblings about their behaviour and conduct, she could not do so to other 
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participants and their siblings because her authority did not extend to other people’s 
families. She used this to problematize the US justification for the invasion of Iraq to 
liberate the Iraqi people from an oppressive dictator. (For a more detailed discussion 
see chapter 9.) 
 Limitations of Participants’ Constructions 10.1.3
Whereas many of the participants’ constructions were insightful and sophisticated, I 
also identified some limitations. In many cases, they constructed events and made 
ethical judgments in rather black and white terms, categorizing events as ‘right’ or 
‘wrong’. Very few participants looked at any issue from more than one perspective. 
This is, of course, the way that a great deal of debate is conducted – in the print and 
electronic media and in social settings. However, this may also relate to the way school 
curricula are designed and delivered. 
From my experience of working in schools in Pakistan, I know that the predominant 
model of curriculum planning used is what Ross (2000) and Kelly (2004) refer to as the 
content driven model. In this model of curriculum planning the focus is on the 
knowledge content of what needs to be learnt. A pupil’s mind is considered to be a 
‘tabula rasa’ or a ‘clean sheet’ (Kelly, 2004: 28). S/he is required to internalize a body 
of valuable, authentic knowledge. Given the essentialism underpinning this model, it 
sits uncomfortably with pedagogical approaches that value discussion, debate and 
problematization of issues, encouraging the learner to construct authentic, albeit 
tentative, knowledge and understanding – an approach to learning, which Freire 
(1970/2005: 80) refers to as ‘problem-posing education’. This problem can possibly be 
overcome by reviewing the way school curricula are constructed. 
Another limitation, closely related to the one discussed above, was that the 
participants seemed willing to accept accounts and claims without verifying the validity 
and authenticity of the evidence. In particular, there was a worrying tendency to 
accept ‘facts’ reported in documentaries.  This issue again can be related to the model 
underpinning curricular design in Pakistan. Since the knowledge offered through the 
curriculum is considered indisputably authentic and indisputable, hardly any need is 
seen for verifying the evidence on which it is predicated. As a result pupils become 
accustomed to accept received knowledge without trying to assess its authenticity. 
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10.2 Reflections on the Research Process    
The research process that led to the construction of this thesis has been a long, 
arduous, exhausting and fascinating one. When I embarked upon this journey, I was a 
total novice, not that I thought so at that time! I had a vague idea of what I wanted to 
do but it took me considerable time to formulate a clear focus for my investigation. In 
fact, the focus of the research continued to evolve and develop as I proceeded with 
the study. This in the later stages often made me think that had I had a clearer idea of 
what my research was going to be at an earlier point in time, it would have been so 
much better. It would have helped me avoid following paths that led to many a blind 
alley, read more purposefully and design a tighter investigation. However, these 
thoughts have also led me to realise that these blind alleys were not so blind after all, 
as going adrift helped me ‘find’ my way.  
Going through my transcripts, many a time I wondered why I didn’t ask a different 
question, follow up on participants’ response or on some occasions restrain myself 
from steering the discussion. However, I also now realise that learning the intricacies 
of social research are as important an outcome of a PhD journey as the actual findings 
themselves.  
While reading the transcripts, I also realised that I was not able to follow up on what 
individual participants had said. There had also been limited opportunity to find how 
individual participants constructed various aspects of the two conflicts that they 
discussed. Therefore, in any conclusions that I have drawn, I have inevitably, to some 
extent, ironed out the nuances of individual constructions. Had I used individual 
interviews I could have overcome some of these problems. However, after careful 
thinking, I concluded that by using focus groups I had made the right decision. This was 
because the focus and nature of my investigation was such that it lent itself very well 
to young people discussing the relevant issues with one another in a peer group 
setting. Moreover, had I used individual interviews, I would have been co-constructing 
the outcomes to a much higher degree through the questions I would have asked and 
the prompts I might have used. This reflection, however, leads to a humbling 
conclusion that any insight that I might have gained from my research cannot claim to 
have captured the complexities of how each of these young people constructed their 
understanding of the contemporary international conflicts that were discussed.   
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As a result of this study, I have come to appreciate the complexity of the processes 
involved in social research. Rather than being neat and linear, social research is a 
complex, iterative process. It is hard to visualise the finished product during the early 
stages of the journey. Moreover, I realised that, at times, feeling lost was okay, even 
inevitable. This is because any aspect of the social world, howsoever small, that one 
chooses to research is tantalisingly complex and rich. It is inevitable that while trying to 
make sense of this complexity, there will be times when one feels overwhelmed and 
lost. 
Another important lesson that I learnt was the importance of reflexivity in social 
research. By reflexivity I mean the skill of stepping outside your own subjectivity and 
trying to discern what the data says rather than what you think it says. It took me a 
while to learn this lesson as during the initial stages of analysis, I would enthusiastically 
start ‘interpreting’ the data. Many a time my supervisors asked me to review my 
analysis and see if the claims that I had made accurately conformed to the data. I 
gradually realised how much own personal history coloured what I saw around me. 
This came home with force especially while analysing data about the Pakistan-India 
conflict. On my supervisors challenging some of my analysis, I realised how being a 
middle class Pakistani and having studied social studies textbooks similar to the ones I 
have critiqued in chapter 7 had made me make claims that were not entirely 
substantiated by the data itself. This was one of the most powerful lessons as a result 
of which I have started looking at the social world from a different perspective. 
Notwithstanding this experience, I must admit that one can never entirely step out of 
one’s own self. Therefore, any insights gained from social research are bound to be 
culturally and historically located and contingent.  
Doing this research has helped me learn the skill of building an argument – weaving a 
meaningful narrative out of immensely messy and tangled yarn.  Building an argument 
in this thesis has been like telling a coherent and fascinating story by making sense of 
what at times seemed to be a chaotic mass of data.  
10.3 Implications for Education 
In this section, I discuss the implications of the findings of my study for education and 
future research.  
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 Educating Young People with a Sense of Democratic Activism – a case for 10.3.1
Curriculum Reform 
As discussed earlier, whereas the young people who participated in my research were 
very enthusiastic to talk about national and international politics, none of them 
suggested that they might want to pursue a career in politics. This is a source of 
concern because if young people like these ones are alienated from the political and 
democratic institutions and processes in the country then the hope of making things 
work better would remain a distant dream.  
An important implication of this finding is that the curriculum should aim to develop a 
sense of political activism in young people. This can be done by providing opportunities 
for debating key social issues like education, economic development, democracy, the 
role of the armed forces in national life, militancy and extremism. Very importantly, 
the curriculum should encourage young people to explore and debate what it means 
for them to be a Pakistani. This is important because, as I have discussed in chapter 
seven, the existing Pakistan Studies curriculum employs discourses which construct 
Pakistani national identity as primarily predicated on a binary division between 
Pakistani Muslims and non-Muslim others.  Durrani and Dunne (2010) have also 
argued that the discourses used in the social studies textbooks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
province of Pakistan conflate Pakistani nationalism and Islam and use it to construct 
Pakistanis as Muslims who are fundamentally different from non-Muslim ‘other’, 
especially the Indian Hindus. Ross (2000: 148) argues that ‘the characteristics of 
national identity are of particular importance to the content and shape of the 
curricular debate.’  In the existing curriculum, the most likely area for the inclusion of 
opportunities for developing political activism in young people is Pakistan Studies, 
which is an amalgam of history, geography and civics. However, in the existing Pakistan 
Studies curriculum, there are no opportunities to do so. The Pakistan Studies 
curriculum not only fails to provide a space for critical dialogue and debate but it also 
presents a vision of the world predicated on discourses that construct the world in 
black and white terms. Pakistanis and Muslims are extolled and India is often 
presented as the enemy ‘other’. The military is often glorified by drawing on a 
discourse that constructs it as the saviour of the Pakistani state and by implication the 
religion of Islam. These discourses often reify the social world, leaving hardly any room 
for critical reflection and debate.  
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As discussed in chapter two, these effects are achieved through a number of internal 
and external constraints or exclusionary mechanisms, identified by Foucault (1970), 
which act on discourse. One such mechanism identified by Foucault (1970: 52) is 
‘taboo’ (see chapter 2), which makes it difficult to speak about certain things. In the 
existing Pakistan Studies curriculum there are many such ‘taboo’ subjects, which are 
decided in advance for the learners and are not open for analysis through democratic 
dialogue and debate. Thus, there is a need to review the curriculum in this important 
area, providing opportunities to the learning community, comprising the learners and 
the teachers, to recognise that what is often presented as factual incontrovertible 
knowledge actually comprises discourses which are historically and culturally 
contingent and located.  
The participants in my study were able to debate and problematize some topics like 
the two nation theory and the invasions of medieval India by Mahmud Ghaznavi, 
which are instances of issues that are usually presented in Pakistan Studies curriculum 
as beyond discussion and debate. This was probably because, as a result of their 
privileged backgrounds, they had access to a range of discourses about such issues. 
However, relying on pupils’ personal family circumstances for developing such vital 
skills is a precipitous option, especially given the socio-political circumstances 
confronting Pakistan. There is an urgent need to revise the school curricula so the 
pupils can look at difference and not be repulsed by or be afraid of it because as 
Richardson (2007: 93) argues ‘difference and otherness are inescapable part of the 
human condition.’  
 Curriculum Reform and Teacher Education 10.3.2
As discussed in section 10.2, partly the problem emanates from the content driven 
model of curriculum planning that is used by the schools. Therefore, there is a need to 
reconceptualise the curricular framework in order to ensure that the learners will be 
encouraged to problematize, challenge received knowledge and construct valid and 
authentic, albeit tentative, knowledge for themselves. Such a model of curriculum 
planning, rather than requiring the pupils to internalise a body of authentic, 
worthwhile knowledge, encourages them to focus on the process of their learning. This 
model of curriculum planning is in line with what Ross (2000: 137) refers to as the 
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‘process-driven curricula’ and what Kelly (2004: 81) suggests as the ‘process approach’ 
to curriculum planning.  
However, curricular reform can never yield the desired results on its own, unless 
teachers who are to deliver the curriculum are also not equipped to do so. The 
majority of individuals who now are part of the teaching workforce have themselves 
been through the traditional system of schooling, which was predicated on the content 
driven approach to curriculum planning. Therefore, they have the tendency to transmit 
the received knowledge uncritically to the pupils, without encouraging them to 
question, challenge and problematize it. Holden (2007) emphasises the importance of 
educating trainee teachers appropriately to equip them to effectively deliver the 
citizenship curriculum in England. She argues that initial teacher education 
programmes need to ‘include time for trainee teachers to learn strategies for teaching 
about global and controversial issues’ (2007: 54). This need identified by Holden 
becomes even more imperative in countries like Pakistan where teachers are 
unfamiliar with ‘problem-posing education’ (Freire, 1970/2005: 80). Thus, education of 
new and existing teachers comes out as a high priority if we want children and young 
people to acquire the skills of critical analysis, problematizing received knowledge and 
evaluating the authenticity of claims.  
10.4 Implications for Future Research      
The findings of my study have some important implications for future research. Firstly, 
given the problem of militancy and extremism confronting Pakistan, similar research in 
state schools and madrassas (religious seminaries) would be needed in order to 
present a more complete picture of young Pakistanis’ constructions of international 
conflicts. Whereas researching pupils in state schools seems fairly straightforward, 
doing so in madrassas would require careful deliberation and tact because of the 
sensitivity of the topic and the potential for the research to be perceived as being 
‘mala fide’. Notwithstanding the difficulties involved, doing so could prove very 
beneficial because the current Pakistan government is making a serious effort to 
address the issue of militancy and extremism.  
Moreover, such research with pupils in schools could also prove very useful in 
countries like the UK where societies are becoming increasingly diverse comprising 
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people from a range of ethnic and religious backgrounds and where issues related to 
alienation, even radicalisation, of young people are a growing concern.     
Secondly, research into young people’s perceptions of how the problems of extremism 
and terrorism can be addressed could potentially also prove very useful. Such research 
might prove useful with private and state schools and madrassa students in Pakistan 
and also with school pupils in multicultural countries like the UK. Such research, like 
my study, could potentially acknowledge young people’s agency and give them a voice 
in how school curricula should be re-designed to address these pressing matters. 
These aims can only be brought to fruition if the findings of the research are taken on 
board by the policy makers.   
Thirdly, researching teachers’ constructions of how young people can be encouraged 
to learn about issues like politics, democracy, and combating extremism is very 
important. This is because teachers are key stakeholders in the institution of education 
and no one knows the dynamics of classrooms and learning as closely as the teachers.  
Stenhouse (1981: 109) makes a powerful case for ‘placing teachers at the heart of 
educational research process’. This research could potentially be very usefully 
conducted with teachers in private and state schools in Pakistan, and with teachers in 
schools in Western liberal democracies. The findings of such research could usefully 
inform the education of trainee teachers and the continuous professional 
development programmes for existing practitioners. 
Notwithstanding the potential usefulness of future research projects identified in this 
section, one must be cognizant of the fact that research, no matter how insightful, can 
never bring about the envisaged change, unless it is read, and the implications and/or 
recommendations are taken into account in devising policies and practices.  
10.5 End Word 
The suggestions I have made about changing school curricula and educating teachers 
to equip them with relevant professional skills and conducting further research into 
young people’s and teachers constructions of international affairs and how to tackle 
prejudice, extremism and militancy can only play a marginal role in changing Pakistan 
or the wider world. It will do little to address the very serious issues discussed in this 
thesis – a world increasingly divided along the lines of economic prosperity, culture 
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and religion and a growing sense of resentment felt by a very large number of 
disenfranchised people against the policies and actions of the rich and powerful 
countries of the world. Durrant’s (1929/1981: 247) pessimistic appraisal of human 
civilisation in the aftermath of the World War I, indeed, rings true for us in the second 
decade of the 21st century: 
…men discovered how precariously thin their coat of civilization was, how 
insecure their security, and how frail their freedom…The idea of progress 
seemed now to be one of the shallowest delusions that had ever mocked 
man’s misery, or lifted him up to a vain idealism and a colossal futility.    
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Appendix 
A Topic Guide for Focus Group with Young People 
 
Total Duration: 1 hour 
 
 Introduction of the Research 
 Individual Introductions: Tell me your names and something you 
really enjoy doing in your free time. 
 Do you know what happened on September 11, 2001 in the United 
States? In your opinion why were the attacks made?   
 What do you think of the way America reacted to 9/11? 
 Do you think it was reasonable for America to attack Afghanistan & 
Iraq to root out terrorism from the world? (This could be kept as an 
optional follow up to the previous question.) 
 What are your views on the international war on terror? Who is this 
war against? 
 What do you think of the way Pakistan has played its role in the war 
on terror since 9/11? 
 In your opinion what were the factors that led to the assassination 
of Benazir Bhutto?  
 How can the world be made a safer and more peaceful place? 
 Would any of you like to add anything that you feel is important and 
hasn’t been said so far concerning the issues discussed in this 
session?  
 This was a discussion about how young people like you feel about 
the current international situation. Have we missed out any 
important thing that we should have talked about? 
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Complete Transcript of Focus Group 4 
Saeed (M): My name is Saeed Zulfiqar and I am A1 student. And my hobbies are 
reading books and playing video games and surfing. 
 
Naveed: Ok, alright. 
 
Zoya (F): I am Zoya Akram – an A1 student. My hobbies are basically reading or, umm, 
what’s surfing programmes I enjoy. And, yeah, literature is one of my greatest interests 
(laughs). 
 
Naveed: Ok, do you have literature in A-level? 
 
Zoya (F): Yeah, I do, I do. 
 
Naveed: Alright, that’s great. 
 
Komal (F): My name is Komal Zahid. I am an A1 student. And, basically, hobbies include 
music and staying in touch with current affairs. 
 
Farah (F): My name is Farah Zamir. I am also an A1 student. My hobbies are writing – I 
absolutely love writing – and again reading, and besides that I love music and obviously 
current affairs. 
 
Naveed: Ok.  
 
Adil (M): I am Adil Shah. I am in AS. My hobbies include, basically, football – watching, 
playing – and reading as well. 
 
Naveed: What kinds of books do you like reading? 
 
Adil (M): Basically non-fiction.  
 
Naveed: Alright. I now begin with the first question that focuses on the work that I am 
doing. Do you know what happened on September 11, 2001 in the United States? 
 
Everyone: Yes. 
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Naveed: And in your opinion why did it happen? 
 
Komal (F): It’s a very long story. 
 
Naveed: Can you briefly tell me what happened? 
 
Komal (F): It probably started as after, post Afghanistan and Russian war. You had 
Taliban, you had an upcoming terrorist group, breeding in the Arab countries, and who 
had a very influential leader, and they had the specific aim of destabilizing the West. 
 
Naveed: They had a strong leader – you mean the Taliban? 
 
Komal (F): Al-Qaeda.  
 
Naveed: Al-Qaeda.  
 
Komal (F): Al-Qaeda has been breeding in the Arab countries.   
 
Naveed: Ok. 
 
Komal (F): And they found another militant group that had similar aims, similar mission 
statement – the Taliban. So, you had two militant groups – Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. 
And…you can’t say combined, but they had similar views and similar points, they 
followed similar conservative thinking – narrow thinking. And they channeled all that 
through the funds, the thinking, the aims and mission and you had 9/11 and other 
events – other terrorist attacks. You could have Afghanistan, you could have other 
Arab countries who had their differences with the Western world. So, these militant 
groups take these groups take these differences personally and make it their aim to…if 
the government is not fighting for the wrong that the West is doing, they make it their 
aim to do it themselves – and they do it by hook or by crook. And they have no limits – 
terrorism has no boundaries, it has no limits, it has no borders. So, there are 
people…the militant group is breeding in the Arab world, and they attack the Western 
world. You can see how influential and widespread they are, and how operational they 
are. They were able to conduct the second attack and successfully.  
 
Naveed: Anyone else? 
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Saeed (M): I think it is part of a long conspiracy. And it’s that first the USA fed these 
Taliban during that Russian war and they invested on Taliban, made them extremists. 
And it’s because they wanted to come in this region – Middle East. And as a part of this 
conspiracy, 2001 they did this thing – they did this attack on themselves and made it 
an excuse to come in this region. And, I am not sure which source, but I read it that 
48% US citizens – Americans believe that it was America that did this attack. And 
internet is filled with documentaries that US did it themselves. So, I think it is part of a 
long conspiracy. And I think Pakistan is going to be the next target. 
 
Naveed: Quite a different view from what Komal has said. 
 
Komal (F): Another thing is that the day 9/11 happened, the newspapers printed that 
around 93,000 Jews were not in the world trade centre – they were on a national 
holiday – that’s what the newspapers said. It’s not a coincidence that 93,000 people 
are not coming to work on one single day. 
 
Farah (F): Also keep in mind that the world trade centre was bought by a Jew just a few 
days back, before the attack.  
 
Adil (M): But I think, I do not believe in conspiracies – it would have been very hard to 
carry out an attack of this scale without a leak of some kind. So, I think it pointless to 
assume that it was a conspiracy. I think it was done by Al-Qaeda but the reasons were 
just not justified. 
 
Naveed: So, what do you think were the reasons? 
 
Adil (M): It was basically their kind of revenge. They wanted America’s cultural 
imperialism that goes on around the world and we all know it is the only super power 
for the past so many years. It was kind of grudge they had after the Russian war in 
Afghanistan – it was totally destroyed – I think it was sort of a revenge but totally 
unjustified. 
 
Naveed: Totally unjustified? 
 
Adil (M): Yes.  
 
Zoya (F): I would say the same, definitely – not justified, even if, I mean, umm, 
whatever the Western world does to you, you have no right to go and kill so many 
innocent citizens, just for no reason at all. I mean, for personal revenge, even if, umm, 
the US comes and kills 3000 of your people, it is not justified to go and kill tens of 
thousands of theirs in such a senseless act of –  
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Komal (F): The only way the Western world or Taliban or Al-Qaeda justify their  
acts is because the US and the West – the US – because we’re talking about 9/11 – 
they’ve had a strategy that whenever they don’t have an excuse for doing anything, for 
example, they had the Afghan war, they have an excuse that it is their self-interest. 
Every country has the right to protect their self-interest, and their interest at that time 
was to support the Taliban; now it’s to go against them.  
 
The Taliban and the Al-Qaeda have used the same strategy – you see their recorded 
tapes or messages or emails or any other letters that they send, they have the same, 
you can say, policy that they’re protecting the self-interest of Islam – Islam – they are 
showing Islam or their culture as their interest – that we’re protecting our interest. So 
you can’t say we’re wrong we are justified as long as we are protecting our interest, 
just like the US was doing it, just like as any other European nation or the Western 
World does it, so we’re doing the same thing. It’s justified from their end because 
they’re sitting on the other table, on the other end of the table. But it’s obviously not 
justified – killing is never justified.  
 
Naveed: Is that all you have to say about this? [pause] What do you think of the way 
America reacted to 9/11? 
 
Zoya (F): I’d say it was in their own way, perhaps, quite not justified. Umm, actually, 
umm, it was the way, I mean all that, umm, projection against so called terrorists – all 
that rounding up of…of so called terrorists. I mean, for instance, the target of – a lot of 
it was Muslims after that since Al-Qaeda and Taliban were the suspected – the main 
suspects – the prime suspects. Umm, you can’t just round up – if you just round up a 
thousand Muslims, umm, with no proof and you’re not giving them any chance to 
justify themselves, then, umm, you’re actually, I think, that’s a way of getting ready 
made recruits for the Al-Qaeda and Taliban because that would turn their hearts 
against, umm, the Western world, right? And that would perhaps, umm, all those 
families that are affected by all those rounding ups and everything, I think, umm, they 
would actually be in sympathy more with…anti-Western groups than the West 
themselves. So, I think, it is their way of, umm, for example, trying to tackle the 
situation. I don’t think that is wise way to do it.  
 
Adil (M): I think they are planning to say the least – what they did was probably good 
for the short term. For the long term, it’s only three years and [unintelligible] the 
situation has become tense even further. I think for the next fifty years the world 
politics will be defined by the two attacks – one in Afghanistan and the other in Iraq. 
The whole region would be destabilized for the coming so many years, just because –  I 
think they panicked because they had reason to panic as well because if they did not 
do anything about it, they probably would have skinned them alive.  
 
Naveed: Any further thoughts about the way they reacted. 
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Saeed (M): I think it was a conspiracy and America knew what it will do. I remember 
that just after one or two hours the news was on that Osama bin Laden did that – 
without any evidence, without any thing, it was Al-Qaeda, Taliban, Osama bin Laden 
did it. They already knew that this going to happen, I mean they had planned it and 
they knew what their reaction would be.  
 
Komal (F): There is a big air or cloud of confusion as well, surrounding the entire 
situation. There is no direct sense of direction as to what they should do. But instead 
of fixing their own leakages, they started blaming other count…other militant groups. 
Of course you have your suspects, you have your evidence that supports the fact, you 
know, that a certain somebody did it, but you are supposed to correct yourself as well! 
You still have leakages in the CIA, in the FBI. US spends 40 million dollars each year on 
this intelligence service – half of this the country, the world does not know of – 40 
million dollars go to service, secret service. And they couldn’t find out a simple attack?! 
Not a simple attack – 9/11 – attack on the Pentagon, the plane that was shot down in 
Pennsylvania – three attacks on the same day. 40 million dollars gone waste because 
you couldn’t even determine an attack – even suspect an attack. So, it’s all, if…you 
need a sense of direction and that wasn’t there. Post-9/11 at least for let’s say up to 
Afghanistan war – still there is no sense of direction – they still don’t know where 
they’re going – they don’t know where they’re going. The American people themselves 
don’t know where their government is going, what are their plans. So, it’s – there is an 
air of confusion, air of conspiracy, they don’t have any clear facts as to what, they said 
that Muslims – indicated that – everyone agrees that after a few hours of the attack 
the news circulated – the television stated that it was Al-Qaeda. What’s your proof?! 
When you report something you have to have proof for that. Even when the 
government says something, even when the state says something you need proof for 
that. And that proof – just because a person is a suspect, you make that person a 
criminal that’s not justice to anybody, anywhere.  
 
Naveed: Do you think it was reasonable for America to first attack Afghanistan and 
then Iraq? 
 
Farah (F): Absolutely not. If you are fighting against terrorism it does not mean that 
you spread terrorism. Afghanistan – the economy, everything in Afghanistan has been 
destroyed because of the attack – they said that the suspects are the Taliban and 
Osama bin Laden – it’s not justified that for that you kill innocent – millions of innocent 
lives, and it’s not just lives, it’s the country, the economy, the development they’ve 
had. Now where is Afghanistan? They will have to start from scratch. Where is Iraq? 
Where is Iran? There is no development going on – they’ve gone back in time, way 
back in time. And just because of Al-Qaeda, it’s a war for peace. Now, that I feel is an 
extremely absurd, umm, statement that they have a war for peace –peace is not 
supposed to be associated with war. And Americans’, Americans’ reaction to that 
particular incident, by raging war against countries and that also purely Islamic 
countries. We feel that absolutely unjustified. 
 
297 
 
Komal (F): Secondly, post-American attack in Afghanistan – the only reason 
Afghanistan is still running or still has food in people’s houses or any other  thing 
because Afghanistan is the highest opium producer in the world. And we have – the 
only reason is that drugs are supporting the economy, it’s the highest support, opium 
producer in the world [Naveed: hmm]. So, even the support that you are getting from 
the economy or from what you do in the country that’s not good. They’re growing 
drugs to support the economy – that’s not justified.  
 
Adil (M): I would be the last one to refrain from America bashing but I think they had 
no option really. I mean, just imagine that they had not attacked Afghanistan or Iraq. 
Right now Saddam Hussain in Iraq and Taliban in Afghanistan – we all know that 
Taliban right now, even after all the losses that they suffered they are so strong that 
they are basically the pain in the neck of two governments. The Pakistani government 
is so [unintelligible] and they still can’t tackle them. And in the south Afghanistan – it 
belongs to them. So, I think it’s a war that could have been better planned, it could 
have been better executed, but it was a war that was inevitable, especially the 
Afghanistan war. But, I think, the Iraq war it could have been…there could have been 
other ways to do that – the regime change – Saddam Hussain – it could have been 
done in a very better and a very peaceful way.  
 
Farah (F): And again if you are tracking down criminals, I feel it is absolutely unjustified 
to attack countries for that. If you are tracking down criminals does not mean that you 
have to slay innocent lives for that – that’s absolutely unjustified. If America is voicing 
its opinion about human rights and all that it should definitely also keep in mind that a 
country should not violate human rights of any other nation in the world either. If 
human rights had been destroyed in that 9/11 attack it does not mean that countries 
have to be destroyed. You have to track down the criminals – you don’t have to slay 
innocent peoples. You don’t have to destroy families. You don’t have to make people 
cry and suffer for what happened to a group of people and that was because of a 
particular group. That’s absolutely unjustified.  
 
Komal (F): One thing that the US troops in Afghanistan did they broke the back of the 
Taliban. The Taliban spread over the Arab countries, in Pakistan – they went…they 
went out of Afghanistan and spread all over the Arab countries. Just as Adil said for the 
short term it was a good move because you were able to break down the Taliban and 
you were in control of a country that was totally terrorist country so said by the US 
media or other media organizations around the world, the governments around the 
world even our Arab – Muslim countries also admitted that. So, for the time being it 
did some good but the aftermath was terrible! You had Iraq, you had Pakistan, you had 
bombings even during those invasions in Iraq & Afghanistan, bombings never stopped 
in Madrid or in London or in Pakistan or in any other place. So it did continue; for a 
short time you had – you had victory for a short time because you thought you had 
done the right thing. But in the long term what happened postwar alliance or what 
happened immediately, umm, after let’s say Iraq was attacked that was terrible. It was 
not planned and you had unexpected events happening almost on daily basis 
everywhere – it’s not just limited to one country, it’s influencing millions of miles away. 
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Troops are in Iraq but you have bombing in Madrid, you have bombings in London, 
troops are in Iran, you have bombings let’s say in Pakistan. So, the burden is shifted 
towards – on the whole world – nobody is safe any more. [Naveed: hmm] Nobody was 
safe any more before as well, but still you knew that at least you had some sense of 
security. At least I won’t be bombed because of no reason; now you can still be 
bombed because of no reason.  
 
[Naveed: hmm] If terrorists can bomb a group of doctors – a bus of doctors in Pakistan 
– if they can blow up nursing tents in Afghanistan – students, teachers nobody is – 
doctors are supposed to be the last – they’re not supposed to be the victims of war, 
they are not supposed to attack them. But when they are attacked in such huge 
numbers everywhere – in Pakistan, in Afghanistan, in Iraq, nobody else is left. They’re 
just like – they’re as vulnerable as another Muslim or another terrorist. So 
differentiation finishes that moment, when you start killing randomly people – 
anybody – if you’re a soldier, if you’re a doctor, if you’re a child, if you’re a mother – 
anybody – so the differentiation is not anymore there. You become insensitive. Human 
rights are of course violated, your morals change, your civil liberties change as well 
because your thinking has changed, your mentality has changed. Now, you have post-
9/11 more stricter rules on Muslims. Now the mentality has changed so much that 
even if I am applying to the US, I’ll probably think twice – will I be able to study, will I 
have the capacity to have my space to study – I am a student, I am not a terrorist, I am 
not an extremist but I could be looked upon as one so I have to cover all those aspects 
because of two invasions to two other countries – it affects everybody.  
 
Saeed (M): And, I think, this war has empowered the Taliban even more because now 
there are many people – there are people who really hated America though now they 
support Taliban fully. And the Taliban I don’t know from where they are getting more 
weapons. There is no evidence of their getting less powerful, especially nowadays in 
Pakistan. 
 
Naveed: So, do you really think in the short term it has really been effective? 
 
Komal (F): It broke the back of Taliban, so it is effective for the short term. But if you 
just see Afghanistan, yes, Taliban were literally driven out of Afghanistan. But for the 
short term Afghanistan itself was perceived to be safe everywhere, because it broke 
the back of the Taliban. It didn’t have terrorists – we knew they weren’t there but this 
spread out to other countries.  
 
Naveed: So, it dispersed them rather than breaking their backs?  
 
Komal (F): Yes.  
 
Zoya: On the short term basis it was much more profitable for America –  
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Naveed: What do you mean by ‘profitable’?  
 
Zoya (F): As in it was a lot more, umm, supported them in a way that the terrorists had 
spread out and all that but the fact was that the country was destroyed. Yes, you can 
say that they broke the power of the Taliban. That threat that Afghanistan posed to 
them had lessened but the threat they posed to Afghanistan, to the neighbouring 
countries had increased by manifolds. So, in the short term, yes, it was effective for 
America in a good way, not for the Muslim countries, not for the neighbouring 
countries. And in the long term everyone saw the effects – these were not hidden from 
anyone.  
 
Adil (M): I think if you look at it from the point of view of the US citizens there was no 
major terrorist incident in USA after 9/11. So, they are pretty much satisfied that, yeah, 
our security is pretty much okay right now. But what I think that the war in Iraq and 
Afghanistan did was basically – the war was basically between the extremists and 
Americans but now it is a war between the West and Islam. So that pretty much sums 
it up that it is now us versus them.  
 
Komal (F): They’ve raised the war to the next level. And, just yesterday you had you 
had – after all this – after two invasions, the attacks – all that, six people had been 
convicted of being involved in 9/11 case. They’ve been given – the prosecution thinks 
they should be given the death penalty. Now death penalties, possibly, they are 
abolished throughout Europe, except for Russia and few other countries. So, as the 
largest – the second largest democracy – I think they call the US, and it’s the most 
powerful nation in the world – it’s got veto power – it’s the superpower. And, that is 
the place they are taking death penalty – the prosecution is going to prosecute the 
case, basis, basis – based on the fact that they will be prosecuted on death penalty. 
Now, I am not really sure what, umm, laws & regulations are for war crimes or other 
terrorist attacks, but without evidence, the first thing you come on Sun TV that it is 
going to be death penalty. That’s not right! They’re not sentenced as yet – their trials 
have to go on and on for the next six or eight months. This is the starting period and 
you are breeding in people’s minds that it is going to be death penalty – eventually, we 
will kill them, don’t worry. So, where is your justice, where are your natural principles 
of justice. It’s all lost, it’s all in the air – it’s all on paper, there’s nothing in action – all 
this is blurry, there is no substance. It focuses on the basic thing which is easier said 
than done, but of course in the end they do do it.  
 
Naveed: So, generally speaking what do you think is happening in the world? 
 
Zoya (F): Things are lot worse than they were. I mean the spread of terrorism has been 
profound, before that, umm, of course there has been terrorism – there has always 
been terrorism – but it has multiplied after that. It’s almost as if it has set a trend for 
terrorism.  
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Komal (F): Looks like there is nothing safe in the world – not even your own home, not 
even your own town – is Rawalpindi safe after Benazir’s assassination? No it is not! Is 
Pakistan safe? No it is not! Is any country in the world safe now? No it is not!  
 
Zoya (F): Rawalpindi was the sleeping town – the sleeping town – now we have bomb 
blasts.  
 
Adil (M): I think, we as Pakistanis feel it the worst. I don’t know, the rest of the world is 
treating us fine, but as we are going through such trauma, recently, I think our views 
would be very much different.  
 
Komal (F): No it’s not just us, even the London bombings. Is London safe now? It’s not!  
 
Adil (M): The occurrence level is different – we have two in a week and they have one 
in a year.  
 
Komal (F): That’s more than enough for them – more than enough to terrorize them.  
 
Adil (M): Their lives are more important than our lives? 
 
Komal (F): No, I am not saying that. I’m just saying that just one terrorist attack in 
London has a profound effect on everyone there. And over here we know there is 
election going on, we will have terrorism.  
 
Farah (F): It’s not about the frequency and the number of terrorist attacks – even one 
terrorist attack, I mean, it is hell for those who experience it. There is no sense of 
security – it’s threatened. That’s a basic human right and you’ve taken that away. 
That’s not at all something that can be justified to do to defend your own self.  
 
Zoya (F): It’s a big attack on civil liberty. 
 
Adil (M): It’s pretty much selective, like only Pakistan has to bear the brunt of it all, like 
Iraq and Afghanistan. Besides that, I don’t know, we never hear that there is a 
bombing in Dubai or there is a bombing in India which has been done by terrorists. I 
think, basically, it is a very difficult thing to decide that what’s behind this. And 
Pakistan supported Taliban during the Russian war and now it is the biggest target. So 
there is more to it than meets the eye. And for ordinary people like us it is very difficult 
to understand what’s going on.  
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Komal (F): Can’t we – be able to balance out – actually how we can protect civil 
liberties and still have a foreign policy that does not include attacking other people? 
Now it is all about self interest. If my self interest is to be with Farah, I’ll try being with 
her. If my self interest is to, later on, after two days, not be with her, I won’t even…I’ll 
probably do whatever it takes to hurt her, or, you know, damage her. So, it’s all about 
self-interest, it’s all about your foreign policy – how you follow it, how you pursue it. 
So, every country has one excuse – every nation in the world uses it – that we have the 
right to protect our self-interest – that’s where we draw the line – there can be no 
discussion on it. You can’t discuss it with somebody with such a closed and selfish 
mind. My self interest is to go and invade Iraq, I’ll do that!  
 
Farah (F): Even if the UN does not allow you to do it –  
 
Komal (F): Exactly, I don’t care if you like it or not. I don’t care if it kills millions of other 
people, just in the neighbouring country – I don’t care! It’s just my self-interest!  
 
Farah (F): You are just saving yourself no matter at the expense of how many others – 
you just don’t care. It’s just – you save yourself.  
 
Komal (F): The American lives are worth more than just normal human lives anywhere 
in the world. Especially, if you are a Muslim your self-worth even reduces much more.  
 
Adil (M): As a Pakistani I would like to say that we tend to forget the fact that Pakistan 
was a very booming economy during the 1970s and after that we couldn’t recover 
from the loss of Bangladesh. But then, you see, we tend to forget that India has been 
our number one enemy, and it will be our number one enemy despite whatever we 
think it is. Secondly, the number of Indian consulates along the Pakistan-Afghan border 
is beyond belief. There are like six/seven Indian consulates right next to our border to 
Afghanistan.  What I am going to say is that someone could be using Taliban here – 
could be using Taliban to destabilize Pakistan. It could be India, it could be somebody 
else. But, I don’t know, just because they’re radical and fundamental – they’ve not 
become radical and fundamental overnight. I think, there is something that is 
motivating them – it’s probably money – I don’t know, there is some hand in the 
attacks which we cannot, umm, find out. There are terrorists there but there is 
something else as well.  
 
Komal (F): There is a missing piece of the puzzle that we can’t find. People can’t 
identify that – there is a missing piece in the puzzle.  
 
Adil (M): Here the Chinese engineers are getting abducted, and they’re getting 
kidnapped, and they’re getting killed. I don’t know what Chinese engineers have got to 
do with terrorism. I mean, they’re such a peace loving country, at least what we think 
of them. I think that should be an eye opener for us that we should realize that there is 
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something else going on. I mean Chinese engineers should not be a target for 
terrorism. And we like for Gwadar, we always hear that there is something fishy going 
on. As we probably know Gwadar would open up a lot of opportunities for Pakistan 
trade wise, port wise, import-export wise. So, I think, if we see a little deeper, we 
should realize that there is something going on, which we cannot decipher.  
 
Farah (F): Gwadar also threatens the ports and the trading industry in the Arab 
countries as well.  
 
Adil (M): Yes, that’s true. 
 
Farah (F): So, you can see a clear motivator there. So, there are lots of people not 
wanting us to prosper.  
 
Adil (M): True. That’s the point – they want their own people to prosper. If Pakistan 
meets Iran they’ll probably say they are Muslims and all that. But, I don’t think it’s that 
way anymore, if they are Muslims or Christians or Jews. They don’t care – if they are 
allies – you are an ally but if you are not then you are not.  
 
Naveed: What do you think of Pakistan’s role in international conflicts since 9/11? 
 
Komal (F): I think most of us didn’t have a choice. 
 
Adil (M): Yeah, true. 
 
Komal (F): We were told to do something – we never had any choice. It’s like, when, 
either it was to be with the US or be at the expense of the US. So, most people criticize 
the Musharraf regime for supporting the war on terror. But if you see it from a distant 
view you see that you didn’t have any choice. If you don’t support them, they will draw 
in troops in your country – they don’t need your permission. But, sort of we can say 
that we have an option, a chance that if you don’t support us we might just kill you or 
bomb your country or you know devastate your economy. But if you do – if you don’t 
we’ll do all that. And there is no stopping them. And so we didn’t have any option to 
stop that. We didn’t have any option; I mean, other than to be pro-US. Of course it is 
not in our best interest to be that and go against our long-term allies, but sometimes 
you have to do some things because in the short-term period, you just have to do 
them. And for the short-term, it seems the right thing to do. But again, in the long-
term, it is turning out to be chaos for the country.  
 
Adil (M): Even in the long-term if we, like seven years from now, suddenly back from 
now, we could have never have imagined an insurgency of this level at least. I mean for 
303 
 
a person like me at least, I would not consider the Taliban – a small terrorist 
organization – not an organization that could dare to attack places like the GHQ, like 
they try to kill, try to assassinate Benazir. They – we’ve always underestimated the 
threat of Taliban. So, basically that led to our downfall. I think what we did was right – 
supporting America – we had no option. But right now the current political situation – 
it was all on the cards basically. This was bound to happen.  
 
Komal (F): Certain people also believe that the US is trying to destabilize Pakistan that 
they will be able to draw in troops. You have presidential candidates in their foreign 
policy strategies stating they will draw out troops from Iraq into Pakistan. So, that 
clearly shows you what the mentality is. Even somebody running for the White House, 
even though he is not President, he still thinks that the right thing to do after getting 
into the White House is to draw troops in Pakistan and get them out of Iraq and 
Afghanistan. There is no difference between the Republicans and the Democrats – it’s 
the same thinking all over. And it takes a lot, a lot and it takes a lot to change that 
thinking – that attacking is not a solution to your problems. It’ll just increase our 
problems much more and problems for similar countries face like we do.  
 
Adil (M): I somehow would have no problem with US troops coming to Pakistan – I 
mean not attacking Pakistan but having troops in Pakistan – because our troops are 
getting killed for their war. So, I mean it would be better if they come in as well and 
they could get a first hand experience of what’s going on here. So, I think, it’s pretty 
much okay with me. I mean we talk about Pakistan’s sovereignty and all that, I don’t 
think there has been any sovereignty over the Tribal Areas ever in the fifty or sixty 
years of our independence. So, I think, it’s basically, umm, when we try to make peace 
with them, America does not agree, we make war with them we suffer the losses. So, it 
think the, I think, just let them come in. I don’t know if our people think, okay America 
is coming to Pakistan and we are no more a sovereign country –  
 
Komal (F): We are not patriotic enough to defend ourselves – and we are [inaudible] 
but, you know, times have changed and let them come in and fight their own war. Of 
course it’s not going to be, of course it’s not going to be nice, it’s not going to be 
beautiful – it’s going to be very ugly. I think, it’s time they should come and fight their 
own war. We’re done, we’re out of troops, we’re out of money, we’re out of – we’re 
not out of money – they still fund us, but we’re out of the moral support that we had 
from our country before to fight their war. Enough for us!  
 
Zoya (F): I think, it’s the whole cycle of suffering. I mean, we suffer either way. We 
support them – how you suffer by supporting them is see all these religious groups 
within your own country are threatening your own security. Why are they against the 
government? They say the government is pro-American. So, they target the innocent 
people, just to influence the government, right? And if you turn anti-American, then 
Americans will come in and threaten your security again. So, I think, you suffer either 
ways.  
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Komal (F): And you do not have the politicians or a setup that would actually be able to 
balance the two. We don’t have any politicians, we don’t even have a setup as such if 
we have such a situation, if we have such a crisis situation, how do we balance it? How 
do we make sure that we do not crumble – we don’t have that – we have crumbling 
everywhere? 
 
Naveed: How can that be achieved? How can that be balanced? 
 
Adil (M): I think the lack of leadership after Quaid-e-Azam (This is the title given to 
Mohammad Ali Jinnah by the people of Pakistan. Jinnah was the political leader who 
spearheaded the movement for a separate homeland for the Muslims of the United 
India.) has been the factor. There has never been anyone who could unite the, you 
know, four provinces together. Basically, I think the problem of the four provinces 
staying together is overstated. People use it to derive political rhetoric from it. And 
secondly, I would like to say that we – the irony of all this is that we are really a 
moderate nation – Sindhis, Punjabis (the people living in two of the four provinces of 
Pakistan) basically, are very moderate people. The problem lies here…in the North – 
that’s where we should concentrate. I think, besides that people like you and me, we 
don’t go around, kill Americans just for fun. That’s the irony – we’re being portrayed as 
a very radical nation here, which basically hurts someone who knows that more than 
like 70 to 80% people living here are moderates. And they are not after any religion or 
sect or anything else.  
 
Farah (F): I think basically you need to increase the basic qualification level for being an 
MNA (Member of the National Assembly) – just have to be a BA [laughs]. You at least 
actually need to have a better mental educated level. 
 
Adil (M): I think, people will make fake degrees once more. 
 
Naveed: But that too is a recent phenomenon – the legislation requiring to be at least 
BA to contest for elections. 
 
Adil (M): I don’t think it really made any difference. 
 
Naveed: So, what do you think of Benazir’s assassination? 
 
Saeed (M): First I thought it’s okay. But what happened afterwards, I said no, it’s not 
okay.  
 
Zoya (F): Absolutely not! It was never okay. The first thing, it was unfortunate, 
unjustified –  
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Komal (F): You talk about democracy over here and you see a candidate – a democratic 
candidate standing for presidential elections – absolutely unjustified. That’s the worst 
form of extremism you can ever see in Pakistan. 
 
Adil (M): I think, I for one was not a very big Benazir fan. All her antics really proved her 
a [inaudible]. But the fact that…what I thought about the [unintelligible] okay, you 
know, she did some things in the past. But what I think that basically Benazir’s 
assassination tells us that there is more to the terrorism factor – Baitullah Mehsud, 
who was the supposed murderer has denied two, three times on live TV. So, we don’t 
know where we are going right now – If even our national leader is not safe – she was, 
like it or not, our national icon. She had the most contacts in the West; she was the 
one who portrayed Pakistan’s image in a very positive way, I would say here. So, we 
lost her and we lost a lot of other things as well.  
 
Naveed: Any further thoughts on that? 
 
Komal (F): She’s probably responsible for her death as well – living not in the country 
and giving statements outside. For example, a couple of statements – ones that I’ll 
allow once I am the President and Prime Minister – I’m not sure – but when I’m part of 
the government, I’ll allow US troops to draw in, in Pakistan. That’s, you know, it 
probably makes Bush administration pretty happy, but not our people, not the Taliban, 
not the – any militant group – any patriotic Pakistani will not like that. Second, second 
aim that once she is again in power she’ll make sure that Dr. A. Q. Khan [Pakistan’s 
iconic nuclear scientist, who is considered to be the brain behind Pakistan becoming a 
nuclear power. He has also become greatly controversial in the recent years due to his 
alleged role in selling nuclear technology to other countries like Iran.] is handed over to 
the IAEA.  
 
So, all of these are – of course these are her personal opinions, but it gives you more 
or less a rough idea of what the policy of the person will be once the person is in 
power. So you start rethinking is it the right person or not. And is this the person who 
should be a target or not. Then also she – important is – she brought it upon herself as 
well. If you know you are a target – she knew she was a target – so, probably, should 
have given, let’s say, moderate statements, and not said out aloud that I will allow – 
literally I will allow troops draw in Pakistan; I will hand over A.Q. Khan to IAEA, and 
help the international inspectors to protect the nukes of Pakistan. All of this is, I don’t 
say they are unpatriotic, but not a PPP [Pakistan Peoples Party – Pakistan’s major 
political party, founded by Benazir’s father and of which Benazir was the Chairperson 
till her death] stand, but this may be the resentment against her. 
 
Adil (M): I think, basically, she was at least being honest there. I mean, we all know for 
a fact that we have to get in power in Pakistan, you are either pro-establishment or 
you have links with the USA. Besides that you can’t come into power. So, I think she 
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was at least being honest in admitting she would do those things. I mean, for example, 
if PML-Q [another political party comprising a group of politicians who supported the 
military President Musharraf, and which was in power for many years till the recent 
general elections] comes to power again – they would do the same things. It’s because 
they are not the ones who are going to do the shots here, it’s the agencies, it’s the 
establishment who are the stuff. So, basically, she was just being honest when she said 
all these things.  
 
Komal (F): She was being brutally honest with herself. Could have been the timing of 
the statement was probably not right – could have said later on. Could have said when 
she was here – but before coming, and, you know, there is resentment against you – 
potential resentment, which could cost you a lot. It’s always better to be a bit cautious 
about it, but she was daring enough –  
 
Adil (M): That was what I was telling Komal. Benazir for once knew that she was going 
to be targeted – she nearly got killed. But then that tells a lot about the woman herself 
that she was brave enough to come and look into the eye of the murderer. Centralizing 
the A. Q. Khan issue here, I think we all are very emotional people and we tend to 
think of him as a hero. But what he did was that he gave the nuclear technology to 
Libya, North Korea and Iran. I think, umm, Iran and Libya are, probably, justified 
because they are Muslim count – Muslim brothers. But North Korea was, it was purely 
– I think it was a very bad thing. And even for a person who is nationalist and patriotic 
like me, that is not on – it shouldn’t have been done! 
 
Naveed: And do you think the world can be made a more peaceful and a better place 
to be in? Can we make the world safer and more peaceful for everyone? Is there a 
way? 
 
Adil: I wish we could. I wish we could.  
 
Komal (F): That would require a very drastic change in mindsets – a very big change in 
mindsets that is at the moment impossible to achieve. You require a lot of –  
 
Naveed: Could you elaborate you elaborate on that? 
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Komal (F): See, you have to change the mindset – you know the mindset about 
terrorism, about democracy, about human rights, about what is right and what is 
wrong – drawing the line on the right point. That is what countries need to 
differentiate – they need figure out that. And, obviously, we all have our pre-defined 
morals and our predefined cultures and traditions and we’re going to go on with that. 
As Muslims, we will be very emotional towards, umm, very, very sorry –  
 
Zoya (F): Towards any attack. 
 
Komal (F): Yes, towards any attack – yes we will be. Still it requires a lot of, lot of, a lot 
of encouragement and lot of counselling, a lot of hard work to change the mindset. 
Once the mindsets have been changed –  
 
Naveed: Mindsets of whom? 
 
Komal (F): Mindsets of the veto-powers, of countries in general about – Al-Qaeda’s 
mindset, America’s mindset about Muslim nations, Muslims’ mindset about the West. 
A lot of change in mindsets is required.  
 
Adil (M): I think it is high time we should reconcile with the fact that terrorists are 
there. And, I think, it is proven by the last two, three years we cannot defeat them 
through war. But other thing is that Pakistan’s internal crisis that is the political crisis, 
until and unless that is solved, because, umm, you know, it is so, the situation is so 
murky that we do not realize that who is our friend and who is our enemy. Right now 
the next government – I don’t know what their agenda would be to tackle the Taliban. 
The only way, I think, we can proceed is through peace with the Taliban. Umm, 
whenever we try to make that something in-between happens, like there are some 
bombings. I think the only way we can progress as a nation is through a revolution. 
And I’m very sorry to say it has to be bloody, it has to be something that France 
experienced. And, well, it is the only option we are left with, right now.  
 
Komal (F): We have to get to achieve a world peace order. We’ll have to sacrifice a lot 
to achieve it. 
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Farah (F): You pointed out talking to them instead of fighting with them. But that one 
also, again we don’t see eye to eye – we don’t see in the same way because there was 
a show on BBC – we had a live audience, and they had polling as well. And about 68% 
of all Arab citizens feel that talking to the Taliban is not the solution to the problem. 
And fighting them and defeating them physically is the solution. Again even changing 
the mindsets – the way how you change the mindsets, you can’t agree on that as well. 
How you do that, how you don’t do that – you can’t agree on that. Probably you need 
another 50 years to do that or something.  
 
Adil (M): I think, the Arab states will not realize what kind of situation we are in. I 
think, we need to come to terms with the fact that Pakistan is increasingly becoming a 
very volatile place to live in. We do not imagine comparing – people comparing us to 
Iraq. We would laugh at Iraq, a year ago – oh my God another bombing today, uh, uh – 
stuff like that. But now, I think, we need to come to terms with the fact that it is there, 
and it will be there, until and unless we do something about it! Now we as the youth 
can do nothing because I am very sorry to say what our parents’ generation did was 
basically nothing. So, I think, I don’t know, umm, there has to be a revolution here. 
What the revolution should be motivated about is, I think, democracy, because 
democracy would kill everything that is there right now. Democracy would empower 
the youth. Without democracy we can do nothing – we would start protesting on the 
streets, people would lock us up – we can do nothing about it. It is the power makers 
who have the power to do that. 
 
Saeed (M): I think, what we truly need is a true leader – the right leader, who can 
really guide us. Like, we don’t need Zardari (the husband of Benazir Bhutto, who 
became the co-chairman of the Pakistan People’s Party after her assassination). I heard 
the news that he’s going to be the next Prime Minister of Pakistan. We need a 
programme. We need a true – a true leader like Imam Khomeni (the Iranian spiritual 
leader who spearheaded the Iranian revolution of the 1970s) did bring the revolution 
in Iran, we need the same thing in Pakistan. In Pakistan everyone is so divided that it 
almost seems impossible – on basis of religion, on basis of trust and everything, on 
basis of culture – everything is different. 
 
Komal (F): I think, Pakistan is not ready for true democracy because the definition of 
democracy is here I’ll pay 1500 you vote for me, I pay 2000 you vote for me too. First 
of all you have to change people who are actually talking about democracy. They need 
to know how you, let’s say, exactly, what is [unintelligible], what is democracy and how 
you make sure that people – it is a true democracy. One pays somebody to vote for me 
– that’s not democracy!  
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In Pakistan, 70% of our population lives in the rural areas. There you have queues of – 
record out numbers, let’s say, for the polling. It’s because they have increased 1500 to 
2000 for voting for one person. And because you have record turnout it’s not because 
people believe in their leader, it’s because they can have their money to feed their 
children! And secondly, you just said change the mindset, we can’t, even our 
generation, let’s say five generations down the lane, they probably won’t be able to do 
it, because it takes, yes the example of Australia, the Prime Minister gave an apology 
for having laws against native Australians, I don’t remember their [Adil (M): The 
aborigine.] yes the aborigines. So, after 50 years, almost about 50 to 60 years now the 
apology comes, not even compensation, not even solution to the problem.  
 
So, it takes years and years. Just like you had, now we have a fight between religions. 
Back in the 1970s, you had a fight between the colour of your skin. That took a lot of 
time as well. It took a lot of time for a black African American to be in the Congress or 
to be in the Senate. So, all of that takes years and years to happen. And changing 
mindsets is not an easy thing, it takes, you know, it requires a lot of skill, you need to 
have, umm, you need to convince the person, not suppress the person – just agree 
with me. You need to have daring rulers for that.  
 
Naveed: And how do we get those? 
 
Komal (F): I think, the youth should be encouraged to go into politics, because right 
now none present here would be interested in being the Prime Minister, even standing 
for elections at the district level. 
 
Farah (F): Even if we do, we have so many de-motivating factors –  
 
Naveed: For example what? 
 
Farah (F): For example, you have –  
 
Adil (F): You need to understand that in Pakistan politics has always been the dirty 
man’s play. For, for like in a constituency the 5-6 people who are applying for the seat, 
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I think, all of them would have spent a lot of time in jails. They would have spent their 
youth fighting with people – with drugs, involved in mafias. I think, that’s the problem, 
if the National Assembly is full of criminals, then how the hell you suppose that you’re 
going to run a country in very smooth manner. Secondly, I would like to disagree with 
what Komal said where she thinks democracy is not yet Pakistan’s, umm, answers to 
our problems. I think, it’s sixty years since, we were, we were born. And, I don’t think 
so, I think it’s very nice excuse to say we’re divided along lines, along lines of culture, 
lines along provinces, we have four different – their reputation says that Pakistan is 
basically four bulls tied with their tails together. I think there are worse cases. India has 
like so many provinces. America has so many different races and cultures. Spain, 
France they’re like the leading economies of the world, yet they, there are movements 
which want to break away the country, but still they are progressing. I think it’s no 
longer an excuse that democracy doesn’t work in Pakistan and we are divided along 
sectarian lines. I think, basically, what’s hampering the growth is basically us! It’s us 
that we are not getting empowered. 
 
Naveed: All right anything else? 
 
Komal (F): I think we need lot more leaders like Ahmedinejad in different countries of 
the world – the person is daring enough [laughs] to write letters to America to accept 
Islam. We need daring leaders like that plus motivation, who know how to, umm, 
actually take trust of the people in their hands – we need leaders like those.   
 
Naveed: But you said, initially you said that we need to change mindsets. (Komal (F): 
Yeah.) But on the other hand Ahmedinejad is an icon of one very hard-line man in the 
Islamic world. So, don’t you think there is a contradiction there? 
 
Komal (F): I was actually talking about the daring of the person – the person’s 
motivation, courage. 
 
Naveed: Okay. 
 
Komal (F): Changing the mindsets is a very long task. It’s not going to be done in ten 
years, not even fifty years, because it is a very long process. And all of us really, really 
need to work towards it. Until and unless there is a motivation in any of us in Pakistan, 
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any youth in Pakistan, mindsets are not going to be changed. And until and unless the 
government also actually pressurizes people, the mindsets are again not going to 
change. So, actually you really need to have a balance at both ends.  
 
Farah (F): Democracy, like, by definition, is for the people, by the people and is the 
people. But none of this happens in Pakistan. They just, it’s, you know, it’s handled, a 
few people have it in their hands. And for that – for mindsets to change, you need a lot 
more than that. Few people running the entire nation is not how you define 
democracy.  
 
Komal (F): For democracy we need to counter the fact that everyone who comes to 
power becomes thirsty for power. No one wants to leave the seat, I would say. 
Musharraf has been there for ten years. Ayub Khan [another president who acquired 
power through a military coup in late 1950s] was there for ten years. See, the thing is 
we really need to give others a chance as well to come to power and see what they are 
going to do for the country rather than making one particular leader stay in power for 
so long. Because, obviously, the policies of the person may not be in the interest of the 
local people. 
 
Naveed: So, this was basically a session about young people like you and talking to 
them and taking their views about recent international conflicts. So, I want your 
feedback. Was there anything important that I should have included – a question or a 
topic or an area? 
 
Saeed (M): Media influence. 
 
Others: Yes media influence. 
 
Farah (F): That is a major factor. 
 
Saeed (M): You can’t change the mindsets of people without an unbiased media.  
 
Naveed: Okay, I’ll keep that in mind. Anything else? 
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Komal (F): I think US elections are very crucial for us as well. Because our elections do 
not count for that much as American elections. It’s not about who rules in Islamabad 
as much as it is about who rules in the Oval office. So, that’s more important. We need 
to make sure that we get the right link of how it is going to affect us, because the 
people who are running for the White House – all three of them, four of them – stated 
that they will draw in troops in Pakistan. Maybe not directly, but indirectly they do 
have that [unintelligible] so you do have that problem in the long run.  
 
Naveed: Anything else I need to be taking up in a session like this in the future? 
 
Farah (F): Economic issues as well. 
 
Naveed: Like, for example? 
 
Farah (F): Like history of the world, and how it is affecting oil, gold, you have, umm, the 
so called second economic recession in the US. It will probably affect everything else.  
 
Naveed: Okay thank you very much for your time and thoughts.     
    
 
 
 
